Narayanan v. State of Kerala — 1993 DIGILAW 21 (KER)

Judgment :- Petitioner is an Additional Director of Public Relations in the service of the respondent State. The original petition was filed on 25-3-1992 challenging the two proceedings Exts.P12 and P13 of the Government by which the petitioner was informed that his claim for being posted as Director of Cultural Affairs could not be granted and that the earlier decisions rejecting such a claim did not require reconsideration. The original petition was subsequently sought to be amended by filing CMP.No.15954 of 1992 to quash the appointment of one E.K. Bharath Bhooshan an officer borne in the LAS. cadre as Director of Public Relations by the proceedings Ext.P16 dated 26-6-1992. This petition was allowed on 20th July, 1992. 2. Before proceeding to state the facts of the case or dealing with the contentions raised by the parties, I must mention a feature that has been noted in many of the original petitions that have come up before me for hearing. Leave is often granted by this court for amending the original petitions incorporating new averments and new prayers besides producing new documents. Very often the amendments are not carried out in the original petition; nor copies of the amended original petition produced with the result the court has to wade through various petitions to get a true picture of the amended original petition. Such a situation exists in this original petition also, the petitioner not having chosen to carry out the amendment allowed by CMP.No.15954 of 1992 in the original petition. Nor has he chosen to produce copies of the amended original petition. Normally this should have entailed refusal to look into the amendment. But I am refraining from doing so to avoid a failure of justice. It is necessary that all amendments to an original petition either in the averments or the prayers in the original petition or by way of production of new documents should be carried out in the original petition besides producing copies of the amended original petition for the use of the court and for service on the contesting respondents. However, as stated earlier I am treating he petition as one amended by CMP.No.15954 of 1992 and dealing with it as such despite the default on the part of the petitioner in carrying out the amendment. However, as stated earlier I am treating he petition as one amended by CMP.No.15954 of 1992 and dealing with it as such despite the default on the part of the petitioner in carrying out the amendment. I must also mention that in between the original petition and C.M.P.No.15954 of 1992 a document had been introduced as Ext.P15 along with CMP.No.14019 of 1992, a petition for direction. Having regard to the numbering of this annexure, it is clear that the petitioner intended that also to be treated as part of the original petition. But it has made its appearance in a petition for direction without being followed by any petition for amendment of the original petition. Production of such documents along with applications for interim relief to be treated as exhibits in the main petition also causes difficulties to the court when such production is not followed up by appropriate amendment. One of the problems that may arise is that the exhibit in question will remain unexplained and unanswered in any counter affidavit that may be filed by the respondents as it does not form part of the original petition itself, though that contingency does not arise so far as this case and Ext.P15 produced along with CMP.No. 14019 are concerned. With these prefatory remarks I shall proceed to state the facts and deal with the matter on merits. 3. The petitioner joined the service of the State as an Information Officer under the Special Recruitment Programme in the year 1973, he being a member of the Scheduled Caste. He was the seniormost Deputy Director in the Public Relations Department and was promoted as an Additional Director of Public Relations by the proceedings Ext.P1 dated 26-6-1990. There was also a post of Director of Cultural Affairs in the Department which was treated as next in rank to the post of Director of Public Relations in the department as laid down in the government order Ext.P7 dated 8-7-1986. Previously there were posts of Special Officer (Official Languages) in the General Administration Department and the post of Director of Cultural Affairs in the Public Relations Department. Previously there were posts of Special Officer (Official Languages) in the General Administration Department and the post of Director of Cultural Affairs in the Public Relations Department. By Ext.P7 order Government shifted the post of Special Officer (Official Languages) from the General Administration Department to the Public Relations Department, combining it with the post of Director of Cultural Affairs and redesignating the letterpost as Director of Cultural Affairs and Special Officer (Official Languages) which was the post ordered to be treated as next in rank to the Director of Public Relations in the Public Relations Department. This was the state of affairs as per Ext.P7 dated 8-7-1986. 4. While the petitioner was functioning as the Additional Director of Public Relations pursuant to Ext.P1, the post of Director of Cultural Affairs and Special Officer (Official Languages) fell vacant on the promotion and appointment of one Nataraja Panicke- as Director of Public Relations. The petitioner being the next seniormost officer in the Department aspired to be posted to that vacancy and made representation. But that was negatived by government. The petitioner made repeated representations and that resulted in the proceedings Exts. P12 and P13 informing him the t the earlier decision of government not to promote him as Director of Cultural Affairs n! Special Officer (Official Languages) did not require reconsideration. Petitioner filed this original petition challenging Exts.P12 and P13 as stated earlier. 