NANAVATI, J. ( 1 ) ). Against petitioner No. 1 an order of detention was passed under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling activities Act, 1974 on 21-7-1982. That order was revoked on 18-10-1982 and a fresh order for detention of petitioner No. 1 was passed on the same day on the same grounds. It appears that soon thereafter petitioner No. 1 filed Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1342 of 1982 under Art. 32 of the constitution of India in the Supreme Court. We were told at the time of hearing of these petitions that the said petition has been admitted and is referred to a Constitutional Bench. By an order dated 11-8-1983 the State government fixed the period of detention till 16/08/1983. Petitioner no. 1 was, therefore, released from detention on 16/08/1983. On 10-10-1985, the Competent Authority under the Smugglers and Foreign exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 initiated action not only against petitioner No. 1 but against other petitioners also and, therefore, all of them have joined in Special Criminal Application No. 499 of 1991 and they are challenging the order of detention dated 18-10-1982 as the action under the SAFEMA has been initiated on the basis of the said detention order. ( 2 ) ). It may be stated that the learned Counsel for the petitioners stated before us that he was dropping the challenge to the vires of the Constitutional provisions and the relevant provisions of the cofeposa Act and the SAFEMA. It may also be stated that the learned counsel has also sought permission to withdraw Special Civil Application No. 5684 of 1985. We see no reason not to grant that permission as the Supreme court has not passed any order prohibiting withdrawal of the said petition by the petitioners. The stay in that petition is only in respect of consideration of the matter on merits. ( 3 ) ). The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the first order of detention dated 21-7-1982 was passed by the State Government. It was revoked by the State Government on 18-10-1982. The stay in that petition is only in respect of consideration of the matter on merits. ( 3 ) ). The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the first order of detention dated 21-7-1982 was passed by the State Government. It was revoked by the State Government on 18-10-1982. It was submitted that if it is an order passed under Sec. 11 (l) (a) of the COFEPOSA Act then it must be regarded as an illegal and void order as the State Government does not possess any power under Sec. 11 of the Act to revoke an order of detention passed by it. If the said order can be said to have been passed in exercise of the powers available under Sec. 21 of the General Clauses act, then the fresh order of detention passed on 18-10-1982 could be regarded as null and void as no fresh order could have been passed on the basis of the same facts. In support of this later contention, the learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1985 SC 697 : [1985 (2) GLR 820 (SC)] and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Amritial Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 1986 (2) Bom. Court Reports 545. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 4 ) ). On merits, it was submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the power which was exercised by the State Government while revoking the detention order dated 21-7-1982, was one available under Sec. 11 (1) of the COFEPOSA Act. He then relied upon sub-sec. (2) of that section and submitted that a fresh detention order on the same facts could be passed against petitioner No. 1. In support of this contention, he has drawn our attention to the order of revocation itself wherein it is stated that the said order was passed by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 11 (l) (a) of the COFEPOSA Act. Now, if we turn to Sec. ll (l) (a) of the Act, we find that the power has been conferred upon the Stale government to revoke an order of detention, if such an order has been made by an officer of the State Government. Now, if we turn to Sec. ll (l) (a) of the Act, we find that the power has been conferred upon the Stale government to revoke an order of detention, if such an order has been made by an officer of the State Government. Obviously, we do not find any provision under Sec. 11 to the effect that the Stale Government can revoke an order passed by it because the power which is conferred by Sec. 11 is in addition to the power available under Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act. It, therefore, becomes clear that the State Government does not possess any power of revoking an order of detention passed by itself under Sec. 11 of the said Act. For that reason, the order of revocation itself will have to be regarded as null and void. Since the said order has to be regarded as null and void, in view of the specific contention raised on behalf of the State, it will have to be held that the fresh order of detention passed on 18-10-1982 was also null and void since the previous order of detention was not validly revoked. ( 5 ) ). Even if we proceed on the basis that the said order of revocation was passed by the State Government in exercise of the power available under Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act, it will have to be held that no fresh order of detention could have been passed on the same facts. In ibrahim Bachu Bofans case, the Supreme Court was called upon to interprete sec. 11 (2) of the COFEPOSA Act and, after examining the provisions of Sec. 11 (1) of the COFEPOSA Act and Sec. 21 of the General Clauses act, it has held that "the word revocation" in sub-sec. (2) has the same meaning and covers the same situations as provided in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11 of the Act. This would necessarily mean that the power under sub-sec. (2) would be exercisable in cases covered by sub-sec. (1 ). " Thereafter, in paragraph 10 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has made the following observations :"10. We are of the view that this seems to be the legislative scheme. The pronounced judicial view of this Court was that repeated orders of detention are not to be made. (2) would be exercisable in cases covered by sub-sec. (1 ). " Thereafter, in paragraph 10 