HANSARIA,. J. ( 1 ) THE State of Orissa represented through the Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Collector, Kalahandi has filed the First Appeal (F. A. No. 74/93) on 19-4-1993 with a court-fee of Re. 1/- only as against Rs. 9584 payable on the memorandum of appeal. An application under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on the same day. This petition, registered as Misc. Case No. 275 of 1993, came up before a learned single Judge on 10-5-1993. The learned Judge having found that not a single appeal had been filed by the State paying the required court-fee and the usual ground taken for not doing so being that the amount required for purchasing court-fee has not been received from the concerned authority in time felt that some guidelines for extension of time as permitted by Section 149 of the Code should be laid down since this Section is an exception to Section 4 of the Court-fees Act. The learned Judge also felt that the guidelines should be authoritatively laid down by a larger Bench and referred the following questions for answer by the Division Bench:-" (A) Whether non-receipt of the amount required for purchase of court-fee is a good cause for extension of time? (b) Even if it is a good cause, whether the same would be applicable for the State, who is treated differently in respect of stay matters under the Code, where no security is called upon while granting stay in respect of execution of decree for payment of money? (c) When public policy is early disposal of a litigation, whether prayer of the State in Land Acquisition Appeals under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act depriving a claimant of the compensation awarded is to be taken note of for extending time to pay the court-fee merely on the ground that till payment of the amount, claimant shall be paid interest on the said amount?"the case has been placed before this Bench accordingly. ( 2 ) IT may first be stated with respect that the learned single Judge is right in his observation that Section 149 of the Code is an exception to the general rule of paying courtfee at the time of filing of a document as enjoined by Section 4 of the Court-fees Act, 1875. It is apparent that an exception cannot be made a rule. It is apparent that an exception cannot be made a rule. Any other view would amount to amending Section 149 of the Code, because, instead of discretion resting with the Court in the matter of allowing payment of the deficit court-fee, it would be open to a litigant to claim this benefit almost as a matter of right, whereas Section 149 gives power to grant time on the Court being satisfied on a case being made out for the same. ( 3 ) IN this connection, reference may be made to Mannan Lal v. Chhotka Biwi, AIR 1971 SC 1374 , in which it has been held that Section 149 of the Code militates the rigour of Section 4 of the Court-fees Act and it is for the Court to harmonise the aforesaid two provisions by reading Section 149 of the Code as a proviso to Section 4 of the Court-fees Act. This being the legal position it has to be remembered that Section 149 is meant to take care of the real difficulty of a litigant in being not able to pay the required court-fee in time. An inherent and implied prohibition in liberalising the provision of Section 149 may thus be read in the Section. ( 4 ) A learned Judge of this Court in State of Orissa v. Rajanikanta, (1987) 63 Cut LT 390), after taking note of Mannan Lal's case (supra) and some other judgments of different High Courts (as noted in paragraph 6) has held that the cumulative effect of the decisions is that mere inability to pay the court-fee at the time of presenting the memorandum of appeal is not a sufficient ground for indulgence by the Court to exercise discretion under Section 149 in favour of the litigant. Indeed, the view of the Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court Wajid Ali v. Isar Bano, AIR 1951 Allahabad 64, which was noted in the aforesaid decisions is that time may be extended where inability to pay the court-fee is due to circumstances beyond the control of the litigant. To put it differently, the discretion is not to be exercised in favour of the party who has been negligent, as opined in Basawwa v. Limbawwa, AIR 1968 Bombay 309. To put it differently, the discretion is not to be exercised in favour of the party who has been negligent, as opined in Basawwa v. Limbawwa, AIR 1968 Bombay 309. ( 5 ) DESPITE the above, we would observe that when Section 149 has not put any fetter on the exercise of discretion, it may not be permissible to do so by laying any guideline as such. All that can justifiably be said is that the Court while exercising the discretion has to bear in mind that the power conferred is meant to be exercised in exceptional case and on being satisfied that non-payment of courtfee in time is for reason beyond the control of the appellant and the same is not due to his negligence. The ground shown has therefore to be adequate, cogent and strong, because, otherwise the exception would take the form of rule which would militate against the legislative intention. ( 6 ) WITH the aforesaid in mind, we answer the three questions framed by the learned single Judge. In so far as the first question is concerned, we state that the fact of non-receipt of the amount (by an advocate) required for purchase of court-fee cannot ordinarily be a "good cause" for extension of time, because in such a case non-receipt is not a 'cause'; it is really an effect. The cause lies somewhere else. It is the soundness of the cause basing on which discretionary power has to be invoked to come to the aid of a litigant. It may be a 'cause' for the advocate (Advocate-General in the present case); but the Advocate-General is not the appellant. Appellant is the State and the Advocate-general is an agent of the State within the meaning of Order III of the Code. The cause which has, however, to exist is not one which is relatable as to why the agent is being required to file the appeal with deficit court-fee but why the principal could not make available the required amount to the agent. The cause of the agent cannot be the cause for the principal; and it is the cause of the principal which is relevant, and not the cause at the hand of the agent. The cause of the agent cannot be the cause for the principal; and it is the cause of the principal which is relevant, and not the cause at the hand of the agent. In an exceptional case it may however be that though the principal has sent the amount, the