By this common judgment and order, I propose to dispose of two petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India registered as Civil Rule No.2272 of 1992 and 2340 of 1992. 2. Both the writ petitioners were employees under the organization called Tea Research Association and they were posted at Tocklai Experimental Station of the said Research Association at Jorhat. The petitioner in Civil Rule No.2272 of 1992 joined the service of the Research Station as Junior Scientific Officer in October, 1982 and his grievance is regarding the order of transfer issued by the Manager Personnel and Administration of the Research Centre at Jorhat on 4th September. 1992 vide Annexure F to the writ petition and he was transferred to Upper Assam Advisory Department, Dikom of the above Research Centre. His representation against the transfer order was also rejected by a letter dated 15th September, 1992 vide Annexure H to the petition. In the transfer order at Annexure F it was specifically stated that the transfer would not affect his pay and allowances which the petitioner were drawing at that time and he was asked to report to the Advisory Officer at Dikom. 3. The writ petitioner in Civil Rule No.2340 of 1992 joined in the service of the Experimental Station of the Association as Administrative Controller on 1.2.89. He has come before this Court as his service was terminated by giving him salary for 3 months as per clause 3 of the appointment letter. The termination order dated 23rd October, 1992 is at Annexure 15 and his appointment letter dated 9th December, 1988 is at Annexure 6 to the writ petition. According to clause 3 of the appointment letter, the appointment may be terminated by giving one month's notice from either side during the probationary period and 3 month's notice after confirmation without assigning any reason. The writ petitioner was confirmed in the post. 4. Before considering the merit of the case, a preliminary point wat raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitions are not maintainable as a writ would not lie against the main respondents, namely, Tea Research Association and its officers as it is not an authority and as such not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. 4. Before considering the merit of the case, a preliminary point wat raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitions are not maintainable as a writ would not lie against the main respondents, namely, Tea Research Association and its officers as it is not an authority and as such not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. For this purpose reliance has been placed on various decisions by the counsel for both the sides and let me extract the relevant portion of these decisions before considering whether a writ would lie as prayed for by the petitioners, 5. First let me consider whether Tea Research Association is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. 6. This question of 'authority' has been discussed at length in various decisions of the Apex Court. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in Unni Krishnan vs. State of AP, (1993) 1 SCC 645 , the Apex Court approved the ratio laid down in the land mark decision in Ajaj Hasia vs. K ha lid MujM Sebravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 and quoted paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said judgment. 1 quote below the said paragraph : ''The tests for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of Government may not be culled out from the judgment in the International Airport Authority case. These tests are not conclusive or clinching, but they are merely indicative indicia which have to be used with care and caution, because while stressing the necessity of a wide meaning to be placed on the expression 'other authorities' it must be realised that it should not be stretched so far as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. We may summarise the relevant tests gathered from the decision in the Interna­tional Airport Authority case as follows : (1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corpora­tion is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government (SCC p.507, para 14) (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with Governmental character. (SCC p.508, para 15) (3) It may also be a relevant factor ... whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. (SCC p.508, para 15). (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an, indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (SCC p.508. para 15) (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as instrumentality or agency of Government (SCC p. 509, para 16) (6) "Specifically, if a Department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference" of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government.'(SCC p. 510, para 18). If on a consideration of these relevant factors it is found that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government, it would, as pointed out in the International Airport Authority case be an 'authority' and, therefore, 'State' within the meaning of the expression in Article 12. We find that the same view has been taken by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in a subsequent decision of this Court in the UP Warehousing Corportion ts. Vijay Narayan Vajpayyee and the observations made by the learned Judge in that case strongly reinforced the view we are taking particularly «n the matrix of our constitutional system." Therefore, in deciding this question, the six tests laid down above have to be considered. 7. Vijay Narayan Vajpayyee and the observations made by the learned Judge in that case strongly reinforced the view we are taking particularly «n the matrix of our constitutional system." Therefore, in deciding this question, the six tests laid down above have to be considered. 7. I may also mention that a Division Bench of this Court in Snrendra Nath Xalita vs. Assam Co-operative Apex Bank Limited, (1989) 1 GLR 424 [1989 (1) GLJ 54] after considering the decision of the Apex Court in Ajoy Hasia (snpra), International Airport Authority's en e, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Shorn "rakash vs. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 212 summarised the tests to be applied in determining the question as to whether a Corporation or a Body is an instrumentality of the State or not and said tests are as follows :- (i) financial resources of the State being the chief funding source; (ii) functional character being Government in essence; (iii) plenary control residing in Government; (iv) prior history of the same activity having been carried on by the Government and over the new body; (v) some element of authority or command. 8. In Chander Mohan Khanna vs. National Council of Educational Research and Training & others, (1991) 4 SCC 578 , the Apex Court considered whether National Council of Educational Research and Training, for short, 'NCERT' is a State as defined :n Article 12 of the Constitution and held that NCERT is an autonomous body and does not fall within the definition of 'State'. According to their Lordships there is no cut and dried formula which would provide correct division of bodies into those which are instrumentalities or agencies of the Government and those which are not. According to their Lordships, the powers, functions, finances and control of the Government are some of the indicating factors to answer the question whether a body is 'State' or not and each case should be handled with care and caution. According to their Lordships, the powers, functions, finances and control of the Government are some of the indicating factors to answer the question whether a body is 'State' or not and each case should be handled with care and caution. It was also held that where the financial assistance from the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the institution, or the share capital of the corporation is completely held by the Government, it would afford some indication of the body being impregnated with Governmental character and that it may be a relevant factor if the institution or the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected and an existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication. It was further held if the function of the institution are of public importance and related to Governmental functions, it would also be relevant factor and these are mere indicative indicia and are by no means conclusive or clinching in any case Their Lordships cautioned that Article 12 should not be stretched so as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression 'State' and a wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation and that it must not be lost sight of that in the modern concept of welfare State, independent institution, corporation and agency are generally subject to State control which does not render such body as 'State' under Article 12. 9. In Tekruj Vasaodi vs. Union of India & others, (1988) 1 SCC 236 , the question which came up before the Apex Court was whether the institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, for short, 'ICPS' comes within (he category of other authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution and it was held that the above institution is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. It may be stated that the Speaker of the Lok Sabha was its first President and three Ministers, a former Chief Justice of India arid a former Attorney General were Vice-President. Some of the public officers were also associated with the administrative set-up. It may be stated that the Speaker of the Lok Sabha was its first President and three Ministers, a former Chief Justice of India arid a former Attorney General were Vice-President. Some of the public officers were also associated with the administrative set-up. The Memorandum of the society permitted acceptance of gifts, donations and subscriptions and con­tribution from the Government constitute the main source of income of the society and some money come from some other sources also and as Govern­ment money had been coming, the usual conditions attached to Government grants had been applied and enforced. On this fact, it was held that 'ICPS' was not a State within the meaning of Article 12. The case of International Airport Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and other decisions of the Apex Court were considered and it was held that it is not necessary that all the tests laid down in the above decision should be satisfied for reaching the conclusion either for or against holding an institution to be a 'State' and in a given case some of the features may emerge so boldly and prominently that a second view may not be possible. According to their Lordships a broad picture of the matter has to be taken and a discerning mind has to be applied keeping the realities and human experiences in view so as to reach a reasonable conclusion. 10. In PK Ramachundra Iyer & others vs. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 541 : (1984) 2 SCC 141 , the Apex Court considered whether the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, for short, 'ICAR' was an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Court noted the historical background and it was observed that though it was registered as a society, but substantially it was ; an adjunct of the Government of India. It was also \\holiy financed by the Government of India and its budget was voted upon as part of the expenses incurred in the Ministry of Agriculture. The Court further noted that the control of the Government of India permeates through all its activities and it is body to which the Government of India transferred Research Institutes set-up by it and to make it financially viable, a cess was levied. On these facts it war held that the ICAR is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution and amenable to writ jurisdiction. 11. On these facts it war held that the ICAR is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution and amenable to writ jurisdiction. 11. I may add here that in MC Mehta vs. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086 , in paragraph 29 it was held by the Apex Court that it is not correct to say that in India once a corporation is deemed to be 'authority', it would be subject to the constitutional limitation of fundamental rights in the perfor­mance of ail its functions and that the appellation of 'authority' would stick to such corporation, irrespective of the functional context. 12. Reference has also been made at the Bar to the two decisions of the Apex Court in Lamba Industries vs. Union of India (1991) 2 SCC 407 and Grihkaljan Kendra Workers' Union vs. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 619 . But these two decisions are not relevant for our present purpose. So also decision of the Apex Court in Chairman, School of Ruddhirt Philosophy vs. Makhanlal Mattoo, (1990) 4 SCC 6 . 13. Now, let me consider as to whether any one or all the tests laid down in Unni Krishitan (supra) are present in the case in hand. 14. In the writ petitions, it has been stated that the respondent No. 5 society, namely, the Tea Research Association is mainly financed by the Union of India through Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, for short, 'CSIR'. It has also been stated that majority members of the committee are the nominees of the Union of India and the administrative control of respondent No. 5 is exercised by Union of India. It is not disputed that the respondent No. 5 has its own Memorandum of Association. According to the writ petitioners earlier the institution was known as Tocklai Experimental Station, but subsequently re-designated as Tea Research Association. 15. In the counter affidavit, it has been stated that the Association is a registered society registered under West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961 and the rights, duties and powers of the Association are circumscribed by its Memorandum and Rules. It has also been stated that the objects for which the said Association was established were primarily to carry and promote research and other scientific works connected with the cultivation, plantation, production and processing of the tea. It has also been stated that the objects for which the said Association was established were primarily to carry and promote research and other scientific works connected with the cultivation, plantation, production and processing of the tea. According to respondents from the Memorandum and Rules of the Association, it is clear that the Association is an autonomous body and is neither an instrumentality or agency of the Central Government nor any of the State Government. It has also been stated that the Central Government or the State Government has no control over the affairs of the Association and the Association is not bound by any directive of the Central Government and has also no connection or nexus with the respondent No. 6 i.e. the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and the respondent No. 8, namely, the Union of India. According to respondents, the Association is financed mainly from subscrip­tion of its associate members as well as from sale of green leaf, planting materials etc. and only about 25% of the total fund is paid by the Union of India for scientific research. Respondents have further stated that the Indian Tea Association, the predecessor of the present Association played a major role in the improvement of the tea industry through scientific development without any financial support from the Government of India, or the State Government. According to the respondents, the Council of Management, consists of 21 representatives of the industry, 4 representatives of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and one representative of the Tea Board and that since 1990-91 CSIR has withdrawn itself and therefore, from that year the representative of the Government is only one from the Tea Board. It has further been stated that from last 3 years of the audited income and expenditure account of the Association/would reveal that out of expenditure of 4.92 crores, 4.74 crores and 5.58 crores for the years 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-9"?, the contribution of the Central Government was Rs. 0.50 crores, Rs.1.87 crores and Rs. 1.12 crores respectively. 16. At the time of hearing, the Memorandum and Rules of the Associa­tion for the years 1973, 1987 and 1991 were placed before this Court and also the annual report for the year 1990-9!. 0.50 crores, Rs.1.87 crores and Rs. 1.12 crores respectively. 16. At the time of hearing, the Memorandum and Rules of the Associa­tion for the years 1973, 1987 and 1991 were placed before this Court and also the annual report for the year 1990-9!. Petitioners have also placed a letter dated 14.11.1963 issued by the Consultative Committee of the Tea Producer Association and Memorandum of the Association and also an agreement between the Tea Research Association and the Employees of Tocklai Experim­ental Station represented by Tocklai Employees' Union. 17. Before I consider the Memorandum and Rules of the Association, I may state here that according to the respondents CSIR was represented in the Board of Management before 1990-91. The question came up whether CSIR was an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution and the Apex Court in Sabhajit Tewary vs. Union of India & others, AIR 1975 SC 1329 : (1975) 1 SCC 485 clearly held that CSIR is not an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, even if the representa­tives of the CSIR were made members of the Management Committee, it would not make the present Association an instrumentality of the State. 18. The signatories of the Memorandum and Rules of the present Association for the year 1973 were all either representatives of the tea growers or other private individuals and I do not find any representative of CSIR or Tea Board being signatories to the said Memorandum. Attention of this Court has been drawn to clause 3 (b) of the Memorandum of Association, according to which the Association can accept grants of money etc. from the Govern­ment, CSIR and other public bodies corporation. Merely becuse of this clause it would not make the Association an instrumentality under Article 12 of the Constitution. From all the memorandums, I find that the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members are to be elected by the members of the Association in the Council of Management of the Association. Of course in 1975, Memorandum and Rules of the Association, 5 representatives were to be nominated by the CSIR including one representative of the Tea Board. The 1973 Memorandum and Rules of the Association does not indicate any power of the Government except the fact that amendments of Rules and Regulations of the Association has to be approved by the CSIR. The 1973 Memorandum and Rules of the Association does not indicate any power of the Government except the fact that amendments of Rules and Regulations of the Association has to be approved by the CSIR. As stated above, the CSIR is not an instrumentality under Article 12 of the Constitution. 19. Coming to Memorandum and Rules of the Association of 1987, I, also find that all the signatories of Memorandum of Association was either tea growers or the representatives of the tea growers and there was no signa­tory either of the CSIR or Tea Board. Similar clause regarding acceptance of money from the Government or CSIR was found in clause 3(b) of the Memorandum of Association and it is also provided under Rule 25 that Rules and Regulations of the Association may he amended in consultation with CSIR. These two clauses in my opinion will not indicate State control in respect of the Association. 20. In 1991 Memorandum and Rules of Association, similar provisions are also found regarding acceptance of grant from the Government, Tea Board and CSIR and other public bodies etc. In clause (j) of Memorandum No. 3 it was also provided that the Association can borrow or raise any money upon such term as may be deemed advisable with the approval of the Tea Board. In clause 4 of the Memorandum, it was inter alia, provided that remuneration to any member of the Council of Manage­ment shall be made in accordance with the recommendation by or with the approval of the Tea Board. According to clause 6 of the Memorandum in case of winding up or dissolution of the Association, if there remains any property, this can be distributed to such institutions to be determined by the members of the Association subject to the approval of the Tea Board. Clause 7 of the Memorandum further provides that any addition, alteration, modification or removal of any clause of the Memorandum of Association or Rules and Regulations or the dissolution of the Association shall be sub­ject to prior approval of the Tea Board. I may again state that the signatories to the Memorandum and Rules of the Association, 1991 were either tea: growers or their representatives and neither representative of CSIR or Tea Board were signatories to the said Memorandum and Rules. I may again state that the signatories to the Memorandum and Rules of the Association, 1991 were either tea: growers or their representatives and neither representative of CSIR or Tea Board were signatories to the said Memorandum and Rules. According to Rule 22, the funds of the Association, inter alia shall include grants by Tea Board, CSIR, Central Government or any State Government. According to Rule 234 the Association will furnish to the Tea Board on the 30th September or as soon thereafter as may be convenient, every year, a copy of the annual statement of accounts duly audited. According to Rule 24 a draft of the report, and the yearly accounts of the Association shall be prepared by the Council and placed before the Association at its General Meeting for consideration and approval and after approval shall be supplied to the Tea Board. Accor­ding to Rule 25, the Rules and the Regulations of this Association may be amended in consultation with the Tea Board by the votes of three-fifths of, members at an ordinary or an extra-ordinary meeting of the Association. 21. In the annual report of 1990-91, the audited balance sheet as on 31.3.1991 has been concluded. I find that out of total income for the year 1990-91 amounting to Rs. 3,75,84,744/- and Rs. 5,46,23,842/- respectively grants from Tea Board was Rs. 28,12,659/- and Rs. 28,90,982/- respectively, the grant in aid from CSIR for the year 1989-90 was Rs. 50.00.000/- out of the total income of Rs. 3,67,62,920/-. Thus it would appear that the contribu­tion either from the Tea Board or from the CSIR was negligible compared to subscription received from the members of the Association. 22. Either from the Memoradum and Rules of Association or from the balance sheet, I am unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that financial assistance from the State was enough to meet the entire expenditure of the Association and in fact it was negligible. There is nothing in the Memorandum and Rules of the Association that the Asso­ciation enjoys its monopoly status conferred by the State and the State control is deep and pervasive. As the Association is mainly doing research in tea, it cannot be said that the functions of the Association are of public importance closely related to Governmental functions. There is nothing in the Memorandum and Rules of the Association that the Asso­ciation enjoys its monopoly status conferred by the State and the State control is deep and pervasive. As the Association is mainly doing research in tea, it cannot be said that the functions of the Association are of public importance closely related to Governmental functions. The Association was never a Department of the Government and no function of the Government was transferred to the Association Therefore, I am unable to hold that the Tea Research Association is an instrumentality of the State for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution. 23. From the provisions of Tea Act, 1953,1 find that one of the functions of the Tea Board vide clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Act was to undertake, assist or encourage scientific, technological and economic research in tea industries. Therefore, it is the statutory duty of the Tea Board to provide assistance to the present Association. In fact there is no bar to form similar Research Association by other growers and Tea Board may also extend its helping hand in this regard Therefore, it cannot be said that merely because some conditions have been laid down in the Memorandum and Rules of the Association regarding approval of Tea Board, the present Association is an instrumentality under Article 12 of the Constitution. 24. Mr. Lahiri on behalf"? the writ petitioners has urged that under Article 226 of the Constitution, a writ can issue by this Court to any person or authority. In this connection, learned counsel has placed reliance in a decision of the Apex Court in Anai Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Sntarak Trust & others vs. VR Rndani 6 others. (1989) 2 SCC 691 . In that case the appellant before the Apex Court was a public trust running a science college, there were some disputes between the trust and the teachers of the college. The matter also went up to the Chancellor of the University and the award of the Chancellor was made. But the trust refused to accept the award and ultimately decided to close down the college. Therefore, the teachers approached the High Court and the High Court issued direction to the trust to make payment as stated in paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Apex Court. But the trust refused to accept the award and ultimately decided to close down the college. Therefore, the teachers approached the High Court and the High Court issued direction to the trust to make payment as stated in paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Apex Court. Two questions were considered by the Apex Court, namely, payment of compensation under the Ordinance of the University and the maintainability of the writ petition. In the case in hand this Court is concerned only regarding maintainability of a writ petition, 25. In that case, namely, Andi Mukta SSMVSSJMS Trust (supra) the Apex Court considered two earlier decisions of the Court, namely, Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College w. Lakshrai Narain, (1976) 2 SCC 58 and Deepak Kumar Biswas ts. Director of Public Instructions, (1987) 2 SCC 252 -Tn the first case the institution was a degree college managed by a registered co-operative society and the Court refused to entertain any dispute holding that the management of the college was not a statutory body as it was not created by or under an statute. It was also emphasised that an institution which adopts certain statutory provisions will not become a statutory body and the dismissed employee cannot enforce a contract of personal service against a non-statutory body. 26. In Deepak Kumar Biswas (snpra) a dismissed lecturer of a private college was seeking reinstatement in service. But the Court refused to grant the relief although it was found that the dismissal was wrongful. But instead granted monetary benefits. On the basis of the above two decisions in the Andi Mukta SSMVSSJMS Trust (supra), the Apex Court was of the opinion that a service contract cannot be specifically enforced. 27. In Andi Mukta SSMVSSJMS Trust (supra) there was no plea for specific performance of contractual service or for a declaration that the teachers were continued in service and they only claimed terminal benefits and arrear salary to be paid to them. The Apex Court held that if the rights are purely of a private character, no Mandamus can issue and if the manage­ment of the college is purely a private body with no public duty, Mandamus would not lie. The Apex Court held that if the rights are purely of a private character, no Mandamus can issue and if the manage­ment of the college is purely a private body with no public duty, Mandamus would not lie. From the facts of that case, it was held that the college was affiliated to which public money was paid by the Government which played a major role in the control, maintenance and working of educational institu­tions. It was also held that aided institutions like Government institutions discharge public function by way of imparting education to students and they are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating University end the activities are closely supervised by the University. Therefore, employment in such institutions, is not devoid of any public character. 28. Thus according to the Apex Court by exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, High Court can issue writ of Mandamus against a private body or a person provided it has to perform a public duty. It was also held that service contract cannot be specifically enforced. 29. Reliance has also been placed in a decision of this Court in Debipada Bhattachrjec vs. State of Assam, 1993 (1) GLJ 13 wherein it was held that the Managing Committee of the school in that case had to perform public duty and it was controlled by the Government agencies under the rules which were accepted by the school?. On these facts it was held that the Managing Committee of the school is amenable to writ jurisdiction. 30. Coming to the case in hand, the respondent Association in question is doing research in tea, but to get the benefit of the service of the Association, a tea garden or a manufacturer of tea has to be a member. In other words, the benefit of research is not available to all the tea garden owners or manufacturers. It has already been indicated from the audited balance sheet that the main income of the respondent-Association is from the subscription received from its members and grants-in-aid received either from the Tea Board or from the CSIR is nominal. The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and 15 members of the Council have to be elected in the annual general meeting of the Association. It has already been indicated from the audited balance sheet that the main income of the respondent-Association is from the subscription received from its members and grants-in-aid received either from the Tea Board or from the CSIR is nominal. The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and 15 members of the Council have to be elected in the annual general meeting of the Association. In the counter affidavit, it has been stated that in the Council of Management from 1990-91 there is only one member from the Tea Board and other 21 members are elected. 31. It may be stated that other tea planters may also constitute such an Association for doing research in tea as there is no legal bar for this purpose and Tea Board may also provide money by way of grants-in-aid for any scientific development in tea as provided in the Tea Act, 1953. 32. For the reasons stated above, I am unable to hold that respondent-Association is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court as it does not discharge any public duty. 33. It may be stated that in one writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for re-instatement in service i.e. for specific performance of contract and in another writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the transfer order. There­fore, applying the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Andi Mukta SSMVS SJMS Trust (supra) that service contract cannot be specifically enforced, I am of the opinion that both the petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability. Accordingly, both the petitions are dismissed. No. costs. Interim orders stand vacated.