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has made the following observations :"10. We are of the view that this seems to be the legislative scheme. The pronounced judicial view of this Court was that repeated orders of detention are not to be made. Parliament while making provision in Sec. 11 (2) of the Act, must be taken to have been aware of such view and in conferring the power of making repeated orders, safeguards have been provided under sub-sec. (1) by confining the exercise of power to limited situations. Clothing the prescribed authority to exercise power under Sec. 3 even in a situation where the Court has intervened to bring about nullification of the order of detention would give rise to complicated situations and keeping the scheme of the section in view we are of the clear opinion that where an order is quashed by a Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, the power of making a fresh order under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. II is not available to be exercised. " ( 6 ) ). It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that as the Supreme court in that case was concerned with a situation arising as a result of quashing of an order by the High Court and passing a fresh order of detention thereafter the observations made by it should be confined to such situations only. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the Supreme court in clearest terms has observed that till Sec. 11 (2) was enacted the law was that repeated orders of detention could not be made. ( 7 ) ). The said decision of the Supreme Court was considered by the bombay High Court in Amritlal Shahs case (supra ). ( 7 ) ). The said decision of the Supreme Court was considered by the bombay High Court in Amritlal Shahs case (supra ). The two questions which arose for consideration by the Bombay High Court were (1) where an order of detention had been passed by the Government of Maharashtra and where subsequently the same authority revoked the order of detention, whether afresh order of detention could be passed against the same detenu on the same grounds, and (2) whether after the detenu had been released pursuant to an order of revocation, which was passed under Sec. 8 (1) of the COFEPOSA Act, the same authority could pass a fresh order of detention against the same detenu on the same grounds. While dealing with the first question, the Bombay High Court considered the ambit and scope of Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act and Sec. 21 of the General Clauses act and the decision of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim Bachu bafans case and held that when the Supreme Court, while deciding a case before it, analyses a particular provision of law or otherwise discusses a point of law, though not strictly relevant to the determination of the question before it, that part of the judgment must be held to contain the dicta of the Supreme Court on the law and binding on the High Court. As regards the question as to whether fresh order of detention can be passed against the same detenu on the same grounds, the Bombay High Court observed as under :"12. The fact that powers of revocation of an order of detention were provided for not only in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act but also in Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act was naturally before the Supreme Court and it has been noticed in paragraph 5 of its judgment. Despite this if the Supreme Court proceeded to say that in conferring the power of making repeated orders, safeguards have been provided under sub-sec. (I) of Sec. 11 by conferring the exercise of power to limited situations, naturally one must necessarily hold that the power of making repeated orders of detention can be exercised only in those situations which are mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11. . . . . . (I) of Sec. 11 by conferring the exercise of power to limited situations, naturally one must necessarily hold that the power of making repeated orders of detention can be exercised only in those situations which are mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11. . . . . . "the learned Counsel for the respondents, however, placed heavy reliance upon a decision of this Court in Shaukat Ali v. State of Gujarat, 1987 (1) GLH 518. That was a case of preventive detention under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985. In that case the first detention. order was passed on 10-8-1985. That was quashed by this Court on 17-10-1985. Thereafter on the same grounds another detention order was passed on 18- 7-1986 but it was revoked by the State Government on 7-8-1986. Thereafter a third order of detention was passed against him on 8-9-1986. The said order was challenged on various grounds and one of them was that the third detention order on the same grounds could not have been passed once the high Court had quashed the order and set aside the previous detention order. The third order was also challenged on the ground that the High Court having quashed the detention order, it was not open to the detaining authority to pass a fresh order by referring to pre-existing grounds with some additional facts. In the context of the said contention, Sec. 15 of the PASA Act was considered and this Court observed that the proviso abundantly makes it clear that a fresh detention order can be passed on the same grounds. This Court has then made the following observation :". . . . . . THE legislative intent is, therefore, clear that even in those cases where earlier order has expired or is revoked, yet there is no bar on the power of the detaining authority to pass another detention order on the same grounds. "from the observations made in paragraph 18 of the judgment, it becomes clear that in that case there were fresh facts when the fresh order of detention was passed. That would go to show that it was really not necessary for deciding that case to consider the question whether a fresh order could have been passed on the same grounds after the previous order was revoked. That would go to show that it was really not necessary for deciding that case to consider the question whether a fresh order could have been passed on the same grounds after the previous order was revoked. Thus the observations made