Santosh Duggal ( 1 ) THE question involved in this writ petition,filed by the Management, namely, M/s. Delhi Bottling Co. (P) Ltd. underarticles 226/227 of the Constitution, falls in a very narrow compass, namely,as to whether the Industrial. Tribunal, Delhi committed any error or overstepped its jurisdiction by dismissing the application of the petitioner filedunder Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, (hereinafter REFERRED TO toas the Act), by order dated 19. 2. 90. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this controversy are that Shri A. N. Tripathi,respodents. No. 1, was employed as a Boiler Operator with the petitioner company, and that some time during March 1982, certain charters of demandswere raised by the workmen of the Company through the Trade Union ofwhich respondent No. 1 was also a member, wherein a settlement was arrived at on 10. 6. 82 between the management and the workmen with the stipulation that the said agreement would remain binding on the parties for aperiod of three years with effect from 1. 1. 82. The allegation was thatrespondent No. 1, as a workman, persisted in his illegal activities of causingobstruction in the smooth functioning of the petitioner company, even afterthis agreement, and would incite the workers who were willing to work toresort to sit in or go slow or other mode of striking work, and would alsotry to sabotage the boiler which was integral part of the manufacturing unitof the company, and that because of this. successive charge sheets wereserved on him during the months of January, February and March 1983; thefirst charge sheet being dated 10/12 183. second being dated 14/17. 2. 83 andthe third dated 1. 3. 83. After respondent No. 1 replied to all the charges,which were not found satisfactory by the Management, a decision was takento hold a detailed enquiry and respondent No. 1 informed accordingly. Thereare allegations that even thereafter a total strike took place in the factory ofthe petitioner, in which respondent No. 1 was in the forefront, terrorisingand intimidating the workers, willing to join the work. ( 3 ) EVENTUALLY an enquiry was instituted by appointing Shri Jagmohansharma. Advocate as the Enquiry Officer, to enquire into all the threecharges, as noted above, and the first hearing was fixed on 12. 6. 83, whichfact was duly intimated to the workman. ( 3 ) EVENTUALLY an enquiry was instituted by appointing Shri Jagmohansharma. Advocate as the Enquiry Officer, to enquire into all the threecharges, as noted above, and the first hearing was fixed on 12. 6. 83, whichfact was duly intimated to the workman. He participated in the proceedingson that date, as also on the subsequent dates, namely, 27. 6. 83, 30. 6. 83, 2. 7. 83and 9. 7. 83 when the proceedings were adjourned to 12. 7. 83, on which daterespondent No. 1 allegedly absented, and the evidence brought by themanagement could not be examined. The Enquiry Officer is stated to haveadjourned the proceedings to 16. 7. 83 and respondent No. 1 duly informedthereof, but he remained absent, whereupon the Enquiry Officer ordered theproceedings to be taken ex parte. It is alleged that after this order waspassed, a letter was received at the gate on 16. 7. 83 in which respondent No. 1 had stated that since his request to allow him to be represented by Shrir. N. Roy, as representative, had been declined by the Enquiry Officer, hewould not participate in the proceedings, ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, this R. N. Roy was not an employeeof the petitioner company nor a member of the Union. recognised by themanagement, but claimed himself to be President of the Mercantile Employees Association, and thus he was not competent to represent respondentno. 1 in the domestic enquiry. The enquiry proceedings were, however, heldon 23. 7. 83, 30. 7. 83, 5. 8. 83 and 12. 8,83, when Management s evidence wasrecorded, and after conclusion, a detailed report was given by the Enquiryofficer on 31. 8. 83, holding respondent No. 1 to be guilty of most of thecharges levelled against him. ( 5 ) THE Management thereafter took a decision in the light of thereport of the Enquiry Officer that respondent No. 1 be dismissed from serviceon account of having committed various acts of misconduct, which order wascommunicated to him by letter dated 20. 9. 83 whereby one month s wages,as on that date, amounting to Rs. 850. ( 5 ) THE Management thereafter took a decision in the light of thereport of the Enquiry Officer that respondent No. 1 be dismissed from serviceon account of having committed various acts of misconduct, which order wascommunicated to him by letter dated 20. 9. 83 whereby one month s wages,as on that date, amounting to Rs. 850. 