Judgment :- Jagannadha Rao, C.J. This appeal is preferred by the writ petitioner, who was working as a Superintendent in the Travancore Devaswom Board. At the time when the suspension order was passed, she was working as an Assistant Commissioner incharge of a sub-group of temples at Neyyattinkara. There were 82 temples in this sub-group. On account of certain alleged irregularities, appellant was kept under suspension on the ground of lack of supervision which resulted in misappropriation by head clerk, Karthiyayani. An inquiry was conducted on 30-11-1991, but the appellant was reinstated in service pending inquiry. Thereafter, pursuant to certain directions in an earlier writ petition, the appellant was served with a show cause notice as to why she should not be removed from service. Appellant submitted a detailed reply. Thereafter, Ext.P6 order was passed on 19-12-1992 reverting the appellant to the post of junior-most Junior Superintendent. This order was questioned in the present writ petition out which this appeal arises. In CMP 30481 of 1992 stay of reversion was granted. 2. During the pendency of the present writ petition, respondents have reviewed Ext.P6 order and passed Ext.P8 order on 7-1-1993. By Ext.P8 order, appellant was reverted for a period of five years with effect from 3-6-1991. Both Exts.P6 and P8 were challenged in the writ petition. 3. So far as Ext.P6 is concerned, the learned single judge came to the conclusion that it was not necessary to deal with it inasmuch as it was superseded by Ext.P8. The learned judge then considered the validity of Ext.P8 and held that the respondents did not have the power of review and, therefore, quashed the same. Having thus quashed Ext.P8, the learned judge directed respondents to pass fresh orders in accordance with law. Aggrieved by the above said judgment, writ petitioner has filed this appeal. 4. According to learned counsel for the appellant, the original order of punishment, Ext.P6, reverting the appellant to the post of junior-most Junior Superintendent was bad inasmuch as such a punishment could not have been levied under the Rules and punishment of reversion, if any, could have been only for a period of six months. It is also contended that if Ext.PS is without jurisdiction, there is no question of now remitting the matter to the authorities for a fresh reconsideration of the matter. It is also contended that if Ext.PS is without jurisdiction, there is no question of now remitting the matter to the authorities for a fresh reconsideration of the matter. According to the learned counsel, all that could be done was to modify the rig our of Ext., P6 and confine the reversion to six months as permitted by the Rules. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the respondents. Learned counsel relied upon Rule 34 of the Kerala Civil Services (CC & A) Rules which, as being applicable to the facts of the case. Though the heading of R.34 is "State Government's, power to review", the body of R.34 shows that the review here could be of any original order or order on appeal passed by a "subordinate authority". R.34 reads as follows, in so far as it is relevant for the present case: "34. State Government's power to review: -Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the State Government may, on their own motion or otherwise after calling for the records of the case, review ... any original order or order of appeal passed by a subordinate authority under these rules or the rules repealed by R.39 and after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary: (a) Confirm, modify or set aside the order; (b) Impose any penalty or set aside, reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty imposed by the order; (c) Remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such further action or inquiry as they consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or (d) Pass such other order as they deem fit; provided " In our view, the above said Rule did not confer any power of review, which would entitle the Government to review its own orders. Likewise, the Devaswom Board, therefore, would not have any power of review of its own orders. All that the Government or the Devaswom Board could review would be the orders of any subordinate authority whether such an order was an original order or an appellate order. If R.34 is out of question, it must be held that Ext.P8 was without jurisdiction and is a nullity. 6. Once Ext.P8 is without jurisdiction, Ext.P6 would not be superseded, but would come back into force. Then the question would be whether Ext.P6 is valid. If R.34 is out of question, it must be held that Ext.P8 was without jurisdiction and is a nullity. 6. Once Ext.P8 is without jurisdiction, Ext.P6 would not be superseded, but would come back into force. Then the question would be whether Ext.P6 is valid. Under R.11(1)(v) and the Note appended thereto, the reversion to the lower category could only be for six months. This is clear from the following: "Reduction to a lower rank in the seniority list or to a lower grade or post or time-scale whether in the same service or in another service, State or subordinate, or to a lower stage in a time-scale; Note: -(1) The period of reduction shall not be less than six months and hot more than five years. If the period is not specified in the order, the period of reduction shall be deemed to be six months." 7. So far as Ext.P6 order of reversion is concerned, it merely reverted the appellant to the post of Junior-most Junior Superintendent without specifying any period. Therefore, as per the above Note, it has to be restricted to six months. Further, the reversion could not have been to the junior-most position among Junior Superintendents. It could have been only to the post of Junior Superintendent. Therefore, in the category of Junior Superintendent, the appellant could not have been again placed at the junior-most position. 8. Therefore, we modify Ext.P6 accordingly and restrict it to a simple reversion to the lower post of junior Superintendent for a period of six months and not to the position of junior-most Junior Superintendent. 9. The further question would then be whether the order of reversion is to be effective from the date of original suspension in 1991 or from the date of Ext.P6 dated 19-12-1992. In our view, the order of reversion being a substantive punishment, it can take effect only from 19-12-1992 when Ext.P6 was passed. As on today, the entire period of punishment of six months has not been undergone by the appellant inasmuch as Ext.P6 order dated 19-12-1992 was stayed by this Court. Therefore, the appellant will undergo the punishment of reversion, as stated above, for a period of six months after excluding such period of punishment which has already been undergone between 19-12-1992 and the date on which the stay was granted. Therefore, the appellant will undergo the punishment of reversion, as stated above, for a period of six months after excluding such period of punishment which has already been undergone between 19-12-1992 and the date on which the stay was granted. Once the punishment is completed, the appellant will go to the original post in which she was working on the date of suspension. The writ appeal is allowed as stated above.