5. While the original petition was pending, Nataraja Panicker retired from service, on 50-6-1992. Petitioner as the seniormost officer in the department aspired to be promoted and posted as the Director of Public Relations. Petitioner made appropriate re] presentation, which was produced along with CMP.No.14019 a petition for directions as Ext. P15 requesting that he may be posted as the Director of Public Relations with effect from 1-7-1992. The direction sought in that petition was that any decision taken by the government in the matter of appointment of the Director of Public Relations may be stayed. This court issued an interim direction as prayed for on 29-6-1992 and that has continued till date. 6. As apprehended by the petitioner, government decided to appoint an I.A.S. Officer as Director of Public Relations and issued orders accordingly as per Ext.P16 dated 26-6-1992. Petitioner therefore sought leave to amend the original petition which as I mentioned earlier, was allowed on 20-7-1992. 7. 6. As apprehended by the petitioner, government decided to appoint an I.A.S. Officer as Director of Public Relations and issued orders accordingly as per Ext.P16 dated 26-6-1992. Petitioner therefore sought leave to amend the original petition which as I mentioned earlier, was allowed on 20-7-1992. 7. As the original petition stands at present, the original prayer was to appoint the petitioner as Director of Cultural Affairs and Special Officer (Official Languages) and the additional prayer was to quash Ext.P16. 8. A counter affidavit was filed in the first instance on 14-7-1992, after which this court made the interim direction earlier passed on CMP.No.14019 of 1992 absolute on 30th July 1992. The State was also directed to file an additional counter affidavit to the amended original petition and accordingly an additional counter affidavit was filed on 11th August 1992. So far as the post of Director of Cultural Affairs is concerned, it is stated that government had decided not to fill up the said post as a measure of economy. Petitioner could not compel the government to fill up the said post when the government had otherwise decided not to fill it up at present. So far as Ext.P116 was concerned, it was stated that it was open to government under R.37 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules (KSSR) to appoint a member of an all India service to any post in the said service. The decision in that regard was taken by the Council of Ministers after considering all the aspects. Therefore Ext.P16 is not open to challenge. These and other contentions are raised in the two counter affidavits filed by the first respondent. 9. I shall now take up the two points separately. The post of Director of Cultural Affairs and Special Officer (Official Languages) was one which came into beingas such by the proceedings Ext.P7 dated 8-7-1986. The said order also stated that this Director will be next in rank to the Director of Public Relations in the Public Relations Department. The result is that this Director occupies an intermediary place between an Additional Director of Public Relations and the Director of Public Relations, he being No.2 in the Department. It was therefore that the petitioner represented that he may be appointed as the Director of Cultural Affairs in the vacancy caused by the promotion of Nataraja Panicker as Director of Public Relations. It was therefore that the petitioner represented that he may be appointed as the Director of Cultural Affairs in the vacancy caused by the promotion of Nataraja Panicker as Director of Public Relations. The files relating to the petitioner's request and the filling up of the post of Director of Cultural Affairs were produced before me. Government's case is that they had decided not to fill up the post as an economy measure. This matter was repeatedly considered by the government on the various representations of the petitioner and government did not find its way to accede to the petitioner's request or to change their view on the subsequent representations made by the petitioner. The files do not disclose that the non-filling up of this post was actuated by any extraneous motives or that it was for any irrelevant reasons. It appears to have been done as an economy measure in view of the difficult conditions through which the State is passing. It was therefore thought fit to put the Director of Public Relations in additional charge of the office of the Director of Cultural Affairs and Special Officer (Official Languages) without filling up the post by promotion of the petitioner. Petitioner has not pointed out any provision by which he can compel the government to fill up a particular post and that too by him. If the decision was actuated by irrelevant or extraneous reasons, certainly this court may interfere to enforce the rights of an officer whose legitimate claims are being deprived of for reasons not relevant. But that is not the case here. Here the decision was plainly dictated by measures of economy, which led the government to put the Director of Public Relations in additional charge of the post of Director of Cultural Affairs. Since the decision was not actuated by any oblique motives and since the petitioner had no right to compel the State to fill up a particular post or to appoint him to that post, the prayer made to quash Exts. P12 and P13 and to direct the promotion of the petitioner as Director of Cultural Affairs and Special Officer (Official Languages) cannot be acceded to. This prayer made in the original petition is declined, at this juncture. P12 and P13 and to direct the promotion of the petitioner as Director of Cultural Affairs and Special Officer (Official Languages) cannot be acceded to. This prayer made in the original petition is declined, at this juncture. But this does not preclude the government from considering the case of the petitioner for promotion as Director of Cultural Affairs and Special Officer (Official Languages) if and when they decide to fill up the post in the normal course by promotion. 