Judgment Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee, J. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 14th June, 1991 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge. 11th Court, Alipore, 24 Paraganas in Title Appeal No. 219 of 1989 setting aside the judgment and decree dated 15th May, 1990 passed by the learned Munsif, 2nd Court, Alipore, 24 Parganas in Title Suit No. 23 of 1988. The suit out of which this appeal arose was filed by the heirs and legal representatives of Late Phatik Chandra Auddy, the son of deceased Jatindra Nath Auddy against the against the widow of deceased Jatindra Nath Auddy and his two married daughters. The suit was filed for a declaration that the defendant No.1 Smt. Prabhabati Auddy was merely a Benamdar in respect of the suit property purchased by a registered deed dated 27th September, 1948 and the said defendant has no right to transfer the entire suit property by way of gift, sale or otherwise. The suit property is a land situated at 21B, Subji Bagan Lane, Calcutta-27 which originally stood in the name of Smt. Prabhabati Auddy. The said Jatindra Nath Auddy died in the year 1960 leaving behind his wife Prabhabati, one son Phatik Chandra Auddy and two daughters-Minakshi Banerjee and Minati Dey. Phatik Chandra and Minakshi continued living in the said house built by Jatindra with his wife till his death in 1989. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 after entering appearance in the said suit filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code alleging that on the basis of the averment made in the body of the plaint itself the suit was not maintainable in view of the provision of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and as such the plaint should be rejected. The learned Munsif by his order dated 15th May, 1989 allowed the said application under Order 7 Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure rejecting the plaint as the said suit was barred under sub-s. (1) of S. 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. 2. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif the plaintiff-opposite parties who were the heirs of Phatik Chandra Auddy preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 219 of 1989 which was ultimately heard by the learned Additional District Judge, 11th Court. 2. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif the plaintiff-opposite parties who were the heirs of Phatik Chandra Auddy preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 219 of 1989 which was ultimately heard by the learned Additional District Judge, 11th Court. Alipore and the learned Additional District Judge by his judgment and decree dated 14th June, 1991 was pleased to set aside the order passed by the learned Munsif holding that in view of the provision contained in Sub-s. (2) of S. 3 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, the suit was maintainable. During the pendency of the aforesaid Title Appeal No. 219 of 1989 Probhabati Auddy, defendant No. 1 died leaving the other parties of the suit as her sole heirs and legal representatives. 3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, the married daughter and heir and legal representative of the original defendant Probhabati, Meenakshi Banerjee, Defendant No. 2 preferred this appeal. 4. The facts are not in dispute. The question in this appeal is whether the suit barred in view of the provision of S. 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 or the suit is maintainable in view of the provisions of S. 3(2) of the said Act. The trial court held that the suit was barred in view of the provisions of S. 4 of the said Act whereas the lower appellate court held that the said suit was maintainable in view of the provisions of S. 3(2) of the said Act. 5. In order to examine the scope of the provision of Ss. 3 and 4 of the said Act it is necessary to set out the relevant claim in the suit. "(a) A decree for declaration that the defendant No. 1 was merely a Benamdar of her husband, Jatindra Nath Auddy in the matter of purschase of the suit property more particularly described in the Schedule-A herein-under written by a registered deed dated September 21, 1948 and the defendant No. 1 had/has no right to transfer the entire suit property by way of gift, sale or otherwise. (b) For a decree for declaration that the deed of gift dated November 11, 1933 executed by Defendant No. 1 in favour of Defendant No. 2 in respect of the portion of the suit property is void, illegal, nullity and is not binding upon the plaintiffs. (c) A decree for declaration that the plaintiffs are owners of 1/4th share• in respect of the premises No. 21B and 21G, Subji Bagan Lane, Calcutta-27 more particular described in Schedule A herein-under written. 6. The provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 are as follows:- Section 3: "Prohibition of Benami Transaction- (1) No person shall enter into any behami transaction. (2) Nothing in Sub-s. (1) shall apply to the purchase of property by any person in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter and it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the said property had been purchased for the benefit of the wife or the unmarried daughter." (3) Whoever enters into any Benami Transaction shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend up to 3 years or with a fine or with both. (4.) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 an offence under this Section shall be non-cognizable and bailable." 7. Section 4: "Prohibition of the right to recover property held benami: (1) No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of person claiming to be the real owner of such property. (2) No defence based on any right in respect of any property held benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against the any other person, shall be allowed in any suit, or against any other person, shall be allowed in any suit, claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. (3) Nothing in this section shall apply,- (a) where the person in whose• name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family, or (b) where the person in whose name the property is held is a Trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary capacity, and the property is held for the benefit of another person for whom he is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity." 8. The learned Munsif held that in view of the provisions of the section 4 of the said Act, the suit was not maintainable. The