same has not reached the hands of the agent, say, due to postal strike, natural calamity or the like. In such cases, cause of non-receipt of the amount by the agent may also provide good ground; but not when the required amount had not been remitted at all to the agent. In such a case the appellant shall have to satisfy the court as to why the entire amount could not be made available by him/ it to his/ its counsel to enable the latter to file the appeal with the required amount of court-fee. ( 7 ) WHETHER any different yardstick or criterion should be adopted when applicant is the State (the second question) is a matter which requires little probe into the working of the Government and its budgetting. In so far as governmental working is concerned, the view expressed in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 , while dealing with the question relating to condonation of delay has relevance for the case at hand also, as the question was whether when condonation of delay is prayed for by the State, a treatment similar to the other litigants has to be accorded or any special treatment, because of the special functioning of the Government. Thakkar, J. speaking for a two-Jude Bench stated that the fact that condonation of delay was prayed for by the State was an altogether irrelevant fact inasmuch as the doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. The following observations finding place at page 1354 are pertinent in this connection :-"there is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'state is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. The following observations finding place at page 1354 are pertinent in this connection :-"there is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'state is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact, experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with note-making, file pushing and passing on the buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State, which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. . . . . . . " ( 8 ) AS against the aforesaid view, another two Judge Bench stated in G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897 , as below at page 901 :-". . . . . . . . . . . . . IN assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient cause' for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, those factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning - of course, within a reasonable limit - is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. " ( 9 ) THE aforesaid shows that the Supreme Court has taken two different views in the matter. May we call one an idealistic view of which Katji speaks of and the other a realistic view propounded in Ramegowda, that too after taking note of Katji. Ideal is the goal to be achieved; but one cannot shut eyes to realities. May we call one an idealistic view of which Katji speaks of and the other a realistic view propounded in Ramegowda, that too after taking note of Katji. Ideal is the goal to be achieved; but one cannot shut eyes to realities. And reality is that in governmental functioning there is procedural delay, and so, 'a little play on the joints' has to be given to the Government. ( 10 ) THUS, by the time decision is taken to file appeal, expiry of limitation might be round the corner. Prudence would require to file appeals within time without taking the risk of asking for condonation, which may or may not be granted depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. But than, question is, if decision to file appeal has been taken within the period of limitation, why should the money required for payment of court-fee be not made available? Here comes the question of budgetting. As is known, each department is alotted some fund as per the budget passed by the legislature. It may be that by the time appeal is required to be filed, the budgetary provision is getting exhausted and the financial powers available to the concerned head does not permit drawing of other money, even if available under some other head. In some cases, it may as well be that the position of finance is no such that the same cannot be apportioned at any level till additional fund is made available by supplementary budget. ( 11 ) IN view of what has been stated above, we would state that when State asks for time to pay the deficit court-fee, a simple statement like the one at hand that the amount required has not been received from the concerned authority is not sufficient at all to invoke the discretionary power conferred by Section 149 of the Code. Adequate reason (s) must be assigned to the court to show that the appeal is being filed with deficit court-fee because of circumstances beyond the control of the concerned department. If negligence lies at the root of the same, the court may well refuse to invoke its discretionary power. ( 12 ) THE third question would be relevant only in appeals under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, which, according to us, cannot be treated differently from other appeals. If negligence lies at the root of the same, the court may well refuse to invoke its discretionary power. ( 12 ) THE third question would be relevant only in appeals under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, which, according to us, cannot be treated differently from other appeals. The fact that the claimant shall be paid interest in case of delayed disposal has no relevance to the question of exercise of discretionary power under Section 149 of the Code, inter alia, because public money cannot be allowed to be used to benefit a private person, if by due diligence the same can be avoided. A respondent in a case under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act may not be felt aggrieved at the delay in disposal of the appeal because he would be compensated by payment of interest. But the larger public interest would suffer where the State is the appellant inasmuch as the money which would have been available to the State, if interest would not have been required to be paid because of delay in disposal, could have been put to better use and more pressing public use. So, the fact that the claimant would be paid interest is, to repeat, not a relevant consideration while seized with the question of exercising discretionary power under Section 149 of the Code. ( 13 ) LET the records be placed before the learned single Judge for disposal of the case in the light of what has been stated above. ( 14 ) R. K. PATRA, J. :- I agree. Order accordingly.