00 in cash were enclosed, which respondent No. 1 refused to accept, and this amount was subsequently sent bymoney order, and so also the dismissal letter, which was posted by registeredpost A. D. ( 6 ) IT was in this setting of facts that the Industrial Tribunal wasapproached, in view of the requirements of the provisions of Section 33 (2) (b)of the Act, for approval of the dismissal order, because of the fact thatindustrial dispute between the petitioner company and its workmen waspending at the time. ( 7 ) THE workman took a preliminary objection in the reply filed tothis application that the dismissal order had not been passed in terms of thestanding Orders, and as such the application of the Management was notmaintainable, and further that the Management s action amounts to victimisation of the workman for Trade Union activities, and further that thedomestic enquiry in the case was conducted against principles or naturaljustice, inasmuch as his request for being represented by an officer bearer ofthe Trade Union, of which he was a member, as provided by the Modelstanding Orders, under the provisions of Rule 14 (4) (ba) framed under theindustrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, (hereinafter REFERRED TO toas the so Act ), was disallowed, and that because of this denial of opportunity, which violated principles of natural justice that he had not participatedin the enquiry proceedings, and any action taken pursuant to the report givenby the Enquiry Officer, as a result of ex parte evidence, was not legallypermissible. ( 8 ) AFTER getting replication of the Management, the Industrialtribunal framed the following issues : " (1) Whether application filed by the applicant/mgt. is not maintainable as alleged in preliminary objection No. 1 of the writtenstatement filed by the respondent/workman ? (2) Whether the enquiry was conducted by the Mgt. and if so. whether enquiry conducted by the Mgt. is fair and proper ? Ifnot, its effect ? (3) Relief. " ( 9 ) THE workman was represented before the Industrial Tribunal bythe same very R. N. Roy. (2) Whether the enquiry was conducted by the Mgt. and if so. whether enquiry conducted by the Mgt. is fair and proper ? Ifnot, its effect ? (3) Relief. " ( 9 ) THE workman was represented before the Industrial Tribunal bythe same very R. N. Roy. The learned Tribunal after recording evidence anddue hearing held the preliminary issue against the workman by holding thatthe allegations enumerating various acts of misconduct need not be confinedto, those which are covered by the Standing Orders of the establishment orthe company, and that in view of the nature of the alleged acts of misconductattributed to the workman by means of the charge sheets, it would not becorrect to say that an application under Section 33 (2) (b) was not legallymaintainable whereby the Management sought approval of the dismissalorder passed in respect to the workman. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, in so far as issue No. 2 was concerned, namely,whether an enquiry was conducted by the Management, and if 80 whethersuch an enquiry was fair and proper, and if not to what effect; the Tribunalheld that in view of the established position, that workman s prayer submitted in writing to the Enquiry Officer, for being represented by Shri R. N. Roy,stated to be the President of the Mercantile Employees Association, wasrejected for the reason that Shri Roy was an outsider, and the workmancould not be allowed to have his assistance, but could only be represented byan employee of the Management, or any other member of the Generalmazdoor Congress, which was a Union recognised by the Management, andof which the workman was a member, and that in face of this denial ofopportunity, which the workman had sought by means of a written application dated 10. 6. 83, made to the Plant Manager of the petitioner-company,with specific reference to Rule 14 (4) (ba) of the Model Standing Orders; it wasa case where workman s act of boycotting the enquiry proceedings wasjustified, and as a result the enquiry report based on exparte evidence,recorded in the absence of the workman could not form a legal basis fortaking action against the workman, namely, that of his dismissal fromservice. ( 11 ) THERE is a positive finding by the learned Tribunal based on theenquiry report file, which was exhibited before him as M/19 that an application dated 10. 6. ( 11 ) THERE is a positive finding by the learned Tribunal based on theenquiry report file, which was exhibited before him as M/19 that an application dated 10. 6. 83 to this effect was on record, and a copy thereof had beenshown to have been endorsed to Shri Jagmohan Sharma, Advocate, asenquiry Officer, and the order dated 12. 6. 83 has reference to this applicationdated 10. 6. 83, which was also given to the Enquiry Officer on 12. 6. 83 by theworkman, whereupon proceedings were adjourned to 26. 7. 83. to enable theworkman to file Model Standing Orders, and that there was a letter, Ex. WW 1/3 from the Plant Manager of the petitioner company to respondentno. 1, with copy to the Enquiry Officer wherein it was stated that there wasno legal provision making the Model Standing Orders applicable to theircompany, and while asserting that an outsider can be legally appointed anenquiry Officer, workman s request for being represented in the enquiryproceedings by Shri R. N. Roy could not be acceded to. as said Shri Roywas an outsider, and that his allegation Management s offer to the workmanto bring any existing workman of the company as his representative, beingmotivated or mala fide was not correct. ( 12 ) THIS letter has been reproduced in the impugned order, whichreveals that the Plant Manager had intimated to respondent No. 1 that themanagement would strongly plead before the Enquiry Officer for rejection ofhis request to bring an outsider as his representative inasmuch as the Management had never recognised any Mercantile Employees Association as theirrecognised trade union, and there was no question of its President beingallowed as workman s representative in the domestic enquiry. ( 13 ) THE impugned order further reveals that thereafter the Enquiryofficer passed the order dated 30. 