PAMPHLET v. A. K. AUGUSTINE — 1993 DIGILAW 22 (CAL)

JUDGMENT Mukul Gopal Mukherji, J. The present rule for Contempt is directed against, Mrs. A. K. Augustine, a Reader in the University College of Law for having caused publication of a purported contiumatious libellous article which she distributed through her agents in the Calcutta High Court premises on or about 4th December, 1991. 2. On December 5, 1991 some members of the Bar specially by Mr. Bijan Ghosh and Mrs. Chandrima Bhattacharjee placed the pamphlet before the Hon'ble Chief justice. The Hon'ble Chief Justice recorded the following order: "It is stated by some of the members of the Bar specially by Mr. Bijan Ghosh and Mrs. Chandrima Bhattacharjee that one Mrs. A. K. Augustine has been distributing these. pamphlets which amount to scandalising this Court and as such appropriate action be taken. Let the pamphlet which has been handed over by the said advocates be placed before the Division Bench presided over by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. G. Mukherji having determination in respect of criminal contempt." 3. On the same day the matter having been placed before a Division Bench presided over by myself, we directed the matter to be placed before us on 10th December, 1991 at 2 p. m. on which date we recorded the following order: "The matter has been assigned specifically by the Hon'ble Chief Justice to us. It is alleged that Mrs. Augustine has been distributing some pamphlets, the text of which prima facie amounts to scandalising a Hon'ble Judge of this Court. As and when we take up this matter today for a consideration as to what steps should not be taken in this matter, Mrs. Augustine appears before us personally and she owns up the responsibility of having distributed the pamphlet and she sought to justify the statements as contained in the pamphlet. We ask her to show cause by the 20th January, 1992 as to why a Rule for contempt should not be issued against her entailing a contempt proceeding against her which might ultimately lead to her punishment for criminal contempt. She prays for time till 20th of January, 1992 and we grant her such time. She must appear on that date personally and if she deems necessary through a learned Advocate of this court and must file an affidavit. The matter accordingly stands adjourned till 20th of January, 1992 at 10.30 a. m. "Since Mrs. She prays for time till 20th of January, 1992 and we grant her such time. She must appear on that date personally and if she deems necessary through a learned Advocate of this court and must file an affidavit. The matter accordingly stands adjourned till 20th of January, 1992 at 10.30 a. m. "Since Mrs. Augustine appears personally before us and the order is passed in her presence and she is a learned Advocate of this Court, we waive personal service on her but let a copy of our order countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (Court) be handed over to her." 4. On 20th January, 1992 the Bench requested the learned Advocate General to appear in this matter as Amicus Curiae and adjourned the matter till 3.2.92. On 18th January, 1992, the respondent Mrs. A. K. Augustine did swear on affidavit wherein she stated inter alia that no cognizance for criminal Contempt could be taken upon the pamphlet dated 4.12.91 on the motion of the learned Advocate Mrs. Chandrima Bhattacharjee as the court has neither taken cognizance on its own motion nor a motion made by the Advocate General and as such the matter should be dropped. She further stated that the step taken in initiating the contempt proceeding was violative of the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression as she did not exceed the restriction imposed in her exercise of such a right and her criticism was bone fide, reasonable and was offered for the public good. She further contended that the pamphlet contained a true statement of facts which are neither prejudicial nor offending the administration of justice. The pamphlet contained fair criticism and true facts without imputing improper motive against the Judge or interfering with the administration of justice: She had a right of criticism against injustice which has been done to her making her confirmed service as a Reader non-effective in as much as justice is not a cloistered virtue and justice must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comment of the ordinary man. The pamphlet was a reflection on the conduct or character of the Judge in reference to discharge of his judicial duties and did not amount to any contempt, as the reflection made in the pamphlet amounted to a fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. 5. She further averred that she was a teacher of the Department of Law, University of Calcutta in the rank of a Reader and a Special Member of the Bar Association, Calcutta High Court. She was appointed a whole time lecturer from January 1983 and continued in the same post till 1st June, 1989. She was B. Sc. B.T., LL. B. securing first position in First Class from the University of Calcutta and was an LL. M. from the University of Toronto. By operation of law her Readership stood confirmed under the 'provisions of the Calcutta University Statute with effect from 1st June, 1990. 