10. Though this point arose by virtue of the amendment to the original petition, the main point which was urged before me was in relation to the appointment of E.K. Bharath Bhooshan, I.A.S. as the Director of Public Relations from 1-7-1992 on the retirement of Nataraja Panicker. Petitioner states that this is contrary to the Special Rules governing the service and that his normal chance of promotion should not be prejudiced by bringing in an outsider into the service. Respondents however point out that this appointment is only for a period of one year and that it is also justified by R.37 of the K.S.S.R. 11. Appointment to the post of Director of Public Relations is governed by the Special Rules, namely the Kerala Public Relations Service Rules. The method of appointment under the Special Rules is by promotion from the category of Deputy Director of Public Relations (now Additional Director of Public relations ) or by transfer from any other service or by direct recruitment. R.28A of the KSSR provides that notwithstanding anything contained in those rule's or in the Special Rules, direct recruitment shall be resorted to in the case of appointments in the post of Heads of Departments in the absence of suitable persons for appointment by promotion or by transfer. Any appointment by promotion or transfer shall be made on the basis of merit and ability, which shall be assessed by the authority competent in the government to make such appointment. I shall also refer to R.37 on which total reliance was placed by the State to justify the appointment of Bharath Bhooshan. Any appointment by promotion or transfer shall be made on the basis of merit and ability, which shall be assessed by the authority competent in the government to make such appointment. I shall also refer to R.37 on which total reliance was placed by the State to justify the appointment of Bharath Bhooshan. This rule provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the KSSR or the Special Rules, an officiating or permanent officer of an all India service may be appointed to any such service or class of category thereof, but that such officer shall not by reason of such appointment cease to be a member of the all India service. While the case of the petitioner is that even under R.28 the case of an officer waiting for promotion cannot be overlooked and direct recruitment resorted to unless he was found not suitable on a consideration of his merit and ability by the competent authority, the case of the State is that irrespective of anything stated in the K.S. S.R. they are entitled to import an officer from the I AS cadre for appointment in any State service. 12. Counsel for the petitioner submits in the first instance that R.37 on which reliance is placed by government to sustain the appointment of Bharat Bhooshan cannot apply to appointments to the post of heads of departments. According to him the matter is governed solely by the terms of R.28Aof the KSSR, which he says does not postulate the appointment of an Officer in the IAS cadre, but only direct recruitment, in the contingency of the absence of suitable candidates for appointment by promotion or by transfer. The submission is that even if there are no suitable candidates for appointment by promotion or by transfer, Government could only resort to direct recruitment, and not appoint as IAS officer. He refers to the non-obstante clause in R.28A to submit that thereby the operation of R.37 is ruled out in the case of appointment to the posts of heads of departments. 13. The Government Pleader on the other hand contends that R.37 overrides R.28A, as it applies notwithstanding anything contained in the KSSR or in the special rules. 14. Since the mutual effect of Rules 28A and 37 comes up for consideration, I shall first read the two rules: "28A. 13. The Government Pleader on the other hand contends that R.37 overrides R.28A, as it applies notwithstanding anything contained in the KSSR or in the special rules. 14. Since the mutual effect of Rules 28A and 37 comes up for consideration, I shall first read the two rules: "28A. Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in the Special Rules, in the case of appointment to the posts of Heads of Departments, direct recruitment shall be resorted to in the absence of suitable persons for appointment by promotion or by transfer. Appointment by promotion or by transfer shall be made on the basis of merit and ability, seniority being considered only when merit and ability are approximately equal. Merit and ability shall be assessed by the authority competent in the Government to make such appointment: Provided that the lists for consideration for appointment by promotion or by transfer to the posts shall not ordinarily consist of members of service who do not have at least one year of service before the date of their superannuation after appointment to such a post XX XX XX 37. Appointment of All India Service Officers to State posts. - Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or the Special Rules, an officiating or permanent officer of an All India Service may be appointed to any State Service, or class or category thereof. Such Officer shall not, by reason of such appoint rent, cease to be a member of an All India Service." 