JUDGMENT Nikhil Nath Bhattacharjee, J. : The writ petitioner who is the appellant herein has impugned the judgment and order dated November 17, 1992 passed by the learned trial Judge, the operative part of which runs as follows : "Considering all the aspects the writ petition is disposed of by directing the respondent Tramways Authorities to consider the representation of the petitioner for rectification of his date of birth on the basis of Admit Card and the School Final Certificate produced by the petitioner within a period of 6 weeks from the date of communication of the order and by passing an appropriate decision as to the rectification of the date of birth on the basis of such evidences. It is made clear that the petitioner will not be entitled to any service benefit for his earlier appointment until he reached the age of 21 years on the basis of the age in the said Admit Card. There will be no order as to costs. This order will not prevent the respondent authority to take any other appropriate action against the petitioner in accordance with law." 2. On the factual aspect it appears that the petitioner was sponsored by his father who having put in more than 15 years of service, was entitled to do so, for the post of conductor with the then Calcutta Tramways Company Ltd. in the year 1956. At the time of recruitment, standard for appointment as conductor, amongst others, was 21 to 30 years of age as per the staff regulation, as was printed in the staff employment forms issued to petitioner's father by the company. The forms were duly filled in by the father giving particulars of the petitioner as Matric standard, of native village, Ugawan, P.S. Asthanan, Patna, Bihar but the column as to age was, significantly, left blank. There was a medical examination of the petitioner on 29.11.56 and it appears from the report thereof that petitioner's age as per his own statement was 23 years but the Chief Medical Officer of the Company found him to be 25 years of age. The petitioner joined his appointment on 29.1.57. In the records of the company his age was noted as 25 years as on 29.1.57, that is to say, his recorded date of birth is 29.1.1932. 3. The petitioner joined his appointment on 29.1.57. In the records of the company his age was noted as 25 years as on 29.1.57, that is to say, his recorded date of birth is 29.1.1932. 3. It is petitioner's specific case that he appeared at the School Final Examination as a regular candidate being a student of M. L. Jubilee Institution, 29, Surya Sen Street, Calcutta held in March 1955. He states that he could not pass the said examination and had to appear as a private candidate in the School Final Examination held under the Board of Secondary Education, West Bengal in March 1962 and passed the said examination in the 3rd Division. He further states that according to his Admit Card of the School Final Examination, 1955, as also the certificate of passing the examination of 1962 his date of birth is 14.12.1939. 4. In any case the petitioner worked as a conductor and eventually was promoted to the post of Traffic Inspector in the company. Anomalies regarding age and date of birth of a number of employees having come up, a circular was issued in 1978 by the authorities inviting prayers for amendment of the recorded date of birth of the employees and accordingly the petitioner applied for rectification of his date of birth in the service book which wrongly recorded as 29.1.1932 in place and in stead of his actual date of birth being 14.12.1939. The application was supported by copies of the Admit Card and the certificate of passing School Final Examination, 1962. He subsequently submitted a school leaving certificate issued by the Headmaster, M.L. Jubilee Institution on 4.1.91 wherefrom it also appears that his date of birth as per the admission register of the school is 14.12.1939 which tallies with that of the Admit Card and the school final pass certificate. On 8.9.78 he was asked to appear before the Chief Medical Officer (Respondent No. 7) for medical examination as to his age but he did not appear. In March 1990 the petitioner was intimated that his representation for rectification of his recorded age in the service book was rejected, against which he submitted an appeal which also met the same fate on 27th November, 1990. Another appeal for rectification drafted by a lawyer was submitted in January, 1991. In March 1990 the petitioner was intimated that his representation for rectification of his recorded age in the service book was rejected, against which he submitted an appeal which also met the same fate on 27th November, 1990. Another appeal for rectification drafted by a lawyer was submitted in January, 1991. On 9th February, 1991 the respondent authority intimated the petitioner that he had been given an extension of service upto 28th January, 1992 he having already reached the age of superannuation of 58 years on 28th January, 1991. On 10th April, 1991 the petitioner received a letter dated 8th April, 1991 from the respondent authority intimating the final rejection of his appeal amendment of service record as to his date of birth. On 23rd September, 1991, the petitioner was served with a letter dated 16/19th September, 1991 declaring that he would superannuate from the service with effect from 30th September, 1991. The petitioner was very much aggrieved by the said decision of the respondent authority and moved the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. The specific case of the respondent, on the other hand, is that the Calcutta Tramways Company was subsequently taken over by the State Government and became the Calcutta Tramways Company (1978) Limited. In 1991 the authorities issued printed forms to all CTS employees inviting option whether to come under the revised scale and be superannuated on attaining 58 years of age or to retain the old scale and to retire at 55 years of age which was the age of