6. At the material time in the cause list of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohitosh Majumdar's Court there was a direction that "no prayer for interim order excepting in case of extreme urgency shall be entertained without serving a copy of the writ application along with Annexures upon the respondents to be heard and affected by such interim order without giving such proper and reasonable opportunity to contest the same." Despite such a direction a writ application was filed on 5.2.91 in the Court of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohitosh Majumdar which was entertained by his Lordship even though there was no urgency of1 moving the" writ application challenging her appointment as a Reader long after about 21 months of her appointment when she already stood confirmed and was actually working in the said post. Mr. T. P. Mishra joined the post' of lecturer "about 21 months ago" and having accepted the said post of Lecturer, he waived his claim for the post of Reader. The petition was filed for forestalling or delaying the hearing of the writ application moved by her on 11th January, 1991 before Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. M. Yusuf challenging the illegal holding of the post of Head of the Department of Law for Post-Graduate Studies in Law by Mr. Amit Sen with the prior service of the copies of the writ application to all the concerned parties on 17th December, 1990. Justice K. M. Yusuf challenging the illegal holding of the post of Head of the Department of Law for Post-Graduate Studies in Law by Mr. Amit Sen with the prior service of the copies of the writ application to all the concerned parties on 17th December, 1990. University matters came under the jurisdiction of Mr. Justice Mohitosh Majumdar, sometime after the filing of her writ application on 11th January, 1991. Her Advocate on-record Mr. Ashis Kumar Ghosh who conducting her case being C.O. No. 175 (W) of 1991 was incidentally present in the Court of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohitosh Majumdar while the learned Advocate appearing for Mr. T. P. Mishra moved the application on 5th February, 1991, Despite Mr. Ghosh praying for time wanting an opportunity to have a copy• of the writ application served before the issuance of interim order, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohitosh Majumdar overruled the prayer of the learned Advocate and passed an interim order to the effect that the confirmation of the respondent as a reader should not be made or given effect to without the leave of the Hon'ble Court. It was further ordered by the said Hon'ble Judge that both the writ applications would be taken up analogously. She placed a Xerox Copy of the letter dated 22nd April, 1991 issued by her learned Advocate Mr. Ashis Kumar Ghosh in this context. She further averred that with an ulterior motive to frustrate the object of the earlier writ application filed by her wherein she challenged illegal continuance of Dr. Amit Sen as Head of the Department of Law, Mr. T. P. Mishra filed a writ petition challenging her appointment as Reader even though she already stood confirmed in the said post. The incidents which took place thereafter were narrated by her in her pamphlet dated 4.12.1991 which was circulated by her on 5th December, 1991 to draw the attention of the Hon'ble Members of the Bench and the Bar. She thereafter filed an appeal against the ex parte order passed on the writ application of Mr. T. P. Mishra in which the trial Judge directed that she should not be confirmed to the post of Reader without the leave of the Court. She moved also an application for stay of the said interim order dated 13th February, 1991. Before the Appeal Court the learned Advocate of the writ petitioner Mr. T. P. Mishra in which the trial Judge directed that she should not be confirmed to the post of Reader without the leave of the Court. She moved also an application for stay of the said interim order dated 13th February, 1991. Before the Appeal Court the learned Advocate of the writ petitioner Mr. T. P. Mishra submitted on 30.4.1991 that the final hearing of the matter by Mr. Justice Mohitosh Majumdar was over on 27th March, 1991 and the Judgment was kept reserved and the result would be out very soon and on this representation the Appeal Court did not pass any interim order and disposed of the appeal with some observation to protect her interests to the effect that in the event of the ultimate decision going against her, she could move for appropriate reliefs against the final order. 7. She, however, averred that Mr. Justice Mohitosh Majumdar was a paper setter and Examiner of the LL.M. course of the University of Calcutta. He not only set the question paper for one of the subjects, he also examined the said answers scripts and accepted the remuneration of Rs. 150/- for setting the question paper That the said Judge's son is a student of the 5th year class in the LL.B. course and his son secured the highest marks in the Part-II Examination. Despite the order of the Appeal Court which was passed on the expectation of an early delivery of the judgment in the case, the judgment was not delivered. It would appear from the cause list of the Hon'ble Judge that some cases were enlisted for judgment but no judgment was actually delivery in such cases even after six months. The xerox copies of the list of cases of the said Bench was filed as annexures to the affidavit to draw the attention of this Court that certain matters appeared for hearing on 12th June, 1991, 26th July, 1991, 22nd August, 1991 and 3rd October, 1991 and the items were identical. She further averred that in order to show cause to the present contempt rule one applied for the urgent certified copies of the relevant orders which did form a part of the order-sheet but she could not obtain the same as the writ petition has not yet been numbered and the file has been kept in the custody of the Hon'ble Judge concerned. She submitted in ultimate analysis that whatever statements she made, were all true and she had