6. 83 whereby while rejecting the objectionof the workman as to his appointment as Enquiry Officer, being an outsiderby holding that there was no bar in the way of the Management to appointan outsider as Enquiry Officer, and which course is conducive to the fairconduct of the enquiry without any bias or prejudice, went on to say that". . . . . . this being a domestic enquiry, leaves no scope for any interference byan outsider. Neither the Management nor the workman is being represented or assisted by an outsider. . . . . . this being a domestic enquiry, leaves no scope for any interference byan outsider. Neither the Management nor the workman is being represented or assisted by an outsider. The said union of which the workman is thepresident is Gold Spot Employees Union. This Union is not recognised bythe management. In view of the aforementioned reasons, I hereby reject therequest of Mr. Tripathi for bringing an outsider to represent him, as it isonly a domestic enquiry. However, I allow Mr. Tripathi to bring any personto represent him who is the employee of the management company. " ( 14 ) THERE is also a finding of the learned Tribunal that there is aletter on record of enquiry proceedings as M. 19 in respect to workman sapplication challenging appointment of the enquiry officer, and furtherstating that as he had not been allowed to be assisted by Mr. R. N. Roy,president of the Mercantile Employees Association, which act was againstthe principle of natural justice, he did not want to participate in the enquiryproceedings. This application was rejected by the Enquiry Officer by observing that the allegations were repetitive of the objections raised earlier, andthese were not maintainable. The learned Tribunal after taking note of the material and documentson record of the enquiry proceedings as well as evidence recorded beforehim, came to the finding that it is worth noting that nowhere in these proceedings it was stated that Shri Tripathi can be represented by any outsiderwho may be office bearer of a Union in which Shri Tripathi may be amember. The stand throughout was that this being a domestic enquiryworkman can be represented by only existing employee of the company, andfurther that in so far as the question as to whether the workman was amember of the Union of which Shri R. N. Roy was the President was concerned. there is deposition on oath by the workman dated 30. 5. 85. before thetribunal in which he has denied the suggestion that he has no concern withthe Union of which Shri Roy was the President. there is deposition on oath by the workman dated 30. 5. 85. before thetribunal in which he has denied the suggestion that he has no concern withthe Union of which Shri Roy was the President. ( 15 ) THE learned Tribunal rejected the contention of the Managementthat since the workman had been shown to be member of General Mazdoorcongress, which was a Union recognised by the Management, there was noreason for him to choose not to berepresented by a member of the saidunion and his insistence for being represented by Shri R. N. Roy had beenrightly declined by the management as well as the Enquiry Officer, and heldthat the wording of Rule 14 (4) (ba) of Model Standing Orders made it abundantly clear that position adopted by the Management and endorsed to bythe Enquiry Officer, was not sustainable. ( 16 ) IT further observed that the Enquiry Officer while disallowingthe request of the workman to be represented by Shri R. N. Roy, nowhereindicated that he went through the Model Standing Order, in order to examinethe request of the workman but recorded a general observation that nostanding Orders had been produced before him by the workman to justifythe request, for representation by Shri R. N. Roy, This observation is notsustainable, because it is not mentioned that the workman was called uponto do so, and the only reason for rejecting the request of the workman to berepresented by Shri R. N. Roy was that the said Shri Roy was an outsider,and could not be allowed to represent the workman in a domestic enquiry. ( 17 ) THAT reason was not justified for the short reason that there is nosuch requirement in the Model Standing Orders under reference, namely. Rule14 (4) (ba ). ( 17 ) THAT reason was not justified for the short reason that there is nosuch requirement in the Model Standing Orders under reference, namely. Rule14 (4) (ba ). Thus insistence of the Management that the representative of theworkman should be an employee of the management or that the Trade Unionwhose officer could represent him should have been a recognised Trade Union,was wholly unjusutified, which resulted in violation of the principles of naturaljustice, inasmuch as it became a case where the Enquiry Officer and themanagement put obstruction in the way of the wokman in being properlyrepresented in the domestic enquiry, by insisting upon him to bring anemployee of the establishment only, as his representative, and if in thissetting the workman refused to cross-examine and later on boycotted