ORDER :- The eleven petitioners were members of the Municipal Council of Palai of which the total membership is twenty. They were elected for a five year term expiring on 31st January 1993. But it was extended by a notification Ext. P.1 dated 28th January 1993 for a further period of six months with effect from 1st February 1993. It was a general notification issued under the proviso to Section 8(1) of the Kerala Municipalities Act 1960 (14 of 1961) extending the term of office of the elected Councilors of all the municipalities in the State for a further period of six months from 1st February 1993. Similar notification was issued in relation to Councilors of Municipal Corporations as well as seen from Ext. P. 1. 2. Section 8 of the Act deals with the term of Councilors, and the filling up of seats. Sub-Section (1) which is relevant provides that the term of office of Councilors shall, save as otherwise expressly provided, be five years commencing from such date as the Government may, by notification in the Gazette appoint. This Section was amended by Ordinance I of 1993 by adding a proviso to the effect that Government may, by notification in the Gazette, extend or reduce the said term by such period as may be specified in the notification. Similar provision was made in the Municipal Corporations Act also. It was in exercise of the powers so conferred by the proviso that the term of office of the Municipal Councilors of all the Municipalities in the State was extended by Ext. P. 1 for a period of six months. 3. While the petitioners were thus functioning during their extended tenure, Government issued a notification Ext. P 2 on 24th February 1993, again in exercise of the powers conferred on them under the proviso to Sub-Section (1) to Section 8, reducing the term of office of the elected Councilors of the Palai Municipality by a period of five months and seven days, with effect from 25th February 1993. The Municipal Councilors of Palai had therefore to vacate their office pursuant to Ext. P 2.
The Municipal Councilors of Palai had therefore to vacate their office pursuant to Ext. P 2. The reason for this notification is mentioned in the explanatory note as follows :- "Now, it has been brought to the notice of the Government that the Municipal Council, Palai is acting in violation of the provisions of the Kerala Municipalities Act and in utter disregard and defiance of the instructions issued by the Government and the Director of Municipal Administration. The Council as per its resolution No. 6 dated the 3rd February 1993 decided to set aside the proceedings initiated by the Municipal Commissioner against a building constructed in violation of the Rules and the Government Orders, and to assess that building for property tax. As per resolution Nos. 1 and 2 dated the 17th February, 1993 the Council decided to discard the instructions issued by the Government and the Director of Municipal Administration with regard to the preparation of Municipal budget. It has also been brought to the notice of the Government that pandemonium prevailed in the Council meetings held on 3rd February 1993 and 15th February 1993 and that the Council meeting on 17th February 1993 was held with the help of the police. The Standing Committee of the Council is also not functioning properly. In these circumstances, Government have decided that the term of office of the elected Councilors of the Palai Municipality may be reduced to the extent necessary, so that the term may be allowed to expire on the 24th day of February, 1993." Petitioners have challenged Ext. P 2 notification as ultra vires the powers of Government. 4. Even at this stage, I must mention that though the petitioners alleged mala fides in the issue of this notification, that contention was not pressed at the time of the hearing. The arguments centered only on the legal issue which I shall presently mention. 5. According to the petitioners, Section 8 is inapplicable in a situation like this, and if at all any action was required, it should have been under Section 54, which contemplates communication to the Council concerned of the grounds on which government proposed to supersede the Council, opportunity to show cause, and consideration of the explanation or objections, if any.
5. According to the petitioners, Section 8 is inapplicable in a situation like this, and if at all any action was required, it should have been under Section 54, which contemplates communication to the Council concerned of the grounds on which government proposed to supersede the Council, opportunity to show cause, and consideration of the explanation or objections, if any. I shall extract Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of this Section as also Sub-Section (1) of Section 8 for purposes of easy reference, the other Sub-Sections being unnecessary :- "54. Government's power to dissolve or supersede council :- (1) If in the opinion of the Government a council persistently makes default in performing the duties imposed on it by law, or exceeds or abuses its powers, the Government may by notification direct that the council be dissolved and reconstituted on such date as the Government may fix in that behalf; or the Government may, if they think necessary, supersede the council for a specified period not exceeding two years : Provided as follows :- (a) for the purpose of completing the elections to a council which has been dissolve the Government may, in their discretion, from time to time, extend the time fixed by them under this Sub-Section for its reconstitution; (b) the Government shall not supersede a portion only of the municipal council. (2) Before publishing a notification under Sub-Section (1), the Government shall communicate to the council concerned the grounds on which they propose to do so, fix a reasonable period for the council to show cause against the proposal and consider its explanations or objections, if any; Provided that where a council has disobeyed an order issued under S.45, the Government shall not be bound to follow the procedure laid down in this Sub-Section. "8.
