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1993 DIGILAW 207 (ALL)

GOPAL SINGH v. DHANRAJI DEVI

1993-03-29

J.P.SEMWAL

body1993
J. P. SEMWAL, J. ( 1 ) BY the application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. the applicant Gopal Singh has sought quashing of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 418 of 1982 under Section 312/34, I. P. C. Police Station Chiraiya Kot, district-Azamgarh, pending in the court of Additional Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh. ( 2 ) AN incident took place on 21-3-1981 at about 9-9-30 P. M. in which Paramhans Singh, Surya Nath Singh and Kedar died and Devendra singh received injury. Three different First Information Reports were lodged in respect of the said incident by different person, vide Annexure- B,c and D, annexed to the affidavit filed in support of the present application. ( 3 ) IT is alleged that the First Information Report (Annexure-C) was lodged by Smt. Dhanraji, opposite party- No. 3. who was not an eye-witness, while the remaining two First Information Reports were lodged by the eye-witnesses. Chiraiya Kot Police, after investigating the case, submitted final report in all the above Crime Nos. 93, 93a and 938 of 1981. After submission of the final report, the opposite party No. 1 Smt. Dhanraji filed a complaint on 18-6-1983, in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh, against the present applicant along with three others under Ss. 302/34, I. PC. vide annexure-1 to the affidavit filed in support of the instant application. The Additional Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh, has summoned, the applicant and three others under S. 302/34, IPC, vide his order dated 20-9-1982 (Annexure-E), It is contended that out of 14 witnesses mentioned in the list, only Dhanraji, Brijesh Singh, Bhagwan Singh, Harinath, Shah Singh and Dr. S. B. D. Gupta, were examined and the Additional Judicial Magistrate summoned the applicant and three others without complying with the provisions of Sectioh 202 (2), Cr. P. C. The applicant has prayed for quashing of the complaint on the ground that summoning order without complying with the provisions of Section 202 (2), Cr. P. C. is illegal. ( 4 ) AT the time of admission of this application, further proceedings were stayed, vide order dated 2-11-1982 of this Court. ( 5 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have perused the record of the case as well as rulings cited before me. P. C. is illegal. ( 4 ) AT the time of admission of this application, further proceedings were stayed, vide order dated 2-11-1982 of this Court. ( 5 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have perused the record of the case as well as rulings cited before me. ( 6 ) SRI V. C. Tiwari, learned counsel for the applicant, has raised sole contention that the mandatory provisions u/s. 202 (2 ). Cr. P. C. have not been complied with by the Magistrate concerned by not examining all the witnesses of the complainant before summoning the accused and, therefore, the summoning order is illegal and the complaint is liable to be quashed. ( 7 ) IN order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel it would be relevant to set out the provisions of S. 202, Cr. P. C, which, reads as follows :"202 Postponement of issue of process- (i) Any Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance, or which has been made over to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding : provided that, no such direction for investigation shall be made,--- (a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session; or (b) where the complaint has not been made by a court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any,) have been examined on oath under Section 200. (2) In an enquiry under sub-section (1) the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath: provided that if it appers to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. (2) In an enquiry under sub-section (1) the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath: provided that if it appers to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. (3) If an investigation under sub-section (3) is made by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police station, except the power to arrest without warrant. " ( 8 ) THIS section only applies (i) where there is a complaint filed under Section 190 (i) (a), Cr. P. C. before a Magistrate; or (ii) when it is transferred to him under Section 192, Cr. P. C. and not under Section 410. It does not apply when cognizance is taken otherwise than on complaint. This section comes into play when the Magistrate after examining the complainant and his witnesses present if any, has reasons for distrust and thinks that he would not be justified in issuing process without taking some furthersteps to ascertain whether the allegations are prima facie true or not. ( 9 ) A new clause (a) proviso to sub-section (i) and new proviso to sub-section (2) have been added making provision that the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence triable exclusively by Court of Session must himself make an enquiry into the complaint and call upon the complainant to produce all witnesses and examine them on oath and further that in such a case, the. Magistrate must not direct investigation by the police officer or other person. ( 10 ) THIS provision has been incorporated because of the abolition of all committal enquiries in the new code and to provide some sort of preliminary scrutiny by the Magistrate