V. H. BHAIRAVIA, J. ( 1 ) IN this civil application the applicant-Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation prayed for condonation of delay of 53 days in preferring the fist appeal against the order passed by the Chief Judge Small Causes Court Ahmedabad in Municipal Valuation Appeal No. 3755 of 1988 on 23 March 1990 whereby the appeal is allowed and the Gross rateable value fixed by the Municipal Corporation Ahmedabad for the yeas 1986 and 1987-88 for the premises bearing M. C. No. 672/20/20 of Naroda A ward is quashed and bill bearing No. 3004 dt. 27th March 1987 for appeal premises is also quashed and held to be inoperative. The excess of tax if recovered was also ordered to be refunded to the applicant herein with 18% interest from the date of deposit within four months etc. ( 2 ) IN the instance case. the Rule was issued and was made returnable on 20th January 1992 and notice of Rule was served upon the respondent herein and the respondent appeared through its learned advocate Mr. Modi. The Court directed the learned advocate for the applicant Corporation to file detailed affidavit explaining reasons for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. Accordingly the affidavit on behalf of the applicant-Corporation is filed by Shri Nathusingh Vaghela Deputy Assessor and Tax Collector of the Municipal Corporation on 19th December 1992 and the copy whereof was also served upon Mr. Modi the learned advocate for the respondent and Shri Arvindbhai J. Patel-Partner of the respondent has filed affidavit-in-reply on 28th December 1992 ( 3 ) THE learned advocate for the respondent took serious objections against condoning the delay on the ground that the applicant-Corporation has failed to explain the reasons for delay in filing the appeal. Thus this application came to be heard on 28th December 1992 and Mr. Modi the learned advocate for the respondent has again taken the same objection seriously contending inter alia that the deponent is not the competent authority to file this affidavit and the deponent has not fully explained the reasons of delay in filing the appeal. ( 4 ) IT has been vehemently submitted by Mr. Modi the learned advocate for the respondent that under see. 481 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act the Municipal Commissioner is the competent authority for filing the appeal. ( 4 ) IT has been vehemently submitted by Mr. Modi the learned advocate for the respondent that under see. 481 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act the Municipal Commissioner is the competent authority for filing the appeal. This appeal has been filed by the Commissioner and therefore the application for condonation of delay is also required to be signed by the Commissioner himself and in support of this application an affidavit is also required to be filed by the Commissioner himself. But in the instant case the affidavit is filed by one Shri Nathusinh Vaghela - the Deputy Assessor and Tax Collector of the Municipal Corporation who is not the competent authority to file such affidavit in support of civil application for condonation of delay. There is no such notification issued by the Municipal Commissioner conferring powers to Shri Vaghela for filing such affidavit. It has been further submitted by Mr. Modi that the deponent Shri Vaghela was not the concerned officer at the relevant time dealing with such types of matters and therefore he has no personal knowledge regarding legal proceedings of this case. Therefore also he is not competent to file affidavit in support of this civil aplication. We are not convinced by the arguments advanced by Mr. Modi the learned advocate for the respondent. The applicant is a statutory Corporate body and its administration is governed under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act 1949 Under sec. 481 (1) (g) the Municipal Commissioner is the competent authority to deal with the legal proceedings and he is also competent authority to defend any suit or other legal proceedings brought against the Corporation. Sec. 481 (1) (g) of the Act reads as under : 481 : The Commissioner may- (g) : The Commissioner may defend any suit or other legal proceedings brought against the Corporation or against the Commissioner or a municipal officer or servant in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by them respectively in their official capacity; in proviso to sec. 481 (1) (j) it has been provided as under : provided that the Commissioner shall not defend any suit or legal proceedings under clause (g) without first of all taking legal advice with regard thereto and shall institute and prosecute any suit which the Corporation shall determine to have instituted and prosecuted. 