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Gauhati High Court · body

1993 DIGILAW 216 (GAU)

Alak Saha v. Tripura Gramin Bank

1993-08-23

S.BARMAN ROY, U.L.BHAT

body1993
U.L. Bhat, C.J.— The writ petition has been filed seeking a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to grant a particular pay scale to Field Supervisors appointed directly or by promotion under the Tripura Gramin Bank with effect from the dates of their appointment. In paragraph 12 of the writ petition it is stated that there are numerous persons having the same interest as that of the petitioners and the petition has been filed on behalf of all those persons. Petitioners also filed an application under Order 1 Rule 8, CPC for according permission to file the writ petition on behalf of all Field Supervisors working in the Bank. The writ petition has been admitted. Roy, J. who heard the application under Order 1 Rule 8, CPC, has referred to Division Bench the question relating to applicability of the provision to writ petitions. We have heard learned counsel appearing for both sides. 2. Rule : of Order 1 CPC enables one or more persons to sue be sued, or defend a suit on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons having the same interest. Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested. The Court may direct that one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of or for the benefit of, all persons so interested. Where such direction or permission is made, the Court shall, at the plaintiff's expense, give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons so inserted, either by personal seasonal service, or where reason of the number of persons or any other cause, such service is not reasonably prac­ticable, by public advertisement, as the Court may direct. Any person on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, a suit is instituted, or defended, may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit. Where any person suing or defending in any such suit does not proceed with due diligence in the suit or defence, the Court may substitute in his place any other person having the same interest in the suit. Where any person suing or defending in any such suit does not proceed with due diligence in the suit or defence, the Court may substitute in his place any other person having the same interest in the suit. A decree passed in a suit under this rule shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf, on for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended, as the case may be. 3. What is necessary is of interest in the suit and not identity of cause of action. The object of Order 1 Rule 8, CPC is to facilitate decision on questions in which a large body of persons are interested without recourse to the ordinary procedure. The rule is one of convenience based upon reason and policy and saves trouble and expense which would otherwise have to be incurred in such cases. The rule is intended to avoid inconvenience and delay in disposal of litigation where parties are numerous but having the same interest in the suit. See Kodia Gounder & another vs. Velandi Gounder & others, AIR 1955 Madras 281 (Full Bench). Courts generally are ready to grant permission to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, unnecessary delay and expense as also conflict of findings. 4. Section 141 CPC reads as follows : "The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction." Before the introduction of the explanation by Amending Act 104 of 1976, there was difference of opinion as to whether the provisions of the Code applied to writ proceedings before the High Courts or Supreme Court. One view was that a writ proceeding being one in a Court of civil jurisdiction, the provisions of the Code applied. Another view was that since writ proceedings being one of special or extra-ordinary nature, the provisions did not apply In Banbhai Muijibhat Pate! vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot & others, AIR 1974 SC 2105 , the Court observed that the words "as far as it can be made applicable" in section 141, CPC, make it clear that in applying the various provisions of the Code to proceedings other than those of a suit, the Court must take into account the nature of these proceedings and the relief sought. Bearing in mind the objective of Article 226 to provide quick and inexpensive remedy to aggrieved parties, writ petition is essentially different from a suit and it would be incorrect to assimilate and incorporate the procedure, of a suit into the proceedings under Article 226, The decision of course does not lay down the proposition that no provision of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to procedure can be applied to writ proceedings. In Arbind Kumar Singh vs. Nand Kishore Prasad & others AIR 1968 SC 1227 , the Court interpreted the words 'civil proceeding' in Article 133 and held, following the decision in SAL Narayan Row & another vs. Iswarlal Bhagwantias & another, AIR 1965 SC 1818 , that these words cover all proceedings directly affect civil rights. A proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution to bring up a proceeding for consideration concerning civil rights is therefore a civil proceeding. 5. In view of the difference of opinion referred to earlier, an explanation was added to section 141, CPC by the Amendment Act, 1976. The explanation reads : "In this section, the expression 'proceedings' includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not includes any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.'' ('emphasis supplied.) The effect of the explanation is to make it clear that writ proceedings cannot be regarded as 'proceedings' for the purposes of section 141 CPC. Therefore, as a matter of course and without anything more, no provision of the Code can be automatically sought to be applied to writ proceedings. However, it is well known that several High Courts have framed rules adopting some of the provisions of the Code to writ proceeding!. Even where a High Court has not framed any rule assimilating any particular provision of the Code, it is open to the writ Court in the exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction to apply the particular provision of the Code to writ proceedings, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and as long as there is no contra indication in the High Court Rules. It is now univer­sally accepted that principles of res judicata are applicable to writ proceedings. It is now univer­sally accepted that principles of res judicata are applicable to writ proceedings. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in MP Raghavan Nair vs. State Insu­rance Officer & others, AIR 1971 Kerala 175 (FB) held that some of the provi­sions of the Code of Civil Procedure which are based upon principles of public policy aiming at justice, the securing of which is the very object of Article 226 and principles of repose and peace could be applied to writ proceedings. 6. In Kashi Nath Seth vs. Collector, Central Excise, AIR 1979 Allahabad 128, it has been held that though the procedure prescribed by the Code does not apply of its own force to proceedings under Article 226, some of the salutary principles enshrined in the Code may be applied to writ proceedings. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Teja Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarah & others, AIR 1982 P&H 169 has held that principles underlying Order I Rule 8. CPC could be applied to writ proceedings. In Prabodh Verma & others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others, AIR 1985 SC 167 , the Court observed: " A High Court ought not to decide a writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgments being before it as respondents or at least by some of them being before it as respondents in ?•: representative capacity if their number is too large, and, therefore, the Allahabad High Court ought not to have proceeded to hear and dispose of the Singh's writ petition without insisting upon the reserve pool teachers being made respondents to that writ petition, or at least some of them being made respondents in a repres­entative capacity, and had the respondents refused to do so, ought to have dismissed that petition for non-joinder of necessary parties." (emph­asis supplied) The same principle is reiterated in sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 50 of the judgment summarising the conclusions. 7. The principle underlying Order I Rule 8, CPC is a principle of public policy, a principle intended to avoid multiplicity of cases and to cut short delay and expense in litigation and to avoid conflict of findings. There is nothing in the Rules framed by the Gaubati High Court indicating that the principle underlying Order I Rule 8, CPC, is inapplicable to writ proceedings. There is nothing in the Rules framed by the Gaubati High Court indicating that the principle underlying Order I Rule 8, CPC, is inapplicable to writ proceedings. We therefore, hold that the principle underlying Order I Rule 8, CPC can be effective to writ proceedings before the High Court in appropriate cases depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case bearing in mind the object sought to be achieved by the provision. 8. The question referred to the Division Bench is answered accordingly.