the least desire to scandalise or tend to scandalise or lower or tend to lower the authority of any Court and she did not prejudicially affect and did not interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of judicial proceeding. She had the highest regard for the judiciary but the manner in which she was treated created a serious dissatisfaction in her mind and the pamphlet was born out of an exasperation and cry for justice. It was on 20th February, 1992 that on the perusal of the affidavit sworn by her on 18th January, 1992 and having heard her learned Counsel Mr. Gopal Chakraborty, a Senior Advocate of this Court, we found that a prima facie case for contempt has been made out and issued a Rule Nisi directing her to appear before this Court on 16th March, 1992 at 10-30 A.M. to show-cause as to why she would not be dealt with for having committed criminal contempt of court and be sentenced accordingly. This Rule Nisi was issued by the Present Bench comprising of myself and my learned brother J. N. Hore, J. 8. On 9th September, 1992 she filed another affidavit in answer to the Rule Nisi in which she reiterated almost all her submissions made in the earlier affidavit. She contended inter alia that the initiation of the proceeding for contempt was bad in law. She issued the pamphlet in exercise of her right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. The pamphlet contained bona fide criticism and reiterating true facts without imputing any motive against the judge or without interfering with the administration of justice. She was enjoying a confirmed service and such a confirmed service could not be made non-effective by the learned judge. Justice is not a cloistered virtue and justice must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken, comment of the ordinary man. She was deprived of an appropriate opportunity to contest the writ application filed by Mr. She was enjoying a confirmed service and such a confirmed service could not be made non-effective by the learned judge. Justice is not a cloistered virtue and justice must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken, comment of the ordinary man. She was deprived of an appropriate opportunity to contest the writ application filed by Mr. T. P. Mishra at its initiation when the interim order to her prejudice was passed by the learned judge even though the Judge's cause list contained a direction to the effect that for obtaining an interim order there ought to be an initial service of he writ application to the affected party. The writ application was filed by Mr. T. P. Mishra only to delay the hearing of her initial writ application which she moved on 11th January, 1991 challenging the illegal holding of the post of Head of the Department of Law for post-graduate studies by Dr. Amit Sen. She also narrated the incident which happened while her learned advocate Mr. Ashis Kr. Ghosh being incidentally present prayed for an opportunity to contest the writ application at its initial stage when the application was moved for Mr. T. P. Mishra. But the learned Judge overruled the prayer of the learned Advocate and passed an interim order to the effect that the Readership should not be confirmed or given effect to without the leave of the Hon'ble Court. Even though the learned Judge directed both the writ applications to be taken up for an analogous hearing, when one later writ application filed by Mr. T. P. Misra was heard out in an isolated manner leaving the other writ application filed by her unheard and even though writ regard to the writ application filed by Mr. T. P. Misra that was heard his Lordship did not pass any judgment for long 8 months which exasperated her and she lost her patience. She further averred that with an ulterior motive to frustrate the object of the earlier writ application filed by her wherein she challenged the illegal continuance of Dr. Amit Sen as Head of the Department of Law, Mr. T. P. Mishra filed the subsequent writ petition challenging her appointment as Reader even though her service already stood confirmed. On 13.2.92 the said writ application was ultimately disposed of by the Hon'ble Mr. Amit Sen as Head of the Department of Law, Mr. T. P. Mishra filed the subsequent writ petition challenging her appointment as Reader even though her service already stood confirmed. On 13.2.92 the said writ application was ultimately disposed of by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Haridas Das directing the Vice Chancellor and the University authorities to remove Dr. Amit Sen from the post of Head of the Department of Law within a month from the date of the order. The incidents which took place thereafter have been narrated in her pamphlet only to draw the attention, of the members of the Bench and the Bar to the actual state of affairs. She also reiterated what happened in the Appeal Court when she challenged the ex parte interim order passed by the learned Trial Judge and the Appeal Court not interfering at that stage merely gave her liberty to move against the final order as and when passed by the learned Judge. She further averred that the learned Judge was a paper setter and Examiner of the LL.M. Course of the University of Calcutta and drew remuneration for the paper setting. She further submitted that the learned Judge's son was a student of the 5th Year Class in the LL.B. Course and his son secured the highest marks in the Part II Examination which flabbergasted many of those who are in the know of things. She further pointed out the fact that several cases were listed for judgment but no judgment was actually delivered even after six months despite those matters being borne