Judgment A.M. Bhattacharjee, C.J. I agree with the order proposed by the learned Judge in the Judgment under appeal wherein he has directed the University authorities to consider afresh the case of the writ petitioner (who is now respondent before us) for re-employment. But 1 do so for reasons entirely different from those of the learned Judge. With respect, I do not think the learned Judge was right in holding that the Screening Committee constituted to consider the case of re-employment of the writ petitioner suffered from a serious infirmity as one of its member, Dr. Gouri Nath Shastri, was biased against the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner contended that Dr. Gouri Nath Shastri was "not at all well disposed since 1967 with your petitioner on account of the serious criticism of Dr. Shastri's article entitled 'Sankara and the Empirical World' made by your petitioner". I have not been able to persuade myself to believe that Dr. Gouri Nath Shastri, who even according to the writ petitioner was a scholar of very great repute and eminence, would or could have any bias against the writ petitioner on the sole ground 'that about three decades ago the writ petitioner criticised one of the articles written by Dr. Shastri. Our judgments are very often criticised; sometimes severely; we rather welcome such criticism unless the same crosses the limits of decency or seeks to bring the Court into hatred, ridicule or contempt, thereby tending to interfere with the course of justice. But we cannot conceive that anyone of us would have any bias against anyone on the sole ground that once upon a time he or she wrote something making a very strong but bona fide criticism of our judgment. 2. The law on the question of bias is fairly well settled, though difficulties in a given case may arise in application thereof. There must be real likelihood of bias and not merely suspicion, surmise or conjecture. Whether one refers to Metropolitan Properties Company Ltd., (1968 (3) All ER 304) of Lord Denning Or the Supreme Court decision in G. Nageswara Rao (AIR 1959 SC 1308) of Subba Rao, J. or in A.K. Kraipak (AIR 1965 SC 1308), the law is clear that there must appear to be real likelihood of bias. Whether one refers to Metropolitan Properties Company Ltd., (1968 (3) All ER 304) of Lord Denning Or the Supreme Court decision in G. Nageswara Rao (AIR 1959 SC 1308) of Subba Rao, J. or in A.K. Kraipak (AIR 1965 SC 1308), the law is clear that there must appear to be real likelihood of bias. There must appear circumstances from which any reasonable man would think it likely that the person concerned would either favour or go against a person. What we have got to see is that whether there is reasonable ground of belief, and not mere suspicion to think, that the person concerned was likely to have been biased. As already noted, even according to the writ petitioner, Dr. Gouri Nath Shastri was a person of very high academic achievements and great eminence and reputation. As already stated, it is impossible for me even to imagine that in 1990s, Dr. Gouri Nath Shastri would act unfairly against the writ petitioner for the sole reason that in 1960s the writ petitioner wrote a letter in a daily newspaper criticising one of the innumerable articles written by Dr. Shastri. 3. In International Airport Authority of India ( AIR 1988 SC 1099 at 1103) it has been ruled that "there must be reasonable evidence to satisfy us that there was real likelihood of bias............ there must be real likelihood and not mere suspicion of bias before the proceeding can be quashed ............it is not every suspicion felt by a party which must lead to the conclusion that the authority hearing the proceeding is biased. The apprehension must be judged from a healthy, reasonable and average point of view". This decision in International Airport Authority of India (supra) has been relied on in a later decision of the Supreme Court in Munnuswamy Mudaliar ( AIR 1988 SC 2232 ). I do not think that there can be any apprehension from any healthy, reasonable and average point of view that a man of admitted academic eminence like Dr. Shastri would be biased against the person and act against him unfairly solely on the ground that the latter has once upon a time criticised one of his articles. 4. But I am, however, of opinion that the decision of the Screening Committee, of which Dr. Shastri was a member, warrants our interference for an entirely different reason. Shastri would be biased against the person and act against him unfairly solely on the ground that the latter has once upon a time criticised one of his articles. 4. But I am, however, of opinion that the decision of the Screening Committee, of which Dr. Shastri was a member, warrants our interference for an entirely different reason. It is no doubt true that it is not the function of the' Court to sit in appeal over the decision of such Committees. A rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in Dalpat, A. Solunke ( AIR 1990 SC 434 ) has again reiterated that principle. But it is also well settled that if such a Committee does not consider matters which it ought to consider and/or considers matters which it ought not to consider, the Court cannot but quash such decision, not on a re-appreciation or reappraisal of the matters, but solely on the ground that the Selection Committee acted either on no materials or on irrelevant materials. If such a Committee considers relevant materials and comes to a decision, it is not for the Court to substitute its decision for that of the Committee. But where, as here, the Committee either does not consider relevant materials or considers matters entirely irrelevant, the Court must strike out such decision at the instance of the aggrieved party. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. ( AIR 1967 SC 295 ). 