Sushma W/O Maheshkumar And Anr. v. Devraj Pyareram Verma
1993-04-06
A.R.TIWARI
body1993
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER A.R. Tiwari, J. 1. This appeal, preferred under Section 32 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'The Act') Has been directed against the order dated 4-3-1993 passed by the IInd Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Indore in M. A. No. 2/93 thereby maintaining the order dated 22-1-1993 passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Indore in Case No. A-90(4)/47/92. 2. The order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority and affirmed by the Lower Appellate Court is to the effect that the appellants should restore the essential service temporarily after effecting the repairs in the accommodation used as latrine and bath-room. 3. The matrix in short is that the respondent is the tenant in House No. 8 Palasia Hana (New Palasia Street No. 4), Indore. The appellants became the landlords of the respondent after purchase of the suit-house by a registered sale-deed dated 5-11-1991. The relationship of landlord and tenant is thus not in dispute. In October, 1992, the appellants started construction in the suit-house. On 5-11-1992, the employees of the Indore Municipal Corporation demolished the construction commenced by the appellants. In the process of this demolition, the rear wall of the latrine and bath-room was also damaged. The respondent filed an application under Section 38 of the Act before the Rent Controlling Authority, Indore and also moved an application for interim relief seeking immediate restoration of the essential service as regards the latrine and bath-room. The Respondent also filed Civil Suit No. 225-A/92 before the IXth Civil Judge Class-I, Indore for permanent injunction against the apprehended new construction in the tenanted premises. The order of status quo was passed on 19-11-1992 which is still operative. The defence of the appellans in this civil suit is that the demolition was effected by the Indore Municipal Corporation on 1 2-11-1992 and they have thus, not withheld or cut off any essential supply or services. The interim relief before the Rent Controlling Authority was also resisted on the ground that the respondent is a defaulter in payment of rent.
The interim relief before the Rent Controlling Authority was also resisted on the ground that the respondent is a defaulter in payment of rent. The Rent Controlling Authority considering the material, produced by the parties, and on hearing them passed the order dated 22-1 -1993 to the following effect :- a) The respondent shall immediately pay the arrears of rent to the appellants and the appellants shall effect repairs temporarily to the accommodation used as latrine and bath-room within four days so that this essential service is available to the respondent and his family. b) The landlords shall produce the accounts of expenditure of this work so that the final order in this behalf could be passed after enquiry at the time of decision of the main application. Aggrieved by this order, the landlords preferred the aforesaid appeal. This appeal was, however, dismissed with slight modification. It was directed that in case the appellants failed to restore the essential service as directed, then the respondent would be free to get the repairs done and producee the accounts before the Rent Controlling Authority for direction of the adjustment of such amount against the rent. The landlord-appellants have preferred this appeal. 4. I have heard Shri K. G. Maheshwari, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri R. S. Garg, learned counsel for the respondent" and have perused the record. 5. The main attack against the impugned order is as under :- (a) The tenant is in arrears of rent and as such, he was precluded from initiating such a proceeding. It was thus not a case of withholding of any essential service without just and sufficient cause. The Respondent did not choose to pay the rent despite the direction made by the Rent Controlling Authority. (b) The order of the lower Appellate Court was contrary to law and usage having the force of law. (c) The Act of demolition was not the Act of the appellants. This was done by the Indore Municipal Corporation. Hence, the provisions of Section 38 of the Act were not attracted. (d) The order impugned is also vitiated in the face of the order of status quo passed by the IXth Civil Judge Class I, Indore in the suit instituted by the respondent against the appellant. 6.
This was done by the Indore Municipal Corporation. Hence, the provisions of Section 38 of the Act were not attracted. (d) The order impugned is also vitiated in the face of the order of status quo passed by the IXth Civil Judge Class I, Indore in the suit instituted by the respondent against the appellant. 6. The appellants have also filed a Panchnama in this Court which contains the recital that the repairs of bath-room and latrine were not possible. 7. Shri Maheshwari has thus, vehemently urged that the orders of the Court below deserve to be demolished. On the other hand, Shri Garg has strenuously submitted that no interference in this appeal is permissible in law and the concurrent findings of fact reached by the Authority and the Lower Appellate Court at the interlocutary stage are not liable to be interfered with. 8. It is apt to keep in mind that this appeal has been filed against the interim order and that main petition is yet to be decided after recording of evidence. It is, thus, essential to refrain from expressing opinion on all the issues, as urged, at this stage, in order to obviate possible prejudice to the parties in fair trial before the Authority, and to limit the scrutiny in seeing whether discretion, as exercised, was injudicious and needed to be subverted. 9. In 1984 MPRCJ 18 N, Radheshyam Sharma v. Madan Prakashchand Sharma, it is held that interim relief is matter of discretion unamenable to interference in appeal unless its exercise was found to be perverse or unbacked by sufficient cause. 10. The Rent Control Act prescribes legislative injunctions against the landlord. Section 37 provides that "the landlord shall be bound to keep the accommodation in good and tenantable repairs". This is, thus mandatory injunction. Section 38, on the other hand, prescribes prohibitory injunction demanding that "no landlord either himself or through any person purporting to act on his behalf shall without just and sufficient cause cut off or withhold any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the accommodation let to him." The object behind these legislative injunctions is to ensure that the tenant's stay in the tenanted accommodation remains fetter-free. These injunctions are not liable to be contravened in any manner. 11. Section 31 of the Act mandated that "the decision of the appellate Court shall be final".