in the cause list. She tried every means to get the decision of the trial court. She even mentioned the matter for delivery of the judgment but her advocate was not inclined to mention the matter in open court and finally when the judgment was still kept in abeyance for about long nine months, she was forced to make the facts known to the members of the Bench and the Bar. She craved leave to refer to the cause list of the learned Judge's Court on 12th June, 1991, 26th July, 1991, 22nd August, 1991 and 3rd October, 1991 in support of her submissions that the learned Judge did not deliver the judgments in some cases even though he kept the matters pending even after long six months. She craved leave to refer to the cause list of the learned Judge's Court on 12th June, 1991, 26th July, 1991, 22nd August, 1991 and 3rd October, 1991 in support of her submissions that the learned Judge did not deliver the judgments in some cases even though he kept the matters pending even after long six months. She further averred that her leaflets being widely circulated, the learned Judge on 9th December, 1991 after the matter was kept for judgment for about 9 months after the final hearing was concluded, released the matter from his Lordship's list giving out inter alia that "in the fitness of things it will not be proper for the court to determine the issue involved in this application. Accordingly, the matter should not be treated as heard-in-part by me. Let this matter stand released from my list." The deponent being mentally, physically, emotionally, intellectually and psychologically suffering and being very much sick due to the injuries caused by the ex parte order passed by the learned Trial Judge which sought to deprive her service benefits, as a confirmed teacher of the Calcutta University. The University Authorities having taken advantage of the said ex parte order, became reluctant to give her the service benefits, even though by virtue of provisions of the University Statute, she was a confirmed Reader She was thus suffering very much, which prompted her to issue the impugned leaflet. She filed application before the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice and the Hon'ble Justice S. K. Guin for recalling the order dated 30.4.91 passed by the previous Division Bench. Their Lordships disposed of the said application on 6.7.92 and the matter was thereafter assigned before the Hon'ble Justice N. K. Mitra. His Lordship was pleased to take up the hearing and the matter was ultimately heard and a direction to file written argument was passed ultimately N. K. Mitra, J., vacated the interim order dated 5.2.91 passed by Hon'ble Justice Mahitosh Majumdar and His Lordship was pleased to pass an order of status quo ante. His Lordship was pleased to take up the hearing and the matter was ultimately heard and a direction to file written argument was passed ultimately N. K. Mitra, J., vacated the interim order dated 5.2.91 passed by Hon'ble Justice Mahitosh Majumdar and His Lordship was pleased to pass an order of status quo ante. She further averred that the statements made in the pamphlet were all true and she had the least desire to scandalise or tend to scandalise or lower or tended to lower the authority of any Court and she did not prejudice and interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of judical proceeding or interfere or tend to interfere with or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in any manner whatsoever. She had the highest regard for the judiciary but the manner in which she was treated, created a serious dissatisfaction in her mind and the pamphlet was born out of exasperation and cry for justice. The leaflet could not be treated as scandalising the court itself and the same is merely a reflection on the conduct or character of a Judge in reference to his judicial duty and the said reflection was made in exercise of her right of fair and reasonable expression as a citizen in respect of public acts done in the seat of Justice. The leaflet cannot be treated either interfering with due course of justice or appropriate administration of law by such court or was a reflection against the judiciary as a whole, she acted in good faith and cried for justice. 9. We have given the matter our anxious consideration. It is indeed true that in the pamphlet concerned apart from there being a libelous attack on the learned Judge in very many places for which an action for defamation can validly lie, the user of the words "justice denied voluntarily and deliberately" and "unwarranted interference in justice" by the above-named Hon'ble Judge himself and reflection on "the motivated action of the Hon'ble Judge" which " frustrates the purpose and object for which the writ application is moved under Article 226", are words which are sufficient to scandalise the Court. It amounts to ascribing a motive to the Court and tends to interfere with the course of justice. It amounts to ascribing a motive to the Court and tends to interfere with the course of justice. She further charged the Hon'ble Judge for not having delivered to her proper justice in dealing with the particular case. She cited 10 such illustrations for which she formed a subjective opinion that the Hon'ble Judge has been deliberately unfair to her in dealing with the particular case. She stated, however, in the impugned pamphlet that while the learned Judge in great urgency and hurry took the hearing in Mr. T. P. Mishra's writ application within 52 days of its initiation, even though the appeal against the ex parte interim order was pending before the Division Bench but no judgment was delivered even after 258 days. In respect of her own writ application challenging the continuance of Dr. Sen as Head of the Department the Judge must have a moral obligation to hear out and deliver the judgment in the same since he has taken an oath to deliver justice without fear or favour. 