A. P. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) IN the present case the petitioner has approached this Court for quashing of the order dated 25/11/1986 as well as the order dated 17/04/1986 filed respectively as Annexures 7 and 2 to the writ petition. By order dated 17/04/1986 the petitioner was awarded the punishment to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months in civil jail and to be dismissed from Army service by a summary Court Martial whereas by order dated 25/11/1986 the petitioners petition filed on 10/07/1986 against the order dated 17/04/1986 was rejected by the G. O. C. Central Command, Lucknow, respondent No. 2. ( 2 ) BRIEF facts relevant in the present case are that at the relevant time on 9-8-85 the petitioner was posted as guard in the store of the Military Establishment Central Ordinance Depot, Kanpur (hereinafter called the C. O. D. ). The petitioner was charge-sheeted by the officer Commanding of the C. O. D. for committing criminal breach of trust in respect of the property belonging to the Government. It was alleged that while posted at C. O. D. , Kanpur on 20/09/1985 at 6. 30 hours while returning from guard duty the petitioner connived with L. J. Dwivedi to steal 40 shirts which property belonged to the Government. Similar charge-sheet was served on Narendra Singh, Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist guards and J. L. Dwivedi who happened to be the driver of the vehicle in which the petitioner and other guards were sitting at the time of recovery of the shins. ( 3 ) IN the summary Court Martial all these charged persons who faced same charge were asked to plead guilty, whereas the petitioner, Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist pleaded guilty- the driver, J. L. Dwivedi and Narendra Singh guard did not plead guilty. The Court Martial awarded 89 days rigorous imprisonment to Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist and they were retained in service whereas the petitioner was awarded six months rigorous imprisonment and was dismissed from service while J. L. Dwivedi and Narendra Singh, who had not pleaded guilty, were awarded one years rigorous imprisonment and had also been dismissed from service. ( 4 ) SRI Yatindra Singh, who appeared for the petitioner, has raised only one contention in support of his case. ( 4 ) SRI Yatindra Singh, who appeared for the petitioner, has raised only one contention in support of his case. It has been argued by him that the award of punishment to the petitioner different from the punishment awarded to Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist cannot be justdied inasmuch as the petitioner and those two persons, namely, Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist were similarly situated both in respect of the charges levelled on them and the plea of guilt. According to the the petitioners counsel, there was no distinguishing feature for awarding higher punishment to the petitioner and minor punishment on Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Art. 14 of the Constitution and argued that the punishment awarded to the petitioner which is more severe than the punishment awarded to Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist is vitiated by the violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution for the reason, as stated above, that there was no distinguishing feature in the case of the petitioner on one hand and Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist on the other. ( 5 ) ON the other hand, Sri Shishir Kumar, Additional Standing Counsel for the Union of India, has contended that Article 14 of the Constitution has no application to the orders of summary and general Court Martial convened under the Army Act. According to him, it is in the discretion of the Court Martial to award one punishment for the same offence to one and to award other punishment to another person charged with the same offence. The learned counsel argued that in the defence matters the Courts power of judicial review is very limited and it cannot interfere against the quantum of punishment awarded to a member of the Force. The learned counsel placed reliance on S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 : (1990 Cri LJ 2148) and Major G. S. Sodhi v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1617 : (1991 Cri LJ 1947 ). The learned counsel placed reliance on S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 : (1990 Cri LJ 2148) and Major G. S. Sodhi v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1617 : (1991 Cri LJ 1947 ). On the analogy of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, the learned counsel maintained that since the requirements for recording reasons and principles of natural justice, which are necessary ingredients of Article 14 of the Constitution, are not attracted in the case of punishment awarded by the Court Martial, as such, all other ingredients of equality enshrined in the Constitution are also not attracted. ( 6 ) I shall now examine the judgments cited by the learned counsel. In S. N. Mukherjees case (1990 Cri LJ 2148) the Supreme Court has ruled thus : "therefore except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function is required to record the reasons for its decision. "the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and assures a decree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision oi judicial review. Therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. " ( 7 ) IN paid 47, however, the Supreme Court has held that reasons are not required to be recorded for an order passed by the confirming authority while confirming the findings and sentence recorded by the Court Martial. Similarly, the Central Government is also not required to record reasons for dismissing the post-confirmation petition. In para 43, the Supreme Court has held that at the stage of recording findings and sentence the Court Martial is also not required to record its reasons and at that stage reasons are only required for the recommendation for mercy if the Court Martial makes such a representation. ( 8 ) THE question involved in the case of S. N. Mukherjee (1990 Cri LJ 2148) (SC) has been stated in para 9 of the judgment. ( 8 ) THE question involved in the case of S. N. Mukherjee (1990 Cri LJ 2148) (SC) has been stated in para 9 of the judgment. The first question posed was : (I) Is there any general principle of law which requires an administrative authority to record the reasons for its decision; and (II) If so, does the said principle apply to an order confirming the findings and sentence of a court-martial and post-confirmation proceedings under the Act?"a reading of the judgment will show that while replying to the said question the Supreme Court answered the first question in affirmative while its answer to the second question was in the negative. The Supreme Court while replying the first question held that reasons are required to be recorded by an administrative authority while exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions whereas while dealing with the second question it held that the said principle had no application to the case of an order of confirmation of the order of the Court Martial and of the sentence of the Court and also to the post confirmation proceedings before the State Government. ( 9 ) IN my opinion, therefore, the facts of the case do not lend support to the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent to the effect that the Supreme Court has absolutely ruled out the necessity for recording of reasons by Court Martial constituted under the Army Act in any situation whatsoever. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel then placed reliance on the latter part of the observations of the Supreme Court in para 22 of the report in Major G. S. Sodhis case (1991 Cri LJ 1947 ). In that case G. S. Sodhi alleged discrimination in the matter of award of punishment and submitted that Maj. S. C. Mehra tried for a similar offence was awarded severe reprimand, similarly, in the case of Maj. Sen Verma only loss of six months seniority was awarded whereas in this case the punishment awarded was removal from service which was more severe and was, therefore, hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. From the judgment it does not appear that Major G. S. Sodhi and Major S. C. Mehra and Major Sen Verma were tried together for the same offence and were placed similarly in the matter of the plea of guilt and there was no distinguishing feature between their cases. From the judgment it does not appear that Major G. S. Sodhi and Major S. C. Mehra and Major Sen Verma were tried together for the same offence and were placed similarly in the matter of the plea of guilt and there was no distinguishing feature between their cases. Forced with this, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that in the said part of the judgment the Supreme Court had expressed its disinclination to interfere in the matter of punishment awarded by the Court Martial. It will be beneficial to quote the words of the Supreme Court in this context. "the next submission is that there is discrimination in award of punishment. It is submitted that Maj. S. C. Mehra tried in a similar offence was awarded severe reprimand and in the case of Maj. Sen Verma only loss of six months seniority was awarded. We see no merit in the submission. It is for the general court-martial to decide as to what sentence should be awarded in the given circumstances of the case. We are unable to hold that the sentence awarded is wholly disproportionate. " ( 11 ) A reading of the above quoted portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court belies the argument of the learned counsel. The Supreme Court had not absolutely ruled out its interference in case where it was satisfied that the punishment awarded was disproportionate to the offence. In Sodhis case (1991 Cri LJ 1947) the Supreme Court refused to interefere on the quantum of punishment for the reason that it was for the court-martial to decide as to what sentence is to be awarded in the given circumstances. It obviously meant that the circumstances attending in the case of Maj. G. S. Sodhi and Maj. S. C. Mehra were not identical. Similarly, the case of Maj. G. S. Sodhi and Maj. Sen Verma were also not identical. In my opinion, therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court in G. S. Sodhis case has no application to this case for the reason that in the case before me the circumstances in the case of the petitioner and in the cases of Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist were absolutely identical inasmuch as all of them were charged for same offence and all of them pleaded guilty to the charges levelled on them in the same trial. Yet Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist were awarded punishment for 89 days rigorous imprisonment and retention in service whereas the petitioner was singled out, without any reason, to undergo six monthsrigorous imprisonment with dismissal from service. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that this Court cannot interfere against the award of punishment even if it is dissimilar to the award of punishment govern to other persons situated identically is therefore not substantiated from the judgment cited by him above. ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, cited the case of Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2386 : (1988 Cri LJ 158 ). He placed reliance on para 9, the relevant of which reads :"the question of choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous definance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of Judicial review. " ( 13 ) THE Supreme Court on review found in the case of Ranjit Thakur (1988 Cri LJ 158) that the punishment awarded to the appellant was unduly harsh and, therefore, it quashed the sentence and reinstated him in service. ( 14 ) IN view of this decision of the Supreme Court it is not right for the respondents Counsel to argue that in the matter of Court-Martial Article 14 of the Constitution has no application and the Court Martial has absolute and unfettered discretion to pass orders of punishment, which may even appear to be arbitrary and uncalled for in the given set of circumstances. ( 15 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner then cited the case of Mohd. Azaz v. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, (1991 ) 1 UPLBEC 44 and Dr. ( 15 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner then cited the case of Mohd. Azaz v. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, (1991 ) 1 UPLBEC 44 and Dr. Satish Agarwal v. Principal and Chief Superintendent, S. N. Medical College and Hospital, Agra, 1985 UPLBEC 835 . Although these cases do not relate to the defence personnel but since they too deal with the point involved in the case they too deserve consideration. ( 16 ) IN the case of Mohd. Azaz (1991 (1) UPLBEC 44) this court held that while awarding punishment in the case of mass copying in the examination the Board of High School and Intermediate Education U. P. cannot adopt different standards for different students charged with the offence of mass copying without recording reasons for subjecting them to different treatment. In that case, it was found by the Court that although all the examinees were charged with mass copying but some were let off while other set of persons were subjected to lighter punishment and yet another set of persons were punished with severe punishment. In the circumstances, applying