JUDGMENT - S.H. KAPADIA, J.:---This appeal has been preferred by Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay against judgment and order dated 14th February, 1991/22nd March, 1991 in Writ Petition No. 3119 of 1988 by which the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the original petitioner and quashed the order of dismissal dated 14th September, 1988 and further directed the Corporation to hold a fresh enquiry and pass fresh orders in accordance with law as laid down by the impugned judgment. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal, briefly, are as follows: (a) On 1st January, 1981, the original petitioner was employed by the Corporation as a junior auditor and accounts assistant. He was posted at D Ward. In April, 1981, the original petitioner was assigned to pension section of D Ward of the Bombay Municipal Corporation. (b) In November, 1983, the original petitioner was asked to attend to the duties of casual pay master. He was required to work under one A.M. Bhatt, Senior Officer. However, intermittently, the original petitioner was required to work as a casual pay master. (c) On 17th November, 1984, he was once again required to perform duties as a casual pay master and he was required to handle cash in hand. (d) On 22nd November, 1984, the original petitioner was required to attend the head office and on that day, when the petitioner returned to the D Ward Office from the Head Office, he found that auditors from the Chief Auditors Section of the Corporation had come to `D Ward and they had raised certain queries as discrepancies came to be discovered by the audit section in the pension account of `D Ward of the Corporation. On the same day, a memo was issued to the petitioner, calling upon the petitioner to give explanation in respect of those discrepancies in the pension account and also make good the loss. (e) On 23rd November, 1984, respondent No. 3 i.e., the Chief Accountant of the Corporation started detailed investigation and pursuant to that investigation, the original petitioner was charged with misappropriation. At that stage, according to the original petitioner, he took loans from his friends and relatives and deposited the amounts with the Corporation as according to him, he was threatened with criminal prosecution. (f) On and from March, 14, 1985, the original petitioner was suspended. Thereafter, a preliminary enquiry was conducted. At that stage, according to the original petitioner, he took loans from his friends and relatives and deposited the amounts with the Corporation as according to him, he was threatened with criminal prosecution. (f) On and from March, 14, 1985, the original petitioner was suspended. Thereafter, a preliminary enquiry was conducted. Consequent thereupon, on 15th February, 1988, charge-sheet was given to the said petitioner, inter alia, stating that he was working as audit and accounts assistant in the office of the Assistant Accountant, D Ward; that occasionally, he was working as a casual pay master; that he had dishonestly misappropriated amounts to the tune of Rs. 1,58.214 during the period 28th November, 1983 to 22nd November, 1984; that he had also misappropriated during the same period Rs. 11,608/- jointly with other clerks; that he had also contravened Municipal Rules, Regulations and Bye-laws and in the circumstances, the said charge-sheet was given to the petitioner. By the said charge-sheet, the petitioner was informed that one K.M. Dhakephalkar, retired District Judge was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. (g) By his reply dated 25th March, 1988, the petitioner denied the charges; that although he was a law graduate, he did not understand the intricacies of law; that he was not exclusively entrusted with Municipal funds to the tune of Rs. 1,58,214/-; that it was possible that he had made excess payment but it did not constitute misconduct or negligence; that he made the payment of Rs. 26,000 under protest; that he sought inspection of imprest register and pension register for 1982 and in the circumstances, he denied all charges referred to above. By letter dated 25th March, 1988, the petitioner requested the Municipal Commissioner to permit him to engage an Advocate to represent his case which was denied by the Municipal Commissioner. (h) On 21st June, 1988, the said Enquiry Officer submitted his report in respect of five employees, including the petitioner. By letter dated 25th March, 1988, the petitioner requested the Municipal Commissioner to permit him to engage an Advocate to represent his case which was denied by the Municipal Commissioner. (h) On 21st June, 1988, the said Enquiry Officer submitted his report in respect of five employees, including the petitioner. According to the said report, the petitioner was working as accounts assistant in the Assistant Accountants office; that occasionally, he also worked as a junior pay master; that ordinarly; there were two deposits of cash lying in the Municipal safe -- one was imprest advance which was sanctioned to that office and which was Rs.45,000/- on 22nd November, 1984 and the other consisted of amounts drawn on advance cheques -- that the Enquiry Officer after examining the evidence on record and the procedure followed by the Corporation, came to the conclusion that the petitioner had misappropriated the amounts and that the amounts were withdrawn from the Municipal safe in the name and style of a particular purpose or for the payment to a particular person when the petitioner was in charge of the cash counter; that payments are shown to have been made to persons who have died and also in the name of persons who were non-existent. In the circumstances, the Enquiry Officer concluded that the petitioner was guilty of misappropriation. By the said findings, the Enquiry Officer also came to the conclusion that other clerks were also guilty of the charges levelled against them. (i) By show cause notice dated 6th July, 1988, the Commissioner, as per the Manual