himself in complaint case before he commits a case to the court of session under S. 209, Cr. P. C. ( 11 ) SECTION 202, Cr. ( 10 ) THIS provision has been incorporated because of the abolition of all committal enquiries in the new code and to provide some sort of preliminary scrutiny by the Magistrate himself in complaint case before he commits a case to the court of session under S. 209, Cr. P. C. ( 11 ) SECTION 202, Cr. P. C. makes clear that after issuing process the Magistrate cannot under the present code, hold any enquiry as contemplated by Section 202 of the Code and that once process is issued, the Magistrate can only, where it appears to him that offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, commit the case to the Court of Session. ( 12 ) EVEN in a case, exclusively triable by the Court of Session, all that the Magistrate has to see, is whether on cursory perusal of the complaint and the evidence there is prima facie evidence in support of the charge against the accused, AIR 1980 SC 1780 : ( 1980 Cri LJ 1271) Kewal v. Suraj. ( 13 ) THUS, holding of an enquiry or taking of any other step under Section 202 (1.) is not obligatory in any case but is discretionary that the Magistrate if wants to be further satisfied after examination of the complainant under Section 200 as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This is made clear by the words, may if he thinks fit in Section 202 (1 ). ( 14 ) PROVISO to sub-section (2) of S. 202 cannot be read as a proviso to sub-section (1) of that section. Hence, if the Magistrate issues process after examining the complainant under Section 200, Cr. P. C. and thereafter commits the accused under S. 209, his order cannot be challenged on the ground that he should have held an enquiry under S. 202 and examined all the witnesses of the complainant before issuing process, because, the case was triable exclusively by the Court of Session. ( 15 ) THE proviso to Section 202 (2) is attracted only when the Magistrate postpones issuance of process and holds enquiry. Thus, when the Magistrate does not postpone the issue of the process and on examining the complainant on oath under Section 200, issues process under Section 204, Cr. ( 15 ) THE proviso to Section 202 (2) is attracted only when the Magistrate postpones issuance of process and holds enquiry. Thus, when the Magistrate does not postpone the issue of the process and on examining the complainant on oath under Section 200, issues process under Section 204, Cr. P. C. , in a case exclusively triable by Court of session and subsequently commits the accused to the Court of Session he does not commit any illegality, because he has no obligation to examine all the witnesses of the complainant before the process. ( 16 ) THE obligation under Section 202 (2), Cr. P. C. would not arise in a case where the. Magistrate does not postpone the issue of process and hold an enquiry and the obligation under S. 208 (1) also arises only where the witnesses are examined "under Section 202 or 208". If the Magistrate decides to postpone issue of the process and to hold an enquiry under sub-section ( 1 ) of Section 202, then the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 202 comes into operation and the Magistrate must comply with the statutory requirements of the proviso which are mandatory. The proviso which is appended to sub-section 2 of Section 202 makes it obligatory upon the Magistrate to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath, if the offence alleged is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. It is quite clear from the wording of the proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 202, Cr. P. C. that it places fetter on the discretion of the Magistrate and it is obligatory for him to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath, and which he intends to rely upon. No discretion is given to the Magistrate either to take evidence of all witnesses on oath or not at his discretion. He is bound to require the complainant to call all his witnesses. This proviso does not show that all the prosecution witnesses must be examined by the Magistrate. The intention of the legislature is clear from the words: "all his witnesses", which connote that these witnesses shall be examined which are of the choice of the complainant and which he intends to rely upon. This proviso does not show that all the prosecution witnesses must be examined by the Magistrate. The intention of the legislature is clear from the words: "all his witnesses", which connote that these witnesses shall be examined which are of the choice of the complainant and which he intends to rely upon. The intention of the legislature is not that complainant may be compelled to examine all his witnesses rather only these witnesses were to be examined who can be said to be his witnesses. This is in consonance with Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act which lays down in clear terms that no particular number of witnesses, is necessary for proof of any, fact. ( 17 ) THE mandate is, however, that in an enquiry under sub-section ( 1) of Section 202, Cr. P. C. the Magistrate shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. This enquiry is done by the Magistrate when he is not satisfied from the statement of the complainant and the witnesses present under S. 200, Cr. P. C. The mandate is not for the complainant to produce all witnesses. He has option to examine any number of witnesses mentioned in the list which he intends to rely. All of the witnesses