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1993 DIGILAW 195 (ALL)

Ranvir Singh Chahar v. District Inspector Of Schools, Agra

1993-03-23

RAVI S.DHAVAN

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Judgment Ravi S. Dhavan 1. Upon this writ petition being presented for admission a caveat was entered at the Bar on behalf of Ram Bharose Sharma, who has been remitted to be Impleaded as a party respondent. The impleadment has been incorporated and Ram Bharose Sharma now stands impleaded as respondent no. 3. 2. In pursuance of a Judgment of this Court, between, in effect, the same parties, the District Inspector of Schools was required to examine the record of the matter relating to the controversy on who ought to be the officiating Principal at the Shree Mahatma Kapil Dev Inter College, Arhera, district Agra. The Judgment was given in writ petition nos. 18069 of 1991 and 84567 of 1991. Both the writ petitions were filed by the petitioner. In the Judgment dated 10 September, 1991, an inquiry was to be made by the District Inspector of Schools which inquiry ought to have completed within a reasonable time but he did cot. The District Inspector of Schools lingered the matter for more than one year and a quarter. On 19 January, 1993, he passed the impugned order (Annexure 10 to the writ petition) by which he held that the respondent no. 3, Ram Bharose Sharma being the senior most teacher ought to officiate on the post of the Principal. A perusal of the Impugned order bares out that it was in pursuance of a notice given by the District Inspector of Schools by which he has fixed 24 December, 1992, as the date for hearing the parties. The impugned order also bares out that the proceedings before the District Inspector of Schools by which he gave his order, dated 19 January, 1993, were not in reference to the directions given in writ petition No. 18069 of 1991; Ranvir Singh Chahar v. District Inspector of Schools, Agra and others. These are matters of record. So one thing is clear that whatever proceedings took place before the District Inspector of Schools, the terms of his inquiry were not in reference to the directions given by the Judgment, dated 10 September, 1991, passed by the Honourable S.R. Singh, J. 3. But, the notice by which the parties were required to appear before the District Inspector of Schools, is relevant. The notice is dated 19 December, 1992. It is addressed to the Manager, Shree Mahatma Kapil Dev Inter College, Arhera, district Agra. But, the notice by which the parties were required to appear before the District Inspector of Schools, is relevant. The notice is dated 19 December, 1992. It is addressed to the Manager, Shree Mahatma Kapil Dev Inter College, Arhera, district Agra. The subject of the notice is complaints in reference to financial and budgetary irregularities The text of the notice makes it clear that the District Inspector of Schools had received complaints on two counts (1) from the public and (2) those registered at the office of Additional Deputy Director of Education, Agra and the District Magistrate, Agra or at the office of Public Grievances at Agra. This notice refers to the dated 24 December, 1992. Thus, it is Implied that whoever may have been called to participate in the inquiry on 24 December, 1992, was in the matter of the complaints which is referred in the notice dated 19 December, 1992 (Annexore-13 to the writ petition) and not in reference to any inquiry which the High Court had ordered by its Judgment, dated 10 September, 1991. The terms of reference upon which the District Inspector of Schools was to proceed in the Inquiry were as contained in the notice which he had circulated to the parties. But when it came to inquire and give his decision, he adjudicated on matters which were issues raised in the writ petitions upon which the High Court had directed him to see the record, hear the parties and then give his decision. 4. Thus, upon a certiorari, this Court is of the view that there is a manifest error committed by the District Inspector of Schools in giving a notice on one subject and a decision on another. No party had adequate notice on what District Inspector of Schools inquired. On record, it was understood that his inquiry would be in reference to the complaints as referred to in the notice, dated 19 December, 1992. The District Inspector of Schools could not, thus, inquire another subject which was alien to the notice he bad given to the parties. This record is accepted at the Bar by the petitioner, respondent no. 3 and the learned Standing Counsel. All are agreed that there is a manifest error which has been committed by the District Inspector of Schools. 5. This record is accepted at the Bar by the petitioner, respondent no. 3 and the learned Standing Counsel. All are agreed that there is a manifest error which has been committed by the District Inspector of Schools. 5. The decision which the District Inspector of Schools give was not in reference to the notice dated 19 December, 1992. The District Inspector of Schools adjudicated on a Us on who ought to be claimant on the post of the officiating Principal, a subject matter upon which no notice was given by him to any of the Parties. The District Inspector of Schools proceeded with manifest irregularity and the order Impugned, thus, cannot be sustained for the simple reason that it is beyond the terms of the reference, outside the scope of inquiry as under the notice and the parties were not under notice on the subject matter of adjudication. Thus, order dated 19 January, 1993, is quashed. 6. The petition is allowed with costs against respondent no. 1, the District Inspector of Schools, Agra, to be paid by the State of U.P. The District Inspector of Schools Agra, will take the matter up as if he was acting upon the decision of the High Court, dated 10 September, 1991 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) and complete his inquiry. As he has already delayed the matter for so long, this inquiry will be completed by him within three weeks. This decision will be intimated to him by the learned Standing Counsel, U.P. A certified copy of this order may be given to the parties within three days against payment of requisite charges upon an application being made. Petition allowed.