lower appellate court on the contrary held that when the Benanii Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance 1988 was promulgated on 19th May, 1988 there was no such provision that the purchase of property by any person in the name of his wife shall not be deemed to be a benami transaction. Such exclusion was introduced by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 which came into force with effect from 5th September, 1988. It was further held that the suit was filed on 28th January, 1988. So after the promulgation of the said Ordinance of 1988 the suit was no doubt hit by S. 2(1) of said Ordinance and became non-maintainable and it remained so till the Act was enforced on 5th September, 1988. But no such formal order was passed by the learned Munsif rejecting the plaint. There was no occasion for the plaintiffs-appellants to take further steps. It was further held that on the date of the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Act had already come into force and that after the Act had come into force the question was whether the provisions of the said Act shall have retrospective effect and apply to pending suit or proceedings or not. It is not in dispute that the said Act has got retrospective effect and applied to all pending suits or proceedings. It is not in dispute that the said Act has got retrospective effect and applied to all pending suits or proceedings. On consideration of the provisions of Sub-s. (2) of S. 3 of the said Act that in the instant case the suit was pending when the Act came into force excluding purchase of properties by any person in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter from benami transaction and accordingly the plaintiffs were entitled to get the benefit of the same since it was the positive case of the plaintiffs-opposite parties that their grand-father, Late Jatindra Nath purchased the suit property in the name of his wife Prabhabati for which the plaintiffs-opposite parties have got some shares therein. It was further held that it is a totally different matter and according to learned lower appellate court the suit was maintainable and the learned Munsif was wrong in dismissing the same. Mr. Bhaskar Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate appearing on the behalf of the appellant submitted that Ss. (1) of S. 3 of the Act prohibits the creation of benami transaction. However sub-s. (2) thereof provides that nothing in Sub-s. (1) shall apply to the purchase of property by any person in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter and it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the said property had been purchased for the benefit of the wife• or the unmarried daughter". Therefore sub-s. (2) of the S. 3 meely states that a benami in the name of wife or unmarried daughter is not prohibited unless contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that the said property is purchased for the benefit of the wife or the unmarried daughter. It was the intention of the Legislature that s. 4 will not apply in case of benami in favour of wife or unmarried daughter then the legislature would instead of using the expression "Nothing in Sub-s. (1)" in Sub-s. (2) of S. 3 would have used the expression, "nothing contained in the Act" or "notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act". Therefore, even if contrary is proved as mentioned in sub-s. (2) then the said transaction should be deemed to be benami transaction and in that case s. 4 would apply. Therefore, even if contrary is proved as mentioned in sub-s. (2) then the said transaction should be deemed to be benami transaction and in that case s. 4 would apply. On the other hand, if contrary is not proved then the presumption will be that the property had been purchased for the benefit of the wife or the married daughter and in such case the wife or the unmarried daughter would be the real owner and as such there could be no cause of action for institution of the suit. 9. Mr. Ashoke Banerjee, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents submitted that S. 3 of the said Act lays down a clear bar to any person entering into any benami transaction but at the same time in sub-s. (2) thereof it is laid down an exception which is that if a person purchases a property in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter it shall be presumed, unless contrary is proved, that the property had been purchased for the benefit of the wife or unmarried daughter. Sub-s. (3) of S. 3 of the said Act lays down the provision that any person entering into benami transaction shall be liable for prosecution. It was further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that Sub-s. (1) of S. 4 of the said Act bars any suit, claim, or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held but in Sub-s. (3) of S. 4 of the said Act there is an exception clause. Clause B of Sub-s. (3) of S. 4 stipulates that nothing in S. 4 shall apply where the person in whose name the property is held is a Trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary capacity, and the property is held for the benefit of another person for whom he is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity. According to Mr. Banerjee it was abundantly clear that the scheme of the aforesaid Section that while benami transaction as such has been prohibited by the said Act and exception has been given to cases where the property has been purchased in the benami for the benefit of the wife or the unmarried daughter. According to Mr. Banerjee it was abundantly clear that the scheme of the aforesaid Section that while benami transaction as such has been prohibited by the said Act and exception has been given to cases where the property has been purchased in the benami for the benefit of the wife or the unmarried daughter. For the first time in India concept of beneficial uses brought in the said Act and the word 'benefit' has to be given its due connotation. Whether property is purchased for the benefit of wife or not is a triable issue inasmuch as Sub-s. (2) of S. 3 of the said Act lays down a legal presumption in favour of beneficial uses by the wife unless contrary is proved. It was further submitted that it was well settled law that presumably a property is held for the benefit of someone, she has opportunity to apply the property for her own benefit. By making a gift of the property during her lifetime she was not deriving any benefit out of the state so demised upon her. On the other hand the benefit