These injunctions are not liable to be contravened in any manner. 11. Section 31 of the Act mandated that "the decision of the appellate Court shall be final". The intention, so proclaimed, is that litigative system should be seen to operate in a manner that final justice does not become futile promise. In the light of this legislative intent, the jurisdiction under Section 32 of the Act is purposefully circumscribed by the clauses stated therein indicating that an appeal shall lie on "no other" ground. In this appeal before me, the attack mainly is on clause (i) i.e. the decision "is contrary to law or usage having the force of law". This ground too is under the strain of tenebrosity in that there seemed to be no clarification as to whether the challenge was with regard to law or usage. The ground is simple reproduction, without specification, of the provision. 12. The position emerging from the record is as under :- (i) The portion of the rented accommodation, latrine and bath-room, is part of the accommodation let to the tenant (respondent) and thus was used by the tenant under the tenancy. (ii) This portion has been damaged by the Corporation as a result of some alleged unauthorised construction by the landlord so much so that the landlord has issued notices to the Corporation. (iii) The essential service enjoyed by the tenant thus, stood withheld. (iv) The landlord has failed to keep this portion "in good and tenantable repairs", thereafter as obligated under the law to do so in terms of Section 37 of the Act. (v) The Civil Court has injuncted the landlords and ordered maintanance of status quo. 12A. The appellants do not claim to have withheld it on the ground of failure to pay the rent. It was not the plea that the landlords had done it and they could do it on the basis of furnishing any "just and sufficient cause", as contended here. In fact, the defence in essence is that this was done by the Corporation and as such, Section 38 of the Act was not attracted. In pursuit of such a plea, it was overlooked that the act of the Corporation, even if unwarranted, was at least at this stage found to be linked with the act of the landlords in the face of demolition of some other construction labelled as unauthorised.
In pursuit of such a plea, it was overlooked that the act of the Corporation, even if unwarranted, was at least at this stage found to be linked with the act of the landlords in the face of demolition of some other construction labelled as unauthorised. The remedy otherwise available to a litigant cannot be seen to be lost on pettifoggery. It cannot be gainsaid that the Corporation or landlords have no locus standi to cause damage to any part of tenanted accommodation or make it in any way unserviceable. 13. The appellants in these circumstances, cannot get away with the consequence pleading their impeccability and the respondent cannot be left in the lurch. 14. There is no specific provision of interim relief in the Act. The recourse, of necessity, has to be to the provisions like Section 151, Civil Procedure Code or order 39, Rule 1 or 2, Civil Procedure Code on the strength of Rule 16 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Rules, 1966. Terms can be imposed under Order 39, Rule 2(2), Civil Procedure Code. The Authority imposed the terms of payment of rent. 15. In this backdrop, the submissions advanced as detailed above are found to be non-meritorious and as such do not help the appellants at this stage and this armoury of attack should be better preserved for more appropriate stage. The Panchanama, demonstrative of unrepairable condition of the portion in question, deserves no consideration at this stage. 16. In the ultimate analysis, I find that the discretion is judicially exercised and is not liable to be faulted with under Section 32 of the Act. It is not perverse, nor injudicious. There is no just and sufficient cause for declining the restoration at present. 17. In AIR 1938 Bombay 408 (DB), Maria Flaviana and Ors. v. Ramchandra Santuram Asavle and Ors. it is held that - "I do not wish to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Judges, if I am satisfied that it has been exercised, as it must have been, after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. The mere fact that there is no judgment here giving reasons for the "sufficient cause" does not in my opinion show that that discretion has not been judicially exercised. I would therefore, on both grounds dismiss this appeal with costs." -X- -X- -X- -X- -X- 18-19.
The mere fact that there is no judgment here giving reasons for the "sufficient cause" does not in my opinion show that that discretion has not been judicially exercised. I would therefore, on both grounds dismiss this appeal with costs." -X- -X- -X- -X- -X- 18-19. The appeal thus, accordingly fails and is dismissed. The respondent is ordered to pay or deposit entire arrears of rent, if not already paid or deposited, within two days from today. The order impugned shall become enforceable only on payment or deposit of the rent as directed by the Rent Controlling Authority. The direction by way of interim relief is limited to the effecting of necessary repairs only. 20. However, the direction as regards adjustment of the amount of expenses in the rent, as passed by the Lower Appellate Court is set aside and the one embodied in the order of the Rent Controlling Authority is restored. 21. It is, however, clarified that nothing stated herein shall be construed as an expression of opinion on any point falling for consideration in the main petition. 22. The parties are however, in the facts and circumstances of the case, directed to bear their own costs of the appeal as incurred. 23. The parties shall appear before the Rent Controlling Authority, Indore on 12 - 4-1993 to take further orders. The records shall be returned immediately. The Rent Controlling Authority, Indore is directed to endeavour to conclude the main case within a period of three months from 12-4-1993.