This revision petition is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Assistant District Judge No. 2, Cachar at Silchar in Title Appeal No.13 of 1986 reversing the judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff No. 1 at Silchar in Title Suit No. 1 of 1983. The plaintiffs are the petitioners herein and defendant No. 1 is the opposite party. 2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows : The suit was laid by the plaintiffs for ejectment of defendant No. 1 from the suit house and also for realisation of arrear of rent amounting to Rs. 5,240/-. According to plaintiffs, defendant No. 1 took possession of the suit house as a tenant by executing a lease deed for a period of 5 years commencing from 1st day of Aswina 1364 BS ending on the last day of Bhadra 1369 BS. As per the condition of the registered lease, the monthly rent was fixed at Rs.250/- per month payable in advance within the month of Aswina for the whole year. It was also agreed between the parties that the Municipal tax would be paid in time. Even after the expiry of the lease, defendant No. 1 continued to be in possession of the suit house by paying rent as well as Municipal tax. According to plaintiffs, defendant No. 1 from Bhadra 1388 BS neither paid rent or Municipal tax in spite of repeated demands and therefore, he was a defaulter. The other ground for ejectment was for re-construction of 3 storied RCC building by demolishing the suit house which was in a dilapidated condition and unsafe for inhabitation. It may be stated that proforma defendant No.2 is the mother of the plaintiff No.l who purchased the suit premises by registered sale deed dated 11.8.59 and defendant No.l also attorned plaintiff No.l as his landlord. Plaintiff No.2 and 3 purchased the remaining part from proforma defendant No. 2 by another registered sale deed dated 3.6.82 and defendant No.l was duly informed by registered notice dated 17.8.82. 3. The suit was contested by defendant No.l and various legal pleas have been taken viz absence of cause of action, maintainability of suit, mis-joinder of causes of action and non-joinder of parties. According to defendant No.l he took the suit premises on lease from the original owner Haji Ishraque Ali by a deed dated 26.1.57 at an annual rent of Rs. According to defendant No.l he took the suit premises on lease from the original owner Haji Ishraque Ali by a deed dated 26.1.57 at an annual rent of Rs. 3000/- to be paid in advance and the tenancy was according to Bengali calendar year. It is admitted that the plaintiffs purchased the ownership of the suit premises and also received rent as per terms of the deed. But the plaintiffs declined to receive rent from 31st Bhadra 1388 BS though it was offered and thereafter rent was deposited in the Court in time. Therefore, the allegation of defaulter has been denied. Regarding Municipal tax it is stated that the defendant used to pay the tax regularly till 3rd quarter of 1980, but as the tax was paid before issue of bills by the plaintiffs, the defendant could not pay the Municipal tax and therefore, he cannot be treated as a defaulter in respect of this tax. Regarding bona fide requirement it has been stated that the plaintiffs have a two storied building on a plot of land and have another building It was also been stated that the plaintiffs has a separate building at Beelpar which is quite suitable of expansion of his proposed business. The statement that the suit house is in a dilapidated condition and is unsafe for human habitation has been denied. 4. On the pleadings, learned trial Court framed as many as 12 issues. 5. Before the learned lower appellate Court two points were urged as to whether defendant was a defaulter and whether plaintiffs had bonafide requir­ement for the suit premises. The Court noted that the learned trial Court while deciding issue No.6 held that defendant was not a defaulter for non-payment of Municipal tax. This point was considered by the learned lower appellate Court with reference to evidence on record including the lease deed Ext.5 and held that the defendant was not a defaulter. Regarding the second point that the house was in a dilapidated condition and it needed re-construction and thereafter for expansion of the business of the plaintiffs, the learned lower appellate Court on the basis of evidence on record held that the suit house was not in a dilapidated condition and it was not necessary for bonafide requirement of the plaintiff viz expansion of their business. 6. Heard Mr. BK Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. 6. Heard Mr. BK Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. NM Lahiri, learned counsel for the opposite party. 7. The first point that may be taken up is regarding whether the findings of the learned Court below was perverse and/or erroneous that the house was not in a dilapidated condition and that it was not required for the bonafide use and occupation of the plaintiffs. 8. From the judgment of the learned lower appellate Court I find that the Court below has considered the entire evidence on record in depth while arriving at the above decision. The learned Court noted that the proforma defendant No.2 who was the mother of the plaintiff No. 1 and mother-in-law and grand-mother of plaintiffs Nos.2 and 3 respectively, transferred her portion of the suit land by 2 registered deeds Ext.2 and 3 executed on 3.6.82 and the present suit was filed on 3.1.83. Court also noted that in Exts.2 and 3 it was not recorded that the suit premises was old and in dilapidated condition, rather it was shown to be in good condition. 