theenquiry, he cannot be blamed and as such the ex parte enquiry in the absenceof the workman, when he was not allowed to be properly represented couldnot be a basis for any action against him, the Management s action in terminating the services of the workman, as a result of this enquiry could not beapproved. ( 18 ) THE learned Tribunal, therefore, held that it was not a fit caseto accord approval to the Management for dismissal of the workman fromservice. In this view of the matter, he did not feel called upon to furtherexamine the ex pane evidence or the finding of the enquiry officer on meritsor to scrutinise the plea of the workman that the action of the managementwas an act of victimisation. ( 19 ) IT is this order which is assailed in the present writ petition byreiterating that since respondent No. 1 was admittedly a member of thegeneral Mazdoor Congress and also spokesman of the workers of the petitioner company, who were members of the said Union, and that if he hadany right to be represented by an office bearer of any Union, was only thatof General Mazdoor Congress. It is further contended that since the workman himself was an experienced person, well vested in the affairs of theunion, and its workers, he was fully competent to defend himself, and didnot need, in fact, any representative to assist him in the domestic enquiry,and that in such a situation certified Standing Orders or Model Standingorders would have no force, and that, in any case, there was no provision inthe Model Standing Orders which entitled respondent No. 1 to be representedby an office bearer of any Union, of which he did not prove himself to be amember. ( 20 ) DURING hearing of this writ petition, Shri D. D. Verma, Seniorcounsel, appearing for the petitioner company, vehemently argued that inthe absence of any evidence on record of the enquiry proceedings or beforethe Tribunal, firstly, that the Mercantile Employees Association was a recognised Trade Union, and secondly that Shri R. N. Roy was its President, andthirdly that respondent No. 1 was member of that Union; there was no illegality or irregularity or violation of principles of natural justice, and that theenquiry Officer could legitimately reject such a request of the workman. ( 21 ) MR. Verma, however, conceded that there was no certified Modelorders of the petitioner company, and accordingly in view of the provisionsof Section 12a of the SO Act, Model Standing Orders including the oneunder Rule 14 (4) (ba) would be applicable in the present case. ( 22 ) THAT being so, the provisions of the aforesaid Model Standingorders would exclusively govern the matter, and the contention now beingput forward on behalf of the petitioner company that the refusal to grantprayer of the workman to be represented by Shri Roy was justified for thereason that it was not shown that Union, of which Mr. Roy was stated to bea President, was a registered one, for the short reason that there is no suchrequirement contemplated in the Model Standing Orders to the effect thatthe Union whose representative the workman elects to be represented in theenquiry proceedings should be a registered Trade Union or recognised by themanagement concerned. All that is required by this rule is that the workman must be a member of the Union whose office bearer or representativenomintes to be represented by him. All that is required by this rule is that the workman must be a member of the Union whose office bearer or representativenomintes to be represented by him. ( 23 ) IT is also pertinent to note that not only that the workman wasnowhere called upon by the Enquiry Officer to show or establish that he wasa member of the Mercantile Employees Associaton, there is positive evidencebefore the Industrial Tribunal to the effect that respondent No. 1 was amember of the said Union, and he had stated so in his application dated10-6-1983, which was on record of the enquiry proceedings, and which findsmention in the order dated 12-6-1983. That being so, it does not now lie inthe mouth of the petitioner company to insist that the refusal to grant requestof the workman was justified for the reason that there was no evidence thathe was a member of the said Union. ( 24 ) THE Industrial Tribunal has rightly come to the conclusion onthe basis of the evidence on record of the enquiry proceedings as well asadduced before him that there was no such ground as was now being putforward, for disallowing the request, as the same was declined for the shortreason that the workman could not be allowed to be represented by anoutsider in a domestic enquiry. The learned Tribunal further observed thatthis was the stand taken by the management, and the Enquiry Officer tothe same time, and that there was no requirement that the Trade Union ofwhich office bearer is nominated by the workman should be the Unionrecognised by the management or registered under the Trade Union Act, andthat the only contemplation is that there must be a Trade Union of which theperson nominated is an office bearer, and the workman is a member, andthat this condition was satisfied when the workman approached the Enquiryofficer to be represented by Mr. R. N. Roy, and that the denial of therequest was an act in contravention of the legal provisions of the statutoryrules framed under SO Act as well as principle of