DAVE, J. ( 1 ) ). This Civil Revision Application has been directed against the orders pronounced by the learned 2nd Extra Assistant Judge, Nadiad, dated 1/02/1988 below Exhibit-1 in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 123 of 1987 which calls upon me to decide and answer the undermentioned two questions : (I) Whether the First Appellate Court can decide and dismiss an appeal on merits, in absence of the appellant or the Advocate representing his cause, or whether it has a limited scope of dismissing the appeal for appellants default only ? (II) Whether the authority or jurisdiction to decide and dismiss the appeal on merits, in absence of the appellant or his Advocate can be derived from the provisions contained under Sec. 107, Sec. 151 or Rule 33 of Order 41 of the Code ? the facts : ( 2 ) ). The plaintiff had filed Regular Civil Suit No. 268 of 1985 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (J. D.), Borsad for permanent prohibitory injunction in respect of the agricultural land bearing Survey no. 110 situated-at village Bhadran. The plaintiff had filed the necessary application for interim orders at Exhibit-5. The learned Civil judge (J. D.), Borsad by his orders dated 16/05/1986 had vacated the ad interim orders earlier granted by him below application Exhibit-5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the above said orders, the plaintiff had preferred the appeal before the District Court, Kheda at Nadiad, which came to be registered as Civil Misc. Appeal No. 87 of 1986. The learned Extra Assistant judge, Nadiad before whom the said appeal was listed for hearing, dismissed the same by the judgment and orders dated 28/10/1987 for default of appearance. It requires to be noticed that the above said appeal came to be dismissed by the said orders not only for the default of appearance on the part of the learned Advocate representing the cause of the appellant, but also on merits. Later on the appellant-plaintiff had submitted the application for review of the said orders and for the readmission of the appeal on the ground that, if the learned Advocate for the appellant was found not to be present, then the only proper, legal and justifiable order would have been of the dismissal of the appeal in default only and that, the appeal could not have been dismissed on merits. This application also came to be "summarily dismissed" by the learned Extra Assistant Judge, Nadiad by the orders dated 1-2-1988 reiterating the say "that the Court has perused the Memorandum of Appeal, the judgment of the Court below and the documentary evidence adduced by the appellant, and that the Court has taken all the trouble to travel and watch the complete R and P of the suit and therefore, there is no scope of granting the application for review. " the appellant feels aggrieved and dissatisfied with the above said orders of the summary dismissal of the said application. The said Orders form the subject-matter of this Revision and are on canvass before me. ( 3 ) ). Mr. S. D. Patel, the learned Counsel who appears on behalf of the petitioner has urged that the learned Appellate Judge could not have dismissed the appeal on merits, when the learned Advocate representing the cause of the petitioner-appellant-plaintiff was not found to be present. In such circumstances the only course open and available to the Court was to dismiss the appeal only for the default of appearance on the part of the learned Counsel. ( 4 ) ). The appeal being an appeal against the orders pronounced by the learned judge below application No. Exhibit-5 registered as Civil Misc. Appeal No. 87 of 1986 would be governed by the provisions contained under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but Rule 2 of Order 43 of the Code when says that Order 41 of the Code applies to the Appeal From Orders, the reference shall have to be made to the relevant provisions contained under order 41 of the Code. Rule 17 of Order 41 which finds its place within the part under the caption "procedure on Hearing", says that when on the day fixed or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called out for hearing, the Court may make an order that the Appeal Be Dismissed. The explanation to the above said rule inserted by the Amendment Act, 1976 with effect from 1- 2-1977 goes to show that nothing in the said sub-rule shall be construed as "empowering the Court to dismiss the appeal on merits". The explanation to the above said rule inserted by the Amendment Act, 1976 with effect from 1- 2-1977 goes to show that nothing in the said sub-rule shall be construed as "empowering the Court to dismiss the appeal on merits". Thus the explanation signifies and postulates that if the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called out for hearing, the Court may pass the necessary orders dismissing the appeal. But the Court is not empowered to dismiss the appeal on merits. This legal situation which probably required a clear re-affirmation appears to have been brought-in on the Procedural Statute with a view to command the Courts not to decide the appeals on merits in absence of the appellants or the Advocates retained and expected to represent and advance their causes, whenever called upon by the Courts during the course of the decision of the appeals. It therefore needs no telling that when the learned Advocate representing the cause of the petitioner-appellant-plaintiff was found not to be present, the only course open to the learned Appellate Judge was to dismiss the appeal for the appellants default and in no circumstances the Court could have decided and dismissed the appeal on merits. ( 5 ) ). Mr. G. D. Bhatt the learned Counsel who appears on behalf of the respondent has tried to urge that Rule 17 of Order 41 would apply to the hearing of the Appeal at the admission stage only and not thereafter. The above said contention being raised by the learned Counsel appears to be clearly unacceptable. This conclusion can be drawn by a mere look at the scheme of Order 41 of the Code. Rules 1, 2, 3, 3a and 4 of Order 41 of the Code relate to the form of Appeal, the grounds which may be taken in the appeal, the rejection or the amendment of the memorandum, the application for condonation of delay and the right to file appeal by any one of the plaintiffs or the defendants. Rules 5, 6, 7 (omitted) and 8 relate to "stay of Proceedings and of Execution". Rules 9 to 15 relate to the "procedure on Admission of Appeal. " Rules 16 to 29 relate to the "procedure on Hearing of the Appeal". Rules 5, 6, 7 (omitted) and 8 relate to "stay of Proceedings and of Execution". Rules 9 to 15 relate to the "procedure on Admission of Appeal. " Rules 16 to 29 relate to the "procedure on Hearing of the Appeal". Rule 17 of Order 41 of the Code therefore comes into picture only after the appeal is admitted and the occasion of hearing of the appeal arises. In view of this clear scheme of Order 41 of the Code, Mr. Bhatt cannot successfully urge that Rule 17 