Judgment :- These two revision petitions are arising from suit O.S.No.105/86 on the file of the Munsiff's Court. Parappanangadi. It is a suit for partition. Petitioners in these revisions are not parties to the suit. They filed two separate interlocutory applications, one for impleadment and other for the issue of a commission. Both these petitions were dismissed by the court below as per the common order dated 1-9-1987, which is challenged in these petitions. C.R.P.No.1711/87 is against the order in I.A. 2248/86 and C.R.P. 2345/87 is against the order in I.A.I415/87. The plaintiff is figured as first respondent in both the revisions and the defendants 1 to 8 as respondents 2 to 9. 2. The facts of the case can be summarised thus: One of the items of properties comprised in R.S.451/2 is the plaint schedule property which is sought to be partitioned in O.S.105/86. It was originally belonged to Guruvayoor Devaswom in jenmom rights. It was held by one Unichira Amma on kanam rights as per kanam chit dated 31-1-1927. Guruvayoor Devaswom filed O.S.No. 80/81 in the Munsiff's Court, Parappanangadi against the legal heirs of Unichira Amma in realisation of the arrears of rent due under the kanam chit. In execution of the decree in O.S.80/81 G uruvayoor Devaswom brought all the properties under kanam chit to court sale. In E.P.137/above properties were sold in court auction on 17-9-1964. The sale was duly confirmed and the sale certificate was issued to auction purchaser. The auction purchaser took delivery of the property on 8-12-1964. While so, second petitioner herein had obtained assignment of the rights of the auction purchaser. In the meanwhile Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings (Amendment) Act of 1969 came into force. The first petitioner claimed that she had the leasehold right over the properties under kanam rights. The tenancy right of the 1st petitioner was later recognised by the Land Tribunal, Chavakkad and issued Certificate of Purchase. In view of the provisions of the above Act of 1969 an order for 'redelivery was passed in E.A.418/69 and the Amin came to the property for effecting re-delivery. At that time there was a mediation talk through Advocate Sri. Raman Kutty Menon, who was appearing for the applicant in the matter and as a result thereof an agreement was executed (Ext.Al). At that time there was a mediation talk through Advocate Sri. Raman Kutty Menon, who was appearing for the applicant in the matter and as a result thereof an agreement was executed (Ext.Al). As per this agreement northern half of the property was allowed to be in possession of the petitioners while the possession of southern half of properly was to be with defendants 4 to 8. Since the matter was thus settled, neither of the parties thereafter appeared before the Munsiffs Court in the suit O.S.85/80 and the suit was thus allowed to be dismissed for non-prosecution. The suit O.S.85/80 was the one filed by petitioners for declaration that they had become the owners of the property on the basis of the certificate of purchase obtained by them. The petitioners have thus been in continuous possession of the northern half of the property pursuant to the aforesaid settlement. However the present suit O.S.105/S6 was filed by one of the successors in interest of Unichira Amma for partition of the property. No reference was made in the plaint O.S.105/ 86 as to the agreement. When the petitioners came to know about the institution of the suit, they filed LA. 2248/86 praying that they may be impleaded as parties to the suit in as much as they are vitally interested in contesting the claim for partition in respect of the northern portion of the property. LA. 1411/37 was also filed by them for the issue of a commission for preparing a plan and report in respect of the plaint schedule property. While deciding these two petitions, the court below framed four issues. The first issue among them relates to the question whether the petitioners have got any title or possession over the plaint schedule property before the disputed delivery. Without taking any oral evidence the court below passed an order that the petitioners are not in possession of the plain schedule property. Therefore in view of this finding, the court below dismissed both the petitions. It is against that common order the present revision petitions are filed. 3. Without taking any oral evidence the court below passed an order that the petitioners are not in possession of the plain schedule property. Therefore in view of this finding, the court below dismissed both the petitions. It is against that common order the present revision petitions are filed. 3. The petitioners filed the application for impleadment under 0.I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') which runs thus: "(2) Court may strike out or add parties: The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to nave been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.". (Italics supplied) Before finally deciding the correctness of legality of the impugned orders it would be highly necessary to examine the ambit and scope of sub-rule (2) of R.10 of the Order 1 of the Code. It cannot be disputed that the main object of the rule is to bring on record of the court all the persons or parties to dispute relating to one subject matter so that the dispute may finally be determined at the same time without delay, inconvenience and expense of separate actions and trials. 