10. Mr. Gopal Chakraborty in the first place by citing the decision of Ram Chandra Keshav Adke vs. Govind Joti & Ors. reported in AIR 1975 S.C. 915 at paragraph 25 contained that the initiation of the contempt proceeding law in as much as the Chief Justice took cognizance of the matter on the basis of the matter being moved by certain learned Advocates of this Court without the necessary consent of the Advocate General. The matter having been assigned to us we also initiated the contempt proceeding in an irregular manner, Invoking the ratio in Nazir Ahmed vs. Emperor reported in AIR 1936 Privy Council 253, Mr. Chakraborty contended that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. . 11. Mr. Chakraborty further submitted that Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 made it clear that the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by the Advocate General or on a motion being made by any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General but that was not so done in this case. We are afraid this contention has no substance in view of the fact that the Hon'ble Chief Justice on 5th December, 1991 merely forwarded the impugned pamphlet to us with a direction that it should be placed before "the appropriate Division Bench presiding over by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mukul Gopal Mukherji having determination in respect of criminal contempt". The appropriate Division Bench comprising myself and G. R. Bhattacharjee, J. thereafter asked her to show cause as to why, a Rule for Contempt should not be issued against her entailing a contempt proceeding which might ultimately lead to her punishment. We thus applied our mind on the basis of the informant applied to be. She filed an Affidavit in answer to the show cause notice and ultimately on 20th February, 1992 myself and my learned Brother J. N. Hore, J. issued a Rule Nisi for contempt against her. Thus no illegality has been done in the facts and circumstances of the present case in initiating the contempt proceeding by the Court on its own motion. 12. Mr. Chakraborty further submitted before us with reference to the decision in Baradakanta Misra and others vs. Registrar, Orissa High Court reported in AIR 1974 SC 710 that the expression scandalise, lowering authority of the court, interference, obstruction and administration of justice have all gone into the legal currency of our sub-continent and have to be understood in the sense of only having been so far understood by our Courts with the aid of English Law where necessary. Scandalisation is a species of contempt and may take several forms. A common form is the vilification of the Judge. When proceedings in contempt are taken for such vilification, the question which the Court has to ask is whether the vilification is of the Judge as a Judge or it is the vilification of the Judge as an individual. If the latter is the case, the Judge is left to his private remedies and the Court has no power to commit for contempt. If the former is the case, the court will proceed to exercise the jurisdiction with scrupulous care and in cases which are clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Secondly, the court will have also to consider the degree of harm caused as affecting administration of Justice and if it is slight and beneath notice, the courts will not punish for contempt. If the former is the case, the court will proceed to exercise the jurisdiction with scrupulous care and in cases which are clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Secondly, the court will have also to consider the degree of harm caused as affecting administration of Justice and if it is slight and beneath notice, the courts will not punish for contempt. The salutary practice is adopted by Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The jurisdiction is not intended to uphold the personal dignity of the Judges. That must rest on super foundations. Judges rely on their conduct itself to be its own vindication. The Courts of Justice in a State from the highest to the lowest are by their constitution entrusted with functions directly connected with the administration of justice, and it is the expectation and confidence of all those who have or likely to have business therein that the Courts perform all their functions on a high level of rectitude without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. And it is this traditional confidence in the courts that justice will be administered in them which is sought to be protected by proceedings in contempt. The object, as already stated, is not to vindicate the Judge personally but to protect the public against any undermining of their accustomed confidence in the Judge's authority. If the attack on the Judge functioning as a Judge substantially affects administration of justice, it becomes a public mischief punishable for contempt and it matters not whether such an attack is based on what a Judge is alleged to have done in the exercise of his administrative responsibilities. A Judge's functions may be divisible, but his integrity and authority are not divisible in the context of administration of justice. An unwarranted attack on him for corrupt administration is as potent in doing public harm as an attack on his adjudicatory function. In Brahma Prakash Sharma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1954 S.C. 10 = 1953 SCR 1169 =AIR 1954 