S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) WRIT appeal No. 1544 of 1993 arises out of an interlocutory order passed by the learned single judge pending the writ petition. The appellant is the management of south central railway. It is aggrieved by the order passed by the industrial tribunal-cum-labour court, Bangalore under Section 33-c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The order has been passed in favour of respondent-1 workman. It is not in dispute that for the purpose of adjudicating disputes regarding service conditions of the employees of railway, the central administrative tribunal will have jurisdiction. Writ petition 17146 of 1992 is however filed challenging the award of labour court presumably under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of india. Now the short question is whether the original writ petition is at all maintainable in this court. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the administrative tribunals Act, 1985 (for short 'the act') lays down that save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the central administrative tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts except the Supreme Court, in relation to all matters listed in this section. It cannot be disputed that the present dispute pertains to the service conditions of respondent No. 1 workman. Section 28 of the Act, provides for exclusion of jurisdiction of courts except the Supreme Court under article 136 of the constitution, and says that on and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under this act by a tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any service or post or service matters concerning members of any service or persons appointed to any service or post, no court except fa) the Supreme Court; or (b) any industrial tribunal, labour court or other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) or any other corresponding law for the time being in force, shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that Section 28 read with Section 14 of the Act, would only exclude the original jurisdiction of the high court, but if the labour court has passed any order pertaining to service conditions of the employee under the Provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, as in the present case, a writ petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution would lie to the high court despite this provision. It is difficult to agree with this contention. Once the authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act decide a dispute, it remains a dispute pertaining to the service conditions between the employee on the one hand and the management on the other. Therefore, Section 14 read with Section 28 of the Act, excludes the jurisdiction of any other court except the Supreme Court or the concerned central administrative tribunal, to adjudicate upon such dispute even though it has been processed in the labour court in the first instance. In either case, the jurisdiction of the high court can never be invoked on the plea that the high court's jurisdiction is not invoked for the first lime by way of original jurisdiction, but for setting aside the labour court's order under article 227 of the constitution. It is also pertinent to note that Section 29 (1) of the act provides that every suit or other proceeding pending before any court or other authority immediately before the date of establishment of a tribunal under this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such tribunal. This Section also indicates that even pending proceedings, on the coming into operation of the Act, had been transferred to the tribunal. This Section also indicates that even pending proceedings, on the coming into operation of the Act, had been transferred to the tribunal. It is now well settled that the tribunals functioning under the act are substitutes for the high courts for the purpose of adjudicating upon service disputes and the high court's jurisdiction has got excluded vide s. p. sampath kumar v union of India and others, therefore it is difficult to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the railway authorities that if the dispute was for the first time sought to be adjudicated upon before the high court jurisdiction would get excluded and the central administrative tribunal has to be approached but if the said dispute has originated in labour court and thereafter it has to be further processed, the high court would still retain jurisdiction for adjudicating upon such disputes. This contention runs counter to the mandate of Section 14 (1) read with Section 28 of the Act, and cannot be countenanced. Reliance placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of m. b. majumdar v union of india, is also of no avail to the learned counsel for the appellant. In that case, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the chairman of the tribunal can be equated with the chief Justice of the high court and the vice-chairman can be equated with the sitting judge. What was submitted was that in s. p. sampath kumar's case, the Supreme Court has earlier held that the tribunal is a substitute for the high court for adjudication of disputes. This could include fixation of salary to the vice-chairman and the members treating them as equivalent to the chief Justice and the sitting judge of high court. It is this contention which was rejected by the Supreme Court in majumdar's case (supra) by observing that the tribunals constituted under the act cannot be treated as deemed high courts with all the logical consequences, and the members of the tribunals who draw less salary than the high court judges or vice-chairman of tribunal and have early retirement age as compared to vice-chairman cannot therefore claim equality with the judges of the high courts or even the vice-chairman of the tribunal in the matter of pay and age of superannuation. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court therefore cannot be pressed in service in support of the contention canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant. We are informed that a full bench of the central administrative tribunal, Madras bench, has taken the view that the cat will have jurisdiction to entertain petitions challenging the orders of labour courts and industrial tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act. Even that apart, so far as the present controversy is concerned no other view is possible. The high court's jurisdiction for adjudicating upon such disputes though they may be emanating for the first time or after adjudication by labour court or industrial tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, would get excluded once the jurisdiction that the high courts enjoyed hithertofore had been vested with the administrative tribunals from the appointed day. We may refer to a decision of the gujarat high court in union of India v j. Lemos, wherein the division bench consisting of g. t. nanavati and m. s. parikh, jj. , in terms held that petition against an award of the labour court in recovery application of railway employees, cannot lie before the high court and the high court has no jurisdiction to entertain such petition. We respectfully agree with the said view. We may also refer to one more submission canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention. He invited our attention to Section 19 in chapter iv of the administrative tribunals act. That chapter deals with 'procedure'. Section 19 provides that a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a tribunal may make an application to the tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. Now this clearly presupposes a direct application to the central administrative tribunal and the procedure which should be followed in such a case. It is difficult to appreciate how this Section can be pressed into service for conferring jurisdiction on a high court to entertain a petition under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution, in connection with service matter which is adjudicated by a labour court or industrial court as noted earlier. As Section 28 of the Act, stood earlier, even labour court or industrial court could not have adjudicated upon such a dispute and only Supreme Court could have looked into such dispute apart from the central administrative tribunal. As Section 28 of the Act, stood earlier, even labour court or industrial court could not have adjudicated upon such a dispute and only Supreme Court could have looked into such dispute apart from the central administrative tribunal. But, only because of the amendment to Section 28, which has permitted in the first instance labour court or industrial court to also look into the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act, it would not confer any jurisdiction on the high court to entertain such a dispute as that jurisdiction stands excluded on the threshold of the dispute. As such, no assistance can be got from section 19 to substantiate the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. For all these reasons, therefore, the writ petition itself is not maintainable in this court and therefore, the writ appeal against the interim order also would not be maintainable. The writ petition itself therefore will have to be ordered to be returned to the petitioner for presentation before the proper court. The appeal and the writ petition are accordingly disposed of. No costs. --- *** --- .