5. Under Rule 19 of the First Statutes of the Calcutta University; the' recommendation of the Screening Committee was to be made "on the basis of the performance of the Teacher concerned as the Teacher and/or quality of research papers or books produced by him." The Rule further provides that in considering the academic activities of the Teacher, whether as a Teacher or as a Research Guide, his activities "particularly during the last five years preceding the date of superannuation" should be considered. It, however, appears from the records produced by the University that none of the three experts, including Dr. Gouri Nath Shastri, has at all considered the performance of the writ petitioner as a Teacher either during preceding five years or at any other point of time. It, however, appears from the records produced by the University that none of the three experts, including Dr. Gouri Nath Shastri, has at all considered the performance of the writ petitioner as a Teacher either during preceding five years or at any other point of time. It is true that all three of them are of opinion that in the absence of published materials, it was not possible for them to express any opinion as to the research activities of the writ petitioner. But as already pointed out, research activities are not the only consideration and one may be a Teacher of the first order without being a Research Guide or even without any research activities. I am also sorry to note, and this I say with great respect to Dr. Gouri Nath Shastri who is no more in this world, that Dr. Shastri in his written opinion has considered the earlier academic career of the writ petitioner as a student which was no longer for him to consider in this case. Dr. Shastri has also, and this again I say with respect, made unnecessarily uncharitable remark about the thesis which the writ petitioner submitted for his Ph.D. Degree on the sole ground that the same has not yet been published. A research dissertation does not lose its quality on the ground that the same has not been published as yet. I am accordingly of opinion that the learned Judge was right in allowing the writ petition and directing the University authorities to consider afresh the case of the writ petitioner for re-employment. I would accordingly dismiss the appeal and direct that the University authorities shall consider afresh the case of the writ petitioner for re-employment by constituting a new Screening Committee within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order. I am glad to note that Batabyal, J. has also come to the same conclusion in his separate judgment appearing hereinafter. No order as to costs. N.K. Batabyal, J. The issue of re-employment of the respondent No. 1 in the capacity of Mahamahopadhyay Gopinath Kaviraj Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Calcutta as per para 19 of the Calcutta University First Ordinances, 1979 is the subject-matter of the writ petition giving rise to this appeal by the University appellant. 6. No order as to costs. N.K. Batabyal, J. The issue of re-employment of the respondent No. 1 in the capacity of Mahamahopadhyay Gopinath Kaviraj Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Calcutta as per para 19 of the Calcutta University First Ordinances, 1979 is the subject-matter of the writ petition giving rise to this appeal by the University appellant. 6. The writ petitioner was appointed as a Lecturer in Sanskrit in January, 1958 and he joined the University of Calcutta as a whole-time Lecturer in Sanskrit in January, 1971. He was promoted to Readership with effect from and February, 1986. On the basis of his long and distinguished career as a teacher upto the Post-Graduate level, his academic attainment, research studies and works and successful research guidance, he was appointed Mahamahopadhyay Gopinath Kaviraj Professor of Sanskrit by the Calcutta University Authorities. He was due to retire on completion of the 60th year of his age on 28th of February, 1991. As he was eligible to seek re-employment under paragraph 19 of the Calcutta University First Ordinances under the Calcutta University Act, 1979, he submitted an application to the appropriate authority on 11th of April, 1990. As he was not informed about the fate of the application for reemployment, Dr. Charkraboty, writ petitioner served a letter dated 29th of January, 1991 requesting the Vice-Chancellor of the University to intimate him about the decision of the University Authority over the matter within a fortnight but to no effect. Thereafter, he served again on 24th February, 1991 another urgent letter of request on the Vice-Chancellor for informing him about the decision of the University over the matter. Lastly, he wrote again on 21st of February, 1991 about the decision of the University but in vain. Thus being apprehensive, the petitioner in the last week of February, 1991, served a demand letter upon the University Authorities for intimating him of the decision on the issue of his re-employment within 24th February, 1991 positively but this also yielded no result. He then filed the writ petition being C.O. No. 3335 (W) of 1991 praying for directing upon the respondents to refrain from disallowing the petitioner to continue in his service in the post of MM. He then filed the writ petition being C.O. No. 3335 (W) of 1991 praying for directing upon the respondents to refrain from disallowing the petitioner to continue in his service in the post of MM. Gopinath Kaviraj Professor of Sanskrit with effect from 1st of March, 1991, to communicate the decision of the concerned authority relating to re-employment of the petitioner in the said post with effect from 1-3-1991 and other reliefs. 7. His main contention is that there was un-explained delay in considering the case of the petitioner constituting an illegality and the same operated detrimental to the rights of the petitioner. His further contention is that the Selection Committee under Rule 19 of Calcutta University First Ordinances, 1979 was not properly constituted and the participation of Dr. Gourinath Shastri (since deceased) vitiated the deliberation of the Screening Committee due to mala fides and bias. 8. The application was contested by the University, respondent. The Learned Court below has been pleased to hold that the case of the petitioner was not properly considered• and the participation of Dr. Gourinath Shastri as a Member of the Screening Committee vitiated the deliberations. Accordingly, the recommendation of the Screening Committee stood set-aside, and the writ petition was allowed by directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for re-employment afresh after taking into account the basic and fundamental objections taken in the writ application including other materials before the respondents within a period of one month from the date of communication of the order. 9. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment recorded by the learned Court below the University of Calcutta and others have preferred this appeal. Their contention is that the Learned Judge erred in entertaining the writ petitioner by not properly considering the different aspects of the matter; that the Learned Court below erred in holding that the case of the writ-petitioner was not properly considered and the participation of Dr. Gourinath Shastri vitiated the deliberations and that the Learned Court below wrongly held that the Constitution of the Screening Committee was not proper. The appeal is hotly contested. 10. Gourinath Shastri vitiated the deliberations and that the Learned Court below wrongly held that the Constitution of the Screening Committee was not proper. The appeal is hotly contested. 10. Shri Pratap Chatterjee, Learned Counsel for the appellants has submitted that the decision of the Learned Court below has turned on the question that the Screening Committee was not properly constituted and the decision of the University Authority was taken long after the expiry of the attainment of age of 60 years by the writ-petitioner. It has been further held by the Learned Court that Dr. Gourinath Shastri rendered himself incompetent to participate as a Member of the Screening Committee. The Learned Counsel has submitted on the basis of paragraph 19 of the Calcutta University First Ordinances under the C.U. Act, 1979 that there was no obligation upon the University under that Rule to decide this way or that way the application for re-employment by the writ petitioner within a particular date. But the Learned Counsel has submitted that there was unfortunate delay on the part of the authorities to dispose of the application for re-employment. 11. Mr. K.K. Moitra, Learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent No. 1 has not addressed the Court strenuously on this point. It appears from the first paragraph of paragraph 19 of the C.U. First Ordinances referred to above that the material words are as follows:- "A whole-time Teacher of the University enjoying University Grants Commission Scale of pay introduced since 1st April, 1973 shall retire after the completion of 60 years of age provided that the Syndicate may give re-employment to a talented Teacher of the University for a limited period beyond the age of 60 years considering his/her academic activities particularly during the last 5 years preceding the date of his/her superannuation, supported by relevant documents." 12. So the opportunity of re-employment is not open to a Teacher of the University, as a matter of course after he retires on completion of 60 years of' age. The University Authorities have a discretion in the matter though the discretion has to be exercised according to law. The opportunity does not open unless one has reached the age of' superannuation but there is no rigid time-limit before which the application for re-employment has got to be disposed of by the University Authorities. The University Authorities have a discretion in the matter though the discretion has to be exercised according to law. The opportunity does not open unless one has reached the age of' superannuation but there is no rigid time-limit before which the application for re-employment has got to be disposed of by the University Authorities. Nothing has been placed before us by the Learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that there was any obligation upon the University Authorities to dispose of the application for re-employment within any rigid time frame. Hence, we find that there is substance in the argument of the Learned Counsel for the appellants on this point. 13. The next momentous issue is whether the Screening Committee was properly constituted. Under Rule 19 of the First Statutes, on receipt of an application for re-employment supported by relevant documents, the Syndicate is required to form a Screening Committee with the following Members and consider the relevant documents and the service record of the Teacher concerned:- (a) The Vice-Chancellor; (b) The Dean of the Faculty Council for Post-Graduate Studies concerned, if any; (c) One expert in the field of specialisation of the teacher concerned, to be nominated by the Chancellor; and (d) Two Experts in the field of specialisation of the Teacher concerned to be nominated by the Syndicate; Provided that:- (i) Such period of' re-employment shall initially be for a period of two years and subsequently for a period of one year or less. (ii) the recommendation of the Screening Committee regarding re-employment shall be made on the basis of the performance of the Teacher concerned as a Teacher and/or quality of research papers of books produced by him. (The recommendations shall also justify that he/she x cannot be replaced immediately or his/her continued availability will be indispensible for existing research programme); (iii) pay shall be fixed in accordance with the normal rules applicable............... ; (iv) re-employment shall not be offered as a matter of course but only in exceptional cases with sufficient justification as indicated in clause (ii) and subject to any law in force. 14. There is no dispute that the respondent No. 1 in the appeal, Dr. Chakraborty opted for University Grants Commission Scale of pay and in the normal course he attained the age of superannuation on completion of 60 years of age. The application for re-employment is dated 11-4-90. 