"8. Term of Councilors and filling up of seats :- (1) The term of office of councilors shall, save as otherwise expressly provided, be five years commencing from such date as the Government may, by notification in the Gazette appoint : Provided that the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, extend or reduce the said term by such period as may be specified in the notification." Petitioners' case is that Section 8 is a general provision relating to term of office of Municipal Councillors in general in all the Municipalities, and the proviso thereto is one intended to be of general application, though it may, in given circumstances, be applied to specified regions or specified Municipalities when it may become necessary to extend or reduce the term of office having regard to local conditions, situations and the like. But Section 54 applies to a different situation of misfeasance or malfeasance on the part of a Municipal Council, when the procedure prescribed therein should be followed and the council superseded, Government cannot in such circumstances, invoke the proviso to Section 8 (1) and by-pass the special procedure prescribed under Section 54. 6. The Additional Advocate-General on the other hand, submitted with reference to the files that Government had ample reason to supersede the Council in this case. The reasons therefore are given in the explanatory note to Ext. P 2 which I have extracted above. He submits that Government may resort either to Section 8 or Section 54 in such circumstances. Section 8 also applies to the facts of the case, and therefore government need not have recourse to Section 54. He mentioned that an emergency situation had arisen when the Budget of the Palai Municipality had to be passed before March 31, 1993, which required urgent action, possible only under Section 8, Section 54 being hedged in by various conditions. The power to extend or reduce the term specified in the proviso to Section 8(1) could be exercised from time to time having regard to the provisions of Sections 15 and 20 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125. The Additional Advocate General referred to the decisions in Sandhiram Mahajan v. Deputy Commissioner, AIR 1953 Assam 168 and Jai Narain v. Land Acquisition Collector, AIR 1976 Delhi 166 to support this submission of his.
The Additional Advocate General referred to the decisions in Sandhiram Mahajan v. Deputy Commissioner, AIR 1953 Assam 168 and Jai Narain v. Land Acquisition Collector, AIR 1976 Delhi 166 to support this submission of his. He did not demur to the proposition that Section 54 also applied to the facts of this case, though he would submit that the choice was of the Government. He made a further plea that in any case and even if this court was of the view that Section 54 was the provision to be invoked, this court may not exercise the discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioners who are guilty of grave acts of misconduct as set forth in the explanatory note to Ext. P 2. 7. Heard both sides. It will be seen from a perusal of Section 8(1) and Section 54 that; they operate in different fields and are intended to subserve different objects. In the case of default in performance of duties or excess or abuse of powers by the council as mentioned in Sub-Section (1) of Section 54, the government's power is to act under Section 54 and to supersede the Municipal Council itself. This affords an opportunity to the Council to show cause against the charges made against it with a corresponding obligation on Government to consider the explanation or objections. The Section embodies a very salutary rule of natural justice and fairplay to an elected body like a municipal council. Naturally, an objective consideration of the objections is called for under the Section. This is the specific provision for taking action against any council for non-performance of their duties or for abuse or excess of powers. On the other hand, Section 8 is a general provision relating to the term of office of Councilors applicable generally to all Municipal Councilors in the State. The term, when fixed by the Government by notification, may be extended or reduced by invoking the proviso. But such extension or reduction is not related to the conduct of the Municipal Council, or of the Councilors, but to the exigencies and situations in the entire State, or in particular regions or even in a Municipality, which may require the extension or reduction of the term of Municipal Councilors generally or in particular regions or Municipalities.