thereof comes into play, only at the admission stage and not thereafter. ( 6 ) ). Thus, on the above said assessment of the legal position emanating from Order 41 of the Code, it is apparent that the learned Appellate Judge could not have decided and dismissed the appeal on merits, when the learned advocate representing the cause of the petitioner-appellant-plaintiff was found not to be present. ( 7 ) ). One more aspect. If the appeal is dismissed on merits without hearing the learned Advocate representing the cause of the appellant, then, there would be a judgment on merits against him and he would have to challenge the appellate judgment and the consequent decree by way of filing Second appeal as envisaged by the provisions contained under Rule 42 of the code. On the other hand if the appeal is dismissed for default only, under rule 17 of Order 41 the appellant has a right to make an application to the Appellate Court for the readmission of the appeal under rule 19 of Order 41 of the Code and then the Court is required to readmit the appeal on such terms as to cost or otherwise, if it is proved that the appellant was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing, when the appeal was called out for hearing. This position also would go to assert the view that when the learned Advocate for the appellant was found not to be present, the only course open to the Appellate Court was to dismiss the appeal, not on merits but only for the default of appearance on the part of the appellant. This position also would go to assert the view that when the learned Advocate for the appellant was found not to be present, the only course open to the Appellate Court was to dismiss the appeal, not on merits but only for the default of appearance on the part of the appellant. Having said this much, one should also say that this exercise of testing the authority or jurisdiction of the Appellate Court to decide and dismiss the appeal on merits in absence, is really not needed, regard being had to the express embargo placed by explanation to Rule 17 of Order 41. ( 8 ) ). The learned Counsel Mr. Bhatt presses in service the Rajasthan High court decision in Dargah Committee. Ajmer v. Smt. Hamida Banu and Anr. , air 1988 Rajasthan 169, with a view to demonstrate that a learned single judge of Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) has taken a contrary view by saying that the Court in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec. 107 read with Sec. 151 and Rule 33 of Order 41 of the Code is empowered to decide the appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant or his Counsel. ( 9 ) ). With great respect, I must admit that it appears extremely difficult, rather impossible to me to subscribe to the said view taken by the Rajasthan high Court. The said pronouncement (AIR 1988 Rajasthan 169) firstly proceeds on the consideration of the provisions contained under Sees. 107 and 151 of the Code. Firstly taking the provisions contained under Sec. 151 of the code for the examination, with a view to ascertain as to whether something, unambiguously prohibited by express provisions of law can be done by Courts of Law under the camouflage of the exercise of the inherent powers. It must be said that Sec. 151 of the Code merely saves the inherent powers of the courts and does not confer jurisdiction or authority on the Court to do something which the Courts are otherwise not entitled to do. The exercise of inherent powers cannot, be made a tool or a lever to do something which the Courts are prohibited to do under express embargo. The exercise of inherent powers cannot, be made a tool or a lever to do something which the Courts are prohibited to do under express embargo. If expressly barred jurisdiction or authority is permitted to be exercised or utilised under the inherent powers, one must be prepared to suffer a situation, arising from the process of drawing a logical extremity, where the Courts would fell free to say well; we are prohibited to do this under an express embargo, but nonetheless we shall do the same under our inherent powers. " This would be nothing less than disastrous. The provisions contained under Sec. 107 of the Code would also not be able to confer such powers on the Courts. "powers of Appellate Court: 107. (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an appellate Court shall have power : (a) to determine a case finally, (b) to remand a case, (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial, (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. " ( 10 ) ). Section 107 (l) (a) indeed empowers the Court to determine a case finally but the said provisions cannot be read or construed so as to suggest or signify an expressly prohibited act or authority to determine a case finally in absence of the appellant or the Advocate. Accepting such a construction flying in the face of the express provision would amount to nothing but the implied and clandestine rewriting of the provisions motivated for usurping that part of the jurisdiction which is denied by the express provision. ( 11 ) ). Rule 33 of Order 41 speaks of the Power of Court of Appeal and simply says that the Appellate Court shall have the power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made. Under this rule the Court can also pass or make such further or other decree or order, as the case may require. Under this rule the Court can also pass or make such further or other decree or order, as the case may require. The provisions contained in this Rule can never be construed or read as conferring the otherwise Forbidden jurisdiction of deciding the appeal on merits on the Courts. The Courts must forbid the forbidden and must not do what is forbidden by extending their search of broad and general provisions. The syllogism indicated above obliges me to express my inability to concur with the view taken by the Rajasthan High court. ( 12 ) ). Thus the present Civil Revision Application succeeds and the same is required to be allowed. The same is hereby accordingly allowed and the orders under revision are hereby set aside. ( 13 ) ). The application presented on behalf of the appellant to the Court below in fact makes a reference to the provisions contained under Order 41 Rule 19 of the Code. The petitioner appellant has narrated the circumstances under which the learned Counsel representing his cause could not remain present before the Appellate Court. In view of this position the said application requires to be treated as an application for re-admis-sion of appeal dismissed for default falling within the purview of Rule 19 of Order 41 of the Code. The Appellate court is hereby directed to decide the said application on merits and according to law, regard being had to the provisions contained under Rule 19 of Order 41 of the Code, after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard, to the parties, with utmost expedition. ( 14 ) ). Rule is made absolute accordingly, but with no order as to costs. .