9. Court also noted the recital in the above sale deeds and came to the findings that proforma defendant No.2 had for seen that there would be litiga­tion with the tenant and in order to avoid it, transferred the land and it was not made for the purpose of re construction of a RCC building as pleaded by the plaintiffs. 10. The learned lower appellate Court took into consideration, the certified copy of the assessment register of the Municipality Ext. K where it was not recorded that the house was old or it was not dilapidated condition. According to learned lower appellate Court if the house was in such a condition, Munici­pality would have taken appropriate steps for its demolition. The reasoning given by the learned lower appellate Court is quite sound. 11. To prove this point plaintiffs examined PW 5 a Masion and PW 6 a Carpenter and according to these witnesses the suit premises was beyond repair. The learned lower appellate Court rejected their evidence on the ground that no sufficient reason for the above opinion was given. Sitting as a revisional Court, I am unable to say that the above reasoning is perverse. The learned lower appellate Court rejected their evidence on the ground that no sufficient reason for the above opinion was given. Sitting as a revisional Court, I am unable to say that the above reasoning is perverse. On the other hand the defendant examined the Overseer of the Assam Town and Country Planning Department, DW 2 who deposed before the Court that he visited the suit premises and found it to be in good condition. His evidence supports the evidence of defendant DW 1 on this point. Therefore, I hold that the learned lower appellate Court rightly rejected the claim of the plaintiffs. 12. Regarding bonafide requirement, in the plaint, the plea taken was that the house was necessary for expansion of the business of the plaintiffs. The learned lower appellate Court noted that plaintiffs were having hardware business. But in the evidence a new case was set up that the suit premises were required for construction of a RCC building for starting a hotel by the plaintiff No.3, the son of the plaintiff No. 1. In view of the variation between the pleadings and the evidence, the learned lower Court rightly rejected the new plea set up by the plaintiffs that the suit premises was required for running the hotel business by plaintiff No.3. An attempt was made to show that plaintiff No.3 got training in hotel management by working in a Sweetmeat shop and also in another shop. These are not sufficient for running a hotel business as held by learned lower appellate Court. The learned lower appellate Court also noted the annual income of the plaintiff No.l and 2 and came to right finding that plaintiffs have no financial capacity to construct a RCC building. Although the plaintiffs stated that loan will be taken from the bank, no evidence was adduced. 13. Apart from the suit premises, the learned lower appellate Court noted that plaintiffs have got other houses and a plot of land in the market area which according to learned Court was sufficient to construct a RCC building. I hold that the finding of the learned lower appellate Court on this point also calls for no interference. 14. Next question that is to be decided is whether the plaintiffs was a defaulter. Ext.5 was the original lease deed for the tenancy for a period of 5 years commencing from 1st day of Aswina 1364 BS. I hold that the finding of the learned lower appellate Court on this point also calls for no interference. 14. Next question that is to be decided is whether the plaintiffs was a defaulter. Ext.5 was the original lease deed for the tenancy for a period of 5 years commencing from 1st day of Aswina 1364 BS. Though the lease was not renewed, the defendants were occupying suit premises by holding over. Ext, 5 is in Bengali. According to clause (2) of the said agreement the defendant was to pay monthly rent of Rs. 250/- together per year amounting to Rs. 3.000/-and according to clause (3) the entire amount of Rs. 3000/- was to be paid in advance within the month of Aswina. According to clause (4) the Municipal tax as assessed on the date of execution of the agreement or to be assessed in future would be paid by the defendant. 15. According to plaintiffs as stated in the plaint the rent was paid up to Bhadra 1388 BS, but from Aswina 1388 BS onwards the defendant did not pay rent. It has also been alleged that the defendant did not pay Municipal tax for 4th quarter of 1980, 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter of 1981-82 and 1st quarter of 1982 -83. Therefore, defendant was a defaulter. 16. Although the plaintiffs took the plea that the defendant was to pay rent, after the expiry of the lease, monthly on the basis of Exts. A(2)(4)(5) to (14;, the learned lower appellate Court held that the above rent receipts would prove that even after the expiry of the period of lease, the landlord accepted the rent for one year in advance as per terms of the lease. This finding is based on evidence on record and cannot be faulted. 17. The Court noted that regarding non-payment of rent after Bhadra 1388 BS except the solitary statement of PW 1, there was no other evidence. On the other hand, according to DW i viz the defendant No.l he paid rent to the plaintiffs up to Bhadra 1388 BS according to rent receipts Exts. A, A(0) to A(14). He has further stated that the rent due for the year commencing from 1st of Aswina 1388 BS was offered to the plaintiffs in advance, but they refused. To prove such refusal, defendant has examined himself. A, A(0) to A(14). He has further stated that the rent due for the year commencing from 1st of Aswina 1388 BS was offered to the plaintiffs in advance, but they refused. To prove such refusal, defendant has examined himself. Accor­ding to defendant as the plaintiffs refused to accept rent and due to long vacation of the civil Court, rent for the above year was deposited in the civil Court on the reopening day. Ext. B is the certified copy of the challan showing payment of rent from 1st Aswina 1388 BS to Bhadra 1389 BS. For subsequ­ent years also rent was deposited in the Court. Therefore, the defendant was not a defaulter in respect of payment of rent of Rs.3,000/-per year in advance. 