has been conferred on some other than the person for whose benefit the property was purchased. Such act amounts to defeating the original claim of the successor and other persons who are originally owners of the property and as such the deed of gift by which the property was transferred was illegal and not non est in the eye of law. In this connection Mr. Banerjee also submitted that word "benefit" according to dictionary meaning means that benefit is something that promotes, will being advantage useful help, help financial, help in time of sickness, old age or employment. That being the provision Prabhabati could not have alineated in the property by way of deed of gift in favour of one of her daughters. It was further submitted that S. 7 of the said Act has expressly repraled Ss. 81, 82 and 94 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882, S. 66 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and S. 281A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. It was submitted that these Sections in Indian Trust Act were so long standing in way of advantage of doctrine of advancement in India. But expressly there is no bar to plead and establish "doctrines of advancement". It was further submitted that everything in statute has to be given a meaning. It was submitted that these Sections in Indian Trust Act were so long standing in way of advantage of doctrine of advancement in India. But expressly there is no bar to plead and establish "doctrines of advancement". It was further submitted that everything in statute has to be given a meaning. The words in Sub-s. (2) of S. 3 of the said Act "shall be presumed", "unless contrary is proved", "for the benefit......" have to be given due meaning. Mr. Banerjee has submitted that it is clear that the legislature has clearly intended to assign an appropriate meaning to the word 'benefit'. This plain English word can be interpreted as such. It was further submitted that if such benefit or advancement theory is established, the Sections will be interpreted in a manner by which the wife had no power to make a gift of the property to her daughter as purpose of the trust will then be frustrated. On plain reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act it is clear that the scope of Ss. 3 and 4 are different. Section 3 of the said Act prohibits the benami transaction and that it is prospective because of use of expression that no person shall enter into any benami transaction. In other words after coming into force of the Act by virtue of S. 3, benami transactions have been strictly prohibited with the exception provided therein. The said Section cannot be given retrospective effect as benami transaction has not only been prohibited but has been made an offence. If section 3 is given retrospective effect in that event the provisions of Article 20(1) of the Constitution will be violated. Article 20(1) of the Constitution provides that no person shall be convicted for an offence except in violation of the law in force at the time of the commission of the Act charged as an offence. Prior to the promulgatation of the Ordinance and/or Act of the 1988 there was no bar for entering into benami transaction. That is way S. 3 of the said Act introduced a clear prohibition in respect of a benami transaction with the exception provided in Sub-s. (2) and if anybody violates this provision he should be punished with imprisonment in view of Sub-s. (3) of S. 3 of the said Act. That is way S. 3 of the said Act introduced a clear prohibition in respect of a benami transaction with the exception provided in Sub-s. (2) and if anybody violates this provision he should be punished with imprisonment in view of Sub-s. (3) of S. 3 of the said Act. Section 4 of the said Act prohibits the right of recovery of property held in benami. So, S. 4 covers past transactions and that after coming into force of the Act. no suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or a against any other person shall lie or on behalf a person claiming to the real owner of such person shall lie or on behalf a person claiming to be real owner of such property. Sub-section (2) of S. 4 provides that no defence based on any right in respect of any property held benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person, shall be allowed in any suit, claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. Section 3 provides the cases where the prohibition of the right to recover property held in benami shall not apply. Sub-section 3 provides where the restriction shall not apply in order to bring the case within this scope of exception provided in Sub-s. (3) of the S. 4 it has to be established that where the person in whose name the property is held is the coparcener in Hindu undivided family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners of the family or where the person in whose name the property is held is a Trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary capacity, and the property is held for the benefit of another person for whom he is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity". There is no presumption in cases covered by Sub-s. (3) of S. 4 as provided in Sub-s. (2) of S. 4 of the said Act. It is a principle of rules of interpretation that the legislative purpose of a particular enactment contained in the Act is to be arrived at accordingly. There is no presumption in cases covered by Sub-s. (3) of S. 4 as provided in Sub-s. (2) of S. 4 of the said Act. It is a principle of rules of interpretation that the legislative purpose of a particular enactment contained in the Act is to be arrived at accordingly. In particular, it is deemed to remedy the mischief to which the enactment is directed. 10. The matter was summed up by Lord Diplock in Jones vs. Wrotham Park Settled Estates (1979) 1 All ER 286 at p. 289. “........I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involved reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it. Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. vs. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. (1971) AC 850 provides an instance of this; but in that case the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order to justify this course were satisfied First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; Secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertance overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that .required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law unless this third condition is fulfilled any attempt by a court of justice to repair the omission in the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction to determine what is the meaning of a written law which Parliament has passed.” 