15. Both these rules apply notwithstanding anything contained in the KSSR or in the Special Rules, so that if both operate, they override each other. If the non-obstante clause in R.28A is given its full effect, R.37 will be out of operation for appointment to the posts of heads of departments while if the said clause in R.37 is given effect in all its amplitude, R.28A is obliterated if the appointment of an IAS officer is contemplated. This piquant position has to be resolved, in favour of one or other of these rules by a process of construction, if possible, delineating the precise scope, effect and an a of Application of the respective provisions. Such situations need not confound the court, as it is always open to read and place the provisions in their proper setting and perspective to avoid any conflict between the two. Such situations need not confound the court, as it is always open to read and place the provisions in their proper setting and perspective to avoid any conflict between the two. The purpose and policy underlying the provisions, the object sought to be subserved, their intendment so far as is discernible, therefrom or from the other pro visions of the statutes of which they form part will have to be borne in mind in deciding which of the two provisions has overriding effect in a given situation. The process ultimately is one of construction of the two provisions in the light of the-well accepted principles of interpretation of statutes and deciding which is the particular provision and which is general provision, so far as a given situation is concerned. 16. A working test which may be applied in cases of such direct conflicts is that the latter enacted t prevails over the earlier one! But this test cannot be invoked when both the provisions form part of the same enactment or set of rules. 17. The Supreme Court was confronted with such a situation in the decision in Sri. Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co., AIR 1956 SC 614. The competing provisions were S.45A of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 and S.3 of the Displaced Persons Act, 1951, both of which applied to the facts of that case and operated "notwithstanding anything inconsistent there with contained in any other law for the time being in force". Tie court resolved the conflict in favour of the Banking Companies Act c considering the object and purpose of the two laws and observed: - "It is therefore desirable to determine the overriding effect of one or the other of the re 13vant provisions in these two Acts, in a given case, on much broader considerations of the pis -pose and policy underlying the two Acts and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of, he relevant 'revisions therein." The question came up again in Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lai, AIR 1977 SC 265 when it was observed with reference to the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1975 and the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956: - "20... When two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains a non-obstante clause stating that its provisions will override those of any other law, stimulating and incisive problems of interpretation arise. Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol, cases of such conflict have to be decided in reference to the object and purpose of the laws under c inside ration ... as indicated by us, the special and specific purpose which motivated the enactment of S.14A and Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Act would be wholly frustrated if the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act requiring permission of the competent authority were (o prevail over them. Therefore, the newly introduced provisions of the Delhi Rent Act must hold the field and be given full effect despite anything to the contrary contained in the Slum Clearance Act. 21. For resolving such inter se conflicts, one other test may also be applied though the persuasive force of such a test is but one of the factors which combine to give a fair meaning to the language of the law. That test is that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one. S.14A and Chapter III A having been enacted with effect from December 1,1975 are later enactments in reference to S.19 of the Slum Clearance Act which, in its present form, was placed on the statute book with effect from February 28,1965 and in reference to S.39 of the same Act, which came into force in 1956 when the Act itself was passed. The legislature gave overriding effect to S.14A and Chapter IIIA with the knowledge that Ss.19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act contained non obstante clauses of equal' efficacy. Therefore the later enactment must prevail over the former. The same test was mentioned with approval by this Court in Shri Ram Narain 's case at page 615." The Supreme Court dealt with the matter again in Jain Ink Manufacturing Co. v. L.I.C. of India, AIR 1981 SC 670 where the conflict was between certain provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 and the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1971. The Supreme Court considered the case in the light of the object and purpose of the two enactments and opted for the latter Act with these words: "8. v. L.I.C. of India, AIR 1981 SC 670 where the conflict was between certain provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 and