14. There is no dispute that the respondent No. 1 in the appeal, Dr. Chakraborty opted for University Grants Commission Scale of pay and in the normal course he attained the age of superannuation on completion of 60 years of age. The application for re-employment is dated 11-4-90. The University Syndicate by resolution dated 29-5-90 resolved that the following experts be appointed to serve on the Screening Committee for the purpose of re-employment of Dr. Braja Bihari Chakraborty, MM. Gopinath Kaviraj Professor, Department of Sanskrit:- (a) Dr. Gourinath Shastri, and (b) Prof. Anantalal Thakur only on 9th January, i.e., after about 8 months from the date of the resolution taken by the Syndicate on 29-5-1990, the Registrar of University wrote to the Secretary of the Chancellor, C.U. to nominate an expert as Chancellor's nominee on the Screening Committee. On 5th of February, 1991, the Secretary to the Chancellor, C.U. wrote to the University Authorities that Prof. S.G. Kantawalla, Prof. of Sanskrit University of Baroda was re-nominated on the Screening Committee for recruitment to the post of Profs. etc. and for considering the proposals for re-employment of Teachers in Sanskrit for a period of 2 years. On 8th of February, 1991, the University Authorities wrote to Prof S.G. Kantawalla about his engagement and inviting his opinion as a Member of the Screening Committee in connection with the re-employment of Prof. Braja Bihari Chakraborty, the respondent No. 1. The other two experts, namely, Dr. Gourinath Sastri and Prof. Anantalal Thakur were informed of their engagements on 16th of July, 1990 to act as members of the Screening Committee in connection with the re-employment of Prof. Braja Bihari Chakraborty, the respondent No. 1 requesting them to give their valued opinions in connection with the prayer for re-employment. 15. In paragraph 28 of the writ petition, the stand of the respondent No. 1 (who is the writ petitioner in the Court below) has been clearly stated as follows:- "28. Braja Bihari Chakraborty, the respondent No. 1 requesting them to give their valued opinions in connection with the prayer for re-employment. 15. In paragraph 28 of the writ petition, the stand of the respondent No. 1 (who is the writ petitioner in the Court below) has been clearly stated as follows:- "28. That your petitioner says that the constitution of the purported Screening Committee for your petitioner's re-employment being violative of para 19 of the 1979 Ordinance is bad, illegal and motivated, inasmuch as your petitioner is a well-known specialist in the field of the Vedanta and as per para 19 of the Calcutta University First Ordinances 1979 the experts of the purported Screening Committee are to be very highly specialised in the field of the Vedanta to adjudicate your petitioner's specialisation. But none of the two experts the respondents Nos. 6 and 7 respectively nominated by the Syndicate for the purported Screening Committee are any specialist in the Vedanta to judge your petitioner's specialisation. Hence the appointment of the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 as expert members of the purported Screening Committee is violative of the Statutory provisions and as such, any adverse proceeding, if any against the petitioner, on the basis of the recommendation of the above two experts should he held as bad and illegal and is without jurisdiction". 16. The case of the appellant, University is that the University Authorities duly formed a Screening Committee to assess the merits of the petitioner for the purpose of re-employment in terms of para 19 of the First Ordinances but the Members of the Screening Committee did not recommend the case of the writ-petitioner for re-employment. 17. The main contention of the petitioner that the so called three expert Members of the Screening Committee were not specialised in the field of Vedanta and as such the Committee so constituted was not in accordance with para 19 of the First Ordinances. What is meant by the expression "field of specialisation" in the context of the particular case has not been discussed anywhere within the four-corners of the judgment under Appeal. It appears from the writ petition itself that Dr. Chakraborty was appointed MM. Gopinath Kaviraj Professor of Sanskrit by the Calcutta University Authorities and he joined the post on 20.6.89. What is meant by the expression "field of specialisation" in the context of the particular case has not been discussed anywhere within the four-corners of the judgment under Appeal. It appears from the writ petition itself that Dr. Chakraborty was appointed MM. Gopinath Kaviraj Professor of Sanskrit by the Calcutta University Authorities and he joined the post on 20.6.89. Under Rule 19 of the First Ordinances the Syndicate may give re-employment to a talented teacher for a limited period considering his acadamic activities particularly during the last 5 years preceding the date of his superannuation supported by relevant documents. Therefore the Syndicate was to consider the academic activities of the applicant for re-employment particularly during the last 5 years before superannuation of his service career. As the writ petitioner was appointed a Professor of Sanskrit only so his field of specialisation as a Teacher was Sanskrit. It no where appears from paragraph 12 of the writ petition that he acted as a Teacher of Vedanta only in the University. He had done his Ph. D. in Vedanta and that is undoubtedly his field of special interest so far as he was a serious student of Philosophy. But so far as he was a Teacher of the University it cannot be said that his field of specialisation as a Teacher in the University was Vedanta. This is not borne out anywhere within the four-corners of the writ petition. Accordingly there is no justification for holding that for the purpose of para 19 of the First Ordinances the field of specialisation of the writ petitioner was not Sanskrit. In this view of the matter no fault can be found with the engagement of Dr. Gourinath Sastri, Dr. Anantalal Thakur and Dr. S.G. Kantawalla as expert members of the Screening Committee in this case. 18. In paragraphs 29 and 30 of the writ petition, Dr. Chakraborty has raised three points which have been strenuously urged before us by Mr. Moitra, Counsel. The paragraphs are as follows:- "29. That your petitioner states further that Dr. Gourinath Sastri, the respondent No.7, is not at all well disposed since 1967, with your petitioner on account of the serious criticism of Dr. Sastri's article entitled "Sankara and the Empirical World" made by your petitioner showing. Dr. Sastri's very poor and incorrect knowledge of the very general ideals of the Vedanta. That your petitioner states further that Dr. Gourinath Sastri, the respondent No.7, is not at all well disposed since 1967, with your petitioner on account of the serious criticism of Dr. Sastri's article entitled "Sankara and the Empirical World" made by your petitioner showing. Dr. Sastri's very poor and incorrect knowledge of the very general ideals of the Vedanta. On this ground the appointment and the adverse recommendation of Dr. Sastri, if any, should be held as bad, illegal prejudicial and motivated and be set aside. A copy of the above criticism by your petitioner is annexed hereto with the mark of the letter "E". 30. That the respondent No.8, Dr. Kantawala, the other expert member of the purported Screening Committee nominated by the Chancellor is known to be of the similar nature as that of the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 as regards specialisation. He also is not a specialist in the Vedanta, the field of specialisation of your petitioner and he is not even acquainted with the Bengali language in which your petitioner's Ph. D. thesis and publications are written and, as such, the appointment and adverse recommendation, illegal and motivated and should be rejected in limine". 19. It has been submitted on behalf of the Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 that Dr. Gourinath Sastri maliciously alleged that the petitioner's Matriculation result was poor, whereas the petitioner's secured 73% marks on average with letter marks in Sanskrit in the Matriculation Examination. Dr. Sastri declined to recommend the case of the petitioner for re-employment as MM. Gopinath Kaviraj Professor of Sanskrit out of bias and malice. The observations of Dr. Anantalal Thakur are irrelevant, biased and beyond jurisdiction. It has been further submitted that the observations of Dr. Kantawalla are suffering from the same vice as that of Dr. Thakur. He is exposed to the charge that he, like two other experts, is not specialised in the field of Vedanta. As such the adverse observations, of the experts must be quashed. On behalf of the Learned Counsel for the respondent No.1, it has been argued that when allegations of mala fide and improper motive were made on the part played by the Members of the Screening Committee it was obligatory on the part of those respondents to controvert the said allegations. But Dr. Sastri has not come forward to challenge the said allegations of mala fide etc. But Dr. Sastri has not come forward to challenge the said allegations of mala fide etc. 20. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant-University that mere allegations of malafide are not sufficient for holding that it is a case for interference in the Extraordinary Writ Jurisdiction of this Court. The Learned Lawyer has in this connection referred to both English and Indian decisions in support of his contention that there must appear to be mal likelihood of bias and not mere suspicion to think that the person concerned was likely to have been biased. 21. Mr. Chatterjee has first referred to the case of Rex vs. Nailsworth Licensing Justices (1953 (2) AER 652). In that case at the hearing before a Licensing Committee of an application for an off-licence, a petition in favour of the licence, signed by members of the local community was tendered in support of the application. Objection as to its admissibility was made by those opposing the application through the Secretary of the Association, but the justices over-ruled the objection. The petition was not read out in Court, nor was it handed to the justices for their inspection. While the justices were in retirement considering their decision it was observed that one of them had previously signed the petition. The Justices returned into Court and announced that the licence was granted. Objection was then made that a justice who had signed the petition had adjudicated on the matter which was the subject of the petition but the justices declined to alter their decision. On a motion for an order of certiorari to quash the justices' order on the ground of bias and that in the circumstances justice was not seen to have been done. Held, (i) although it was undersirable that a justice who had signed a petition should sit and adjudicate on the subject matter of the petition, to justify the setting aside of a decision of justices there must be something in the nature of real bias; merely that a justice might be thought to have formed some opinion on a licensing matter beforehand was not a ground on which the decision of the Committee could be upset; and, therefore, the order for certiorari would not go. (ii) the objection could, and should have been made before the decision of the justices had been announced and on that ground also the court, in its discretion, would refuse the application. 22. Mr. Chatterjee has then referred to another case reported in 1954(2) AER 850 (Rex vs. Camborne Justices); Held, "the frequency with which allegations of bias have come before the Courts in recent times seems to indicate that the reminder of LORD HEWART, C.J., in R.V. Succex JJ. Ex P. Mecarthy (1924) I K.B. 259), that it is "of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done" is being urged as a warrant for quashing convictions or invalidating orders on quite unsubstantial grounds and, indeed, in some cases on the flimsiest pretexts of bias. While indorsing and fully maintaining the integrity of the principle reasserted by LORD HEWART, C.J., this court feels that the continued citation of it in cases to which it is not applicable may lead to the erroneous impression that it is more important that justice should appear to be done than that it should in fact be done". 23. These two cases were referred to with approval in a Supreme Court case reported in 1974 (3) SCC 459 (Partha Sarathi vs. State of A.P.). The Learned Lawyer for the appellant has also cited a case reported in AIR 1992 SC 188 (Jibon Kumar Lohia & Anr. vs. Durgadutta Lohia & Ors.) in support of his contention that the context of likelihood of bias is whether reasonable person in possession of relevant information would have thought that bias was likely and whether the person concerned was disposed to decide the matter only in a particular manner. In that case it was held that with regard to bias in relation to a judicial Tribunal the test that is applied is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment but whether litigant would reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the Tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. The test of likelihood of bias is whether a reasonable person would have thought that bias was likely and the person concerned was disposed to decide the matter only in a particular manner. 24. The test of likelihood of bias is whether a reasonable person would have thought that bias was likely and the person concerned was disposed to decide the matter only in a particular manner. 24. In an unreported Division Bench judgment of our High Court in FMAT No. 3160 of 1992 (Ajit Shuk Deo Sharma vs. Vishwa Bharati University & Ors.) (in which one of us was a member of the Bench) it has been held, "the law on the point is fairly well settled though difficulties may in a given case arise in application thereof. If I may say so with respect, the Learned Trial judge correctly appreciated the law on the point when he tried to ascertain as to whether there was any real likelihood of bias and not merely suspicion, surmise or conjecture. That is also what appears to be the law on the point as explained in the decisions cited by the Counsel for the parties and as such I need not refer to all of them. Whether one refers to Metropolitan Properties Company Ltd. (1968-3 All E.R. 304) of Lord Denning or to the Supreme Court decision in G. Nageswara Rao (AIR 1959 SC 1300) of Subbo Rao, J. or in A.K. Kraipak (AIR 1965 SC 150, the law is clearly that there must appear to be real likelihood of bias. There must appear circumstances from which any reasonable man would think it likely that the person would or did favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. What we have got to see is that whether there is reasonable around of belief, and not mere suspicion to think that the person concerned was likely to have been biased." 25. Shri K. Moitra. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted on the basis of the principles laid down in Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Majdoor Conaress ( AIR 1991 SC 101 ) that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of the law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system, governed by rule of law, discretion when conferred upon executive authorities must be confined within defined limits. In a system, governed by rule of law, discretion when conferred upon executive authorities must be confined within defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decision should be made by the application of known principles of rules and in general such decisions should be predictable and the litigant should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is un-predictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. 26. The Learned Counsel has also referred to the principle laid down in Smt. Srilekha Vidyarthi vs. State of U.P. ( 1991(1) SCC 212 ) where it has been laid down that the question whether the impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to apply is to see whether there is a discernible principle emerging from the impugned act and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. When a mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no impediment in following that procedure, performance of the act otherwise in a manner which does not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable, may itself attract the vice of arbitrariness. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprice of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. 27. From a reading of the decisions as mentioned by the Learned Counsel of the contending sides, it is clear that the law concerning bias is a product of natural justice and it operates in the area where the statute is silent. The fundamental principle of rule of law is that no one is allowed to be a judge in his own case. There is another dimension of the rule which is expressed as the rule of audi alteram partem. The rule is that no one can be a judge of his case leads to the inevitable conclusion that the least pecuniary interest in the subject matter of consideration will disqualify a judge or a member of the Administrative Tribunal from acting in that capacity. The rule is that no one can be a judge of his case leads to the inevitable conclusion that the least pecuniary interest in the subject matter of consideration will disqualify a judge or a member of the Administrative Tribunal from acting in that capacity. But if the interest alleged is any other kind of interest, it must be shown by the petitioner that the interest is substantial so as to make it highly probable that the authority concerned has a real bias. A mere possibility of bias is not enough to disqualify the concerned member of the Tribunal. What has got to be seen in a case where there is an allegation of bias in respect of a member of an Administrative Board or Body is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. In other words, whether there is substantial possibility of bias animating the mind of the member against the aggrieved party, vide G.R. Madan vs. Chancellor, Lucknow University, 1983 UPSC 137. 28. Mr. Moitra, Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has emphasized upon the fact that no affidavit-in-opposition has been sworn against the allegations of fact against the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 in this appeal (who were respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 in the Trial Court). Therefore, the Court has to accept the allegation of malafide. The Learned Court below has also accepted the said contention on the ground that the allegation of malafide stands uncontroverted and hence proved. It is true that no affidavit was sworn by the three experts to controvert the allegation made against them in the writ petition though they were very much parties to the proceeding. Unfortunately, the Learned Court below failed to advert to the question whether there was real likelihood of bias in the facts and circumstances of the case. Our Supreme Court in Akhila Nand Sharma vs. Vice-Chancellor, Hindu University, 1983 (Supp) UPSC 122 has cautioned that plea of malafides should not be readily accepted against eminent persons comprising the Selection Committee. This does not mean that we are oblivious of the principles laid down in Pratap Singh vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1964 SC 72 ) where the suspended Medical Officer made serious allegation of bias with date against the Chief Minister through affidavit. But in reply, there was no counter-affidavit. This does not mean that we are oblivious of the principles laid down in Pratap Singh vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1964 SC 72 ) where the suspended Medical Officer made serious allegation of bias with date against the Chief Minister through affidavit. But in reply, there was no counter-affidavit. The alegations were held to have been proved. 29. In paragraph 29 of the writ petition it has been stated as follows:- “29. That your petitioner states further that Dr. Gourinath Sastri, the respondent No.7, is not at all well disposed since 1967 with your petitioner on account of the serious criticism of Dr. Sastri's article entitled "Sankara and the Empirical World" made by your petitioner showing Dr. Sastri's very poor and incorrect knowledge of the very general ideals of the Vedanta. On this ground the appointment and the adverse recommendation of Dr. Sastri, if any, should be held as bad, illegal prejudicial and motivated and he set aside....................” 30. In paragraph 30 of the writ petition it has been alleged as follows against Dr. Kantawala:- "30. That the respondent No. 8, Dr. Kantawala, the other expert member of the purported Screening Committee nominated by the Chancellor, is known to be of the similar nature as that of the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 as regards specialisation. He also is not a specialist in the Vedanta, the field of specialisation of your petitioner and he is not even acquainted with the Bengali language in which your petitioner's Ph. D. thesis and publications are written and as such, the appointment and adverse recommendation, if any of the respondent No. 8 are bad, malafide, illegal and motivated and should be rejected in limine". 31. No specific allegation has been made in a separate paragraph against Prof. Anantalal Thakur. But in paragraph 31 in the writ petition it has been stated jointly as follows:- "31. That your petitioner states about the lack of specialisation of the expert members of the respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8 in the Vedanta the field of specialisation of your petitioner. on the basis of the all India record books like Universities Hand Book; India Who's Who and Indian Books in Print' etc. and other reliable sources". 32. These books have not been placed before the Court and we cannot accept the ipse-dixit of the writ petitioner on this point. on the basis of the all India record books like Universities Hand Book; India Who's Who and Indian Books in Print' etc. and other reliable sources". 32. These books have not been placed before the Court and we cannot accept the ipse-dixit of the writ petitioner on this point. Moreover there is no reference that the name of the writ petitioner appears in the said publications as a specialist in Vedanta. It has already been explained above that attempts have been made to find fault with the selection of the three expert members on the ground of lack of specialisation in the particular field in which the petitioner is a specialist. It is not the case of the appellant that Dr. Chakraborty is not a Ph. D. in his subject Vedanta. But we arc concerned with his capacity as a Teacher in Sanskrit only for the purpose of re-employment as he was MM. Gopinath Kaviraj Professor of Sanskrit in the University. Therefore the alleged lack of specialisation of Dr. Kantawala or Dr. Sastri or Prof. Thakur in Vedanta can cut no ice. 33. In view of the discussions of the legal principles as discussed above, it has got to be seen whether in the facts and circumstances of the case there was real likelihood of bias against the writ petitioner, respondent No. 1 so far as Dr. Gourinath Sastri is concerned. The factual frame is that in the year 1967 the writ petitioner scathingly criticised Dr. Sastri's article entitled "Sankara and the Empirical World" in a letter to the Editor's column in a widely circulated paper in Calcutta showing Dr. Sastri's very poor and incorrect knowledge of the general ideals of the Vedanta. There is no other allegations of any fact or circumstance showing that there was any occasion for any difference either in the academic or intellectual level between Dr. Gourinath Sastri and the writ petitioner during the course of next two decades or so. Against the other two experts of the Selection Committee, there is no specific allegation of personal bias. The only ground against them is that they were not experts in the field of the specialisation of the writ petitioner. This particular point has already been discussed above as without any substance. 34. Against the other two experts of the Selection Committee, there is no specific allegation of personal bias. The only ground against them is that they were not experts in the field of the specialisation of the writ petitioner. This particular point has already been discussed above as without any substance. 34. Under Rule 19 of the C.U. First Ordinances the Syndicate shall form a Screening Committee with certain specified persons and consider the relevant documents and the service records, of the teacher concerned. The members are the Vice-Chancellor, the Dean of the Faculty Council of Post-Graduate studies concerned, one expert in the field of specialisation of the teacher concerned to be nominated by the Chancellor and two experts in the field of specialisation of the teacher concerned to be nominated by the Syndicate. The field of specialisation of the teacher concerned here, according to our view, is the study of Sanskrit. There is nothing on record to show what particular matter comes within the stream under the rubric of Department of Sanskrit of Calcutta University. It should be clearly borne in mind that this has nothing to do with the claim of the writ petitioner that he was himself a learned scholar of Vedanta Philosophy. Three experts as required under the Rules were chosen to make a Screening Committee. The Screening Committee was required to make recommendations on the basis of the performance of the teacher concerned as a teacher and/or quality of research papers or books produced by him (the recommendations should also justify that he cannot be replaced immediately or his continued availability will be indispensable for existing research programme). The academic activities of the teacher concerned particularly during the last five years of his superannuation are of the particular significance in this context under Rule 19 quoted above. So the ambit of consideration of the Selection Committee was the performance of the applicant as a teacher and his academic activities