mentioned in the list of the complainant need not be examined and he has an option to give up any of the witnesses of the list. ( 18 ) ON a plain reading of this proviso, it is clear that it mandates (i) that the Magistrate shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and (ii) shall examine them all. The underlying principle behind it is that since the offence alleged is of serious nature and is to be tried by Court of Session, and there being no material before the Court as in a police case, it is necessary that all the witnesses whom the complainant intends to examine in support of his case should be examined in the enquiry under Section 202, Cr. P. C. so that the accused will be aware of the evidence against him. The entire scheme is that an accused person does not come in the picture at all till the process is issued. The object of the proviso apended to sub-section (2) of Section 202, Cr. P. C. so that the accused will be aware of the evidence against him. The entire scheme is that an accused person does not come in the picture at all till the process is issued. The object of the proviso apended to sub-section (2) of Section 202, Cr. P. C. is not only to enable the Magistrate to determine whether process should be issued against the accused but also to confer a statutory right upon the accused, namely, that in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session, no process should be issued until the Magistrate has called upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses. The object of giving this statutory right to the accused is to give him sufficient information of the case against him and to prepare his defence, which right is further ensured by the provisions of Section 208 (i), Cr. P. C. which enjoins the Magistrate to furnish to the accused free of cost copies of statement of all persons recorded under Section 202. This latter right would be defeated where the Magistrate does not examine any witness as required by the proviso. In such a case, he would be deprived of the opportunity to point out discrepancy, if any, in the evidence given in the Court of Session and at the enquiry under the Proviso to Section 202 (2 ). Though the Magistrate is bound to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath but it does not take away the right of the complainant to give up any of the witnesses. , though mentioned in his list, for the proviso does not empower the Magistrate to, prescribe the number of witnesses to be examined by the complainant or to prevent the complainant to withdraw any witnesses from his list. When he does so, such witness ceases to be his witness within the purview of the proviso. The accused has no doubt right to cross-examine the witnesses examined by the complainant but he cannot urge that the proceeding under Section 202 shall be quashed because, the Magistrate did not examine the witnesses given up by the complainant. ( 19 ) THE witnesses required to be produced by the complainant are the witnesses which the complainant intends to examine in support of his case. ( 19 ) THE witnesses required to be produced by the complainant are the witnesses which the complainant intends to examine in support of his case. The proviso only mandates that the Magistrate shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses but it neither expressly nor impliedly prescribes any requirement that it is mandatory for the complainant to examine each one of the persons named in the complaint petition as witnesses and further that the Magistrate is duty bound to ensure the compliance of this requirement. The Magistrate cannot compel the complainant to examine any witness which he does not intend to examine. ( 20 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant cited two single bench rulings of this Court namely, 1990 Cri LJ 2525 Dharamveer v. State of U. P. , 1982 Cri LJ 1270, Anisa v. Banne Khan. The learned counsel of the opposite party No. 1 cited Division Bench ruling of this Court namely Dinesh Chandra Sinha v. Rahmatullah reported in 1981 ACC 313 : (1981 All LJ 344 ). None of the aforesaid rulings relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant helps him. ( 21 ) IN Dharamveers case two points were raised. Firstly, that other witnesses mentioned by the complainant as witnesses of the occurrence were not examined under S. 202 Cr. P. C. and secondly that the statement of the doctor does not indicate that any injury sustained by the prosecution side could be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The learned single Judge has made observations about a wisdom behind enacting the proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 202, Cr. P. C. and the duty of the Magistrate under said sub-section. It was on the second point that learned Judge partly allowed the petition as the doctor had not said in the statement that any of the injuries sustained were likely to cause death or were in the normal case suspected to cause that harm. Thus, the Magistrates order was quashed in so far as he had summoned the petitioner under Section 307, IPC but it was upheld in so far as it related to Ss. Thus, the Magistrates order was quashed in so far as he had summoned the petitioner under Section 307, IPC but it was upheld in so far as it related to Ss. 147, 148, 149, 323 and 324, I. P. C. ( 22 ) IN case of Anisa relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, it has been held that all the witnesses should be examined before summoning the accused, if the offence complained of was exclusively