Judgment :- The above original petition is filed by the Manager of Adithya Vilas am Lower Primary School, Kannimelcherry, an aided school and by a teacher appointed by the Manager in a permanent vacancy. The school is run by the local N.S.S. Karayogam and the Manager is elected by the Karayogam Committee for a period of three years. The first petitioner was elected as Manager on 21-5-1989. Before him, the 7th respondent was the Manager elected in the year 1986 whose appointment was also duly approved by the Department and he continued as Manager till the present incumbent took charge. 2. While the 7th respondent was acting as Manager, the committee appointed the 6th respondent at L.P.S.A. in a leave vacancy for a period of 90 days from 5-12-1988 as per Ext. P1 Order. According to the petitioners, the 6th respondent worked only for 11 days and was absent from duty without specifying any reason. According to respondents 6 and 7, the 6th respondent was prevented from attending duties on other days by one fraction of the local Karayogam who was opposed to her appointment. According to the 6th respondent she had complained about her being prevented from attending duties both to the police as well as the educational authorities and no action was taken by any of them. Subsequently, a permanent vacancy to the post of L.P.S.A. arose in the school with effect from 31-3-89. In that vacancy instead of appointing the 6th respondent on the basis of her claim under S.51A of Chapter XIV of the Kerala Education Rules, the management appointed the second petitioner on 2-1-1990. Being aggrieved by the said appointment, the 6th respondent filed Ext. PS representation to the first respondent. According to the 6th respondent, she had also filed representation to various departmental authorities including the controlling officer viz. the 5th respondent. The first respondent issued notice to the concerned parties on Ext. P8 representation and after hearing the parlies issued Ext. PH order dated 8-3-1991 approving the appointment of the 6th respondent as L.P.S.A. from 7-12-1988 to 4-3-1989 and directing that she would be paid the salary for the days she had actually worked if she is otherwise eligible. Ext. P11 further directed that the first petitioner shall appoint the 6th respondent in the vacancy that arose from 2-1-1990, as the 6th respondent is a 51-A claimant. From a reading of Ext. Ext. P11 further directed that the first petitioner shall appoint the 6th respondent in the vacancy that arose from 2-1-1990, as the 6th respondent is a 51-A claimant. From a reading of Ext. P11, it is clear that the appointment of the 6th respondent was not approved or rejected by the controlling authority under the Kerala Education Rules. The matter was looked into by the Government purportedly under Rule 92 of Chapter XIV-A of the K.E.R. The Rule 92 of Chapter XIV-A of the K.E.R. provides as follows: - "Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the Government may, on their own motion or otherwise, after calling for the records of the case revise any order passed by a Subordinate authority (in respect of matters contained in this Chapter), which is made or is appealable under these rules - a) Confirm, modify or set aside the order b) impose any penalty or set aside, reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty imposed by the order c) rem it the case to the authority, which made the order or to any other authority directing such further action or inquiry as they consider proper in the circumstances of the case, or d) Pass such other order as they deem fit. From a reading of the said rule, it is clear that the jurisdiction conferred on the Government by the said rule is only to revise any order passed by a subordinate authority, in respect of any of the matters contained in Chapter XIV, A which is made or is appealable under the said rules. It is true that while revising any order passed by a subordinate authority, the Government is given power to confirm, modify or set aside the order, impose any penalty or set aside, reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty imposed by the order or remil the case to the authority, which made the order or to any other authority directing such further action or inquiry as they consider proper in the circumstances of the case or pass such other order as they deem fit. All these powers, however wide they are, arc available only in the matter of revising an order passed by a subordinate authority. The Government is not given any authority or power to act in a vacuum. Neither can they pass an order of an original nature purportedly acting under Rule 92. All these powers, however wide they are, arc available only in the matter of revising an order passed by a subordinate authority. The Government is not given any authority or power to act in a vacuum. Neither can they pass an order of an original nature purportedly acting under Rule 92. In the present case, approval or denial of approval of appointment has to be done by the controlling authority viz. respondent No. 5. Incase of delay or refusal on the part of the Controlling Officer to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under the Rules, the aggrieved parties could move the higher authorities to compel the controlling authority to exercise his jurisdiction. The Revisional Authority however is not empowered to interfere in the matter to the extent of passing an order either approving or rejecting the appointment of the teacher concerned in the absence of an order by a subordinate authority, either way. From a plain reading of Rule 92 it is clear that existence of an order passed by a subordinate authority is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction under the said rule. In the present case, the Government has acted without jurisdiction in directly approving the appointment purportedly acting under the revisional jurisdiction. If the Government is permitted to pass original orders under Rule 92 of Chapter XIV-A, it could lead to disastrous consequences. Therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that Ext. P11 is passed without jurisdiction and the same is set aside. 3. The petitioner's counsel contended that the appointment of the 6th respondent is made by the 71h respondent acting as the Manager while he was employed as a Conductor in K.S.R.T.C. and that an employee under the K.S.R.T.C. is prevented by rule 8(2) of Chapter III of the K.E.R. from being appointed as the Manager of a private school. According to learned counsel, the appointment made by the 7th respondent is Therefore ab initio void. The fact that the 7th respondent was elected as the Manager by the local karayogam in the year 1986 and his appointment as Manager was approved by the department for three years is not disputed. Nobody has got a case that the 7th respondent's appointment as Manager was challenged by anyone or the approval granted to him, as Manager was withdrawn. Nobody has got a case that the 7th respondent's appointment as Manager was challenged by anyone or the approval granted to him, as Manager was withdrawn. In the circumstances, there is no merit in the contention that an appointment made by 71h respondent merely because he was employed, as conductor in K.S.R.T.C. during the relevant period would render the appointment made by him an initio void. 4. Various other contentions are also urged. As they relate to disputed questions of fact, I am leaving them open to be decided by the appropriate statutory authority. 5. The vacancy to the permanent post of L.P.S.A. arose as early as on 1-4-1989. The 6th respondent is without any employment. The second petitioner who is appointed to the post has also not been able to draw any salary, as his appointment is not approved. In the circumstances, it is just and necessary that a decision is taken by the controlling officer regarding the approval of appointment of the 61h respondent as per Ext. P1 order of appointment and her consequential claim for appointment to the permanent vacancy which arose subsequently, without any further delay. 1, therefore, direct the 5th respondent to take a final decision regarding the approval of appointment of the 6th respondent as per Ext. P1 and her consequential preferential claim for appointment under Rule 51A of Chapter XIVA of the K.E.R. in the permanent vacancy which arose subsequently, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. Needless to add that all the concerned parties including the petitioners herein and the respondents 6 and 7 should be given an opportunity to be heard in the matter before a final decision is taken by the 5th respondent. With the above direction, the original petition is disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.