containing instructions for dealing with cases involving disciplinary matter, called upon the petitioner to show cause why penalty of dismissal should not be imposed in terms of Clause 49 of the said Manual. A bare perusal of the said show cause notice indicates due compliance with Clause 47 of the said Manual which specifies that reasonable opportunity against the proposed action should be given to the person charged by furnishing him with a copy of the findings and the grounds; that the employee should be told of the action proposed to be taken by the competent authority and that he should be given reasonable time and opportunity to make his representation against the proposed penalty. (j) In reply to the said show cause notice, the petitoner alleged that the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer was not fair; that during the preliminary enquiry, large number of witnesses were examined and that inspection of documents was not given; that the petitioner was pitted against a legal mind and that refusal of an Advocate to represent his case violated rules of natural justice; that the petitioner denied all allegations regarding misappropriation. (k) By his order dated 14th September,1988, the disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that the petitioner had dishonestly misappropriated Rs. 1,58,214/- as also Rs. 11,603/- along with D.C. Rathod, junior pay master; that on careful consideration of the evidence on record before the Enquiry Officer and the defence of the petitioner being taken into account, the disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that the petitioner ought to be dismissed from Municipal service in view of gross misconduct proved against him. (l) Against the said order of dismissal dated 14th September, 1988, the petitioner came to this Court by way of the above writ petition. By the said writ petition, the petitioner alleged that no hearing was given prior to order of dismissal dated 14th September, 1988; that the show cause notice dated 27th June, 1988 issued by the disciplinary authority was restricted only to quantum of punishment and not to merits; that the disciplinary authority did not provide personal hearing to the petitioners prior to the order of dismissal dated 14th September, 1988; that the petitioner was not permitted to cross-examine co-delinquents/witnesses whose statements were recorded at the stage of preliminary enquiry although the investigating officer Mr. Khare was examined by the Enquiry Officer; that the Enquiry Officer acted as a prosecutor as there was no presenting officer and as the petitioner was denied permission to engage an Advocate, there was violation of rules of natural justice. In the circumstances, the petitioner alleged that the entire enquiry was bad in law and liable to be set aside. (m) By the affidavit in reply dated 13th September, 1989, filed on behalf of the appellant-Corporation, all the above allegations came to be denied. By the said affidavit-in-reply, the Corporation placed reliance on the above Manual dealing with disciplinary enquiry and pointed out that the disciplinary authority had acted in consonance with Clause 47 of the said Manual. (m) By the affidavit in reply dated 13th September, 1989, filed on behalf of the appellant-Corporation, all the above allegations came to be denied. By the said affidavit-in-reply, the Corporation placed reliance on the above Manual dealing with disciplinary enquiry and pointed out that the disciplinary authority had acted in consonance with Clause 47 of the said Manual. It was also submitted that lack of presenting officer did not violate rules of natural justice. It was also averred by the Corporation that inspection of relevant documents was given and in the circumstances, there was no violation of rules of natural justice. (in) By judgment under appeal, the learned Single Judge, without going into the merits, came to the conclusion that the findings of the Enquiry Officer as also the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority stood vitiated in as much as rules of natural justice was violated for lack of opportunity to the petitioner. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the petitioner was pitted against a plain legal mind of the Enquiry Officer who was a District Judge (retired) and refusal to permit to engage a lawyer vitiated the enquiry. The learned Single Judge gave the above finding on the basis that it will depend upon the facts of each case as to whether the competent authority was entitled to refuse permission to engage an Advocate by the delinquent. According to the learned Single Judge, the matter was a complicated case and the Commissioner ought to have permitted the delinquent to engage an Advocate and in the absence of the said permission, the enquiry stood vitiated on account of denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. Similarly, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that lack of presenting officer to present the prosecution case also violated rules of natural justice as to present case was a complicated matter and, therefore, the department should have appointed a separate presenting officer to conduct the enquiry. The learned Single Judge also came to the conclusion that the enquiry was bad in law as no opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross-examine witnesses who were co-delinquents in the preliminary enquiry and who have made incriminating statements during the preliminary investigation and denial of opportunity to cross-examine the said witnesses violated rules of natural justice. The learned Single Judge also came to the conclusion that the enquiry was bad in law as no opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross-examine witnesses who were co-delinquents in the preliminary enquiry and who have made incriminating statements during the preliminary investigation and denial of opportunity to cross-examine the said witnesses violated rules of natural justice. The learned