18. The only point for determination is whether non-payment of the Municipal tax by the defendant he can be treated as a defaulter. Defendant has taken the plea that plaintiffs paid the entire Municipal tax in advance even without a demand notice. 19. From the agreement it is very clear that rent was fixed at Rs. 3,000/-per year in advance @ Rs. 250/- per month. This is stated in two separate clauses viz clause No. (2) and (3) as stated above. Regarding Municipal tax, according to agreement Municipal tax was to be paid as per assessment made at the time of execution of the lease deed and thereafter as per assessment to be made in future. In otherwords, the Municipal tax was not a fixed amount. Therefore, the question of paying Municipal tax alongwith the rent every month cannot or in advance for the year does not arise as it was not a fixed amount. Had it been a fixed amount then a contrary view would have been possible. From the Municipal laws it is also clear that tax can be realised from the occupier of the building. There is nothing on record to show that prior to the payment of Municipal tax in advance by the plaintiffs any demand was received by the defendant and therefore, the question of default in payment of Municipal tax does not arise. From the Municipal laws it is also clear that tax can be realised from the occupier of the building. There is nothing on record to show that prior to the payment of Municipal tax in advance by the plaintiffs any demand was received by the defendant and therefore, the question of default in payment of Municipal tax does not arise. I am, therefore, constrain to hoid that payment of Municipal tax alongwith the rent cannot and does not arise as there was no demand from the Municipality and that the defendant cannot be treated as a defaulter for non-payment of Municipal tax, inasmuch as, no demand notice was received by the defendant. Having paid the Municipal tax in advance by the plaintiffs now they cannot take the plea that defendant was a defaulter in payment of Municipal tax. In fact, there is nothing on record to show that any demand was made by the plaintiffs for re-imbursement of the Municipal tax paid by the plaintiffs. Therefore, I hold that the learned lower appellate Court rightly decided this point in favour of the tenant. 20. Reliance has been placed in a decision of the Bombay High Court in Navnitprasad vs. Ahmedabad Municipality, AIR 1967 Bombay 163. In that case the Municipal tax was to be paid to the landlord and according to the Bombay High Court that the payment of Municipal tax may well he in the nature of rent though not the rent strictly so called. In the case in hand Municipal tax was to be paid not to the landlord but to the Municipal Board. Even in that decision the Bombay High Court held that strictly Municipal tax cannot be said to be rent. Therefore, this decision is of no help to the plaintiffs. 21. Attention of this Court has also been drawn to a decision of this Court in Kishanlal Singol vs Hari Kissan, AIR 1956 Assam 113. In that case the suit premises was rented out at Rs. 60/- and in addition 10% by way of taxes payable monthly by the defendant to the plaintiff as vent. Therefore, defendant was to pay Rs. 66/- per month as rent. In that case the suit premises was rented out at Rs. 60/- and in addition 10% by way of taxes payable monthly by the defendant to the plaintiff as vent. Therefore, defendant was to pay Rs. 66/- per month as rent. This Court hold that for failure to pay the agreed amount alongwith the Municipal tax and other maintenance charges in time under the terms of the contract between the parties, the tenant can be deemed to be a defaulter under Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1949. From the above facts it is very clear that the tax etc. was fixed and it formed part of the rent. But in the case in hand the Municipal tax was not fixed and was to be paid by the defendant not to the landlord but to the Municipality. As such, payment to the Municipality can­not be made unless there is demand. From the facts of the above case I am of the opinion that the ratio laid down is not applicable to the case in hand. 22. Situated thus I agree with the learned lower appellate Court that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the defendant was a defaulter. 23. Argument has been advanced before this Court regarding comparative hardship and in this connection various decisions have been referred to viz Dainodar vs. Nandram, AIR 1960 MP 345 ; Sukumar vs. Naresh Chandra, AIR 1968 Calcutta 49 and Gulab Chand Prasad vs Budhwanti, AIR 1985 Patna 327. 24. In the case in hand, the question of hardship of the tenant does not arise as the suit for his eviction has been dismissed. Regarding hardship of landlord, I may say that in view of the finding of the Courts below that the plaintiffs have other building as well as vacant plot of land it cannot be said that it will cause hardship to the plaintiffs if the suit is dismissed. 25. I may record here that I have not examined the question whether hardship can be a ground under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 in a suit for eviction as there is no such provision in the Act itself. I keep this matter open to be decided in any appropriate case. For the reasons stated above, I do not find merit in the present petition and accordingly it is dismissed. No costs.