JUDGMENT - M.K. MUKHERJEE, C.J.:-For committing the murder of his sister-in-law (brothers wife) and attempting to commit the murder of his mother the appellant has been convicted under section 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code respectively by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Satara. For the first conviction he has been sentenced to imprisonment for life and for the other rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs. 500/- in default rigorous imprisonment for one year, with a direction that the substantive sentences shall run concurrently. 2. According to the prosecution case, the incident took place on November 1, 1988 at or about 8 p.m. in the house of Muktabai (the mother) in village Dolegaon within the Police Station of Borgaon where she used to reside with her second son Jayvant, his wife Lata (the deceased) and youngest son Ashok (the appellant). It is alleged that at the time of the incident, only Muktabai and Lata were in the house as Jayvant had gone to Satara and the appellant had gone out after having his meals. While they were preparing for going to bed the appellant came armed with an axe and assaulted Muktabai causing three injuries on her person. Then he inflicted two blows upon Lata with the axe resulting in her instantaneous death. 3. While being assaulted, Muktabai raised a hue and cry and on hearing the same some neighbours including Ramchandra Godse, the Police Patil, and another Ramchandra Godse, came there and heard about the incident from Muktabai. Jayvant came back home at or about midnight and also heard about the incident from Muktabai. Muktabai was removed to hospital by Jayvant and from there she went to the police station and lodged an information about the incident. On that information a case was registered which ended in a charge-sheet. 4. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges levelled against him and contended that his mother had falsely implicated him at the instance of his brother Jayvant with whom he was inimically disposed. He also took a plea of insanity. 5. To prove the charges levelled against the appellant the prosecution principally relied upon the testimony of Muktabai (P.W. 2), the mother of the appellant. He also took a plea of insanity. 5. To prove the charges levelled against the appellant the prosecution principally relied upon the testimony of Muktabai (P.W. 2), the mother of the appellant. She testified that on the day of the incident the appellant assaulted her by means of an axe as a result of which she sustained injury on her head, right shoulder and right hand finger. She further stated that after assaulting her the appellant assaulted her sons wife Lata by the axe as a result of which she sustained injury on her throat and fell down dead. According to her while being assaulted she raised hue and cry and some witnesses came to the spot. To them and to her son Jayvant who came later she narrated the incident. 6. As regards the motive for such assault, P.W. 3 testified that the appellant had kept a sum of Rs. 600/- which he received as his remuneration for working as an agricultural labourer, with her and she had spent some amount out of it. The appellant however was insisting upon return of that money but she was unable to comply with his demand. P.W. 3 lastly stated that she was examined by a doctor for the injuries sustained by her and that she had lodged an information about the incident with the police station. 7. P.W. 3 was cross-examined at length principally to establish that the appellant was insane at the material time and that he did not know what he was doing. We will refer to the answers given by her on that aspect at the appropriate stage. Suffice it to say that as regards her testimony as to the manner in which she sustained injuries and Lata, met with her death she was not cross-examined except that a suggestion was put to her that she had falsely implicated the appellant but the suggestion was denied. Having carefully gone through her entire evidence we do not find any reason to disbelieve her testimony more particularly when thereby she was implicating her own son. 8. The testimony of P.W. 3 stands corroborated first by the testimonies of Ramchandra Godse (P.W. 5) and the other Ramchandra Godse (P.W. 6) . Having carefully gone through her entire evidence we do not find any reason to disbelieve her testimony more particularly when thereby she was implicating her own son. 8. The testimony of P.W. 3 stands corroborated first by the testimonies of Ramchandra Godse (P.W. 5) and the other Ramchandra Godse (P.W. 6) . P.W. 5, the Police Patil of the village, stated that on November 1, 1989 at or about 8.15 p.m. he came to know about the incident and within a few minutes he reached the house of Muktabai. There he met Muktabai who had bleeding injuries on her person and on his query she told him that the accused appellant had assaulted her and had also assaulted Lata by means of an axe. P.W. 6, who lives 50 feet away from the house of the appellant, stated that on November 1, 1988 at or about 8.30 p.m. while he was in his house he heard a hue and cry raised by Muktabai that she and her daughter-in-law were being assaulted by Ashok (the appellant). Thereafter he went to the house of Muktabai and saw Lata and Muktabai with bleeding injuries on their persons. As there is nothing on record to discredit P.Ws. 5 and 6 it must be said that their evidence corroborates the testimony of P.W. 3 to the extent that at the earliest opportunity she spoke about the incident to the neighbours. 9. The next piece of evidence to corroborate the evidence of P.W. 3 is furnished by the First Information Report wherein the substratum of the prosecution case finds place. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the First Information Report was lodged by her in the early morning of the following day. 10. From the report of the post-mortem examination of deceased Lata and from the medical certificate issued in respect of the examination of P.W. 3, both admitted in evidence under section 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we find that Lata had incised wounds on the mandible and the neck, with all great vessels cut at the side of the wounds and that P.W. 3 had five incised wounds on her body besides two abrasions on the knee. The incised wounds found on the persons of the two victims were clearly possible by a sharp cutting instrument like an axe, as is the prosecution case. 11. The incised wounds found on the persons of the two victims were clearly possible by a sharp cutting instrument like an axe, as is the prosecution case. 11. Another circumstance which also corroborates the ocular version of the incident as given out by P.W. 3 is that an axe smeared with blood was found lying on the ground in the house of P.W. 3 and was seized by the Investigating Officer in the presence of witnesses on November 2, 1988. The axe was sent for chemical analysis and on such analysis it was found to contain human blood. 