in that case with regard to the power of the Government to pass a fresh order on the same grounds will have to be regarded as obiter. The observation that even in a case where the State Government revokes an order of detention a fresh order of detention can be passed on the same grounds will have to be regarded as obiter for the reason that the contention, which was raised in that case, was that after an order of detention is quashed by the High court, a fresh order of detention cannot be passed on the same grounds. In support of the view the taken in that case, the Division Bench relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Jagdev Singh v. State of J. and k. , AIR 1968 SC 327 . In that case a Five-Judge Bench of the Supreme court has held that a fresh order of detention can be passed on the same facts, if for any reason the earlier order of detention is to be revoked by the Government. The Supreme Court held like that as the Supreme Court did not find anything in the Defence of India Act and the Rules which prevented the State Government to cancel the order of detention to pass another in its place or pass a fresh order of detention on the same facts in case the earlier order of detention on the same facts was found to be defective for any reason. ( 8 ) ). The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that such a course can be adopted subject to the fact that the fresh order of detention is not vitiated by mala fides. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed :"now, there is no doubt that if the Government resorts to the device of the series of fresh orders after every six months and thus continues the detention of a detenu. circumventing the provisions of Rule 30-A for review, which, as interpreted by this Court in Lakhanpals case. WP. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed :"now, there is no doubt that if the Government resorts to the device of the series of fresh orders after every six months and thus continues the detention of a detenu. circumventing the provisions of Rule 30-A for review, which, as interpreted by this Court in Lakhanpals case. WP. No. 258 of 1966, Dated 7-3-1967 = (AIR 1967sc 1507) give some protection to the citizens of this country, it would certainly be acting mala fide- Such a fresh order would be liable to be struck down not on the ground that the Government has no power to pass it but on the ground that it is mala fide exercise of the power. . . " ( 9 ) ). What is required to be borne in mind is that the Supreme Court was dealing with a case under the Defence of India Rules, and considering the scheme of the Defence of India Act and the Rules it held that a fresh order of detention can be passed on the same facts provided it is not mala fide. As against that, the decision of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim Bachu Bafans case is under the cofeposa Act and after considering the scheme of the Act and the relevant provisions, the Supreme Court has observed as under :"we are of the view that this seems to be the legislative scheme. The pronounced judicial view of this Court was that repeated orders of detention are not to be made. . . " ( 10 ) ). Therefore, even though the decision in Ibrahim Bachu Bafans case is by a three-Judges Bench, it being directly on the point has to be followed. With due respect, the learned Judges deciding the case of Shaukat ah have over looked this fact. The Division Bench which decided Shaukat alis case, has observed that a Bench consisting of three-Judges, could not have overruled the law laid down by the five-Judges Bench which decided the case of Jagdev Singh (supra ). With due respect, the learned Judges deciding the case of Shaukat ah have over looked this fact. The Division Bench which decided Shaukat alis case, has observed that a Bench consisting of three-Judges, could not have overruled the law laid down by the five-Judges Bench which decided the case of Jagdev Singh (supra ). But, as we have pointed out above, Jagdev singhs case, was not a case arising under the COFEPOSA Act and so far as Ibrahim Bachu Bafans case, is concerned, it was a case which arose under the COFEPOSA Act and the above stated observations are made by the Supreme Court in that case after considering the scheme of the COFEPOSA Act. Therefore, in our opinion, while dealing with the case arising under the COFEPOSA Act, we must follow the decision of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim Bachu Bafans case. With due respect, it is not possible for us to agree with the view expressed by the Division bench of this Court in Shaukat Alis case. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the order of revocation and the fresh order of detention passed by the state Government on 18-10-1982 were illegal and void in view of the stand taken by the Government that the order of revocation was passed in exercise of the power under Sec. 11 (l) (a) of the COFEPOSA Act only and not Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act. Even otherwise also, we are of the view that the State Government could not have passed a fresh order of detention on the same grounds following the decision of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim bachu Bafans case, and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Amritlal shahs case. ( 11 ) ). As we are allowing Special Criminal Application No. 499 of 1991 on this ground, we have not considered the other challenges to the validity of the detention order. ( 12 ) ). In the result : special Civil Application No. 5684 of 1985 is permitted to be withdrawn. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Special Criminal Application No. 499 of 1991 and Special Civil Application no. 5900 of 1991 are allowed. The impugned order of detention is declared as illegal. The proceedings initiated under the SAFEMA on the basis of the said illegal order are, therefore, quashed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Special Criminal Application No. 499 of 1991 and Special Civil Application no. 5900 of 1991 are allowed. The impugned order of detention is declared as illegal. The proceedings initiated under the SAFEMA on the basis of the said illegal order are, therefore, quashed. Rule in each of these petitions is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. .