superannuation according to the staff regulation of the erstwhile company. So long CTC employees were due to retire at 55 years of age with an annual extension on the basis of medical fitness for a further period of 5 years. The petitioner submitted his option form in part A, Part B and part C duly signed by him on 5.9.91 electing to come under the revised scale of pay retrospectively with effect from 1.5.90. In the option form it is specifically provided that the age of superannuation will be 58 years unless one has crossed the said age when it would stand finally on 30.9.91. In the option form it is specifically provided that the age of superannuation will be 58 years unless one has crossed the said age when it would stand finally on 30.9.91. Earlier the petitioner's service was extended upto 28.1.1992 but the petitioner having exercised the option to come under the revised scale of pay retrospectively, he was allowed to opt the revised scale of pay and he having already crossed 58 years of age, was due to retire finally with effect from 30.9.91 as per terms of the scheme accepted by him and in fact he retired from the company's service on superannuation with effect from 30.9.91. 6. Now of the 4 decisions strongly relied upon before us, the first in point of time is the case of Khagendra Nath Dutta vs. Deputy Commissioner, Special Branch, Calcutta reported in 1989(1) Calcutta Law Journal Page 499. In that case the petitioner was a matriculate and the certificate thereof was with him but at the time of entry as a constable in 1950 he declared his date of birth as April 25, 1931 and not what his certificate recorded in order that he was not disqualified being a minor. On the verge of his retirement in November, 1988 he prayed for correction of his age on the basis of the matriculation certificate. His departmental authority having refused to rectify his date of birth the petitioner moved a writ application when the Hon'ble Mr. Justice, G. N. Ray, as his Lordship then was, held that having enjoyed the benefit on the basis of a wrong declaration, he cannot be permitted to reap further benefit of his own wrong. The learned Judge also observed that the writ court being a court of equity, the petitioner must come with clean hands and that nobody should be allowed to initiate an action arising out of his own wrong. 7. The second decision is of Nihar Ranjan Bhowmick vs. State of West Bengal reported in 1990(7) SLR 69. The petitioner in that case entered into the Government service in 1949. His date of birth in the service book was recorded as 19.1.31 and he was described a non-matric. It was his case that he passed the Matriculation Examination in 1948 from East Bengal Secondary Education Board, Dacca and that his date of birth as recorded in his certificate is October 1, 1933. His date of birth in the service book was recorded as 19.1.31 and he was described a non-matric. It was his case that he passed the Matriculation Examination in 1948 from East Bengal Secondary Education Board, Dacca and that his date of birth as recorded in his certificate is October 1, 1933. In 1950 he submitted his matriculation certificate to his administrative head for correction of his date of birth but although his educational qualification was corrected, no correction was made in the service book about his date of birth. According to the recorded age in the service book he was due to retire on superannuation with effect from January 31, 1989. The petitioner made representation for correction of his date of birth. His averment that date of birth of several other police personnel on the basis of matriculation certificate, admit card and other authentic documents had been corrected, remained uncontroverted. However, a learned Single Judge dismissed his writ application against which he preferred an appeal before the Division Bench which held that the recording of the date of birth in the service book was not on any cogent material, not even on the basis of his declaration and that when the genuineness or authenticity of the matriculation certificate is not disputed or challenged, the date of birth as recorded in such certificate must be taken to be correct. There was also another aspect of the matter which was that undisputedly in several other cases the authorities themselves had corrected the dates of birth on the basis of matriculation certificates although upon such correction it was found that the concerned incumbents were minors at the respective dates of appointments and the court held that there was no reason why the petitioner should be discriminated against. The further fact that weighed with the Division Bench appears to be that the authorities having learnt that the incumbent according to matriculation certificate produced by him entered into the police service during minority did not take any steps to initiate disciplinary proceeding, indicates that appointment of a person below the age of 18 at the material time immediately after the partition was neither unusual, nor illegal. 8. 8. The third case is of Smt. Suraj Kumari vs. District Judge, Mirjapur, reported in AIR 1991 Allahabad 75 wherein a Single Judge of the said court held that person not coming to court in clean hands should be penalised and in that case which has absolutely no bearing in the facts of the present case awarded some cost for the said wrong doing. 9. Lastly, in the decision reported in Steel Authority of India Limited vs. Sudhendu Kumar Chakraborty, reported in Calcutta Law Times 1991 (1) H.C. 318 another Division Bench of this Court presided over by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Umesh Chandra Banerjee held that recording of age of a regular student cannot be equated with that of a private candidate in the school final certificate and further that where the petitioner was informed in 1980 that a certain date of birth had been accepted for official purposes and he did not take any action against the same till 1990 the writ petition could have been straightway rejected on that ground alone but for ends of justice the petitioner's age on medical examination is to be accepted as his correct age at the time of entry into the service. 