triable by the Court of Session. In that case also, two submissions were made. Firstly it was submitted that the Magistrate could not have summoned the accused persons. However, the statements under Section 200 and 202, Cr. P. C. were not Annexed, hence his Lordship did not find that prima facie any case was disclosed by the complaint. Next submission was that the offence being under Section 364, IPC any order summoning accused persons could not have been passed without recording the entire statements. The learned Judge agreed with this submission and was of the opinion that the mandatory provisions of Ss. 202 (2), Cr. P. C. have been contravened because all the witnesses have not been examined. The order of the special Judicial Magistrate summoning the accused persons was, therefore, quashed. The learned Judge, however, sent back the case to the lower court for compliance of the provisions contained in S. 202 (2), Cr. P. C. It was observed that if the accused persons are to be summoned under any sections, offence under which is triable exclusively by the Sessions Court, they cannot be summoned unless all the witnesses desired to be produced are examined and it is also recorded that the complainant does not want to produce any other witnesses. ( 23 ) IN the Division Bench ruling of this Court namely Dinesh Chandra Sinha v. Rahmatullah reported in 1981 ACC 313 : (1981 All LJ 344), relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1, it has been held that the Magistrate can certainly summon the accused even after examining some of the witnesses mentioned in the complaint but the complainant has to make it clear that witnesses examined on his behalf were only witnesses on whom he intended to rely upon. If the complainant does not make this position clear that it is not open to the Magistrate to summon the accused without examining all the witnesses either mentioned in the complaint or in the list accompanying the complaint. It has also been observed in this ruling, that before summoning the accused, it is not upon the Magistrate to insist upon the production of all the witnesses cited by the complainant in his complaint. He can summon the accused, even after some of the witnesses cited in the complaint have been examined by the complainant but this he can do only in the event when the complainant make it clear that the witnesses examined by him were the only witnesses on whom it intended to rely upon. If the names of some persons to be examined as witnesses are not specifically mentioned in the complaint the Magistrate will call upon to disclose their names and examine them also if he so wished or give them up it he does not want to examine them. Their Lordships of the Division Bench in the aforecited case of Dinesh Chandra Sinha followed ratio laid down in the rulings of Haribans Tewari v. Hari Shankar reported in 1977 A Cr R 287 Babu Ram v. State of U. P. reported in 1978 A Cr R 126 and Mohan Singh v. Uttam Singh reported in 1980 Prayag Mirror Prakashika 245. ( 24 ) SRI D. P. Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1 argued that out of six eye-witnesses named in the report lodged by Smt. Dhanraji Devi, five witnesses namely Brijesh Singh, Bhagwan Singh , Saheb Singh, Shivhari Singh and Devendra Singh have been produced and examined. Apart from these five eye-witnesses, Smt. Dhanraji Devi examined herself and Dr. Gupta who conducted the autopsy and Head constable Bhadeshwar Prasad who scribed the First Information Report one more witness namely Radhey Shyam who was named as eyewitness in the First information Report was not examined and the complainant had given an application to the effect that she did not wish to produce him as he had been won over by the other side. These averments have been made in the counter affidavit filed by Ram Achar Singh as pairokar of opposite partly No. 1 Dhanraji Devi. These averments have been made in the counter affidavit filed by Ram Achar Singh as pairokar of opposite partly No. 1 Dhanraji Devi. ( 25 ) LEARNED counsel for the opposite party No. 1 thus argued that the aforesaid ruling of Dinesh Chandra Sinha supported his contention that the order of summoning the accused even after examining some of the witnesses, mentioned in the complaint is legal as witnesses examined on behalf of complainant were the only witnesses on whom she desired to be produced and intended to rely upon. ( 26 ) THE learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1 submitted that the complainant was relying on the evidence of the witnesses examined under Section 202, Cr. P. C. and was not relying on the evidence of Radhey Shyam who was named as eye witness in the First Information Report and had been won over by the other side. This has not been controverted. The contention has substance. Even the ruling of Smt. Anisa v. Banne Khan, reported in 1982 Cri LJ 1270 cited by the learned counsel for the applicant makes observation that if the accused persons are to be summoned under any Section, offence under which is triable exclusively by the Sessions Court they cannot be summoned unless all the witnesses desired to be produced are examined and it has also been recorded that the complainant does not want to produce any other witnesses. In that case, the case was sent back to the lower Court for compliance of the provisions of Section 202 (2), Cr. P. C. with the aforementioned observations. The emphasis is on the examination of the witnesses which the complainant desired to be produced. ( 27 ) THIS ruling also supports