But such extension or reduction is not related to the conduct of the Municipal Council, or of the Councilors, but to the exigencies and situations in the entire State, or in particular regions or even in a Municipality, which may require the extension or reduction of the term of Municipal Councilors generally or in particular regions or Municipalities. For instance it may not be possible to hold the elections for some reasons as happened at the time of issuing Ext. P 1 when government may extend the term under the proviso. Equally, it may be necessary to reduce the term of the Councilors, say when a Municipality is converted into a Panchayat or when elections are held well within the extended time so that it becomes necessary for the new Councilors to assume office. The proviso is of general application relating to the term of office of Municipal Councilors as such. The considerations which prevail upon Government while exercising powers under the proviso to Section 8(1) are more in the realms of policy and of subjective satisfaction than the objective approach based on concrete facts which informs Section 54. The fields occupied by the two Sections are thus different. While Section 54 is in the nature of a punitive action which requires an opportunity to show cause, Section 8 is in the plans of Governmental policy, which is not related to any punitive action. Therefore, if in a given case, the action is really punitive in nature, in the circumstances covered by Section 54, that should be resorted to, and not Section 8. I am therefore of the view that the notification Ext. P 2 issued in purported exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Section 8(1) is not warranted in law. The said proviso has been invoked for purposes other than that for which it was intended in law. Ext. P 2 is therefore ultra vires the proviso to Section 8(1). 8. It is true that the subject of Section 8 is Municipal Councilors while Section 54 deals with Municipal Councils. But the reduction of the term of Councilors en masse in a Municipality renders the Municipal Council itself non-functional, so that the attempted support to Ext. P 2 on this ground does not appeal to me.
8. It is true that the subject of Section 8 is Municipal Councilors while Section 54 deals with Municipal Councils. But the reduction of the term of Councilors en masse in a Municipality renders the Municipal Council itself non-functional, so that the attempted support to Ext. P 2 on this ground does not appeal to me. Government cannot indirectly get rid of a Municipal Council by resort to Section 8 without recourse to Section 54 in circumstances falling under it. 9. What Ext. P 2 does is in effect to lay charges against the manner in which the Municipal Council was functioning and to take action against it for its non-functioning or alleged abuse of powers. That squarely falls under Section 54. When a statute has prescribed a particular procedure for a particular purpose it is well established that that mode has to be followed (See in this connection Janardhanan v. Joint Registrar, (1990) 1 Ker LT 530). Viewed from this angle also, the only action that could be taken was under Section 54 which conforms to natural justice, and which affords the Municipal Council an opportunity to show cause against the action. 10. The notification Ext. P 2 is thus unsustainable. It is true that the Additional Advocate-General has pointed out various acts of malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of the Municipal Council. These submissions are no doubt borne out by the file he has produced. But then the petitioners had had no occasion to show cause against these charges made against them or to prove that they are nevertheless not guilty of the said charges. That is what is contemplated by Section 54. In the absence of any such opportunity to show cause, it will be premature and injudicious for this court to condemn the petitioners and rush to the conclusion that the petitioners are unfit to hold office as members of the Municipal Council. For the same reason, I am unable to accept the plea of the Additional Advocate General that this court should not exercise the discretion under Article 226 in favour of the petitioners. Acceptance of this plea would virtually be condemning the petitioners without an opportunity of being heard, which was their right under Section 54 as Councilors of the Palai Municipality.
Acceptance of this plea would virtually be condemning the petitioners without an opportunity of being heard, which was their right under Section 54 as Councilors of the Palai Municipality. I decline the invitation of the Additional Advocate-General to hold the petitioners unfit to be councilors having regard to the non explanation in the original petitions, of the charges made in the explanatory note to Ext. P 2. This factor is really not in issue in this original petition where the attack is based on the differential fields of applicability of Sections 8 and 54. 11. In the view that I have taken, I am not expressing any opinion on the question of exercise of power from time to time under the proviso to Section 8(1). I leave that question open as unnecessary for purposes of this case. No other points are urged before me. 12. The original petition is therefore, allowed. The notification Ext. P 2 is quashed. But this will not preclude the Government, if so advised, from proceeding against the Municipal Council under Section 54 of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960, and to take such action as may be justified on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. 13. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.