10. What is the Ratio Decidendi in the above 4 decisions applicable to the present case ? Dias on Jurisprudence defined Ratio Decidendi as the material facts of the case plus the decision thereon. To our mind the common element that reverberates through the above 4 citations is the legal maxim, Nemo Exproprio Doio Consequitor Actionen i.e. on one can maintain an action arising out of his own wrong. Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes edited by Langan (12th Edition) at page 212 under the heading "Presumption against impairing obligations, or permitting advantage from one's own wrong," observes : "On the general principle of avoiding injustice and absurdity, any construction will, if possible be rejected (unless the policy of the act requires it) if it would enable a person by his own act to impair an obligation which he has undertaken, or otherwise to profit by his own wrong." 11. He then quotes with approval the observation in Kith vs. Taylor (1991) 1 K.B. 625 as follows : ''A man may not take advantage of his own wrong. He then quotes with approval the observation in Kith vs. Taylor (1991) 1 K.B. 625 as follows : ''A man may not take advantage of his own wrong. He may not plead in his own interest a self-created necessity." In 1989 (1) CLJ 499 the learned Judge relied fully on this principle and rejected the writ application. In 1990(7) SLR 69 the principle was attracted but as immediately after entering into the service the incumbent prayed for correction when his educational qualification and not the date of birth was corrected without assigning any reason and also as he was discriminated against in the matter of such correction, the writ application was allowed. In AIR 1991 Allahabad 75 the court not only did not allow taking advantage of one's own wrong but penalised him for attempting to take such advantage. In CLT 1991(1) H.C. 318 the possibility of taking advantage of a wrong doing by obtaining a Pass certificate as a private candidate at a much later date was shut out on the further ground that no step for rectification was taken for about 10 long years. Excepting the Allahabad case all the 3 decisions relate to Government service. In the present case the relationship between the petitioner and his employer was initially contractual and the petitioner clearly vitiated the contract by suppressing the material fact, namely, his admit card or school leaving certificate showing his actual age at the time of entry into the service. This he did only to avoid disqualification. Furthermore, he passed school final in 1962 but took positive step only in 1978 for rectification of record relating to his age and that too in response to a circular only. It has been argued that there is no declaration of his age' by him before his authority either at the time of entry or thereafter but it appears that he perfectly knew his recorded age but intentionally kept mum and thereby practised fraud upon his authority. Lastly, by exercising the option to come under the revised scale of pay, he practically gave a go bye to his intended superannuation beyond 30.9.91. When he took advantage of his own wrong, it will be a travesty of justice if he is allowed to reap further benefit out of the same. 12. Lastly, by exercising the option to come under the revised scale of pay, he practically gave a go bye to his intended superannuation beyond 30.9.91. When he took advantage of his own wrong, it will be a travesty of justice if he is allowed to reap further benefit out of the same. 12. In view of the ratio coupled with the facts as aforesaid, we are of the view that the writ petition was liable to be rejected at the very threshold. 13. The learned trial Judge in the impugned order directed the respondent authority to dispose of his representation for correction of his age on the basis of admit card and school final certificate but from appellant's own averments as noted above it appears that all his representations and appeals were duly considered and disposed of and that nothing is left for further consideration. The submissions on factual aspects before the learned Judge were not correct. The petitioner in accordance with the office record and his own option was to retire from service with effect from 30.9.91. But by an interim order dated 27.9.91 the learned trial Judge directed the parties to maintain status quo as on the said date. By another order dated 10.10.91 the interim order was allowed to continue untill further order. While dealing with the contempt matter the said learned Judge by an order dated 8.1.92 directed that till the contempt matter is disposed of the petitioner is to be paid his salary month by month. It is significant to note that the respondent authorities have not preferred any counter appeal against the impugned judgment and order of the learned trial Judge. 14. For the reasons aforesaid we are of the opinion that the appellant has failed to sustain the appeal which is liable to be disposed with the direction that within two weeks from this date the writ petitioner-appellant shall submit a representation before the respondent authorities for rectification of his age on the basis of the Admit Card and the School Final Pass Certificate and in case the representation is rejected a detailed order shall have to be passed disclosing the ground for such rejection and the said order shall have to be served upon the representationist with expedition. 15. The appeal thus stands disposed of. 16. There shall be no order as to costs. Umesh Chandra Banerjee, J. : I agree. 15. The appeal thus stands disposed of. 16. There shall be no order as to costs. Umesh Chandra Banerjee, J. : I agree. Appeal disposed of.