the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution, the court quashed the order of punishment awarded to Mohd. Azaz and directed that he should be given the same treatment which was given to the persons who were let off. ( 17 ) THE case of Dr. Satish Agarwal is identical to the facts of the present case. In that case many persons were charged with the same offence but by different charge sheets relating to one single incident whereas apology of some persons was accepted it was not accepted in respect of others. The Court held that since there was no distinguishing feature, between the cases of whose apology was accepted and those whose apology was not accepted, the order was liable to be quashed on the ground of breach of provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court ruled that the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution got immediately attracted when the persons similarly placed are distinguished in the matter of award of punishment without giving reasons for making the distinction. ( 18 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner also cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1984 SC 1499 . ( 18 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner also cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1984 SC 1499 . In the case of Sangara Singh, Supreme Court applied the provisions of Art, 14 of the Constitution for ordering reinstatement of Sangara Singh in service as it was found that Sangara Singh was similarly situated with other police officers who had earlier been reinstated by the Punjab Government on the recommendation of a committee constituted to look into the matter of reinstatement of dismissed agitators. Brief facts of Sangara Singhs case are that disciplinary proceedings were initiated by State Government of Punjab against 1100 members of police force on the ground that they had participated in an agitation which was not allowed under the rules governing the discipline in the police force. A large number of complaints were filed against the agitators and accordingly 1100 members of police force were dismissed as a result of the disciplinary proceedings and prosecutions launched against them. Subsequently, a committee was constituted by the State Government consisting of superior officers of police force to review the cases of dismissed police personnels and on the recommendation of the committee 100 agitating members of police force were reinstated whereas remaining 100 were left out of police force and were not reinstated. Consequently, they filed writ petition for their reinstatement on the same ground on which 1000 members of police force similarly situated with them were reinstated. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions but the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and held as follows :"if the indiscipline of a large number of personnel amongst dismissed personnel could be condoned or overlooked and after withdrawing the criminal cases against them, they could be reinstated, we see no justification in treating the present appellants differently without pointing out how they were guilty of more serious misconduct or the degree of indiscipline in their case was higher than compared to those who were reinstated respondents failed to explain to the Court the distinguishing features and, therefore, we are satisfied in putting all of them in same bracket. On that conclusion the treatment meted to the present appellants suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and Article 14 forbids any arbitrary action which would tantamount to denial of equality as guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. The Court must accordingly interpose and quash the discriminatory action. " ( 19 ) THE above observations of the Supreme Court thus make it clear that in the matter of imposing penalty the government or any governmental agency cannot deal its servants with different yardsticks if they are similarly situated and there is no distinguishing feature which may justify separate deal to them. In the present case as well, the responddents have failed to point out any distinguish penalty to the petitioner as compared to the penalty imposed on Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist. ( 20 ) GIVING my anxious consideration to the facts of the case, the argument of the counsel for the parties and the cases cited, I am of the opinion that the orders under challenge in the writ petition deserve quashing as the same are in violation of principle of the equality clause of Article 14 of the Constitution. In my opinion, even the Court Martial-whether summary or general has no unfettered discretion to impose different punishment to different persons for the same offence when all of them are identically situated in the matter of gravity of offence and the evidence cited in respect of offences against them. Petitioner like Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist having pleaded guilty and having charged with the same offence the award of same punishment to the petitioner as was awarded to Mohan Singh Bist and Y. P. Bhardwaj was the rule as his case was not at all distinguishable from the case of Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist. On the facts before me the respondents were not justified in awarding different punishment to the petitioner from the punishment awarded to Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist. No reason has been given either in order or in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. For satisfying myself regarding existence of reasons on the file, I summoned the record of the case and on examination of the record with the help of the counsel for the respondents. No reason has been given either in order or in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. For satisfying myself regarding existence of reasons on the file, I summoned the record of the case and on examination of the record with the help of the counsel for the respondents. I could not lay my hands to any distinguishing feature in the file which could justify the award of more severe punishment to the petitioner as compared to the punishment awarded to Y. P. Bhardwaj and Mohan Singh Bist. I therefore, set aside the order dated 17/04/1986 and 25/11/1986 (Annexures 2 and 7 to the writ petition respectively) for being in violation of the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 21 ) IN the result, the writ petition sucdeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The orders dated 17/04/1986 and 25/11/1986 are quashed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service. Petitioner shall, however, undergo rigorous imprisonment of 89 days, if he has not already undergone the sentence. The petitioner shall also be entitled to costs. Petition allowed. .