4. Section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877 dealt with the powers of the court to strike off or to add parties to the suit. as far as the addition of the parties, the above provision says: "Whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added". This provision is exactly similar to the one found in O.1 Rule 10(2) of the 'Code'. That being so the decisions under S.32 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1877 in so far as they relate to the addition of parties can well be applied in interpreting provisions contained in sub-rule (2) of R.10. This provision is exactly similar to the one found in O.1 Rule 10(2) of the 'Code'. That being so the decisions under S.32 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1877 in so far as they relate to the addition of parties can well be applied in interpreting provisions contained in sub-rule (2) of R.10. Likewise 0.16 Rule 11 of the Judicature Act in so far as it relates to the addition of parties is more or less similar. The said provision is like this: "The names of any parties, whether plaintiffs or defendants, who ought to have been joined or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matterT While interpreting the above provision contained in the Judicature Act, the Court in Montgomery v. Foy. Morgan & Co. reported in (1895) 2 Q.B. 321 Lord Esher MR. observed: "I can find no case which decides that we cannot construe the rule as enabling the Court under such circumstances to effectuate what was one of the great objects of the Judicature Acts, namely, that, where there is one subject-matter out of which several disputes arise, all parties may be brought before the Court, and all those 'disputes may be determined at the same time without the delay and expense of several actions and trials. It appears to me that the words of the rule are large enough .to allow of the joinder of the British Saw Mills Company as defendants in this case. I think the question arising between them and the plaintiff is a "question involved in the cause or matter" within the meaning of the rule." (Italics supplied) Lord Charles A. Turner, C.J. in Vydianadayyan v. Sitararnayyan in (1852 (V) ILR (Madras) 52, while dealing with the case coming within the S.32 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1877 observed: "Is it meant by these words that a person not originally impleaded is to be made a party only if the questions raised in the suit cannot otherwise be completely and effectually determined between the parties to the suit? or is it meant completely and effectually determined so that they shall not be again raised in that or in any other suit between the parties to the suit or any of them and third parties? or is it meant completely and effectually determined so that they shall not be again raised in that or in any other suit between the parties to the suit or any of them and third parties? To accept the more restricted interpretation involves the Addition of words which we do not find in the section, namely, "between the parties to the suit", and there can be few, if any, questions which cannot be determined between the parties to the suit one way or the other, and of which the determination, if they be material, will, as between the parties to the suit, not be final. On the other hand, the interpretation warranted by the terms would enable the Court to a void conflicting decisions on the same question which would work injustice to a party to the suit, and finally and effectually to put an end to litigation respecting them. No better instance of the wisdom of such a rule could be afforded than is presented by the suit before the court Reading/ the whole of the rules under O.XVI of the Judicature Act together, it seems clear that R.13 should be interpreted in the larger sense. Although _ex parte Smith (L.R. 2 Ch. D. 51) and Bower v. Hartley (L.R.1 Q.B.D. 656) were decided on Rules 17,18, they indicate the principle, we believe, the framer's of the rules had in view, namely ... that a material question common to the parties and to third parties should be tried once for all. To secure this result the Court has a discretion to add parties which it should exercise, unless by the addition of new parties either of the parties already on the record would be prejudiced or hindered of their remedies". 5. Patanjali Sastri, J. in Vanjiappa Goundan v. N.P. V.L.R. Annamalai Chetdar and others (AIR 1940 Mad. 69) placing reliance on AIR 1929 Mad. 443 held: "The "question involved in the suit" referred to in O.I, R.1G(2) mean not merely the questions which are involved in the suit as originally framed between the parties to the suit. The object of the provision is that where several disputes arise out of one subject-matter, all the parties interested in such disputes should be brought before the Court and all questions in controversy between them should be completely settled in the action". The object of the provision is that where several disputes arise out of one subject-matter, all the parties interested in such disputes should be brought before the Court and all questions in controversy between them should be completely settled in the action". The same question came up for consideration in Paramsivam Filial v. Adilakahmi Ammal and others (AIR 1953 Mad. 618). There the learned judge held thus: "In interpreting 0.1,R.10(2), Civil P.C. the construction of the language of the section should be as liberal and as wide as possible and should not be restricted merely to the parties involved in the suit but the attempt should be always to make parties all persons who may be necessary in order that there might be a final and complete adjudication of the points involved in the suit". The court also pointed out: "Pitchayya v. Raitamma (AIR 1929 Mad. 268), Ramaswami Chettlar v. Vellappa Chettiar (AIR 1931 Mad. 357) and Sivarama Filial v. Ganesaratnam Filial (AIR 1935 Mad. 353) certainly make it clear that it will be necessary, to effectively