Judgment :- The petitioner, namely A. Palani, it is said, had been appointed as Rakshak in Railway Protection Force. He was stated to be performing the duty from 21.30 hours to 06.00 hours on July 15/16, 1982 at Villivakkam railway yard along with another Rakshak by name Krishnamurthy. He, along with the said Rakshak Krishnamurthy, was stated to have committed theft of two small wooden folding dining tables, two cushion pillows covered with brown colour rexine, two mirrors and seventeen numbers of small rolls of copper tubes from AC Coach No. SR 2685 found stationed there by using a false key for opening the said coach. For the said act of theft, charges, it is said, had been framed against them and a disciplinary enquiry had been instituted by the appointment of an Enquiry Officer. After complying with the requisite formalities and procedure, the Enquiry Officer, on consideration of the materials available on record, found the petitioner guilty of the charges framed against him and submitted his findings to the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority, in turn, ordered his removal from service. 2. The petitioner, aggrieved by the removal, it is said, preferred appeal before the competent authority, who, in turn, it is said, exonerated him of the charges and allowed the appeal by ordering his reinstatement in service. The petitioner, it is said, had been accordingly reinstated in service by Office Order No. 81/83 dated May 12, 1983. As respects reinstatement, the entry reflected in his service register, as produced today for perusal of court, is couched in the following terms : "Sri A. Palani Ex. RK/GPD who was removed from service w.e.f. February 20, 1983 on appeal is reinstated as Rakshak and posted to TNPM without prejudice to the DAR action to be taken against him." 3. The respondents railways, without resorting to filing any revision under Rule 60 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 (for short 'the Rules') reopened the enquiry for the same cause of action on the same facts and framed a charge against him for his failure to prevent theft of railway materials on the night of July 15/16, 1982 while he was on duty along with Rakshak Krishnamurthy. The Enquiry Officer, on consideration of the relevant materials produced, found him guilty of the charge and the Disciplinary Authority, in his proceedings M/XP/227/5-84 dated December 30, 1984 ordered his removal from service. The Enquiry Officer, on consideration of the relevant materials produced, found him guilty of the charge and the Disciplinary Authority, in his proceedings M/XP/227/5-84 dated December 30, 1984 ordered his removal from service. 4. The aggrieved delinquent petitioner preferred appeal before the Chief Security Officer, Southern Railway, Madras, who, in his proceedings No. M/XP/227/5/85 dated August 26, 1985 dismissed the appeal and the operative portion of the appellate order is couched in the following terms : "In the result, I find the charges against the appellant/delinquent have been amply proved and the order of penalty imposed by the Sr. SOR/MAS as disciplinary authority in removing the appellant from service is valid, proper and commensurate with the gravity of the charge. The appellant who was deputed to prevent theft, allowing and involving in the theft of railway materials are very serious charges and unbecoming of a member of disciplined force. Such delinquents deserve to be punished deterrently so as to maintain the morale and discipline of the Force. Therefore I confirm the penalty of removal from service imposed by the Sr. SOR/MAS on the appellant/delinquent." The aggrieved delinquent petitioner resorted to the present action praying for issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the said order and to direct the respondents to reinstate him in service with backwages and other attendant benefits. 5. Mr. D. Peter Francis, learned appearing for the petitioner, would press into service the lone and sole submission that once a departmental enquiry is over and the delinquent petitioner had been exonerated, no second departmental enquiry on the same facts can be ordered, unless there is a specific provision for reviewing the earlier order of exoneration and in this view of the matter, the punishment of removal from service inflicted upon the petitioner in the second departmental enquiry had no legs to stand and consequently, the writ petition has to be allowed by setting aside the penalty of his removal from service and ordering his reinstatement with backwages and other attendant benefits. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. A. Venugopal learned Counsel appearing for the respondents would however repel such a submission and further submit that the delinquent petitioner did not at all whisper a word or raise his little finger as to the utter untenability of holding a second enquiry, when especially he had been exonerated on the enquiry instituted earlier either during the enquiry or before the appellate authority. That apart, he would further submit that he had not exhausted the remedy of revision, as had been provided under the salient provisions adumbrated under Rule 60 of the Rules and that in such circumstances, it goes without saying the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. The tenability or otherwise of the rival submissions of either counsel may now fall for consideration in the arena of discussion. There is no pale of controversy that the petitioner, along with another Rakshak by name Krishnamurthy, had been charged for alleged commission of theft of railway materials whilst they were on duty at Villivakkam Railway yard on July 15/16, 1982. Yet another fact, about which there is no dispute, is that in the disciplinary enquiry instituted for the charge of theft against them resulted in the punishment of removal from service. It is also not in dispute that in the appeal before the competent authority, the petitioner had been exonerated of the charge and he had been reinstated in service, by making the relevant entry in the service register, as stated earlier. It is only in the second enquiry, on the same cause of action instituted against the petitioner, a fresh charge had been framed, different from the one earlier framed and on the charge so framed, he was found guilty by the Enquiry Officer and on the report so submitted by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority inflicted upon him punishment of removal from service, which was also laterly confirmed on appeal. The moot question that arises for consideration is as to whether it is legitimately permissible for a second enquiry to be instituted, when especially in the original enquiry instituted, the delinquent petitioner had been exonerated of the charge framed against him. 8. The moot question that