The facts giving rise to this application under section 401 of CrPC lie in a narrow compass and may be stated in brief. The petitioner before me is one Mantu Banik, who is a Supervisor of Tripura State Co-operative Bank. On 20.11.1987 he filed a complaint to Officer-in-charge of Ambassa PS, Tripura (N), who after filling up the prescribed form of FIR registered a case under sections 457/380 of IPC. 2. The police held an investigation culminating in a report dated 22.6.1988 which was submitted to the SDJM, Kamalpur, North Tripura under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code for short). The contents of the report made out the complaint of Shri Banik to be false and included a prayer to accept the FIR as false under sections 457/380 of IPC with a further prayer to pass necessary order for returning the seized materials to the person from whose possession those were seized. This final report was accepted by the learned SDJM by his order dated 11.8.1989. But before acceptance of this FR the OC, filed a complaint (PR) dated 6.4.89 accusing Shri Banik of the commission of offence under section 211 of IPC by reason of the latter having lodged with the police false complaint dated 18.11.87. This PR was actually presented before the learned SDJM on 3.6.89.By the order dated 2.9.89 learned SDJM took cognizance of the offence under section 211 of IPC against Shri Mantu Banik and passed order for issuance of summons to him. Shri Banik appeared on 16.11.89 and he was also admitted to bail. Thereafter Shri Banik filed a petition dated 12.12.89 stating that the PR submitted by the OC, Ambassa PS does not constitute the ingredients of offence punishable under section 211 of IPC and he prayed for discharging him. But the learned SDJM by his order dated 30.12.89 rejected that prayer. Hence, this revision petition, 3. The main ground of attack in this revision is that learned SDJM failed to appreciate the provision laid down under section 173 (2) (ii) of the Code. It is submitted by Mr. But the learned SDJM by his order dated 30.12.89 rejected that prayer. Hence, this revision petition, 3. The main ground of attack in this revision is that learned SDJM failed to appreciate the provision laid down under section 173 (2) (ii) of the Code. It is submitted by Mr. AM Lodh the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that when the final report is submitted by police under section 173 of the Code for accepting the FIR as false under sections 457/380, it is incumbent upon the Investigating Officer to inform the complainant of the action taken by him and in the event of his failure to issue an intimation as required under clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of section 173 of the Code he violates the provision and as such the Magistrate accepting final report holding the case as untrue cannot proceed further to take cognizance of the offence under section 211 of IPC on a PR filed by police. The contention of Mr. Lodli has considerable force as in the case of Bhagwaot Singh vs. Commissioner of Police & another, reported in AIR 1985 SC 1285 it was held by their Lordships that : "In a case where the Magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-section (2) of S. 173 decides not to take cognizance or takes the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the First Information Report, the Magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report." It has also been observed by their Lordships that under section 173 (2)(ii) the police officer is obligated to communicate to the informant the action taken by him and the report forwarded by him to the Magistrate. The informant must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process. 4. So, in view of the aforesaid decision it must be held that neither the SDJM nor the concerned police officer complied with the provision of section 173 (2) (ii) of the Code. 5. The next contention of Mr. 4. So, in view of the aforesaid decision it must be held that neither the SDJM nor the concerned police officer complied with the provision of section 173 (2) (ii) of the Code. 5. The next contention of Mr. Lodh is that learned Magistrate commit­ted gross error of law in taking cognizance of the offence under section 211 of IPC on the basis of the PR filed by the police as according to section 195 (1) (b) (i) of the Code no Court can take cognizance of an offence under section 211 of IPC except on the complaint in writing of that Court or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is whether on the facts of the case the bar against taking cognizance in section 195 (1) (b) (i) is attracted. Section 195 (1) (b) (i) so far as it is relevant for the purpose of this case may be attracted : "No Court shall take cognizance-(1) (b) (5) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (43 of I860), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228 when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or (ii) ... ... (iii) ........except on the complaint in writing of that Court or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate." 6. While section 190 of the Code enumerates the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings, section 195 (1) (b) (i) requires that complaint should be in writing by a Court or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. 7. Now we are concerned with the question whether the offence under section 211 of IPC is "committed in or relation to any proceeding in any Court". 8. 