Single Judge also came to the conclusion that the show cause notice was given by the disciplinary authority on 27th June, 1988 which was replied to by the petitioner on 6th July, 1988 raising important questions of law and on facts and in the circumstances, personal hearing ought to have been given by the disciplinary authority before passing final order of dismissal. According to the learned Single Judge, Clauses 46 to 50 of the Manual indicated that personal hearing ought to have been given by the disciplinary authority and since the same was not done, there was breach of obligation under the said Manual. According to the learned Single Judge, the disciplinary authority did not pass a speaking order of dismissal and that was one more ground for coming to the conclusion that the disciplinary authority had not only violated rules of natural justice but also obligations under Clauses 46 to 50 of the said Manual. According to the learned Single Judge, the disciplinary authority was bound to record his findings on each of the contentions raised by the petitioner in his reply to the show cause notice and since the same has not been done, the enquiry as well as the disciplinary authoritys decision were contrary to rules of natural justice as well as Clauses 46 to 50 of the said Manual. (o) By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge set aside the entire enquiry as also the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority and directed reinstatement with back wages to be paid to the petitioner. The learned Single Judge, however, made it clear that the appellant-Corporation was entitled to hold a fresh enquiry and pass fresh orders in accordance with law. (p) Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the Corporation has filed the present appeal. 3. At the very outset, the learned Counsel for the Corporation pointed out that the original petitioner died on 17th March, 1992 and in the circumstances, the only issue which survives for determination related to payment of back wages. (p) Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the Corporation has filed the present appeal. 3. At the very outset, the learned Counsel for the Corporation pointed out that the original petitioner died on 17th March, 1992 and in the circumstances, the only issue which survives for determination related to payment of back wages. It was further submitted that important questions of law arose in the appeal, particularly, interpretation of the Manual referred to hereinabove and in the circumstances, it was submitted that an authoratative pronouncement by this Court would certainly enable the Corporation to implement the provisions pertaining to disciplinary enquiry. Accordingly, we decided to examine the impugned judgment, notwithstanding the demise of the original petitioner on 17th March, 1992. 4. On behalf of the Corporation, it was urged that the learned Single Judge had erred in coming to the conclusion that refusal of permission to the petitioner to represent his case through an Advocate amounted to violation of rules of natural justice. It was further submitted that even according to the learned Single Judge, it would depend on the facts of each case and in the present case, it was submitted that the matter was not complex so as to require an Advocate to represent the case of the delinquent. The learned Counsel for the Corporation submitted that the petitioner himself was a law graduate and the Enquiry Officer was a District Judge (retired). In the circumstances, the Commissioner was right in refusing permission to the petitioner to engage an Advocate. It was also submitted that the facts of the case conclusively established that the petitioner had misappropriated the amounts and in fact, the petitioner had also admitted it. In the circumstances, the Commissioner was right in refusing the said permission. It was next contended by the learned Counsel that the learned Single Judge was in error in coming to the conclusion that the Corporation ought to have appointed a presenting officer, the enquiry stood vitiated. It was further submitted that the enquiry which was held gave full opportunity to the petitioner to put-forth his case and in the circumstances, lack of presenting officer did not violate rules of natural justice. It was further submitted that the enquiry which was held gave full opportunity to the petitioner to put-forth his case and in the circumstances, lack of presenting officer did not violate rules of natural justice. It was next contended by the learned Counsel that the learned Single Judge erred in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner was not given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses whose statements were recorded at the stage of preliminary investigation and in the absence of the said cross-examination, rules of natural justice were violated. In this connection, our attention was drawn to the finding of the Enquiry Officer who has ruled that he has not relied upon the statements of the witnesses recorded in the preliminary enquiry and secondly, the said statements were not brought on record in support of the departments case. The Enquiry Officer further observed that the said statements were of the codelinquents and in the circumstances, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the question of cross-examination of the said witnesses did not arise. It was next contended that the learned Single Judge had erred in coming to the conclusion that the enquiry held by the disciplinary authority stood vitiated as no personal hearing was given by the disciplinary authority and that he should have given personal hearing and, therefore, the order of dismissal ought to be set aside. It was also contended that the learned Single Judge had erred in coming to the conclusion that the Enquiry Officer had failed to give reasons on each of the grounds raised in the reply to the show cause notice. For the above reasons, the learned Single Judge had erred in setting aside the order of dismissal. It was contended that the order of dismissal was in accordance with Clause 47 of the said Manual and there was no violation of rules of natural justice. In the circumstances, it was submitted that the impugned judgment was liable to be set aside. 