Cr. An unwarranted attack on him for corrupt administration is as potent in doing public harm as an attack on his adjudicatory function. In Brahma Prakash Sharma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1954 S.C. 10 = 1953 SCR 1169 =AIR 1954 Cr. L. J. 233, it is pointed out that the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals but is intended as protection to the public whose interest would be very much affected, if by the act of or by the conduct of any party the authority of the Court is lowered and the sense of confidence which the people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened. 13. Mr. Chakraborty by citing the decision in Conscientious Group vs. Mohammed Yunus and Ors reported in AIR 1987 SC 1451 contended that a contempt application filed without complying with requirement of obtaining of written consent• of the Advocate General or Solicitor General or the Attorney General as the case may be, would be bad in law. That was a case of Mohammed Yunus, Chairman, Trade Fair Authority of India saying with regard to a particular Supreme Court Judge who held that the singing of the National Anthem was not compulsory that the said Judge had no right to be called either an Indian or a Judge. In that case the reasons for refusal were not found to be irrelevant or, arbitrary and was not permitted to be reviewed. It has, however, no bearing to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 14. Mr. Chakraborty further contended that the entire High Court was bound to hear the proceedings in the nature of a criminal contempt of this particular nature. We do not also find any substance in the said contention. Mr. Chakraborty, citing the decision reported in AIR 1969 SC 186, Debabrata Bandopadhyay & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., contended that the Court should not be supersensitive in its appreciation as to whether or not it is a case for contempt or a mere libellous attack on the particular Judge concerned. Mr. Chakraborty in the next place submitted before us by citing the decision of In re: S. Mulgaokar reported in AIR 1978 SC 727 that the proposition is well established that the judiciary cannot be immune from criticism. Mr. Chakraborty in the next place submitted before us by citing the decision of In re: S. Mulgaokar reported in AIR 1978 SC 727 that the proposition is well established that the judiciary cannot be immune from criticism. However that decision also laid down that when that criticism is based on obvious distortion or gross mis-statement and made in a manner which seems designed to lower the respect for the judiciary and destroy public confidence in it, it cannot be ignored. It is not correct to say that an action for contempt of Court, which is discretionary, should be frequently or lightly taken. But, at the same time it is not correct to suggest that the Court should abstain from using this weapon even when its use is needed to correct standards of behaviour in a grossly and repeatedly erring quarter. It may be better in many cases for the judiciary to adopt a magnanimously charitable attitude even when utterly uncharitable and unfair criticism of its operations is made out of bona fide concern for improvement. But, when there appears some scheme and a design to bring about results which must damage confidence in our judicial system and demoralize Judges of the highest court in the State or the apex Court by making malicious attacks, anyone interested in maintaining high standards of fearless, impartial, and unbending justice will feel perturbed. Although the question whether an attack is malicious or ill intentioned, may be often difficult to determine, yet, the language in which it is made, the fairness of the factual accuracy, the logical soundness of it the care taken in justly and properly analysing the materials before the maker of it are important considerations. Moreover, in judging whether it constitutes a contempt of Court or not, the Court is not concerned more with the reasonable and probable effects of what is said or written than with the motives lying behind what is done. A decision on the question whether the discretion to take action for contempt of Court should be exercised in one way or the other must depend on the totality of facts and circumstances. Krishna Iyer, J. in the said reported decision gave out that there should be a wise economy of use by the Court of this contempt jurisdiction. A decision on the question whether the discretion to take action for contempt of Court should be exercised in one way or the other must depend on the totality of facts and circumstances. Krishna Iyer, J. in the said reported decision gave out that there should be a wise economy of use by the Court of this contempt jurisdiction. The Court will act with seriousness and severity where justice is jeopardized and/or unfounded attack is made on the judges, where the attack is calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial process. The Court is willing to ignore by a majestic liberalism, trifling and venial offences. The second principle must be to harmonise the constitutional values of free criticism (the fourth estate included) and the need for a fearless curial process and its presiding functionary, the Judge. A happy balance has to be struck, the benefit of the doubt being given generously against the judge, slurring over marginal deviations but severely proving the supremacy of the law over pugnacious, vicious, unrepentant and malignant contemners, be they the powerful press, gang-up of vested interests, veteran columnists or olympian establishmentarians. The third principle is to avoid confusion between