natural justice, and in thatsituation the workman was justified in declining to participate in theproceedings, and that the action proposed or taken on the basis of the exparte report of the Enquiry Officer was not sustainable. ( 25 ) I see no reason take to view different than what the learnedtribunal has taken on the facts and circumstances of this case, inasmuch asthere is no error apparent on the face of the record, on any point of law,which calls for interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction underarticle 226 or even Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 26 ). Mr. Verma contended, relying on a Supreme Court judgmentreported as AIR 1956 231, J. K. Iron and Steel Co. , Ltd. Kanpur v. The Ironand Steel Mazdoor Union, Kanpur, that the powers of Industrial Tribunalsare not absolute, but circumscribed by the provisions of the Statute thatcreates them, and that they have to function with the limits imposed there,and to act according to its provisions. Whereas, there can be no denyingthis proposition, but it is not clear as to now this principle is attracted to thepresent case, because the Industrial Tribunal has not, in any manner, overstepped its jurisdiction, and has on the basis of evidence come to a clearfinding that the stand taken by the management, and endorsed by theenquiry Officer in denying the workman the right to be represented by anoffice bearer of the Union of his choice was not correct, and that this vitiatedthe ex parte proceedings in the enquiry, and the resultant report. ( 27 ) THERE is, on the other hand, a catena of authorities laying downthat the High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction cannot assume thepower of an appellate Court with the necessary limitation that findings offacts reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of appreciation ofevidence, cannot be re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings, and only anerror of law, which is apparent on face of the record, can be correctedby a writ petition. This proposition was laid down by the Supreme Court. very early in point of time, in the case reported as AIR 1964 S. C. 477. Syedyakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan and Others. ( 28 ) THE same proposition has been reiterated in another judgmentreported as 1963 (1) LLJ (SC) 684, Agnani (W. M.) and Badri Das and Others,where again it was emphasized that there can be no interference in writjurisdiction on a point of fact, and only on error of law, but that too of sucha nature as to be apparent on the face of the record. It is further clearlyheld that if two views were possible on a reasonable construction of evidence,and the Industrial Tribunal has put one interpretation upon certain materialplaced before it, and the High Court had thought it better to put another,that could not even be a valid ground for interference by the High Court,unless it was a case that the view taken by Tribunal was not. at all, reasonably possible. That being not the case, judgment of the High Court wasset aside, and the order of Industrial Tribunal sustained. ( 29 ) IN the present case also, the same proposition would apply,because all that the Industrial Tribunal has held is that on a plain construction of the provisions of Rule 14 (4) (ba) of the rules, framed under the SOAct, the stand taken by the management and the Enquiry Officer that therepresentative nominated by the workman to represent him could not be anoutsider and must be a member of the Union registered under the Tradeunion Act or recognised by the Management, was not correct. It is noteven a case where this view was reasonably possible, but on a reading of therelevant provisions, the interpretation put by the learned Tribunal was theonly view possible. ( 30 ) IT is also not the case where any finding has been arrived at inthe absence of evidence because the Tribunal has clearly held, after referenceto the documents on record of enquiry proceedings, which were dulyexhibited as well as the evidence adduced before him, including the statementof the workman that he had been able to establish that he was a member ofthe Mercantile Employees Association, of which Mr. R. N. Roy was thepresident, and that this fact had been clearly stated by him in his applicationdated 10-6-1983. The present is also a case covered by the ratio of the judgment of thesupreme Court in the case reported as 1982 (1) LLJ (SC) 46. State ofharyana and Another v. Rattan Singh, because here also the enquiry officerendorsed the stand as taken by the management through its plant managerthat an outsider cannot be allowed to represent the workman in domesticenquiry by passing order on 12-6-1983. The Court clearly held in thereported case that where it was a case of perversity, or arbitrariness,bias or surrender of independence of judgment, the finding arrived at by thedomestic tribunal, in such a situation, would not be good. (emphasis added ). The Court clearly held in thereported case that where it was a case of perversity, or arbitrariness,bias or surrender of independence of judgment, the finding arrived at by thedomestic tribunal, in such a situation, would not be good. (emphasis added ). ( 31 ) IN view of this and the consistent view of this Court that thehigh Court in writ jurisdiction cannot constitute itself into an