481 (1) (j) it has been provided as under : provided that the Commissioner shall not defend any suit or legal proceedings under clause (g) without first of all taking legal advice with regard thereto and shall institute and prosecute any suit which the Corporation shall determine to have instituted and prosecuted. Thus it is clear that before initiating legal proceedings including filing appeal the Municipal Commissioner is required to obtain legal advice and accordingly legal advice was also sought for. As per administrative procedure the files of the case moves from one table to another table and therefore obviously the Municipal Commissioner is not required to watch day-to-day movement of this file but such procedure is required to be done through his subordinate officers who have been assigned concerned departmental work for some legal process. The deponent Shri Nathusinh Vaghela who is Deputy Assessor and Tax Collector in the Municipality and it has been stated by the deponent in his affidavit as under :" I have leave to file this further affidavit to submit further particulars about the case papers being dealt with in various departments of the Corporation as pointed out in para 1 of my affidavit made on 3rd December 1992 as per the records in the file of this case". In the last paragraph of the said affidavit the deponent has slated as under :"statements of facts made hereinabove are true to my knowledge as per the records". The rule of affidavit does not require to file affidavit of the same person who is competent to file civil application for condonation of delay. In support of civil application the facts stated in civil application could be explained and supported by the officer of the Department who is conversant with the facts and proceedings of the case. The argument of Mr. Modi that Shri Vaghela is not the competent authority to file said affidavit is unsustainable. In support of civil application the facts stated in civil application could be explained and supported by the officer of the Department who is conversant with the facts and proceedings of the case. The argument of Mr. Modi that Shri Vaghela is not the competent authority to file said affidavit is unsustainable. The officer of a Corporate Body who is conversant with the facts of the case and who is in a position to give accounts of movement of the file and notings made therein which is not contrary to the fact on record and which is found to be correct and satisfactory is a competent and the affidavit filed by him is a valid affidavit in the eye of law and it cannot be thrown out on the ground that it is not filed by the Competent Authority. A public officer who is well conversant with the facts of the case and who is capable of and competent to give accounts of this from the record to be treated as Competent Authority for the purpose of filing the affidavit and who may be the statutory authority for filing the main appeal. In view of the above the arguments advanced by Mr. Modi are rejected. ( 5 ) NEXT contention of Mr. Modi the learned counsel for the respondent is that the deponent has failed to give full account of 53 days delay in his affidavit and no leniency should be shown to the public authority in the matter of condoning the delay. No discrimination betwen Public Body and private litigant should be made and both should be treated equal in the eye of law. The learned advocate Mr. Modi relied upon certain judgments of this Court delivered in Civil Applications Nos. 587 of 1990 and 589 of 1990 dt. 24 June 1992 and in a group matter of Civil Application Nos. 593 of 1990 and others dt. 25th June 1992 and Civil Application No. 629 of 1991 decided on 7th September 1991 and Civil Application No. 626 of 1992 dt. 18th August 1991 It has also been submitted by Mr. Modi that the discretionary power given to the Court in the matter of condoning the delay should be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. The learned advocate Mr. Modi relied upon the principle laid down in the case of Ramlal and others vs. Rewa Coalfields. 18th August 1991 It has also been submitted by Mr. Modi that the discretionary power given to the Court in the matter of condoning the delay should be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. The learned advocate Mr. Modi relied upon the principle laid down in the case of Ramlal and others vs. Rewa Coalfields. reported in AIR 1962 SC p. 361. It has teen held as under :"in construing s. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal". Mr. Modi further relied upon State of U. P. and Anr. vs. Surendra Nath and Ors. reported in AIR 1992 All 127 wherein it has been held as under :- Where the appeal by the State Government was first filed with a huge deficiency of Court fee when money had already been placed at the disposal of the State Counsel and there was delay in filing the appeal with proper Court-fee which was not explained and it was also not explained as to why the appeal was filed with such huge deficiency of Court-fee neither it was stated as to when the papers were sent by the Collector to the State Government for sanction for filing appeal and as to how the sanction granted by the State Government reached the office of the Collector after about one month the delay of 109 days in filing the appeal cannot be condoned. In such a case it could not be said that on account of strike by the lawyers in the High Court the appeal could not be filed when the office of the Chief Standing counsel was functioning during the strike and the registry of the High Court was open and thus there could be no hindrance in filing the appeal in registry as soon as the papers were received. ( 6 ) MR. ( 6 ) MR. Modi further submitted that the applicant should not have remained inactive in taking prompt action in filing the appeal. On the grounds of negligence and inaction the learned advocate heavily emphasized and vehemently submitted that the Municipal Authority was of the two views viz. whether the appeal should be filed or not and if the Municipal Authority remained negligent and inactive in filing the appeal and if the Municipality intended or wanted to file appeal it must have acted promptly and should not have taken much time in filing the appeal. In the affidavit it is nowhere stated that after taking decision of tiling the appeal the deponent moved from one table to another table for carrying out