5. It was contended that the order of dismissal was in accordance with Clause 47 of the said Manual and there was no violation of rules of natural justice. In the circumstances, it was submitted that the impugned judgment was liable to be set aside. 5. On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended that the learned Single Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that rules of natural justice stood violated by the above factors and the order of dismissal was in breach of Clauses 46 to 50 of the said Manual and the learned Single Judge was right in coming to the said conclusion and accordingly, the order of dismissal was rightly set aside by the learned Single Judge. 6. We find considerable merit in the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant-Corporation. In the present case, as indicated hereinabove, the charge-sheet which was given on 15th February, 1988 clearly spelt-out misappropriation on the part of the petitioner. In reply to the said charge-sheet, the petitioner categorically admitted that he had made excess payment without intention to misappropriate and that he had offered to make good the loss under protest. Secondly, the Enquiry Officers findings clearly established that all relevant documents, including vouchers were examined at length and it was found that amounts were withdrawn by the petitioner for purposes or in names of persons who were not in existence. The petitioner was not able to explain the purposes for which the amounts were drawn and he was also not able to explain how the amounts were withdrawn in names of persons who did not exist. When so questioned, he offered to make good the purported loss. With these facts, it was clear that the petitioner was guilty of misappropriation. The Enquiry Officer examined each of the documents, as found by the learned Single Judge, and even permitted cross-examination. The Enquiry Officer examined 30 witnesses and came to the conclusion, after examining documentary and oral evidence, that the petitioner was guilty of misappropriation. The Enquiry Officer also recorded a finding that the statements of witnesses examined in the preliminary enquiry have not been relied upon by him. In the circumstances, the enquiry held by the Enquiry Officer was fair and in accordance with rules of natural justice. We do not find any prejudice caused to the petitioner in the circumstances of the case. The Enquiry Officer also recorded a finding that the statements of witnesses examined in the preliminary enquiry have not been relied upon by him. In the circumstances, the enquiry held by the Enquiry Officer was fair and in accordance with rules of natural justice. We do not find any prejudice caused to the petitioner in the circumstances of the case. With this background, each of the findings of the learned Single Judge have got to be examined. 7. As regards the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Commissioner had wrongly refused to permit Advocate to be engaged by the Commissioner. We find that the learned Single Judge erred in coming to the said conclusion. The facts clearly indicate that the Enquiry Officer had given full opportunity to the petitioner to put-forth his case; that the petitioner had himself admitted excess payment; that he was himself a law graduate and in the circumstances, the Commissioner was right in refusing Advocate to be engaged by the petitioner. With the above facts, it was clear that the case was not complicated as alleged by the petitioner. In the circumstances, the learned Single Judge erred in coming to the conclusion that absence of an Advocate meant lack of opportunity to the petitioner. 8. The learned Single Judge also came to the conclusion that the enquiry was violative of rules of natural justice as there was no presenting officer to present the case of the Corporation and the Enquiry Officer acted as a judge as well as a prosecutor and in the circumstances, the enquiry was bad in law. In this connection, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-Corporation placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in (Sukhadeo Vishwanath Garaje v. Food Corporation of India and others)1, reported in 1989, Maharashtra Law Journal, page 236, in which it has been held that absence of presenting officer did not violate rules of natural justice. In the present case, as mentioned hereinabove, detailed procedure of recording evidence was followed by the Enquiry Officer; that full opportunity was given to the petitioner and in the circumstances, if the Enquiry Officer examined the witnesses without the assistance of a presenting officer, rules of natural justice are not violated. 9. In the present case, as mentioned hereinabove, detailed procedure of recording evidence was followed by the Enquiry Officer; that full opportunity was given to the petitioner and in the circumstances, if the Enquiry Officer examined the witnesses without the assistance of a presenting officer, rules of natural justice are not violated. 9. Similarly, the learned Single Judge erred in coming to the conclusion that witnesses examined at the stage of preliminary enquiry were not allowed to be cross-examined, rules of natural justice are violated. The above facts clearly indicate that the Enquiry Officer has not relied upon statements of co-delinquents/witnesses. Secondly, the petitioner did not seek examination of the said witnesses and thirdly, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of (K.T. Tripathi v. State Bank of India)2, 1984(1) S.C.Cases, page 43, in which it has been held that concept of fair-play in action depended upon particular list between the parties and where there is no dispute regarding the facts, no real prejudice will be caused to the party by absence of formal opportunity of cross-examination and per-se, it will not vitiate the decision. In the present case, as mentioned above, there was clear admission on the part of the petitioner regarding excess payment and, in any event, full opportunity was given to the petitioner and the documents including vouchers clearly show that the petitioner was guilty of misappropriation. In the circumstances, the learned Single Judge erred in coming to the above conclusion. 