and completely adjudicate and settle all questions involved in the suit, that all parties who claim any title to the properties in suit should be before the Court". (Italics supplied) 6. The aforesaid decisions make it abundantly clear that the provision contained in O.I Rule 10(2) of the Code shall be interpreted as liberal and as wide as possible. In a case where there is one subject matter out of which several dispute arises, all the parties shall be brought before the court invoking the powers under this provision. Such course will definitely avoid delay and expense of several actions and trials. This would also' avoid conflicting decisions on the same subject matter. The material questions common to the parties to the suits as originally impleaded and third parties can also be determined once for all, All the parties who claim any title to the properties in suit should be before the court. All these would obliterate the chances of future litigation on the same subject matter in whatever form among all those asserting rights thereof. 7. The plaintiff in the present case seriously opposed the intervention of the petitioners in the suit as additional defendants. Of course, the plaintiff is dominos lit is and may choose to implead only those persons as defendants against whom only he wishes to proceed. 7. The plaintiff in the present case seriously opposed the intervention of the petitioners in the suit as additional defendants. Of course, the plaintiff is dominos lit is and may choose to implead only those persons as defendants against whom only he wishes to proceed. However, this general rule is impliedly subject to the provisions contained in sub-rule (2) of R.10. It is the power of the court to add parties whose presence be fore it may be necessary in order to adjudicate all questions involved in the suit. Here the court maybe working against the wishes of the plaintiff who instituted the suit. In Dwaraka Nath v. Kishori Lai ((1910) 61.C, 549Mookerjee, J. observed thus: "We must hold, therefore, that the petitioner is a proper party. The question remains, whether he can be joined as a defendant although the plaintiff objects to or does not desire the joinder. Now, as explained in the case of Montgomery v. Foy ((1895) 2 Q.B. 321) the court has the power to add a person as defendant even though the plaintiff objects to such joinder". The learned judge further observed: "The object of the legislature is to avoid multiplicity of suits, and to ensure that the dispute may be finally determined at the same lime in the presence of all the parties interested without the delay and expense of several actions and trials". The above decision was elaborately considered by Venkatasubba Rao, J. in Secy, of State and another v. M. MumgesaMudaliar and others in AIR 1929 Mad. 443. The learned judge observed: "These cases "establish that even against the plaintiff's consent a new party may be impleaded as a defendant and that he may be so added though he may thereby be in a position to counter claim against the plaintiff. Wynn-Parry, J. in Atid Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Fair Play Towage & Shipping Co. Ltd. (1955) 1 W.L.R.336) said: "After all the basis of the whole jurisdiction to add defendants is that there is a cause of action by the plaintiff against not only the existing defendant but the person who would be joined if the application were successful". Wynn-Parry, J. in Atid Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Fair Play Towage & Shipping Co. Ltd. (1955) 1 W.L.R.336) said: "After all the basis of the whole jurisdiction to add defendants is that there is a cause of action by the plaintiff against not only the existing defendant but the person who would be joined if the application were successful". The above view was noticed by Devlin, J. in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. (1956) 2 W.L.R.372 (Q.B. Division) and said: "The beginning and end of the matter is that the court has jurisdiction to join a person whose presence is necessary for the prescribed purpose and has no jurisdiction under the rule to join a person whose presence is not necessary for that purpose". "It is not, I think, disputed that "the cause or matter" is the action as it stands between the existing parties. If it were otherwise, then anybody who showed a cause of action against either a plaintiff or defendant could, of course, say mat the question involved in his cause of action could not be settled unless he was made a party .... In the present case he submits that the subject-matter of the dispute between the existing parties is the "ownership", if I may so put it, of an invention; the plaintiff claims that, he is the owner of it and the intervener alleges that he is, and both disputes ought to be determined at the same time. This construct ion stresses the amplitude of the closing words "all the questions involved in the cause or matter". In this case, the court ultimately came to the conclusion that the application was in effect, an application for leave to intervene against the will of the plaintiff. It further said: "In such a case the appropriate test to determine whether the intervener was a party "who ought to have been joined, or whose presence before "the court may be necessary" to enable the court completely and effectually to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter within Order 16, R.11, was: Would the order for which the plaintiff was asking directly affect the intervener, not in his commercial interests, but in the enjoyment of his legal rights?" 