the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1971. The Supreme Court considered the case in the light of the object and purpose of the two enactments and opted for the latter Act with these words: "8. In the light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases we would test the position in the present case. So far as the Premises Act is concerned, it operates is a very limited field in that it applies only to a limited nature of premises belonging only to particular sets of individuals, a particular set of juristic persons like companies, corporations or the Central Government. Thus, the Premises Act has a very limited application. Secondly, the object of the Premises Act is to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises by a summary procedure so that the premises may be available to the authorities mentioned in the Premises Act which constitute a class by themselves, xx xx 9. Thus, it would appear that both the scope and the object of the Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act. The Rent Act is of much wider application than the Premises Act inasmuch as it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in S.2 of the Premises Act. The object of the Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords or landlords who are neither a Corporation nor Government or Corporate Bodies. It would be seen that even under the Rent Act, by virtue of an amendment a special category has been carved out under S.25B, which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises for their personal necessity. Thus, S.25B itself becomes a special law within the Rent Act. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, there can be no doubt that the Premises Act as compared to the Rent Act, which has a very broad spectrum, is a special Act and override the provisions of the Rent Act." 18. The applicability of Rules 28A and 37 has to be decided in this background of the law on the point. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, there can be no doubt that the Premises Act as compared to the Rent Act, which has a very broad spectrum, is a special Act and override the provisions of the Rent Act." 18. The applicability of Rules 28A and 37 has to be decided in this background of the law on the point. After giving anxious consideration to the question, I am of the view that R.28A has to yield to R.37 when it comes to a question of appointment of an officer of an All India Service to any State service. R.28A is really only a provision, which enables the government to resort to direct recruitment in case there is no suitable person for appointment as Head of a Department, by promotion or by transfer. Transfer in this context means transfer from any other service of the State. The post of Head of Department is a crucial one in the departmental hierarchy, which requires a considerable degree of ability and administrative capacity, and knowledge besides qualities of Leadership and tact. It is therefore that it is made a selection post to be filled up on the basis of merit and ability, seniority being relevant only when merit and ability are approximately equal. R.28A is intended to provide for cases where suitable hands are not available for promotion or transfer in which case government is given the option to resort to direct recruitment, if so desired, R.28A is intended to achieve this object. R.37 is an all-pervading rule applying to all categories of service and posts in government. Members of the All India Service are appointed to cadre posts reserved for them. But it may happen that having regard to the requirements of a particular service at a particular time or having regard tocertain peculiar situations arising, it is felt necessary or expedient to have the service of a talented officer belonging to an All India Service to man a particular post which may or may not be the post of Head of Department. Such situations can be postulated when a competent officer who is otherwise suitable for the post of Head of Department is away on deputation, or on leave, likely to return in a short time, and the next in line in the department may not be sufficiently experienced or competent to fill up the post. Such situations can be postulated when a competent officer who is otherwise suitable for the post of Head of Department is away on deputation, or on leave, likely to return in a short time, and the next in line in the department may not be sufficiently experienced or competent to fill up the post. Direct recruitment may not be possible at this stage when the duration of the vacancy is not that sufficient to resort to direct recruitment, or when it will be unjust and improper to scotch me promotional opportunities of those in the service by bringing in a direct recruit who may be in service for a long time. Such situations can be legion where resort to direct recruitment will work hardship to those in service. But at the same time the service of a competent officer may be required. R.37 provides for such contingencies by enabling appointment of members of an All India Services to any service, class or category. While R.28A is an enabling provision, R.37 is one, which is necessary in public interest to enable government to have well equipped or experienced officers of the All India Service to occupy a particular post at a particular time. I am of the opinion that having regard to the object sought to be sub served by these two rules, R.37 has to be given predominance over sub-rule 28A. 19. It is true that R.28A was introduced into the KSSR only by G.O. dated 31-10-1974, while R.37 was there right from the inception, so that R.28A is in effect a later provision. But the test of the later provision overriding the earlier one is not a conclusive one and if the object and purpose of the rules require predominance for the earlier provision, that has certainly to be accorded. 