Appellatecourt over Tribunals, constituted under special legislation, and certainly notin cases involving findings of facts. One of the leading authorities, enunciatingthis proposition, is the case reported as 1983 Labour and Industrialcases (SC) 1516, Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation. The sameproposition has been highlighted in the case reported as (1980) 2 SCR 146 ,gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, to the effectthat the power of high Court in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article227 of the Constitution is extended only to seeing that a Tribunal functionswithin the limits of its authority, and cannot be equated with the powers asexercised in appellate jurisdiction, and that the award given by the Industrialtribunal can be interferred with in writ jurisdiction only if it was based oncomplete misconception of law, and not evidence, and that no reasonableroan would come to a conclusion, to which the Tribunal had arrived. Theimpugned order in the present case cannot be faulted on any of thesegrounds. ( 32 ) THAT being so, the scope of interference by this Court is verymuch restricted, and circumscribed by established principles. ( 33 ) ALL that Mr. Verma argued was that it was for the workman toprove before the Enquiry Officer that he was a member of the Union ofwhich Mr. R. N. Roy was President, and that the Union was a recognisedunion or registered one. ( 34 ) THESE submissions are not legally sustainable, because in so faras the first point is concerned, respondent No. 1 did state so, as alreadynoticed, in his application, and there is a finding of fact recorded by thetribunal to that effect. The rejection of the request was not on the groundthat he had not proved himself to be a member of the Mercantile Employees association, but on the ground that Mr. Roy was an outsider. It is a mutterof record that the workman was, at no stage, called upon to prove this factof being a member of the Union. The rejection of the request was not on the groundthat he had not proved himself to be a member of the Mercantile Employees association, but on the ground that Mr. Roy was an outsider. It is a mutterof record that the workman was, at no stage, called upon to prove this factof being a member of the Union. It has been held in the case reported as1980 Labour and Industrial Cases (SC) 742, Workmen of Sudder Workshop ofjorehaut Tea Co. Ltd. v. The Management of Jorehaut Tea Co. Ltd. , thatconclusions which are not based on facts as having neither been pleaded orproved cannot be allowed to be urged in the High Court. The present isexactly Such a case. ( 35 ) IN so far as the second contention is concerned, it is not evenrequirement of the Model Standing Orders. Mr. Verma could not evensubstantiate his contention that registration under Trade Union Act wasessential. He conceded, in fact, that no notification in terms of theamended provisions, has been issued. ( 36 ) THE contention of Mr. Verma that the workman was entitled tobe represented only by a member or office bearer of a recognised Union, onthe basis of the Supreme Court judgment reported as AIR 1965 SC 1392 ,the Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, is also not sustainablefor the reason that the said decision is based on the finding that the standingorders of the company in question provided that in domestic enquiry, only arepresentative of a Union, which is registered under the Indian Trade Union,act, and as recognised by the company, could assist and in such a situationthere is no denial of natural justice it the request of the workman, whoinsisted to be assisted by a representative of their own unrecognised Union. ( 37 ) THE ratio of this judgment is not, at all, applicable to the presentcase for the twin reasons, namely, that it is now an admilled case, asconceded by Mr. Verma, that there are no certified standing orders,formulated by the company, and as such Model Standing Orders issuedunder the SO Act would govern the enquiry proceedings against a delinquentemployee on the ground of misconduct, and the Standing Orders, ascontained in Rule 14 (4) (ba) now clearly stipulate that an employee has aright to be represented by an office bearer of a Union, of which he is amember. It is thus no requirement of the statutory standing orders that theunion should be a recognised or registered Union. In fact, the new provision was introduced in Rule 14 (4) by inserting Clause (ba) by amendmentof 1975, and judgment in the Dunlop Rubber Co. case (supra) is of a muchprior date. ( 38 ) THE judgment relied upon by Mr. Verma reported as 1972 (II)LLJ 143. Awadesh Kumar Bhatnagar v: The Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfgweaving Ltd. and Another, is based on the finding of facts in the said case,which have no bearing on the issue arising in the present case. ( 39 ) SIMILARLY, the ratio of the judgment in the case. reported as 1981labour and Industrial Cases 557, The Managar, Boisahabi Tea Estate v. Thepresiding Officer, Labour Court, Dibrugarh and Another, of the Divisionbench of the Gauhati High Court, relied upon by Mr. Verma, is also of noassistance to him, because although on the facts of that case it was held thatenquiry had been held and conclusion reached after following procedurewherein the affected workman was fairly