personal protection of a libelled judge and prevention of obstruction of public justice and the community's confidence in that great process. The former is not contempt but the latter is, although overlapping spaces abound. Because the law of contempt exists to protect public confidence in the administration of justice, the offence will not be committed by attacks upon the personal reputation of individual judges as such. The other guideline for the judges to observe in this contempt jurisdiction is not to be hypersensitive even where distortions and criticism overstep the limits, but to deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified bearing, condescending indifference and repudiation by judicial rectitude, and after evaluating the totality of factors if the court considers the attack on the judge or judges as scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits, the strong arm of the law must, in the name of public interest and public justice, strike a blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the Rule of law by fouling its source and stream. 15. 15. Without going into the question as to, whether the judges should have formulated a code of judicial ethics and etiquette, we can reasonably hold that even though some of the imputations as made by the respondent are not only improper but derogatory to the prestige of the Court apart from being libellous, we cannot totally rule out the possibility of a substantive anguish in the mind of the respondent which prompted her in making her grievance eventuality through the publication of the impugned article. In P. N. Duda vs. P. Shiv Sankar & Ors. reported in AIR 1988 SC 1208 , which was a case of the Hon'ble Minister of Law & Justice & Company Affairs Shri P. Shiv Shankar delivering a speech before a meeting of the Bar Council of Hyderabad, by way of making such uncharitable remarks about the class character of the judges and the partisan attitude in protecting the haves of the society, the Supreme Court thought it wise that the entire speech should be read as a whole and it was held that there is no imminent danger of interference with the administration of justice, nor of bringing the administration into disrepute. In that view the Hon'ble Minister was found not guilty of contempt of Supreme Court. The speech of the Minister read in its proper perspective, did not bring the administration of justice into disrepute or impair the administration of justice, though in some portions of the speech the language used could have been avoided by Minister having the background of being a former judge of a High Court. The Minister perhaps could have achieved his purpose by making his language mild but his facts deadly. It was held in the said case that consent of Attorney General or the Solicitor General to a member of the public for moving the Court under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was not justiciable. However it did not deprive the petitioner of his remedy of requesting the court to take suo motu action. 16. Mr. Chakraborty further relied on the decision of Smt. Archana Guha vs. Sri Ranjit Cuha Neogi reported in 1989 (2) CHN 252 which was a case relating to certain articles published in the daily Aajkal where a suo motu rule for contempt was issued by a Division Bench of this Court. 16. Mr. Chakraborty further relied on the decision of Smt. Archana Guha vs. Sri Ranjit Cuha Neogi reported in 1989 (2) CHN 252 which was a case relating to certain articles published in the daily Aajkal where a suo motu rule for contempt was issued by a Division Bench of this Court. It was held that reading between the lines of some portions of the Article one may however, tend to conclude that there is likelihood of the articles interfering with the pending proceeding, but by reason of the statements as made by the contemners and the submissions from the Bar that there was no improper motive and considering the articles in their entirety in the facts of it, there existed some amount of doubt as regards the culpability of the Editor or the contributors of the articles by reason where for the benefit should go in favour of the persons against whom the Rule of Contempt was issued. The power to punish for contempt ought to be exercised with care and caution and it is only in clear cases this power should be invoked, but not otherwise. In that view of the matter, the publication was found not within the ambit of section 2 (c) (iii) of the Contempt of Court Act, though however, the language used should have been better, polite and sober rather than what was used by the writers of the articles having been encouraged by the Editor of the daily. 17. Mr. Chakraborty cited further the decision K. Veeraswami vs, Union of India & Ors, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 655 at page 717 where it has been observed by K. Jagannatha Shetty, J. for himself and M. N. Venkatachallah, J. that the society's demand for honesty in a Judge is exacting and absolute. The standards of judicial behaviour, both on and off the Bench, are normally extremely high. For a Judge to deviate from such standards of honesty and impartiality is to betray the trust reposed in him. No excuse or no legal relativity can condone such betrayal. From the standpoint of justice the size or nature of corruption cannot be the scale for measuring a Judge's dis-honour. A single dishonest Judge not only dishonours himself and disgraces his office but jeoparlizes the integrity of the entire judicial system. 