Judgment N.PANDEY, J. 1. In this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner has prayed for quashing an order, dated 30 January, 1993, passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan, setting aside the order, dated 26-8-1992 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siwan. 2. It appears one Eero Honda Motor Cycle bearing registration No. BR-28-0798 was recovered from the possession of one Nagendra Singh of Village Kaithy. The Officer Incharge, G. B. Nagar registered a case on 26-3-1992. 3. During pendency of the case two separate applicationsOne on behalf of accused Jogendra Singh and the other on behalf of Arbind Kumar Singh (petitioner) were filed for release of the motorcycle in question. The Chief Judicial Magistrate directed the Police to enquire into the matter and submit a report. Opposite party No. 2 tried to make out a case that the alleged recovery of the motorcycle was from his house and not from the house of Nagendra Singh. He also produced a registration certificate of the vehicle which was in his name. 4. The case of the petitioner is that the motorcycle was originally purchased by Sanjay Kumar Singh and its registration number was BR-068-3489. Sanjay Kumar Singh sold the vehicle to the petitioner which was robbed by criminals. On 25-5-1991, for the alleged offence Mohammadpur P. S. Case No. 41 of 1991 was registered. The said motorcycle was ultimately recovered by G. B. Nagar Police Station for which a case was registered. In support of his claim, accused Yogendra Singh filed registration certificate, dated 26-7-1991 issued by the District Transport Officer, Gopalganj, showing that the vehicle was registered as BR-28-0793 for the first time in the name of Sanjay Kumar Singh. Thereafter, on 13-8-1991, the name of the Opposite party No. 2 was entered as transferee. 5. It appears a report from the Police was called for by the learned Magistrate so as to dispose of the application filed on behalf of accused Yogendra Singh for release of the mjotorcycle. On 24-4-1992, although no report was furnished, the learned Magistrate being convinced on the basis of the registration certificate, released the vehicle in favour of Yogendra Singh on a surety bond. On 24-4-1992, although no report was furnished, the learned Magistrate being convinced on the basis of the registration certificate, released the vehicle in favour of Yogendra Singh on a surety bond. In the meantime, the the police report was placed before the learned Magistrate, disclosing therein that Yogendra Singh was not entitled for release of the vehicle as he had forged and fabricated the registration certificate. A copy of the order of the District Transport Officer, Gopalganj, has also been produced to show that registration of the vehicle in the name of Yogendra Singh was cancelled as the same was found to be forged and fabricated. The learned Magistrate having perused the police report and consider ing all relevant materials arrived at a conclusion that the motorcycle should be released in favour of petitioner Arbind Kumar Singh and accordingly he recalled his earlier order. 6. Being aggrieved, Opposite party No. 2, preferred a criminal revision before the learned Sessions Judge, Siwan, which was ultimately heard by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge and disposed of on 30th January, 1993. setting aside the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The learned Additional Sessions Judge directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate to release the vehicle in favour of Opposite party No. 2 in view of the earlier order, dated 24-4-1992 passed by the Magistrate. The Additional Sessions Judge was of the view that a criminal Court has no power to recall its order He did not consider any other aspects as to who was actually entitled for release. 7. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Opposite party No. 2 in order to substantiate his claim for release of the vehicle. It has also been contended that since the vehicle in question was directed to be released in his favour on 24 4-1392, the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass a fresh order for release of the vehicle in favour of the petitioner. 8. In view of the order of the District Transport Officer, Gopalganj, a copy of which is Annexure 2 to this application, there is no doubt that at the relevant time the registration of the vehicle was in the name of the petitioner. 8. In view of the order of the District Transport Officer, Gopalganj, a copy of which is Annexure 2 to this application, there is no doubt that at the relevant time the registration of the vehicle was in the name of the petitioner. True it is for some time, the vehicle was registered in the name of Opposite party No. 2 but that registration was no longer available, in view of the order of the District Transport Officer. Opposite party No. 2 might have preferred appeal, etc., against that order but so long the said order is not set aside, or rescined, the factual position cannot be denied that the vehicle in question has been registered in the name of the petitioner. 9. This is well-settled principle that for release of vehicle, a criminal Court while making an order of inetrim custody, has to enquire first of all whether the person who claims for the interim custody of vehicle seized is registered owner entitled to use as required under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. If he is such a person, then ordinarily, he is a right and correct person to whom custody of the vehicle has to be entrusted. In support of my view, reliance can be placed over a decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of U. Kariyappa v. P. Sreehantaiah and another, 1980 Cr LJ 422. Admittedly, at the time when the learned Magistrate passed order for release, it was registered in the name of the petitioner. A question has been posed for consideration whether a criminal Court can recall its own order at a subsequent stage of the proceeding. Section 458, Cr. P. C empowers a criminal Court to make an order for interim custody of the property, produced before it during the trial and inquiry. When such a property is produced, regard being had to the nature of the property, the criminal Court has discretion to make such an order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property, pending conclusion of the inquiry or trial. In that view of the matter, on release of such vehicle, maximum duration of such arrangement is only till the conclusion of inquiry or trial. Therefore, such temporary arrangement is only to protect or preserve the property pending inquiry or trial. In that view of the matter, on release of such vehicle, maximum duration of such arrangement is only till the conclusion of inquiry or trial. Therefore, such temporary arrangement is only to protect or preserve the property pending inquiry or trial. But while exercising such discretionary power, the Court has to be careful that such discretion has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. 10. Such release is not even final till the conclusion of the trial or enquiry. The Court has a right to terminate the entrustment get back the property and entrust it to somebody else, whom Court deems fit in appropriate cases. The order is purely an interlocutory in nature. Because even the person entrusted with interim custody is the owner, his possession or custody during the period of entrustment is only as representative of the Court and not in his independent right. In support of such proposition reliance can be placed over a decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of V. Parakashan v. K. P. Parikajkshan and another, 1985 Cr LJ 951. 11. In the circumstances mentioned above, in my view, the revision application filed by the opposite party before the Sessions Judge was not maintainable as the order under challenge was purely interlocutory one. Apart from the aforesaid, it appears from the order of the Magistrate that he has considered all the relevant aspect in detail while ordering the custody of the vehicle to the petitioner. 12. In the result, this application is allowed and the order of the learned Sessions Judge is quashed.