7. Now we are concerned with the question whether the offence under section 211 of IPC is "committed in or relation to any proceeding in any Court". 8. In the case of Bajaji Appaji Kote vs. Emperor, reported in AIR 1946 Bombay 7, it has been observed by his Lordship that : "Where information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is given to an Officer-in-charge of a police station under S. 154, Criminal PC, and is followed by an investigation by him, he is bound under S. 173 (1) to complete it without any unnecessary delay, and, as soon as it is completed, to forward his final report to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, in the Form prescribed by the Local Government, That report may be in the Form A when the complaint is true, or in Form B when the information is found to be false, or in the Form C when the information is neither true nor false and no case is sought to be sent up. An order passed by the said Magistrate on such report would dispose of the complaint made to the police. That order, as pointed out by Beaumont CJ, is not merely an administrative order but a judicial order of the Court. Hence if the complaint be held to be false and a B summary is issued, the offence under S. 211, Penal Code, will have to be alleged to have been committed by the complainant in relation to the proceedings in the Magistrate's Court which ended in an issue of the B summary." 9. The Bombay, Saurashtra and Andhra Pradesh High Court in AIR 1946 Bombay 7 (li); AIR 1952 Saurashtra 67 (68) and AIR 1969 Andhra Pradesh 281 have held that a Magistrate passing order on a final report of police under section 173 referring the case as false should be deemed to be a Court passing a judicial order disposing of the information to the police and that in such a case, the complaint of the Magistrate is necessary for the prose­cution of the informant under section 211 of IPC. 10. In the instant case, the police while submitting the final report made a prayer that the materials that were seized during investigation of the case should be returned to the complainant. 10. In the instant case, the police while submitting the final report made a prayer that the materials that were seized during investigation of the case should be returned to the complainant. In this context, it may be mentioned that under the Code of Criminal Procedure there are three different provisions for different stages at which the Court may pass suitable orders for disposal of seized properties : 1. Before the Court receives a charge-sheet, the matter is covered by section 457 of the Code. Where an enquiry or trial has not comm­enced, the proper section to be applied is section 457, CrPC; 2. During the pendency of an enquiry or trial the matter comes with in section 451 of the Code; and 3. On the conclusion of an enquiry or trial, the matter is within the purview of section 452 of the Code. 11. In the instant case, the materials that were seized are : (i) one trunk, (ii) one gun-cover made of cloth, (iii) one Nayyar lock of 7 lever bearing registered No. 250970, (iv) one belt containing the holes for keeping cartridges, and (v) licence of one SBL No. 6885 etc. The police while filing final report made a prayer for releasing those seized materials to the person from whose possession those were seized. To dispose of the prayer i.e. whether the seized materials should be returned to the person from whose possession those were seized, the action to be taken by the Magistrate in my opinion, is an action as a Court because before taking the decision as to whether the seized materials should be returned to the person from whose possession those were seized the Magistrate is required to go through the materials that were made available before him at the time of filing the final report and such he is to apply his mind not only to the con­tents of the final report, but also to the other materials, namely, the state­ments that were recorded under section 161 of CrPC, and he is to come to certain conclusion as to which person is entitled to the property. Such an order has, therefore, to be characterised as an order in the discharge of his judicial duties which factor constitutes it an act of a Court. 12. Such an order has, therefore, to be characterised as an order in the discharge of his judicial duties which factor constitutes it an act of a Court. 12. In the present case learned Magistrate as per the prayer of the police accepted the prayer in Toto and as such virtually he accepted that the seized material should be returned to the complainant. Therefore, such an order accepting the final report which was filed by police after investigation must be deemed to be a Court passing judicial order disposing of the information given to the police. 13. So in view of all the facts and the case laws referred to above, I am of opinion that SDJM is required to file a complaint in respect of the offence under section 211 of IPC and in the absence of such a complaint the proceeding launched against the petitioner is without jurisdiction. 14. For the reasons stated above, I hold that the complaint against the petitioner Shri Mantu Banik in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed in relation to a proceeding in Court and that in taking cognizance of it the SDJM acted in contravention of the bar contained in the said clause (b) as there was no complaint in writing either of the SDJM or of a superior Court. 15. In the result, therefore, I accept the revision petition, and setting aside the impugned order of learned SDJM quash the proceeding taken by him against the petitioner.