the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1 that the summoning order on the basis of the witnesses examined and relied upon by the complainant does not suffer from any illegality and there has been substantial compliance of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 202, Cr. P. C. Other ruling cited by the learned counsel for the applicant namely Dharamveer v. State of U. P. , 1990 Cri LJ 2525, is distinguishable on facts and does not help the applicant in any way. ( 28 ) THE present petition is under S. 482, Cr. P. C. Other ruling cited by the learned counsel for the applicant namely Dharamveer v. State of U. P. , 1990 Cri LJ 2525, is distinguishable on facts and does not help the applicant in any way. ( 28 ) THE present petition is under S. 482, Cr. P. C. for quashing the complaint on the basis of which the Learned Magistrate summoned the applicant and 3 others after recording statements of five eye-witnesses besides reporter Smt. Dhanraji, Dr. Gupta and constable Bhadeshwar Prasad. It is specifically mentioned in the counter-affidavit of Ram Adhar Singh Pairokar of the opposite party No.- 1 Smt. Dhanraji Devi that the complainant had given application that she did not wish to produce Radhey Shyam who was named as an eye-witness as he had been won over by the other side. It is also averred in para 11 of the counter-affidavit that the complainant did not wish to place reliance on any other evidence and she made an application to the effect that other witnesses were not necessary and would not be produced by her. It is also averred in para 12 of the said affidavit that complainant herself informed the Court that she wished to produce the above 8 witnesses and there was no need to examine the other evidence. ( 29 ) IN view of the provisions of S. 202 (2), Cr. P. C. and the aforecited Division Bench ruling of this Court in Dinesh Chandra Sinha v. Rahmatullah reported in 1981 ACC 313 : (1981 All LJ 344); the order of summoning the applicant and 3 others, does not suffer from any illegality as Learned Magistrate has examined all the witnesses which the complainant desired to produce and intended to rely upon. There has thus been substantial compliance of the provisions of S. 202 (2), Cr. P. C. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of opposite party No. 1 Smt. Dhanraji Devi, it is stated that Smt. Dhanraji has made an application that the other witnesses are not necessary and would not be produced and that she wished to produce 8 witnesses. There has thus been substantial compliance of the provisions of S. 202 (2), Cr. P. C. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of opposite party No. 1 Smt. Dhanraji Devi, it is stated that Smt. Dhanraji has made an application that the other witnesses are not necessary and would not be produced and that she wished to produce 8 witnesses. Sri D. P. Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1 also made statement at the bar that the complainant relies upon the evidence of 8 witnesses only which she had produced and that she does not rely on the evidence of Radhey Shyma, whom the complainant did not desire to examine. It is thus, quite evident that 8 witnesses which have been examined by the Magistrate were the only witnesses which the complainant desired to be produced and intended to rely upon and thus there was compliance of provisions of S. 202 (2), Cr. P. C. ( 30 ) THE applicant seeks to quash the complaint aforementioned by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482, Cr. P. C. ( 31 ) INHERENT powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. The statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. An inherent jurisdiction can be invoked only to prevent abuse of process of court. The inherent powers under S. 482, Cr. P. C. can be exercised by the High Court (i) to give effect to any order passed under the code or (ii) to prevent abuse of any process of any Court of (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. ( 32 ) SECTION 482, Cr. P. C. closely resembles Section 151, C. P. C. and proceeds on the same principle and deals with inherent powers of the High Court. No doubt, the terms of Section 482, Cr. P. C. are wide but at the same time it must be clearly understood that they do not extend the jurisdiction of the High Court to the matters which are not inherently under its jurisdiction. The power being extraordinary ought to be resorted to as far as possible for extraordinary cases. No doubt, the terms of Section 482, Cr. P. C. are wide but at the same time it must be clearly understood that they do not extend the jurisdiction of the High Court to the matters which are not inherently under its jurisdiction. The power being extraordinary ought to be resorted to as far as possible for extraordinary cases. ( 33 ) THIS inherent power cannot be exercised when there is a remedy already available or for doubtful or trivial matters or to help those who sleep over their rights in preferring appeals, etc. or at last resort after failure in available remedies under the specific provisions of the Code. The powers under S. 482, Cr. P. C. cannot be lightly exercised to defeat and delay the normal procedure. 