11. The legislative intention is very clear from S. 4 of the said Act that right to recover property held by benami is prohibited and the exception that are made in regard thereto has to be proved and pleaded strictly in order to avoid the mischief and the embargo set forth in S. 4 of the said Act. In this case there was no pleading so as to bring it within the scope of consideration of S. 4(1) of the said Act. We are unable to agree with the view expressed by the lower appellate court that S. 3(2) said Act protects the remedy prayed for by the plaintiff-opposite party in the suit. There is no over-lapping between the provision of Ss. 3 and 4 inasmuch as S. 3 covers a particular situation which prohibits benami transaction from the date of coming into force of the said Act and S. 4 gives effect to the legislative intent of such provision by taking away the rights of the parties to recover property held by benami. The provisions of Ss. 3 and 4 of the said Act has to be given a harmonious construction and accordingly we are of the view that the learned trial Judge was right in rejecting the plaint on the ground that the provision of S. 4, of the said Act stands as a bar in getting the relief as prayed for in the suit. The provisions of S. 3 of the said Act has no application in this case. 12. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. Judgment and order dated 14th June, 1991 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 11th Court, Alipore, 24 Parganas in Title Appeal No. 219 of 1989 is hereby set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif Second Court. Alipore in Title Suit No. 23 of 1988 is hereby affirmed. There will be no order as to costs. A.K. Bhattacharjee, J.: I agree, but want to add a few lines of my own. 13. The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 seeks to prohibit benami transactions and the right to recover property benami as would be evident from the Preamble of the Act. Benami transaction has been defined in clause (a) of s. 2 of the Act as any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for consideration paid or provided by another person. Benami transaction has been defined in clause (a) of s. 2 of the Act as any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for consideration paid or provided by another person. Sub-section (1) of s. 3 of the Act prohibits a benami transaction. But notwithstanding Sub-s. (1). Sub-s. (2) protects certain benami transactions' made in favour of one's wife or unmarried daughter if such transaction was made for the benefit of such wife or unmarried daughter. The said sub-section further provides that a benami transaction in favour of the wife or an unmarried daughter shall be presumed to be for the benefit of such wife or unmarried daughter unless the contrary is proved. Sub-section (3) of S. 3 makes an offence of benami transaction a punishable one. 14. Section 4 of the Act bars the right to recover any property held benami against a person in whose name the property is held. It also bars the defence based on any right in respect of any property held benami either against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person, in any suit or action or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner. The prohibitions under this section are, however, subject to certain exceptions mentioned in Sub-s. (3) of the section. 15. What is the cumulative effect of Ss. 3 and 4 analysed above? Section 3 prohibits any benami transaction except certain transaction made in favour of wife or unmarried daughter. Section 4 on the other hand bars the right to enforce any claim on a property held benami by a person claiming to be the true owner and also right to defend such a claim in any suit or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner. In short, a benamder cannot institute or defend any suit against a person in whose name the property is held claiming that ostensible owner is not the real owner and that the benamdar is the actual owner. 16. As held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1989 SC 1247 (Mithilesh Kumari vs. P.S. Khare) the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 is retroactive in nature. 16. As held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1989 SC 1247 (Mithilesh Kumari vs. P.S. Khare) the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 is retroactive in nature. So far as the prohibition of benanii transactions and the relative penal measures are concerned, the Act is prospective, but a benami transaction as such would be hit by the prohibitive provisions of S. 4 and would be applicable to pending proceedings as well. The nature of declaration claimed in prayer (a) of the suit clearly attracts the provisions of S. 4 and would be applicable to pending proceedings as well. The nature of declaration claimed in prayer (a) of the suit clearly attracts the provisions of s. 4 here. There is no doubt that benami transaction was not illegal before the enforcement of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 or for that matter before the promulgation of the corresponding Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988. But the Act being retroactive is applicable to pending proceedings as well. 17. Sub-section (2) of S. 3 of the Act only permits certain benami transactions which would be otherwise illegal under Sub-s. (1) of the said section. But the said fact itself does not lift the bar under S. 4. If a property is purchased by the husband in the name of his wife or by a father in the name of his unmarried daughter the same shall be presumed to be to their benefit. If the presumption is rebutted, it will be a benami transaction simplicitor and will come within the prohibition of Sub-s. (1) of S. 3. If the presumption stands, it will remain to be the property of the wife or the daughter in whose name the property is held. In no circumstances a third party can claim ownership of the property against the ostensible owner or against any person claiming through her raising the plea that the ostensible owner was the benamder and that the real owner was somebody else. 18. With these words I endorse the views expressed by my lord and agree that the appeal be allowed. Appeal Allowed, Judgment and order in Title Appeal No. 219 of 1989 set aside, those of Title Suit No. 23 of 1983 affirmed.