8. The Supreme Court in Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and others (AIR 195 8 SC 886) noticed the conflicting views of the Madras High Court in AIR 1926 Mad. 836 and AIR 1929 Mad.443 on the question whether government could be added as a party to the litigation not because it was directly interested in the subject matter of the litigation but because the law enacted by the legislature of that State, had been questioned. Venkatasubba Rao, J. in AIR 1929 Mad. 443 had dealt with the very same question. Srinivasa Aiyangar, J. in A.I.R.1926 Mad. 836 observed: "The very basic principles of judgment inter parts is that the judgments arc not judgments in rem, but declaratory and operative only as between them. The plaintiff being generally dominos lotus, I fail to see on what principle of justice he can be compelled to fight against some other litigant not of his own choice unless such a process is required by a positive rule of law". According to Venkatasubba Rao, J. the above view seems to ignore the distinction which the section makes between two classes of persons, namely, the necessary parties and proper parties. Finally the learned judge found that the view expressed in AIR 1926 Mad. 836 is opposed not only to the plain wording of the Section but also to a large body of authority. Vydianadayyan v. Sitaramayyan (1882) 5 Mad. 52) supra is a direct authority on the point. 9. One of the important conclusions arrived at by the Supreme Court after elaborate consideration of the question relating to addition of parties under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code in Razia Begum v. Sabebzadi Anwar Begum and others (AIR 1958 SC 886) supra, is this: "In a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest, in the subject-matter of the litigation". This takes us to find out what would be "a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest". As observed in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. (1956) 2 WLR 372 (Q.B.Division) supra. The distinction between legal and commercial interest appears to be sharply drawn in the decision of the Court Appeal in Moser v. Marsden (1892^ ". Ch. 487). As observed in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. (1956) 2 WLR 372 (Q.B.Division) supra. The distinction between legal and commercial interest appears to be sharply drawn in the decision of the Court Appeal in Moser v. Marsden (1892^ ". Ch. 487). The plaintiff in that case "was seeking an injunction to restrain the defendant from using a machine manufactured by the intervener. But it was not the intervener's machine but merely his invention; the defendant was not his agent,the intervener had no legal right which would be impaired if the defendant stopped using the machine". Lindicy L.J. said: "The only question involved in the action was whether what the defendant was doing was an infringement of the plaintiff's patent". A judgment to that effect might affect the intervener commercially but would not affect him legally. In other words that judgment in the action would not bind the interrvener; it might affect him indirectly and commercially but not directly as observed by Kay L.J. in (he concurring judgment in Moser v. Marsden (1892) 1 Ch. 487) supra. 10. The Madras High Court in M.V. Krishnamachari v. Dhanalakshmi Ammal and others (AIR 1968 Mad. 142) look the view that "the interest" that is necessary to make a person a party is legal interest including equitable interest, that is an interest which the law would recognise and uphold". The same view was expressed by Kerala High Court in And Uaitty v. Peckay Traders and others (ILR (1982) (1) Ker.168). 11. Let us now examine the position as to the nature of the interest of the petitioners in the present case; whether they have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest. The claim of the petitioners is that the northern half of the property sought to be partitioned was in their possession. The Land Tribunal, Chavakkad has issued Certificate of Purchase recognising their tenant')- rights. The redelivery ordered in E. A.418/69 did not take place in view of-Ext.Al agreement. In this background, it is difficult for this court to say that the interest claimed by the petitioners is a commercial interest. On the other hand I am persuaded to say that it is direct, plain and forthright. If the partition is ordered, notwithstanding their' possession; they will be dispossessed from the properties under the guise of the decree to be obtained in the suit. 12. On the other hand I am persuaded to say that it is direct, plain and forthright. If the partition is ordered, notwithstanding their' possession; they will be dispossessed from the properties under the guise of the decree to be obtained in the suit. 12. It was argued that the court below had observed that the petitioners had failed to prove any direct interest in the subject matter of the suit. It may be noticed that the said observation had been made by the court below while disposing of the interim petitions. It was in order to prove their possession petitioners filed I.A.1411/87 for the issue of a commission for preparing a plan and report. This was not allowed for the reason that the petitioners were not parties to the suit. The procedure adopted by the court below is some what strange. It was for establishing their case for impleadment by direct evidence, issue of a commission was requested. The rejection of that request would amount to denial of opportunity to produce the evidence. No oral evidence was allowed to come on record. The definite case of the petitioners was that if the oral evidence was taken, they could advantageously disprove the case against them. The correctness or otherwise of Ext. A1 agreement could be brought out only on examining Sri. Ramankutty Menon, Advocate, according to the petitioners. The circumstances which