18. No excuse or no legal relativity can condone such betrayal. From the standpoint of justice the size or nature of corruption cannot be the scale for measuring a Judge's dis-honour. A single dishonest Judge not only dishonours himself and disgraces his office but jeoparlizes the integrity of the entire judicial system. 18. A judicial scandal has always been regarded as far more deplorable than a scandal involving either the executive or a member of the legislature. The slightest hint of irregularity or impropriety in the court is a cause for great anxiety and alarm. "A legislator or an administrator may be found guilty of corruption without apparently endangering the foundation of the State. But a Judge must keep himself absolutely above suspicion" to preserve the impartiality and independence of the judiciary and to have the public confidence thereof. 19. Mr. Chakraborty further submitted before us the decision of the Supreme Court in Pritam Pal vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1992 SC 904 for the proposition that the maxim "Salus populi supreme lex", that is "the welfare of the people is the supreme law" adequately enunciates the idea of law. This can be achieved only when justice is administered lawfully, judicially, without fear or favour and without being hampered and thwarted, and this cannot be effective unless respect for it is fostered and maintained. 20. To punish an advocate for Contempt of Court, no doubt, must be regarded as an extreme measure, but to preserve the proceedings of the Courts from being deflected or interfered with, and to keep the streams of justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the Court, though painful, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. No one can claim immunity from the operation of the law of contempt, if his or her act or conduct in relation to Court or Court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to obstruct the due course of justice. 21. In ultimate analysis even though we cannot absolve the respondent for the charge of contempt and we hold her guilty for having used expressions which prima facie lead to contempt, we cannot hold that the present contempt is of such a magnitude or dimension that it substantially interferes or tends to substantially interfere with the due course of justice. Mr. In ultimate analysis even though we cannot absolve the respondent for the charge of contempt and we hold her guilty for having used expressions which prima facie lead to contempt, we cannot hold that the present contempt is of such a magnitude or dimension that it substantially interferes or tends to substantially interfere with the due course of justice. Mr. Chakraborti asked us to take into consideration the case of Legal Remembrancer vs. Matilal Ghose &Ors. I ILR 41 Cal 173 at page 221 and Attorney General vs. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1973) 3 All England Reporter 54 at page 75. As was observed by Justice B.K. Mukherjee in Brahma Prakash sarma & Ors. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1954 SC 10 at para 15, where a question arises as to whether a defamatory statement directed against a judge is calculated to undermine the confidence of the public in the capacity of or integrity of the judge or is likely to deflect the Court itself from a strict and unhesitant performance of its duties, all the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the statement was made and the degree of publicity that was given to it would undoubtedly be relevant circumstances. In the facts of the said case there was publication as is required by the law or libel, but in contempt proceedings that is not by any means conclusive. What is material is the nature and extent of the publication and whether or not it was likely to have an injurious effect on the minds of the public or of the judiciary itself and thereby lead to interference with the administration of justice. Even though in the facts of the case some remote possibility of a contempt was there, Supreme Court thought it wise that it should not be taken note. The Supreme Court clearly thought that the contempt, if any, was technical in character and after the affidavits were filed on behalf of the appellants before the High Court, the proceedings against the appellants should have been dropped. 22. We do not think that it is a case where the proceedings ought to have been dropped as was so done in the aforementioned case. 22. We do not think that it is a case where the proceedings ought to have been dropped as was so done in the aforementioned case. We anxiously enquired as to whether the respondent was ready and willing to tender an apology to the satisfaction of the court and she did not agree to express even a note of regret, even though her learned Advocates persuaded her so to do. We have taken into account the mitigating circumstances as advanced by the respondent and as expressed in the two affidavits sworn by her. It is indeed reprehensive that being an educated lady and a Reader of Law and being herself a litigant in a proceeding before the Judge, she should impute unfairness to the Judge even though subjectively she might have a genuine grievance against the procedure adopted by the learned Judge or the learned Judge not delivering judgment even after 268 days of the hearing of the case which had resultant effect of prejudicially affecting her service conditions. 23. We are thus being quite conscious of the circumstances and the sufferings which prompted the respondent in making the impugned publication, even though we hold that it is a case for contempt, we do not go to the extreme length of punishing her for the same and let her off with a serious reprimand. The rule accordingly stands disposed of. J. N. Hore, J.: I agree. Rule disposed of; respondent reprimanded.