33a. The Honble Supreme Court has summarised some categories to the cases where inherent powers can and should be exercised to quash proceedings- ( 1) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar e. g. want of sanction (2) where the allegations in the F. I. R. or complaint admitting its face value do not constitute any offence, and (3) where allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence or the evidence adduced clearly fails to prove the charge. The High Court while exercising inherent jurisdiction would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry, whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. It is the function of a trial Court. ( 34 ) THE Honble Supreme Court has in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1978 SC 47 : (1978 Cri L. J 165) held the following principles: (1) The power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. (2) It should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, and, (3) It should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. ( 35 ) IN determining whether the allegations in the complaint disclose any offence, the Court has to proceed on the assumption that the allegations are uncontroverted; it cannot enter into the investigation as to whether those allegations are correct or incorrect. ( 35 ) IN determining whether the allegations in the complaint disclose any offence, the Court has to proceed on the assumption that the allegations are uncontroverted; it cannot enter into the investigation as to whether those allegations are correct or incorrect. At the stage of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, the High Court is guided by the allegations whether those allegations set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet do not in law constitute or spell out any offence. In the present case, the complaint filed by Smt. Dhanraji discloses offence and the evidence under S. 202, Cr. P. C. , produced by her supports the allegations made in the complaint. There is thus legal evidence in support of the allegations made in the complaint for the satisfaction of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh. The said Magistrate has issued process after carefully considering the evidence on record and he found from the evidence of the witnesses examined under Section 202, Cr. P. C. that a prima facie case against the accused is made out and hence the accused persons were summoned under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, vide Annexure-E to the affidavit. The High Court would not enter into a meticulous examination of the evidence to determine on the sufficiency of the evidence to justify issue of the process. ( 36 ) THE applicant has though prayed for quashing of the complaint but learned counsel for the applicant has urged about the illegality of the summoning order dated 20-9-l982 passed by the Additional Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh for non-compliance of the provisions of S. 202 (2), Cr. P. C. The appellant had alternative remedy of revision against the summoning order which he has not availed and has choosen to file the present application under S. 482, Cr. P. C. ( 37 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant cited ruling reported in 1986 ACC 36, Dinkar Rao v. Vijay Kumar Goyal. In that case, the learned single Judge has held that revision is maintainable against the order summoning the persons as accused. P. C. ( 37 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant cited ruling reported in 1986 ACC 36, Dinkar Rao v. Vijay Kumar Goyal. In that case, the learned single Judge has held that revision is maintainable against the order summoning the persons as accused. The learned single Judge has followed the ruling reported in case of Ram Yash v. State of U. P. , 1977 Cri LJ 355 (sic); Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, 1985 AWC 103; Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, 1978 AWC 96 : (1978 Cri LJ 165) and AIR 1980 SC 962 : (1980 Cri LJ 690), V. C. Shukla v. State. In this ruling in para 27 it is observed :" In order to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, under S. 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure. it has to be shown that : (i) either it is a case in which the institution or continuance of proceedings amounts to abuse of the process of the Court; or (ii) there is a legal bar against the institution of continuance of the proceedings; or (iii) where the allegations in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in its entirety, do not constitute an offence; or (iv) there is no legal evidence in support of the e\ase. " ( 38 ) IN that case, it was held that all the allegations made in the complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in its entirety, could not constitute any offence against the applicant-revisionist nor there was any legal evidence at all in support of the case put forward by the complainant, such gross abuse of the process of law cannot be countenanced by this Court. ( 39 ) IN the result, the revision as well as application under S. 482, Cr. P. C. were allowed in that case and the proceedings against their revisionist-applicant, were quashed. This authority does not go to help the applicant of the present application at all as in the instant case, as already stated, the allegations made in the complaint of Smt. Dhanraji disclose offence and there is legal evidence in support of the case, put forward by the complainant. The learned Magistrate has made compliance of S. 202 (2) , Cr. P. C. before issuing process to the applicant and 3 others. The learned Magistrate has made compliance of S. 202 (2) , Cr. P. C. before issuing process to the applicant and 3 others. There is thus no illegality in the order of summoning the applicant, dated 29-9-1992. In fact, the applicant challenged the summoning order dated 29-9-1982 though