dealt with,and had just opportunityto present his case, state his pleas, and the findings recorded were notperverse, but even this authority recognised the need for a substantialcompliance with the provisions of the Standing Orders, and observance ofthe principles of natural justice, with the implication that in case there hasbeen non-compliance with any of the provisions of the Standing Orders, itwould be a case where principles of natural justice are to be treated ashaving been violated, as in the present case. ( 40 ) IT was held by the Supreme Court in a case reported as 1967 (2)LLJ (SC) 46, that where a delinquent employee had not been supplied withcopies of the material in support of the charges, and he did not appear onthe date fixed for enquiry, for the reason of non-supply of the requisitematerial, and the enquiry proceeded in his absence, it would be a case whererequirements of principles of natural justice were not satisfied. The ratio of this judgment squarely fits in with the present case, because here the workman declined to participate in the proceedings because of refusal ofpermission to be represented by a person of his choice, which right wasconferred on him by Model Standing Orders, and the Tribunal had rightlyheld this to be a case of violation of principles of natural justice, and on thestrength of this judgment, workman s refusal to participate in the enquiryproceedings cannot be faulted with. ( 41 ) I also find no force in the arguments advanced by Mr. Vermathat respondent No. 1 was an experienced workman, who himself had beenrepresenting workman in various Trade Union disputes, and was thus not inneed of any other person to represent or assist him in the domestic enquiry,and was himself competent to look after the enquiry proceedings against him. This argument fails to take note of the ordinary human situations when aperson howsoever competent or qualified, may not be in a position to defendhis own case, and may need assistance of a third person, who is not personally affected. ( 42 ) I find myself fortified in this view by an observation of thesupreme Court in the case reported as AIR 1972 SC 2178 , C. L Subramaniam v. The Collector of Customs, Cochin, where it was held that : ". . . WHEN a man is charged with the breach of a rule entailingserious consequences, he is not likely to be in a position to presenthis case as best as it should be. "and that is why Rule 15 (5) of the Central Civil Services (Classification,control and Appeal) Rules, 1967 provided that a Government servantcharged with dereliction of duty or contravention of the rules is to berepresented by another Government servant and even by legal practitioner. ( 43 ) RELIANCE was placed by Mr. Verma on 1970 (1) LLJ 571,narayan Das v. State of Orissa, that in the case of an employee of thestatus of a rural welfare inspector, refusal to permit him to engage lawyer inenquiry proceedings would not vitiate the enquiry report. ( 43 ) RELIANCE was placed by Mr. Verma on 1970 (1) LLJ 571,narayan Das v. State of Orissa, that in the case of an employee of thestatus of a rural welfare inspector, refusal to permit him to engage lawyer inenquiry proceedings would not vitiate the enquiry report. ( 44 ) THE ratio of the aforesaid judgment cannot apply to the presentcase, and it is not a correct stand to take that since respondent No. 1, whohad long been a member of the Trade Union, did not require anybody elseto assist him; particularly when the statutory Model Standing Orders entitledhim to seek such an assistance. It was even held in a case reported as AIR1983 SC 109. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumarragnavenoranath Nadkarni and Others, that when a person facing a domesticenquiry is pitted against a legally trained officer, by whom the employer wasbeing represented, then request of the employee to be represented by alawyer should not be refused, and such refusal would amount to denial ofreasonable opportunity of hearing to the employee. ( 45 ) THE facts of the case reported as 1968 (2) LLJ 264 . Ghanshyamdas Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, are also distinguishable because there the delinquent Government servant had failed to appear beforethe enquiry officer inspite of repeated opportunities granted for which novalid cause had been shown in a challenge to the dismissal order, whereasin the present case, the workman boycotted the enquiry proceedings becauseof refusal of his request to be represented by Mr. R. N. Roy, and theindustrial Tribunal has held it amounting to violation of principle of naturaljustice, and I do not find any error committed by the Industrial Tribunal incoming to the finding. In such a situation, the workman was justified fornon-participation in enquiry proceedings and the enquiry report based onex pane evidence stood vitiated. ( 46 ) MR. R. N. Roy, and theindustrial Tribunal has held it amounting to violation of principle of naturaljustice, and I do not find any error committed by the Industrial Tribunal incoming to the finding. In such a situation, the workman was justified fornon-participation in enquiry proceedings and the enquiry report based onex pane evidence stood vitiated. ( 46 ) MR. Verma s next contention that it was for the workman toestablish his plea of victimisation is also no relevance, because