resulted in non-prosecution of O.S.No.85/80 could be brought in only on examining the parties. Therefore this is a lit case where the presence of the petitioners before the court below; may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. No prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff or defendants in case the petitioners were allowed to be added as parties to the suit at this stage particularly for the reason that they had the right to object' the dispossession at the stage of execution. No prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff or defendants in case the petitioners were allowed to be added as parties to the suit at this stage particularly for the reason that they had the right to object' the dispossession at the stage of execution. V.R.Krishna Iyer (J) (as he then was) of this court very pointedly remarked in Vishnu Namboothiri v. Sankara Filial and others (1968 KLT 692) thus: "From the point of view of the plaintiff there is no doubt that if he obtains a decree without the intervenor on record he will be obstructed at the time of the execution of the decree and a suit must necessarily follow for a final adjudication of the rights of the intervenes By impleading the intervener now as the 51h defendant, multiplicity of suits is avoided and an advantageous telescoping of two litigations into one is achieved. Really, the plaintiff will benefit by his being given an opportunity right now to silence the intervener when he claims to have some independent rights in the property". I respectfully agree with this view point as it represents the pragmatic and expedient approach resounded by the wholesome principles governing the addition of parties as visualised in R.10(2) of O.I of the Code. What is propounded in the aforesaid decision is that the impleadment can be allowed if the intervener claims some independent rights in the property I must add here that such claim shall be bonafide and supported by prima facie materials. It shall not be frivolous or illusory. 13. In Bindra v. Sada Ram and others (AIR I960 J & K 67) it is said: "Before directing a party to be impleaded, a court properly demand that it should be prima facie satisfied about the bona fides of the applicant, about the plausibility of his claim, and about the genuineness of his interest in the litigation. It would otherwise be impossible to shut out or check frivolous and mala fide applications." 14. Allahabad High Court points out the possibility of passing collusive decrees in the case of non¬impleadment of interested persons in Kisan Uchattar M.V. Samiti v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Deo'ria (AIR 1989 All. 168). It said: "The provisions of O.I, R.10(2) of the Code clearly empower the court to implead any. Allahabad High Court points out the possibility of passing collusive decrees in the case of non¬impleadment of interested persons in Kisan Uchattar M.V. Samiti v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Deo'ria (AIR 1989 All. 168). It said: "The provisions of O.I, R.10(2) of the Code clearly empower the court to implead any. ' person as party suo mote, who ought to have been jointed, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the question's involved in the suit. In case the plaintiff is permitted as a rule to choose his own opponents and the Court does not interfere on the point, in that event it may be that a collusive decree is obtained against the real owner or interested person without impleading him as a party and when the decree will become final, then at a very laic stage the person vitally affected or the real owner may come to know about it. This would lead to defeat the interest of justice which should not be permitted in a Court of law and to avoid these ugly situations the Parliament with considerable ingenuity enacted 0.1, R.1()(2) of the Code which has been couched in a language having very wide sweep". 15. It is contended that the petitioners are not entitled to be impleaded in as much as the present suit is one for partition where no share is allotted to them. In support of this contention, the decision in Lakshmanna v, Someshwar Rao and another (AIR 1953 Hyd.170) is brought to my notice. That was a case where the court had removed 3rd defendant from the party-array on the ground that she was not a necessary or a proper party. The court said: "The question of the interest of defendant 3 would only arise to the share of Chandramma. The fact whether defendant 3 is entitled to the share of Chandramma or defendants 1 and 2, are questions which are not pertinent or relevant to the adjudication of the plaintiffs claim; they are the rights 'inter se' between defendant 3 and defendants 1 and 2, and plaintiff's claim can be decided without having to determine those rights and the fact whether defendant 3 is Ramanna's heir also does not become relevant for the determination of the suit. Admittedly, she would not be entitled to any share in the lifetime of the plaintiff". The above decision will not render any assistance to the respondents in as much as the factual situation in that case is totally different from the present case. 16. My conclusion is that the claim for impleadment is bona fide. There are prima facie materials in support of the said claim. In the result the orders impugned in these revision petitions arc set aside. The application for impleadment, l.A.No.2248/86 is allowed and the court below is directed to implead the petitioners as additional defendants in O.S.No.105/86. The court below is also directed to take up the application for issue of commission, LA.No.1411/89 and decide the matter afresh in view of the observations made above. The Civil Revision Petitions are allowed. No costs.