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1993 DIGILAW 216 (SC)

Heera Prasad v. State Bank Of India

1993-03-02

J.S.VERMA, S.P.BHARUCHA

body1993
JUDGMENT BHARUCHA, J.—Leave to appeal is granted. 2. The appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court at Patna dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. 3. The appellant was employed by the respondent. He was charge-sheeted for having granted bank loans to a large number of persons without proper documentation and without verifying their credit worthiness and also with having obtained illegal gratification in that connection. An enquiry was held. The Enquiry Officer made a report holding the appellant guilty. Upon the basis of the enquiry report the appellant was dismissed from service. 4. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court at Patna (being Writ Petition No. C.W.J.C. No. 1979 of 1988) impugning the dismissal. The High Court allowed the writ petition by judgment and order dated July 8, 1988. The enquiry, the court concluded, could not be held to be proper and in accordance with law. Consequently, the order of dismissal was set aside. The High Court observed: "This does not mean that the petitioner should be go scot-free. He must face enquiry. Sufficient time has already lapsed. The enquiry must be concluded as early as possible. The petitioner will appear before the enquiring officer (to be nominated in the meantime) at Patna on August 2, 1988 and the prosecution will produce the witnesses examined on his behalf for cross-examination. After the cross-examination is over the petitioner will also produce the witnesses when he may like to enquire. This should be done without any adjournment and the proceeding should be conducted day to day so that it may be concluded as early as possible. With this observation this writ application is disposed of." 5. The same Enquiry Officer then permitted the appellant to cross-examine the witnesses produced in support of the charge and to examine his own witnesses. He made a report dated March 27, 1989 in which he held nine charges against the appellant to be proved, one to be partly proved and one not proved. The disciplinary authority, upon consideration of the enquiry report, passed an order dated October 23, 1989, dismissing the appellant from service. 6. He made a report dated March 27, 1989 in which he held nine charges against the appellant to be proved, one to be partly proved and one not proved. The disciplinary authority, upon consideration of the enquiry report, passed an order dated October 23, 1989, dismissing the appellant from service. 6. The appellant challenged the order of dismissal dated October 23, 1989 on the ground that the enquiry upon the basis of which it had been passed had not been conducted as required by the order of the High Court dated July 8, 1988. He also challenged it upon the ground that he had not been furnished with a copy of the enquiry report. The High Court rejected the writ petition. It held that the judgment of this Court in the case of Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan { (1991) 1 SCC 588 did not cover an order of dismissal that had been passed before the said judgment was delivered. Insofar as the enquiry report was concerned, the High Court took the view that the Enquiry Officer had allowed the appellant to participate in the proceedings as also to cross-examine witnesses and he had considered all relevant aspects on the record. 7. It will be recalled that the High Court by the judgment and order dated July 8, 1988 had held that the earlier enquiry was not proper and in accordance with law and had quashed the order of dismissal dated February 14, 1987 based thereon. It had directed that the appellant should face an enquiry whereat the prosecution would produce the witnesses it had examined on its behalf for cross-examination by the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant could produce such witnesses as he desired. It is the submission of learned counsel on behalf of the appellant that the Enquiry Officer had in the second enquiry report relied upon the findings of the earlier enquiry, since quashed, and that he had not permitted the appellant to examine three necessary witnesses in support of his case. There had, therefore, been no real enquiry as contemplated by the High Courts order dated July 8, 1988 and that, therefore, the dismissal order passed upon the basis of the second enquiry report should be quashed. 8. There had, therefore, been no real enquiry as contemplated by the High Courts order dated July 8, 1988 and that, therefore, the dismissal order passed upon the basis of the second enquiry report should be quashed. 8. Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned senior counsel for the respondent, submitted that the Enquiry Officer had conducted the enquiry as directed by the High Court in its order dated July 8, 1988, from the point of cross-examination of the respondents witnesses onward. 9. The enquiry report made by the Enquiry Officer subsequent to the order of the High Court dated July 8, 1988 is entitled "Additional enquiry report in respect of charges laid against Shri Heera Prasad". It opens with the sentence, "This enquiry report is further to the enquiry report already submitted by me in September 1986." It says that "the enquiry was reopened". It says, further, "As the charges have been dealt with one by one in detail in my previous enquiry report I am confining this report only to the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses as also examination/cross-examination of defence witnesses." The report concludes thus: "After going through the proceedings, hearing the depositions made by the defence witnesses, and hearing the answers given by the prosecution witnesses, I find no reason to change my report as no exonerating fact came out during the enquiry instead it becomes a little darker particularly noting the fact that at least three (03) of the witnesses cited by the charged officer himself refused to come for deposing before the enquiry for reasons best known to the charged officer/witnesses. As the various exhibits etc. were discussed and analysed by me in my previous report, I am not repeating the analysis once again in this report. As aforesaid, the Enquiry Officer held nine of the eleven charges to be proved, one to be partly proved and one to be not proved. (The emphasis is supplied). 10. It is patent that the order dated July 8, 1988 contemplated a fresh enquiry. At best, the examination-in-chief of the witnesses of the respondent could be said to have been allowed to be incorporated in the second enquiry proceedings. The order certainly contemplated that the Enquiry Officer would apply his mind afresh to the evidence on record comprising the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of the respondents witnesses and that of the appellants witnesses. At best, the examination-in-chief of the witnesses of the respondent could be said to have been allowed to be incorporated in the second enquiry proceedings. The order certainly contemplated that the Enquiry Officer would apply his mind afresh to the evidence on record comprising the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of the respondents witnesses and that of the appellants witnesses. It is patent from the "additional enquiry report" made by the Enquiry Officer that there has been no fresh application of mind. It was impermissible for the Enquiry Officer, in these circumstances, to have borne his previous Enquiry Report in mind and to have confined the "additional enquiry report" only to the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and the examination and cross-examination of defence witnesses "as the charges have been dealt with one by one in detail in my previous enquiry report". It was also impermissible for him to have stated that "the findings of the previous enquiry report remain as they are". Having regard to the High Courts order dated July 8, 1988, the Enquiry Officer was bound to consider the material on record afresh and not to take his earlier report into account and to say that he found "no reason to change that report". 11. We are, in the circumstances, not satisfied that the appellant has had a fair opportunity of presenting his case to an Enquiry Officer unbiased by preconceptions. 12. Having regard to all that has transpired, we think that it is in the fitness of things that the order of dismissal dated October 23, 1989 should be quashed and another Enquiry Officer should be appointed by the respondent who should allow the appellant the opportunity of examining as his witnesses the three persons referred to by the earlier Enquiry Officer in the paragraph of the "additional enquiry report" sub-titled Conclusion. He should give to the respondent and the appellant the opportunity of a hearing. He should then apply his mind to the material on record without in any way being influenced by the earlier enquiry reports, and make his own enquiry report accordingly. 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal are set aside. The writ petition is allowed to the extent mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 14. There shall be no order as to costs. For Citation: (1993) 2 SCC 418