10. The learned Single Judge also erred in coming to the conclusion that the disciplinary authority failed to comply with Clauses 46 to 50 of the above Manual in as much as the disciplinary authority ought to have given a personal hearing and the disciplinary authority ought to have recorded a finding regarding each of the submissions raised in reply to the show cause notice and the disciplinary authority ought to have recorded detailed reasons for passing the order of dismissal. In this connection, Clause 47 of the above Manual lays down that the disciplinary authority must give reasonable opportunity against the proposed action by furnishing copy of the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the grounds and also by informing the conclusions provisionally reached by the competent authority on the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the delinquent should be told of the action which the competent authority proposes to take and accordingly a show cause notice ought to have been given against the proposed action. All the above steps were complied with by the disciplinary authority and in the circumstances, the learned Single Judge erred in holding that Clauses 46 to 50 of the said Manual have not been followed. The disciplinary authority, after taking into account the explanation given to the show cause notice and after examining all the relevant facts and the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that there were no extenuating circumstances justifying reduction of penalty and accordingly, the petitioner was dismissed from service. It is now well settled principle of law that where the disciplinary authority concurs with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, detailed and exhaustive reasons need not be given as it would amount to repetition. In this connection, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana)3, reported in 1987 (Supp.) Supreme Court Cases, page 582, lays down that when the punishing the authority accepted the findings and reasons given by the Enquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority is not required, once again, to give reasoned order and in the circumstances, the dismissal order was not vitiated. In view of the said decision of the Supreme Court, which applies to the facts of the present case, the learned Single Judge erred in coming to the conclusion that the disciplinary authority should have given detailed reasons. 11. The learned Single Judge erred in coming to the conclusion that personal hearing ought to have been given by the disciplinary authority as in the absence of personal hearing, rules of natural justice would be violated. We do not agree with the learned Single Judge for the reasons that Clauses 46 to 50 do not contemplate personal hearing as a requirement. We do not agree with the learned Single Judge for the reasons that Clauses 46 to 50 do not contemplate personal hearing as a requirement. Secondly, the Enquiry Officer gave full opportunity to the petitioner and after the petitioner having admitted excess payment itself indicated that the disciplinary authority was not required once again to give a personal hearing. As indicated hereinabove, where a proper enquiry has been held and in the facts and circumstances, it was found that the delinquent had admitted his omission or commission which constituted misconduct, then, depending on the facts of each case, it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that in every matter, the disciplinary authority must give a personal hearing. In the circumstances of the case, the learned Single Judge erred in coming to the conclusion that the disciplinary authority erred in not giving personal hearing to the petitioner. The rules of natural justice cannot be put in a strait jacket. It would depend on facts of each case. In the present case, therefore, rules of natural justice have not been violated. In the present case, Clauses 46 to 50 of the said Manual have been complied with and in the circumstances, the learned Single Judge erred in setting aside the order of dismissal. 12. In view of the demise of the respondent No. 1, as indicated hereinabove, we suggested to the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that in view of the fact that the first respondent died at a very young age, the heirs of respondent No. 1 could be paid ex-gratia amount calculated on basis of salary receivable by the deceased from 14th March, 1985 till the demise of the respondent No. 1 on 17th March, 1992, excluding the amounts actually paid to the deceased during the said period. The Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants agreed to the suggestion of this Court. In the circumstances, the heirs of respondent No. 1 shall be paid as and by way of ex-gratia amount calculated on the basis of salary receivable by the deceased for the period commencing from 14th March, 1985 (i.e. from the date of suspension) till his death on 17th March, 1992, excluding the amounts which have been paid to the original petitioner during the said period. The appellant-Corporation shall pay the above amount as indicated above within a period of three months from today. 13. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order dated 14th February, 1991 / 22nd March, 1991 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 3119 of 1988 is set aside. Consequently, the original petition filed by respondent No. 1 stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs throughout. Appeal allowed.