arises for consideration is as to whether it is legitimately permissible for a second enquiry to be instituted, when especially in the original enquiry instituted, the delinquent petitioner had been exonerated of the charge framed against him. 8. It is not as if such a question had not arisen before Courts of superior jurisdiction and such a question in fact had arisen before Rajasthan High Court in Dwarakachand v. State of Rajasthan, 1958 AIR(Rajasthan) 38, wherein a Division Bench consisting of Wanchoo, C.J. and Dave, J., laid down the law in clear terms as to the permissibility of the second enquiry when once the delinquent had been exonerated in the earlier instituted departmental enquiry. Their Lordships expressed at page 41 - "On a careful consideration, therefore, of the entire matter, we are of the opinion that once a departmental enqiry is over and a public servant has been exonerated, no second departmental enquiry on the same facts can be ordered unless there is a specific provision for reviewing an order of exoneration of this kind in the Service Rules or any law to that effect." 9. The view, as expressed by the Division Bench, was laterly followed by the same High Court in Shikar Chand Sethi v. The Divisional Mechanical Engineer (E), Western Railway, Kota Division, Kota, 1970 AIR(Rajasthan) 210) : I respectfully agree with the view, as expressed by learned Judges of the said High Court. 10. The apex Court of this country had the occasion to consider such a question in State of Assam v. J. N. Roy Biswas (1976-II-LLJ-17) Their Lordships expressed thus at page 19 : "We may however make it clear that no government servant can urge that if for some technical or other good ground, procedural or other, the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law that a second enquiry cannot be launched. It can be; but once a disciplinary case has closed and the official reinstated, presumably on full exoneration, a chagrined Government cannot re-start the exercise in the absence of specific power to review or revise, vested by rules in some authority. The basis of the rule of law cannot be breached without legal provision or other vitiating factor invalidating the earlier enquiry. For the present, this is theoretical because no such deadly defect is apparent on the record." 11. The basis of the rule of law cannot be breached without legal provision or other vitiating factor invalidating the earlier enquiry. For the present, this is theoretical because no such deadly defect is apparent on the record." 11. The next question that calls for consideration is as to whether the delinquent petitioner is estopped from raising such a question for the first time here without raising the same before the Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority or before the competent Appellate Authority. The answer to such a question cannot be anyone other than an emphatic 'yes'. Such a question is after all, a question of law, which can be raised at any point of time. 12. The further question requiring consideration is as to whether the extraordinary remedy, as provided under Article 226 of the Constitution is barred, when especially the delinquent petitioner had not exhausted the remedy of revision, as provided under Rule 60 of the Rules. It is rather well-settled that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is very wide and there can be no fetters for the exercise of such a power when the circumstances warrant by resortment to such a power, in the interests of justice. The non-resortment to writ jurisdiction, when there is an alternative remedy, is by way of self-imposed restriction on the Court, in the exercise of power under Article 226. That does not mean that the Court is denuded of its power to resort to such a jurisdiction in extraordinary circumstances, even in the case of an alternative remedy not having been exhausted. The writ petition having been filed in the year 1986, to say at this juncture that the delinquent petitioner has to utilise the alternative remedy of filing a revision, as contemplated under the relevant rule and then come before this Court, cannot at all be countenanced. The writ petition having been filed in the year 1986, to say at this juncture that the delinquent petitioner has to utilise the alternative remedy of filing a revision, as contemplated under the relevant rule and then come before this Court, cannot at all be countenanced. Such a question did arise for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in K. Venkataraman and K. Arumugham v. The Regional Chief Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Madras, 1988 Writ LR 379 and their Lordships M. N. Chandurkar, CJ and Srinivasan, J. expressed in paragraph 28 thus : "Learned counsel for the respondents submitted : It cannot be therefore contended that the appellants had an alternative remedy by way of appeal to the Chairman of Electricity Board and the writ petition filed by them of ought not to have been entertained. We do not find any justification for accepting this submission. The writ petitions having been entertained and the Chairman of the Electricity Board being the second respondent therein having taken a definite stand against the appellants, it will not be just at this stage to direct the appellants to complete the formality of filing an appeal before the Chairman and approach this court at a later point of time. Mr. Pai has drawn our attention to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana:-" Ordinarily it is true that the court has imposed a restraint in its own wisdom on its exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 where the party invoking the jurisdiction had an effective, adequate, alternative remedy. More often, it has been expressly stated that the rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion rather than rule of law. At any rate, it does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. "Hence, we reject the contention raised by learned counsel for the respondent." 13. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the question of alternative remedy, cited two decisions in C. A. Abraham v. Income-Tax Officer, Kottayam. and Ghan Shyam Das Gupta v. Anant Kumar Sinha. Those decisions, if read in the light of the facts of the case, would throw flood of light that they are not of any help in advancing the case of the respondent to any extent whatever. 14. and Ghan Shyam Das Gupta v. Anant Kumar Sinha. Those decisions, if read in the light of the facts of the case, would throw flood of light that they are not of any help in advancing the case of the respondent to any extent whatever. 14. For the reasons, as above, it goes without saying that the writ petition deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed with costs. Rule Nisi issued is made absolute.