20. The petitioner's contention that R.37 cannot be invoked to sustain the appointment of Bharath Bhooshan as Director of Public Relations is therefore bereft of merit. The next question is whether Bharath Bhooshan's appointment as the Director of Public Relations was justified on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. The method of appointment to the post of Director of Public Relations is governed by the special rules, which could be overridden by resort to R.28A of the K.S.S.R. if there is no suitable person for appointment by promotion or by transfer. The method of appointment to the post of Director of Public Relations is governed by the special rules, which could be overridden by resort to R.28A of the K.S.S.R. if there is no suitable person for appointment by promotion or by transfer. It is the legitimate expectation of every officer in the department to be promoted and posted to higher posts under the Ospecial rules. Adherence to and appointment under the special rules should be the rule, and resort to R.37 of the KSSR, the exception. Appointment de hors the special rules should be made only if there are no candidates suitable for appointment as the Head of the Department by resort to R.28A or if there are circumstances which justify the appointment of a member of the All India Service, by resort to R.37. R.28A itself delineates the scope of appointment outside the special rules, by limiting it to cases where there are no suitable hands available for appointment by promotion or by transfer. R.37 could be resorted to if there are no suitable candidates as envisaged by the special rules, and the circumstances are such that it may not be advisable or feasible to resort to direct recruitment under R.28A, or if the exigencies of service at a given point of time or in a particular situation require the services of a well equipped member of the All India Service to be the Head of a Department. The legitimate expectation of any officer of the department to normal promotion in the avenues provided for him should not be defeated except in such circumstances or where the requirements of the service justify the importation of a member of the All India Service, to meet the requirements of the particular situation or the necessities at a particular time, If it is felt that the existing officers in the department, though suitable for the post, may not be sufficient to meet the requirements at a given point of time, it will be a case for resorting to R.37 for appointment of a member of the All India Service to the post. 21. There is no case in the counter affidavit, nor is it disclosed by the files, that the petitioner is not suitable, or insufficient, for the post of Director of Public Relations. 21. There is no case in the counter affidavit, nor is it disclosed by the files, that the petitioner is not suitable, or insufficient, for the post of Director of Public Relations. Nor is there any case for the respondents that the circumstances now prevailing are such that the services of a better equipped IAS officer are necessary in the department at this point of time for the period of one year from 1-7-1992 to 30-6-1993. In the absence of such a case, it has to be presumed that the petitioner is suitable for the job, and that there are no circumstances justifying a departure from the ususal rule of promotion under the special rules, to appoint an IAS officer for the post for a period of one year. Having regard to the scope of R.37 delineated by me, I am of the opinion that the appointment of Bharath Bhooshan overlooking the claims of the petitioner is without any reason and arbitrary. 22. It is true that the counter affidavit mentions that the Council of Ministers considered the question with reference to the statutory provisions and decided to appoint Bharat Bhooshan. But the counter affidavit is significantly silent about the existence of any extraordinary circumstances justifying a departure from the normal mode of promotion. No circumstances are disclosed to show that the post requires at this juncture an IAS officer to occupy it. In the absence of any such reasons, I am of the opinion that the appointment of Bharat Bhooshan to the post of Director of Public Relations overlooking the claims of the petitioner is unreasonable and liable to be struck down. Ext.P16 by which Bharath Bhooshan was appointed has therefore to be quashed. 23. I have already held that the petitioner was entitled to claim that he should be appointed as the Director of Cultural Affairs when the government itself did not intend to fill up that post. But the non-consideration of his claim for appointment as Director of Public Relations and the appointment of Bharath Bhooshan to the post have to be quashed for the reasons mentioned above. Accordingly the original petition is allowed in part. The petitioner's prayer for appointment as Director of Cultural Affairs is rejected. Ext.P16 and the appointment of Bharath Bhooshan as Director of Public Relations are quashed. Accordingly the original petition is allowed in part. The petitioner's prayer for appointment as Director of Cultural Affairs is rejected. Ext.P16 and the appointment of Bharath Bhooshan as Director of Public Relations are quashed. The first respondent will consider the case of the petitioner for appointment as Director of Public Relations in the vacancy caused by the retirement of Nataraja Panicker expeditiously and at any rate within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs.