D. G. KARIA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition is directed against the judgment and order dated March 12 1990 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application TEN. 44/99. ( 2 ) THE applicant-landlord was owner of land in respect of Survey No. 47 admeasuring 2 Acres and 29 Gunthas and Survey No. 60 admeasuring 0-Acre and 39 Gunthas situated at Gundasana Taluka Songadh District Surat. The respondent herein was tenant in respect of the said land on the appointed day i. e. on June 15 1955 The petitioner-landlord was minor at that time and as such the purchase of land was postponed. The petitioner having attained majority on September 3 1971 preferred application purporting to be under section 29 read with section 31 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act on August 14 1972 for restoration of the possession of the land in question for the purpose of personal cultivation thereof. The Mamlatdar Songadh thereupon by his order dated December 20 1972 rejected the petitioners application. However the deputy Collector on appeal by his order dated June 11 1973 set aside the Mamlatdars order and remanded the matter for fresh inquiry and decision. Thereupon the Mamlatdar Songadh after making fresh inquiry as directed came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not entitled to recover possession of the lands in question for personal cultivation and as such rejected the petitioners application. ( 3 ) THE petitioner being aggrieved by the said judgment and order of the Mamlatdar preferred appeal before the Deputy Collector who by his judgment and order dated November 27 1978 dismissed it. Thereupon the petitioner preferred Revision Application under section 76 of the said Act before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal also dismissed the Revision Application confirming the judgments and orders passed by the Courts below. The petitioner has challenged this judgment and order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in the present petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) IT is an admitted position that the respondent-tenant to the Scheduled Caste. The application of the petitioner for recovering the possession of the lands in question was under section 31 of the said Act. ( 4 ) IT is an admitted position that the respondent-tenant to the Scheduled Caste. The application of the petitioner for recovering the possession of the lands in question was under section 31 of the said Act. Section 31 of the said Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sections 14 and 30 but subject to sections 31a to 31d (both inclusive) a landlord (not being a landlord within the meaning of Chapter III- AA) may after giving notice and making an application for possession as provided in sub-section (2) terminate the tenancy of any land (except a permanent tenancy) if the landlord bona fide requires the land for the purposes enumerated in section 31 of the said Act. Now the application under section 31 is subject to the provisions of secs. 31a to 31d Section 31b of the said Act provides that the tenancy shall not be terminated under sec. 31 inter alia if the tenant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Schedule Tribe. Sub-section (4) of sec. 31b clearly lays down that in case the tenant being a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe the tenancy cannot be liable to be terminated under section 31 and the landlord cannot recover possession of the land for the purpose of personal cultivation. The concurrent findings of facts recorded by the Courts below and confirmed by the revisional authority cannot be disturbed in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 5 ) IT was contended on behalf of the petitioner that section 31b (4) was amended with effect from March 3 1973 when the proceedings under section 31 for the purpose of recovering the land for personal cultivation were pending and as such the provision of sec. 31b (4) of the said Act will not be applicable to the present case. I find no substance in this submission in view of the ratio laid down in the case of Vasanji Kevalbhai and Others vs. Dahiben Wd/o Ranchhodji Jivanji and others reported in 15 G. L. R. 780. 31b (4) of the said Act will not be applicable to the present case. I find no substance in this submission in view of the ratio laid down in the case of Vasanji Kevalbhai and Others vs. Dahiben Wd/o Ranchhodji Jivanji and others reported in 15 G. L. R. 780. The Division Bench of this Court relying upon the case of S. N. Kamle vs. Sholapur Municipality A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 538 held that the retrospective effect to the application of the provisions of law could be given to the widest extent and on certain principles of construction which would be helpful to arrive at legislative intention. Thus the point raised on behalf of the petitioner has already been concluded in the aforesaid decision reported in 15 G. L. R. page 780. ( 6 ) IN view of the overall facts and circumstances of the case there is no substance in the petition. The petition is therefore liable to be rejected and is hereby rejected. Rule discharged with no order as to costs June 11 1993 ( 7 ) THIS Court after calling the learned Advocates for the parties and having waited for about two days distated the judgments on merits in the afternoon of June 8 1993 Thereafter on June 9 1993 at the time of signing the judgment Mr. M. D. Pandya learned advocate for the petitioner was informed about the judgment having been passed and being signed and thereupon he requested the Court to permit him to make his submissions in the matter. According to Mr. Pandya the matter involved an important question of law as to applicability of the amended Act whether prospectively or retrospectively. Permission was granted to Mr. Pandya and accordingly he made his submissions on June 10 1993 ( 8 ) MR. Pandya submitted that the petitioner having attained majority on September 3 1971 served notice under section 31 of the said Act on January 8 1872 to the respondent-tenant terminating the tenancy in respect of the lands in question. The petitioner-landlord thereafter submitted application under section 29 read with section 31 of the Act on August 14 1972 for an order of the Mamlatdar that possession of the land in question for the purpose of personal cultivation. On December 20 1972 the Mamlatdar rejected the said application and dismissed the suit of the petitioner-landlord. The petitioner-landlord thereafter submitted application under section 29 read with section 31 of the Act on August 14 1972 for an order of the Mamlatdar that possession of the land in question for the purpose of personal cultivation. On December 20 1972 the Mamlatdar rejected the said application and dismissed the suit of the petitioner-landlord. The petitioner thereupon preferred appeal before the Deputy Collector Vyara who allowing the appeal rememded the case to the Mamlatdar on July 11 1973 The Mamlatdar on remand of the case after holding necessary inquiry rejected the application of the petitioner-landlord on january 1 1975 by the order at Annexure A to the petition. Mr. Pandya referring to the aforesaid dates submitted that sub- section (4) of section 31 of the Bombay Tenancy Act was amended and inserted by Gujarat Act No. 5 of 1973 and was made effective from March 3 1973 The words In no case a tenancy shall be terminated under section 31 (4 ). If the tenant is a member of a Schedule Caste or a Scheduled Tribe came into force by the aforesaid amendment with effect from March 3 1973 According to Mr. Pandya the tenancy of the respondent-tenant was already terminated on January 8 1972 before the aforesaid sub-section came to be inserted in section 31b of the Bombay Tenancy Act. Mr. Pandya then invited my attention to Chapter VI of Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh and emphasised on Retrospective Operation at page 293 of the said vol. (Fifth Edition 1992 ). I have carefully gone through the general principles relating to restropective operation. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to effect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the inntetion of the legislature to effect existing rights it is deemed to be prospective only nova constitutio futuris formas imponere debet non practeritis. Mr. Pandya therefore submitted that the amended provisions of sub-section (4) of sec. 31 of the Bombay Tenancy Act had no applicability to the facts of the present case. Mr. Pandya therefore submitted that the amended provisions of sub-section (4) of sec. 31 of the Bombay Tenancy Act had no applicability to the facts of the present case. for the reasons that the tenancy of the respondent-tenant was already terminated on January 8 1972 before the amended provision was made effective. ( 9 ) THE proceedings for possession on the ground of personal cultivation were not concluded after service of the notice under section 31 of the Bombay Tenancy Act on January 8 1972 The proceedings were very much pending when the aforesaid amended provision of law was made applicable. It is not dispute that the respondent-teanant is a member belonging to the Scheduled Caste. In an important decision in the case of Mithilesh Kumari and another vs. Prem Behari Khare reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1247 the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act (45 of 1988) are interpreted. The facts of the case in short were that the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that he is the real owner of the suit house and the transaction was benami. The suit was decreed by the trial court and the decree was confirmed by the appellate Court and the Act came into force during the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court. The question was therefore raised whether on interpretation of the statute the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act had retrospective effect. The Supreme Court held that the statute can have retrospective effect by necessary implication and it is not necessary that it must be so expressed in the very terms of the section. The Supreme Court observed therein as under :-"21 We read in Maxwell that it is a fundamental rule of English Law that no statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly at the time of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct implication. A retrospective operation is therefore not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. A retrospective operation is therefore not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in cases in which the statute if operated retrospectively would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions or impair contracts or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of that transaction or consideration already passed. However a statute is not properly called a retorspective statute because a part of the requsites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. We must look at the general scope and purview at the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied and consider what was the former State of Law and what the legislation contemplated. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreebly to existing laws is retropective and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. But laws made justly and for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole as in this case may relate to a time antecedent to their commencement. The presumption against retrospectivity may in such cases be rebutted by necessary implications from the language employed in the statute. It cannot be said to be an invariable rule that the statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be construed The question its whether on a proper construction the legislature may be said to have so expressed its intentio. Craics on Statute Law 7 Ed. writes that the general rule of law that statutes are not operated retrospectively may be departed from (a) by express enactments and (b) by necessary implication from the language employed and the author goes on to say : "if it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation the Courts will give it such an operation. Baron Parke said Lord Hatherley in Pardo vs. Biingham 1809 4 CHApplr 735) did not consider it an invariable rule that a statute could not be rerospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be construed and said that the question in such case was whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed the intention. In fact we must look to the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied and consider what was the former state of the law what it was that the legislature contemplated But a statute is not to be read retrospectively except of necessity. In Main vs. Stark 1809 15 AC 384) Load Selborne said : Their Lordships of course do not say that there might not be something in the context of an Act of Parliament or to be collected from its language which might give towards prima facie prospective a larger operation but they ought not to receive a larger operation unless you find some reason for giving it. In all cases it is desirable to ascertain the intention of the legislature". He went on : Words not requiring a retorspective operation so as to affect an existing statute prejudicially ought not to be so construed but in Reynolds vs. Att. Genl. for Nova Scotia (1809 0 AC 240) it was held that this rule did not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal a privilege which did not amount to an accured right ( 10 ) THE aforesaid ratio squarely applies to the faces and circumstances of the present case. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands act was enacted with a high purpose of transferring the land tilled to the tillers of the soil with the exception of the lands which were leased out for growing sugarcane because of the need for protection of the industry of sugarcane and development of the economy. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands act was enacted with a high purpose of transferring the land tilled to the tillers of the soil with the exception of the lands which were leased out for growing sugarcane because of the need for protection of the industry of sugarcane and development of the economy. The statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending law relating to tenancies of agricultural lands contemplates that on account of the neglect of the landholder or disputes between a landholder and his tenants the cultivation of his estate has seriously suffered or for the purpose of improving the economic and social conditions of peasants or ensuring the full and efficient use of land for agriculture it was expedient to assume management of estates held by landholders and to regulate and impose restrictions on the transfer of agricultural lands dwelling houses sites and lands appurtenant thereto belonging to or occupied by agriculturists labourers and artisans in the Province of Bombay and to make provisions for certain other purposes the provisions of the amending Act were made. Thus having regard to the object of the Bombay Tenancy Act and in view of the law laid down in the case of Mithilesh Kumari (supra) I find no substance in the submission of Mr. Pandya that the amending provisions of sub-sec. (4) of section 31b of the Bombay Tenancy Act will have no retrospective effect. Due care was taken to appreciate this issue even during the absence of Mr. Pandya when the judgment was dictated referring to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. reported in 15 GLR 780. In this view of the matter the submission of Mr. Pandya cannot be accepted. Petition stands rejected accordingly. Petition Rejected. .