Judgment : The 2nd defendant is the petitioner in this civil revision petition against the dismissal of his I.ANo.108 of 1991 praying for restoration of I. ANo.735 of 1990 filed by him and was dismissed on 11. 1990 since he did not pay the cost of Rs.100 which he was directed to pay, by order dated 10. 1990, within the time stipulated (about 25 days). The said I.ANo.735 of 1990 was to set aside the order dated 6. 1990, setting him ex parte in the suit O.S.No.578 of 1988. 2. When the civil revision petition came up before me I posed the question to the learned counsel for the petitioner as to how the abovesaid I.ANo.108 of 1991 itself was maintainable since the order dated 11. 1990 in I.ANo.735 of 1990 was not an ex parte order. Either the petitioner could have filed a petition for enlarging the time granted by the court below for the payment of the abovesaid sum of Rs.100 or filed an appeal or revision in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. But, the petitioner did not resort to either of the two remedies available. Instead, the abovesaid petition has been filed as if the order dated 11. 1990 was an ex parte order. 3. In answer to the abovesaid question posed, the learned counsel for the petitioner very much relied on the decision in Ramanath Mishra v. Ganeswar Mishra,A.I.R1986 Orissa 26. But it has no application to the present case. Thereafter hearing both the parties, the court below, by order dated 7. 1981, set aside the ex parte decree subject to payment of Rs.100 as cost, by 17. 1981. But, since the petitioner therein could not comply with the direction for payment of cost by 17. 1981, a petition was filed for further time to comply with the direction. On consideration, the court below extended the time till 20.7.1981. According to the petitioner therein on 20.7.1981, he could reach the court only at 2.30 p.m. and found that the abovesaid petition for setting aside the ex parte decree was dismissed for non-payment of cost. On the very next day (27. 1981) a petition under Sec.148 read with Sec.151, C.P.C. was filed by the petitioner therein to permit him to deposit the cost on that day. Thus, this petition was actually for further enlargement of time. On the very next day (27. 1981) a petition under Sec.148 read with Sec.151, C.P.C. was filed by the petitioner therein to permit him to deposit the cost on that day. Thus, this petition was actually for further enlargement of time. The court below by order dated 18. 1981, dismissed the said petition, as not maintainable. Thereafter, the petitioner therein filed a petition under Sec.151, C.P.C for restoration of his earlier petition for setting aside the exparte decree. This restoration petition was dismissed by the “impugned order” therein. 4. On those facts, the Orissa High Court no doubt initially held that the trial court erred in rejecting the petition dated 27. 1981 under Sec.148 read with Sec.151, C.P.C. filed by the said petitioner as not maintainable. This initial ruling of the Orissa High Court has no application to the present case, since in the present case, as already indicated, no petition was filed for enlargement of the time originally granted. 5. Then, the Orissa High Court, after the abovesaid initial finding, dealt with the above referred to impugned order. Here, the trial court dismissed the above referred to petition under Sec.151, C.P.C for restoration of the petition to set aside the ex parte decree, on the ground that the dismissal order in the petition for setting aside the ex parte decree was appealable under 0.43, Rule 1(d), C.P.C. In that context, no doubt the Orissa High Court relying on the following passage in Kunj Behari Das v. Chanchala Das, A.I.R. 1966 Orissa 24, set aside the order of the trial court and allowed the abovesaid petition for restoration: “Existence of an alternate remedy by way of appeal has nothing to do with the exercise of the inherent powers by the court in the matter of granting restoration before whom the proceeding was dismissed for default.” 6. But, I find that Kunj Behari Das v. Chanchala Das, A.I.R. 1966 Orissa 24, is a case where the proceeding was dismissed for default of appearance of the petitioner concerned. So, I must state, with due respect that such a ruling in Kunj Behari Das v. Chanchala Das, A.I.R.1966 Orissa 24, has been incorrectly applied to a case where a petition under O.9, Rule 13, C.P.C. was dismissed, not for default in the appearance of the petitioner, but for default in payment of the cost earlier directed to be paid within a stipulated time. 7. This Court has held in M.Selvanayagam v. M.Chella Nadar, 1981 T.L.N.J. 349, that a petition to restore the application under 0.9, Rule 13, C.P.C, dismissed for default of appearance of the petitioner under O.9, Rule 9 read with Sec. 141, C.P.C. would lie (more particularly in view of the explanation recently introduced in Sec.141, C.P.C). It is well known that O.9, Rule 9, C.P.C read with Sec.141, C.P.C provides for setting aside the dismissal of the suit or the petition as the case may be, where the suit or petition is wholly or partly dis missed under Rule 8 of O.9. What the said Rule 8 provides is that, where the defendant (or respondent) appears and the plaintiff (or petitioner) does not appear when the suit (or petition) is called on for hearing, the court shall make an order that the suit (or the petition) be dismissed. So, O.9. Rule 9, C.P.C will come into play only when there is default in the appearance of the plaintiff or the applicant, as the case may be, and not when there is default in the payment of the amount directed to be paid by the court as condition for restoration of the suit or the petition as the case may be. Thus, the abovesaid I.A.No. 108 of 1991 for restoration of I.A.No.735 of 1990 would not lie since there was only default in the payment of the cost directed to be paid in L.A.No. 735 of 1990 as condition for allowing the latter petition under O.9, Rule 13, C.P.C 8. The other decision cited by the learned counsel Jayaraman v. Glaxo Laboratories India Ltd., (1981)2 M.L.J. 11 has also no application to the present case. 9. Even on merits, it cannot be said that the dismissal of L.A.No.108 of 1991 is erroneous. The relevant portion of the supporting affidavit only states as follows: The above allegations are quite vague. It is not stated when actually the Advocate wrote to the petitioner, asking him to pay the abovesaid sum of Rs.100 and what prevented the petitioner from sending the said amount by money order or otherwise to the Advocate. Further, it is not even stated which relative died and when actually he had to go out of his town on account of the abovesaid death. Further, the abovesaid sum is only a small sum of Rs. Further, it is not even stated which relative died and when actually he had to go out of his town on account of the abovesaid death. Further, the abovesaid sum is only a small sum of Rs. 100 and in the abovesaid circumstances, there is absolutely no merit also in the said application. Therefore, there is no case for interference at all. 10. In the result, the civil revision petition is not admitted, but dismissed.