U.L. Bhat, C.J. — Petitioner was born on 1.9.35. On the date of filing the writ petition, namely 30.1.93, he was working as Deputy Inspector of Schools, Jonai. He was told that he has to retire on 31.8.93, which according to him is wrongful, as in his opinion he is entitled to work till 30.9.93. He, therefore, filed the writ petition to quash the letter requiring him to retire on 31.8.93 and to direct the respondents to allow him to work till 30.9.93. The writ petition is opposed by the respondents. 2. Retirement on superannuation is governed by clause (a) of FR 56. FR 56 (a) states, inter alia, that the date of compulsory retirement of a Government servant is the date on which he attains the age of 58 years. Second note to clause (a) reads thus : "Notwithstanding anything contained above, the retirement of Govern­ment employees should take effect from the afternoon of the last day of the month in which the employee concerned attains the age of super­annuation." (emphasis supplied) 3. In Civil Rule No. 216 of 1991, a Division Bench of this Court, dealing with a Government employee who was born on 1.3.1923 held that the action of the Government in retiring the petitioner on 28.2.91 was unsustainable and as per the rule he would have retired on the afternoon of 31.3,81. The judgment does not contain any reason nor does it refer to the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, or the decision of the Supreme Court in Prabhu Dayal Sesma vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1986 SC 1948 . We find that the judgment in Civil Rule No. 216 of 1991 has been followed by other Division Bench in Civil Rule No. 3727 of 1991 and Civil Rule No. 4356 of 1991 without any further or independent reasoning. 4. Retirement on superannuation is on completion of 58 years, the employee must retire on the last day on which he attains or completes 58 years. If such attainment or completion of 58 years is on a particular day of a month, by virtue of note 2 to clause (a) of FR 56, the employee is enabled to continue in service till last day of that month. If, in the present case, the petitioner attains 58 years on i.9.93, he is entitled to be in service till 30.9.93. If, in the present case, the petitioner attains 58 years on i.9.93, he is entitled to be in service till 30.9.93. If, on the other hand, he attains the age of 58 years on 31.8.93, he has to retire on that day and cannot continue in service till last day of succeeding month. 5. If a person is born on a particular day of a calendar month, reckoning of his age starts from that day, inclusive of that day. Therefore, he completes a year on completion of the last day prior to the date of birth in the next year. Rule does not provide for departure from the normal rule of reckoning age. Rule also does not indicate that the date of birth must be excluded for reckoning year or age. 6. An identical matter came up before the Supreme Court in Prabhu Dayal's case. Rule which came up for consideration required that a candidate must not attain 28 years on the 1st day of January next following the last date fixed for receipt of application. The rule did not throw any light on the manner in which a year is to be reckoned. The Supreme Court referred to the following passage in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 37, para 178 at page 100 : "Similarly, in calculating a person's age the day of his birth counts as a whole day, and he attains a specified age on the day next before the anniversary of his birth day." The Supreme Court also referred to two decisions in Rex vs. Scoffin, (1930) 1 KB 741 and in Re, Shnrey Savory vs. Shurey, (1918) 1 Ch 263. References have also been made to the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, as to how age of majority should be computed. Section 4 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, states, inter alia, that the day on which a person was born is to be included as a whole day. On that basis the Supreme Court held that the date of birth is to be included as first day in a person's age and he must be said to have completed the age of one year on the previous day of next year. 7. On that basis the Supreme Court held that the date of birth is to be included as first day in a person's age and he must be said to have completed the age of one year on the previous day of next year. 7. The attention of the Division Benches, which disposed of Civil Rules referred to earlier, was not drawn to the provisions of section 4 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, or the decision in Prabhudayal's case. The principle of the decision squarely applies to the interpretation of FR 56 (a). We, therefore hold that the judgments in Civil Rule Nos. 216 of 1991, 3727 of 1991 and 4356 of 1991 are per incuriam. This Court is bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above. 8. That being so, there can be no doubt that the petitioner completed the age of 58 years on 31.8.93. By operation of second note to clause (a) of FR 56, he has to retire on the last day of the month in which he completes the age of superannuation, this would mean that he has to retire on 31.8.93. 9. We dismiss the writ petition but in the circumstances without costs. Interim order stands vacated.