12. For the foregoing discussion it must be held that the prosecution has been able to conclusively prove that the appellant caused the death of Lata by assaulting her with an axe and attempted to cause death of his mother with the self same axe. 13. The next question which seeks an answer is whether the appellant can claim the benefit of section 84 of the Indian Penal Code in view of his plea of insanity. 14. It is pertinent to point out here that in his examination under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the appellant never raised the plea of insanity. However since absence of a specific plea does not debar an accused from raising such a plea on the basis of materials brought on record, we have to entertain and record a finding on that plea. 15. Section 84 does not confer immunity from criminal liability in every case of insanity of the accused. Along with the insanity there must be proof of the fact that at time of commission of the act he was, in view of his insanity, incapable of knowing the nature of the act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. The mere fact that on earlier occasions he had suffered from mental derangement will not be sufficient to bring his case within the exemption of section 84. To put it differently, in order to avail of the benefit under section 84 it must be shown that the mental faculties of the accused were, as a result of unsoundness of mind, so completely deranged as to render him incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he was doing was either morally wrong or contrary to law. To arrive at such a conclusion it is therefore necessary to ascertain the conduct of the accused, particluarly prior to, at the time of and immediately after the commission of the crime. Let us, therefore, consider the materials on record in the light of the above principles. 16. Evidence on record unmistakably shows that about 1 or 11/2 years before the incident in question the accused had to be kept in a mental asylum and that he was discharged therefrom after six months. According to the mother (P.W. 3) he had to be removed to the mental hospital then as he used to frequently assault her and the villagers and attack animals. But then, as already observed history of earlier mental derangement cannot by itself be sufficient to bring a case within the exemption of section 84. We have therefore to find out the conduct of the accused after coming back cured 6/7 months prior to the incident. It was suggested to P.W. 3 in cross-examination that the appellant had assaulted her under the impression that he was beating a dog or snake but she denied the suggestion. She however stated that after coming out from the mental hospital he once shouted snake. P.W. 3 also admitted that the appellant was not in a position to identify persons when he was under mental derangement and that he used to tear books, break earthen pots and cause loss to property. But then so far as his mental state at the time of the incident in question is concerned P.W. 3 stated, while admitting that he had come back under a state of mental disorder stated that it was not true that the appellant was shouting dog and snake and that she had not seen the accused holding the axe and moving it around him. 17. P.W. 4 Jayvant, the appellants brother, categorically denied the suggestion that even after the appellant was discharged from the mental hospital he was having fits of insanity. Similar suggestions were put to P.Ws. 5 and 6 to show that the accused was insane even at the material time, but they denied the suggestions. Having carefully gone through the evidence on record we do not find materials from which it can be said that the requirements to avail of the exemption under section 84 of the Indian Penal Code have been fulfilled. 18. 5 and 6 to show that the accused was insane even at the material time, but they denied the suggestions. Having carefully gone through the evidence on record we do not find materials from which it can be said that the requirements to avail of the exemption under section 84 of the Indian Penal Code have been fulfilled. 18. On the contrary, the materials on record indicate that the accused was, at the material time, mentally alert. The proof of such fact is provided by P.W. 3 herself when she stated that the accused had been pestering her for the money he had deposited with her which he earned by working as a labourer. This statement shows not only that the appellant was gainfully employed just before the incident but was also conscious about his material claims. Then again we find that the accused entered the house armed with an axe and assaulted the victims on vital parts of their body. The most telling proof of his mental alertness is furnished by the fact that immediately after committing the crime the appellant absconded for three months until he was apprehended by the police and during the first 15 days worked as a labourer under Mahadeo Jadhav (P.W. 2) of village Gotkindi. Normally abscondance by itself is not an incriminating circumstance against an accused but then in the facts of the instant case it assumes importance in that it militates against the plea of the appellant. He ran away from the place of the incident and made himself scarce obviously because he knew that he had done some heinous act. Such knowledge necessarily means that he was fully conscious of what he had done. The conduct of the appellant immediately before, at the time of and after the incident therefore wholly disproves the plea of insanity raised by the appellant. When this finding is considered in the light of the nature, number and the location of the injuries inflicted upon the two victims there cannot be any manner of doubt that the appellant committed the offences of murder and attempt to commit murder. 19. On the conclusions as above, we find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same. Appeal dismissed.