made prayer for quashing the complaint. The applicant did not avail remedy of revision under S. 397, Cr. P. C. specifically provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though the applicant has approached this Court under the lebel (sic) (label) of S. 482, Cr. P. C. however, I have considered the contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant regarding the summoning order as well. There is some overlapping between the powers under S. 397, Cr. P. C. and 482, Cr. P. C. because both are aimed at securing the ends of justice and both are discretionary. ( 40 ) IT is well settled by a long catena of decisions of Supreme Court that at the stage of issuing process, the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he has only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. It is not a province of the Magistrate to enter into detailed discussions of the merits or demerits of the case nor can the High Court go into this matter in its revisional jurisdiction which is very limited one. ( 41 ) IN the present case none of the grounds mentioned under S. 482, Cr. P. C. exist and the inherent power under this section cannot be exercised in the absence of any manifest illegality, miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of Court. To exercise powers under S. 482. Cr. P. C. High Court has to see whether the allegations made in the petition or complaint without adding or substracting anything if proved, makes out a prima facie offence and whether the accused has prima facie committed that offence. At the stage of issuing process against the accused the High Court cannot go into the question as to what would his defence , Municipal Corporation v. Purushottam; AIR 1971 SC 1389 : (1971 Cri LJ 1110), Balraj v. Mohiram ). At the stage of issuing process against the accused the High Court cannot go into the question as to what would his defence , Municipal Corporation v. Purushottam; AIR 1971 SC 1389 : (1971 Cri LJ 1110), Balraj v. Mohiram ). ( 42 ) IT has been held by the Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1982 SC 784 : (1982 Cri LJ 629 (2)) (Khacheru Singh v. State of U. P. ). "if eventually, the learned Magistrate comes to the conclusion that no offence was made out against the accused, it will be open to him to discharge or acquit him, as the case may be". In the case of Kewal Krishna v. Surajbhan reported in AIR 1980 SC 1780 : (1980 Cri LJ 1271), the Supreme Court has observed in para 9 of the report "at the stage of Ss. 203 and 204 ,cr. P. C. in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session, all that Magistrate has to do is to see whether on a cursory perusal of the complaint and the evidence recorded during the preliminary inquiry under Ss. 200 and 202, Cr. P. C. there is prima facie evidence in support of the charge levelled against the accused. All that he has to see is whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. At this stage, the Magistrate is not to weigh the evidence meticulosuly as if he were the trial Court. The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinising the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charge. This Court has held in Ramesh Singhs case reported in AIR 1977 SC 2018 : (1977 Cri LJ 1606) ate of Bhiar v. Ramesh Singh) that even at the stage of framing charges the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the complainant produces or proposes to adduce at the trial, is not to be meticulosuly judged. The standard of proof and judgment, which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of framing charges. A fortiori, at the stage of Ss. The standard of proof and judgment, which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of framing charges. A fortiori, at the stage of Ss. 202,/ 204, if there is prima facie evidence in support of the allegation in the complaint relating to a case exclusively triable by the Court of session that will be a sufficient ground for issuing, process to the accused and committing them for trial to the Court of Session. " ( 43 ) AS stated above, all the witnesses which the complainant desired to produce and intended to rely upon, had been examined by the learned Magistrate. It has been made clear in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party No. 1, Smt. Dhanraji Devi that she wished to produce 8 witnesses only and other witnesses would not be produced. The learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1 also made statement at the bar that the complainant relies upon 8 witnesses only which she had produced. Thus, the complainant has made her position clear that 8 witnesses produced by her and examined by the Magistrate were her witnesses which she desired to be produced and intended to rely upon and that she would not rely upon the other witnesses. There has, thus, been substantial compliance of the provisions of S. 202 (2), Cr. P. C. The learned Magistrate should record in his order of committal that 8 witnesses produced by the complainant and examined by him were the only witnesses of the complainant which she desired to be produced and intended to rely upon. ( 44 ) IN view of my foregoing discussions, there is neither any illegality nor abuse of process of Court nor quashing of the complaint is necessary for securing the ends of justice. I do not find it a fit case which calls for interference in the matter by invoking inherent jurisdiction under S. 482, Cr. P. C. ( 45 ) THE application under S. 482, Cr. P. C. is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed. .