during the last five years before superannuation and/or the quality of research papers or books produced by him. There is no dispute about the fact that there is no publication of any work of the writ petitioner in the form of a book. 35. There is no dispute about the fact that there is no publication of any work of the writ petitioner in the form of a book. 35. The Supreme Court has already held that it is not the function of the Court to hear appeal over the decisions of Selection Committees vide AIR 1090 SC 434 (Dalpat A. Solunke vs. Dr. B.S. Mahajan etc.). So we do not propose to sit in appeal over the decision of the Members of the Selection Committee. We can certainly see whether in those cases where the formation of opinion is subjective, the existence of circumstances relevant to the interference are demonstratively present or not. (Barium Chemicals vs. Company taw Board, AIR 1967 SC 259). In that case Bachawat, J., observed that if it as established that there were no materials upon which the authority could form the requisite opinion, the Court may infer that the authority did not apply its mind to the relevant facts. 36. Dr. Gourinath Sastri in his assessment of the academic activities of the writ petition and opinion regarding the proposal of re-employment of Dr. Chakraborty has in his letter dated 7th of September, 1990 addressed to the Registrar, Calcutta University has opined as follows:- "After going through the record of the candidate in respect of his academic career and activities in the field of research, I venture to submit as follows:- (a) Academic Career: Not uniformly good. Excepting his performance at the M.A. Examination when he obtained a First Class and stood second in order of merit, his performance in the initial stages is definitely poor. (b) Research Activities: The candidate have (?) studied the Vedanta Philosophy in particular. It is a pity that he could not publish his thesis. It is very difficult to assess his merit as a Research Scholar in the absence of any printed material. He has submitted some descriptions of his research activities. But on his own admission, he could not get anything published during the period of his service as a teacher at the University, which is pretty-long. From his self-assessment report it appears that he has been appointed as M.M. Gopinath Kaviraj Professor of Veda. But it is surprising that there is no authenticated document in support of his schlorship in the field of Veda and Vedic study. From his self-assessment report it appears that he has been appointed as M.M. Gopinath Kaviraj Professor of Veda. But it is surprising that there is no authenticated document in support of his schlorship in the field of Veda and Vedic study. In the absence of his credentials in the filed of Vedic studies, I am afraid that there is little justification for continuing him as M.M. Gopinath Kaviraj Professor of Veda at this University". 37. The Screening Committee is required to make recommendation on the basis of the performance of the teacher concerned as a teacher and/or quality of research papers or books produced by him (the recommendations should also justify that he cannot be replaced immediately or his containued availability will be indispensible for existing research programme). Therefore, it is not understood how the academic career of Dr. Chakraborty as a student came under the scrutiny of Dr. Sastri as a member of the Screening Committee. Dr. Sastri has stated nothing about the performance of Dr. Chakraborty as a teacher. Dr. Sastri has on the other hand stated that it is very difficult to assess the merits of Dr. Chakraborty as research scholar in the absence of any printed material. It is clear that Dr. Sastri has, not been able to form any opinion about the quality of research work of Dr. Chakraborty as no authenticated document in support of his scholarship in the field of Vedic studies was before Dr. Sastri. 38. Dr. Sastri considered firstly an inaccessible aspect of the academic carrer of Dr. Chakraborty as a student and then had no printed material to assess the merits of Dr. Chakraborty as a research scholar and lastly no authenticated document for considering the scholarship of Dr. Chakraborty in the field of Vedic studies. It follows logically that the opinion of Dr. Sastri as a member of the Screening Committee suffered from the virus of considering irrelevant materials or no materials at all. There are some stray remarks of Dr. Sastri in his opinion as expressed in the words "it is pity that he could not publish his thesis" and "he could not get anything published during the period of his service as a teacher at the University which is pretty-long". These remarks are completely uncalled for. In this view of the matter, I hold that it can be said that the opinion of Dr. These remarks are completely uncalled for. In this view of the matter, I hold that it can be said that the opinion of Dr. Sastri suffered from real likelihood of bias and arbitrariness. 39. In this view of the matter, the judgment of the Learned Trial Court is upheld. 40. Dr. Sasri an outstanding scholar in Sanskrit is unfortunately no more in this world and it is considered proper that the writ application be allowed by directing the appellant to consider afresh the case of the writ petitioner for re-employment by constituting a new Screening Committee on the materials available and such further materials as may be made available by the respondents as they think just and proper. Much time has already elapsed since the filing of the application for re-employment of Dr. Chakraborty and it is directed that a decision on the application shall be taken within a period 3 months from the date of communication of this order. There will be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case. 41. For expedition to meet the ends of justice, a xerox copy of this order duly counter-signed by the Deputy Registrar (Court) be handed over to the Learned Advocate for the writ petitioner for transmitting the same to the University Authorities for due compliance of the order. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. 3.5.93 Learned Advocate for the appellant orally prays for stay or operation of this order passed by us to-day. The prayer is refused. Judgment of the trial could upheld; writ application allowed with directions on the appellant.