the decision. The period from 5th October 1990 to 16th November 1990 has not been fully explained by the deponent that during this period what was the actual movements of that File. The view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of G. Ramegowda Major etc. vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer Bangalore and Basavalingappa vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer Bangalore AIR 1988 SC 897 in para 7 is as under :" (B) Land Acquisition Act (1894 ). s. 54-Civil P. C. (1908) S. 96-Limitation Act (1963 ). s. 5 of India Art. 136-Land Acquisition Case-Appeal by Land Acquisition Officer against award-Condonation of delay in filing appeals-Cause of delay alleged to be inaction on part of Govt. counsel-High Court condoning delay-Held on facts discretion of H. C. in condoning delay could not be interfered with. There is it is true no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its Counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However the expression sufficient cause in s. 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay". In the case of State of Gujarat vs. Sayed Mohd. Baquit El. In the case of State of Gujarat vs. Sayed Mohd. Baquit El. Edross reported in AIR 1981 SC 1921 it has been held as under :" It is common ground between the parties that on the death of the sole respondent to the appeal the right to sue survived to his legal representatives. No application having been made within 90 days of the death the appeal abated on the 11th March 1979 and an application for having the abatement set aside could have been made within the period of 60 days following that date. (Article 121 of the Limitation Act ). The application actually made in that behalf was thus time-barred by more than 3 months and a half. Mr. Phadke learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute this proposition. He urges however that the delay in making the application last mentioned should be condoned and the abatement of the appeal set aside. No sufficient cause however for the condonation of the delay is made out from any material on the record. As pointed out earlier the clerk of the learned counsel for the appellant was served with a copy of the application dated 23 February 1979 on that date itself and no reason good bad or indifferent is assigned for the failure of that counsel right from the 20th February 1979 to the 29 August 1979 to move the Court till the 29th August 1979 either for having the legal representatives of the deceased brought on the record or for having the abatement set aside after it had taken place. His knowledge of the death of the respondent must be attributed to the appellant State also and his negligence in not moving the Court in time must be deemed to be that of the appellant. Mr. Phadke also contended that he had a strong case for the acceptance of the appeal on merits and that the same should be regarded as a very good reason for the condonation of the delay. The contention is wholly without substance. The abatement stands in the way of the appeal being heard on merits which cannot therefore be looked into. ( 7 ) SO far as the authorities referred to and relied upon by Mr. Modi there could not be any dispute regarding principles observed therein by the Honble the Supreme Court of India and this Court. The abatement stands in the way of the appeal being heard on merits which cannot therefore be looked into. ( 7 ) SO far as the authorities referred to and relied upon by Mr. Modi there could not be any dispute regarding principles observed therein by the Honble the Supreme Court of India and this Court. The first principle is that the appellant should satisfy the Court that he was not negligent in filing the appeal and there was an intention to file an appeal and he has not deliberately delayed in filing the appeal with a view to harass or to cause damage to the opponent by passing time. In the sense as for example-a decree holder might have entered into some transaction after expiry of time of filing appeal against judgment-debtor. On coming to know this the judgment-debtor might have thought to prevent decree-holder from enjoying fruits of the decree and with a view to create obstruction even temporarily he may rush to Court with an intent to file an appeal and application for condonation of delay. Such tendency should not be encouraged. Further it should be tendency or intention of the litigant-appellant to file appeal and he has not remained inactive or has not taken any prompt action for filing appeal viz. applying for certified copy giving instruction to advocate etc. Suppose the litigant-appellant wanted to file appeal against the decree and he remained silent for pretty long time and he applies for certified copy even after expiry of time without any just reason it means that he remained inactive and because of inaction delay occurred and therefore the said tendency should not be encouraged by condoning the delay. Lastly the appellant must fully explain delay and give full account of day-to-day and give reasons and circumstance under which he was prevented from filing appeal within time or should explain the circumstances beyond his control which prevented him from approaching the appellate Court. It does not carry technical meaning of explanation of delay of every day or every hour and so far the legal proceedings dealt with by public Corporate Body some administrative hazards is hound to be there. Some other factors might have played an important roll in such matter. ( 8 ) IN the case of Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag and another vs. Mst. Some other factors might have played an important roll in such matter. ( 8 ) IN the case of Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag and another vs. Mst. Katiji and others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 it has been held as under :"the doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants including the State as litigant are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact on account of an impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbused with the note making file pushing and passing on the buck ethods delay on pan of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant non grata status. So also the approach of the Courts must be to do evenhanded justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits". ( 9 ) IN the instance case the delay has been explained. It has been explained by the deponent in Para 3 of his affidavit as under :-"in the case under appeal the judgment came to be delivered on 23rd March 1990 and copy was applied for on 26th March 1990 It was ready for delivery on 3rd Sept. 1990 and was received by the Advocate on 5th Sept. 1990 It was received by the Tax Department on 9th September 1990 The Junior Legal Assistant received the file from the concerned ward on 26th September 1990 and it was placed before the Assessor and Collector on 28th September 1990 who decided to send it for consideration by the Municipal Commissioner. It was sent to Junior Legal Assistant on 3rd October 1990 and came to be received by the Legal Department on 5th October 1990 Due to pressure of work the file could not be gone through in the Legal Department immediately and the Legal Department sent the same to the Advocate in the High Court on 16th November 1990 and the Advocate sought further instruction and filed the appeal on 23 November 1991 under the circumstances the delay of 53 days in filing the appeal has been caused". ( 10 ) IN our opinion the applicant has not remained negligent in taking decision. No inaction in tiling the appeal has been done. On the contrary the applicant has given full accounts of delay to the satisfaction of the Court. In the instant case the applicant has reasonably and fully explained the circumstances under which the delay has been caused. As observed in sec. 481 of Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act 1949 particularly proviso to sec. 481 (1) (j) the Municipal Commissioner cannot file appeal without obtaining legal advise and for obtaining legal advise some time is bound to be passed. The appellant has not lost much time in applying certified copy and on receiving the certified copy time was consumed in processing the proposal for filng the appeal in the Court and in that circumstances in our opinion delay has been fully and satisfactorily explained by the deponent and therefore this is a fit case where discretionary power under sec. 5 required to be exercised in the interest of fair justice. However it does not mean that in every case it should be as a matter of right to get the delay condoned of whatever nature. The respondent has to incur unnecessary expenditure by engaging advocate for coming to the Court and also he has to remain in tension without there being any fault on his part and for that he should not be penalised. ( 11 ) IT is to be noted here that after matter was fully heard and when judgment was about to be delivered today Mr. Modi learned counsel for the respondent appeared again and brought to our notice the judgment delivered by this Court in Civil Application No. 2135/1991 in First Appeal Stamp No. 9832/1999 delivered on 24th December 1992 and pointed out that it was held in that judgment that filing of an affidavit by the competent authority i. e. competent officer is must. For arriving at said conclusion the Court has relied on the decision in the ease of Govt. of Andhra Pradesh vs. Y. S. Prakashrao and Anr. reported in (1982) 2 SCC p. 385. Mr. Modi relying on the aforesaid decisions submitted that application for condonation of delay should be rejected. The arguments now advanced by Mr. For arriving at said conclusion the Court has relied on the decision in the ease of Govt. of Andhra Pradesh vs. Y. S. Prakashrao and Anr. reported in (1982) 2 SCC p. 385. Mr. Modi relying on the aforesaid decisions submitted that application for condonation of delay should be rejected. The arguments now advanced by Mr. Modi are the same which were advanced by him when this matter was fully heard except the tact of bringing to our notice judgment of this Court as aforesaid. Earlier also Mr. Modi had relied on decision reported in (1982) 2 SCC 385 . It is to be noted that the facts of the case on which Mr. Modi has placed reliance are quite different from the facts of the present case and therefore the judgment in CA No. 2135/1991 in FA Stamp No. 9832 is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Consequently the decision on which Mr. Modi placed reliance viz. (1982) 2 SCC 385 is also not helpful as not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the result arguments advanced by Mr. Modi are hereby rejected. In the result following order is passed : ( 12 ) APPLICATION for condonation of delay is hereby allowed. Delay in filing appeal is condoned on a condition that applicant Municipal Corporation shall pay Rs. 750 (Rupees. Seven hundred and fifty only) to the respondent as costs of this application within fort-night from today. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Petition allowed. .