the learnedtribunal has rightly held that in view of the finding that the enquiry reportwas liable to be set aside, as being based on ex parte proceedings, which inturn involved infraction of principles of natural justice, there was no needto go into the plea of the workman as to victimisation because that had tobe examined only if the enquiry report did not otherwise suffer from anylegal defect. This argument, therefore, based on the aforesaid judgmentdoes not arise in this case. ( 47 ) LASTLY, I would like to deal with the plea advanced bymr, Verma at the fag end of the arguments that in the event of theindustrial Tribunal holding that dismissal order was not sustainable, and noapproval for the same could be accorded, then the Management ought tohave been given an opportunity to adduce evidence before the Tribunal tosubstantiate the charges against the workman. ( 48 ) HERE also, the petitioner has no case for the short reason thatthere is not an iota of evidence that any request in writing was made, at anystage, during pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal for any suchopportunity being granted to the petitioner. It has been held repeatedlythat if a management wishes to adduce evidence insupport of the chargesbefore the Tribunal, then an application for the purpose should be movedbefore the proceedings come to an end, and consequently, the applicationthat is made after proceedings have come to an end, deserve to be rejected. It has been so held by the Supreme Court in the case reported as 1976 (1)Labour and Industrial Cases 180, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. and Ludh Budh Singh. Same view was taken by the Supreme Court in thecase reported as 1983 Labour and Industrial Cases 1697. Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda and Others. It has been so held by the Supreme Court in the case reported as 1976 (1)Labour and Industrial Cases 180, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. and Ludh Budh Singh. Same view was taken by the Supreme Court in thecase reported as 1983 Labour and Industrial Cases 1697. Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda and Others. ( 49 ) SIMILAR view has been expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case reported as 1982 Labour and Industrial Cases (Delhi Highcourt) 1378 Management of Delhi Transport Corporation, New Delhi v. Ramkumar and Another, with which I am in respectful agreement, where it washeld that the management must ask for an opportunity to adduce additionalevidence during pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Court orindustrial Court, and there was no duty cast on the said Tribunal to suomuto call upon the management to produce evidence to substantiate thecharges, and in the absence of a plea to adduce additional evidence at theinitial stage or during pendency of the proceedings, failure of the Labourcourt or the Industrial Court to give such an opportunity shall not vitiatethe proceedings. ( 50 ) THE learned Counsel was asked to show from record as towhether any such application was made before the Industrial Tribunalbefore the close of the proceedings. He could not give reference of anywritten application having been made. On the other band, the statementmade at the Bar by the learned Counsel tor respondent No I that only oralrequest was made during final arguments was not controverted. Mr. Birbalfurther submitted that there is a statutory form provided is Form k. in therules, being Rule 60 read with Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act, lor moving anapplication for opportunity to lead evidence before the Tribunal. ( 51 ) APART from the fact thus that law contemplates written application, and as such an oral request would not suffice, even that came afterthe close of the proceedings, and at the fag end of the final arguments, andin such a case the Industrial Tribunal was nut obliged to give opportunityto the petitioner to adduce evidence. Even in the writ petition, all that isstated in ground (xii), is that the Tribunal was bound to ask the petitionerto lead evidence on merits and prove the charges before it. Even in the writ petition, all that isstated in ground (xii), is that the Tribunal was bound to ask the petitionerto lead evidence on merits and prove the charges before it. It is thus a casewhere making of a written application is not even pleaded, much lessproved, and as such no duty was cast on the Industrial Tribunal to grantopportunity to the management to produce evidence in support of thecharges, after holding that the enquiry report stood vitiated by virtue ofviolation of principles of natural justice. ( 52 ) I, therefore, do not find any merit in the writ petition or anycase made out for interference. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissedwith costs. Counsel fee Rs. 2000. 00. ( 53 ) AS a result, respondent No. 1 would be entitled to be treated asan employee of the petitioner company continuously, and he shall bereinstated accordingly, with retrospective effect, if not already allowed towork, but in so far as the question of back wages is concerned, that shall besubject to proof by the workman that during the relevant period, he was notgainfully employed somewhereelse. ( 54 ) THE order as to reinstatement shall be complied within twomonths from today.