ORDER Gulab C. Gupta, J. 1. Whether members of the petitioner Society, a body registered and incorporated under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the Bombay Public Trusts Act, working for wages in its establishment at Jabalpur, are its 'employees' within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), is the moot question raised in this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, for decision of this Court. 2. Petitioner is a 'Society' registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as also a "Public Trust" registered under Bombay Public Trusts Act having its head office at Bombay and a branch at Jabalpur. It claims to be working for upliftment of down-trodden ladies, to provide them work and infuse self-sufficiency. The Society's unit at Jabalpur is engaged in manufacture of Papad and Badis, which admittedly is an industrial activity. The Society as per its memorandum and Articles of Association takes ladies who actually work with them as members. As far as work done by the ladies is concerned, they are paid remuneration based on quantity produced. Profit accrued to the petitioner Society during the year is allegedly distributed among the members in the ratio of the work done by them. There is however nothing in the memorandum or Articles of Association in this behalf. The claim of the petitioner Society is that these working ladies are not 'employees' within the meaning of the Act and hence the Act does not apply to its establishment at Jabalpur. Besides these working ladies, the petitioner-Society also employs some other employees i.e. drivers etc, out claims that their number is below 20 and hence it is claimed that their establishment is not covered by the Act and the Scheme made thereunder. It appears that the establishment of the petitioner was inspected by the Inspector of the Respondent who held that the ladies working at the establishment were 'employees' within the meaning of the Act and started proceedings against the petitioner. As a result of these proceedings, a demand of Rs. 35,34,304/- was made on the petitioner vide order dated October 14, 1991 (Annex. P-3). 3. Legal validity of the demand dated October 14, 1991 (Ann. P-3) was challenged by the petitioner in this Court in M.P. No. 3922/91. As a result of these proceedings, a demand of Rs. 35,34,304/- was made on the petitioner vide order dated October 14, 1991 (Annex. P-3). 3. Legal validity of the demand dated October 14, 1991 (Ann. P-3) was challenged by the petitioner in this Court in M.P. No. 3922/91. This Court by its order dated June 30, 1992 (Ann. P-4) held that before fixing the liability on the petitioner to pay P.P. in relation to its employees it was obligatory on the part of the respondent No. 2 to decide whether the Act was applicable on the petitioner-Society. The re-spondent No. 2 was therefore to first decide this question and the matter was remanded to him for the purpose. The respondent No. 2 has thereafter passed the impugned order on February 23, 1993 (Ann. P-6) holding that lady workers who are also the members of the petitioner-Society are "employees" within the meaning of the Act and hence the petitioners are liable to make contribution to the P.F. under the Act. It is this order which is impugned in this writ petition. 4. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the main, is that so called lady workers are not employed by any one, much less by the petitioner-society and hence they could not be termed as 'employees' within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act. It is emphasised that these ladies by virtue of their membership are themselves 'Employers' as well as 'Employees' and that this status is not changed only because they are engaged in an industrial activity and paid wages for work done by them. It is submitted that the establishment works on the principle of self-employment and hence each and every member is the owner of the establishment. In the absence of any separate person or body as their employer, these ladies could not be treated as 'employees' for the purpose of the Act. As against this, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the petitioner society because of its registration under the Society Registration Act, and the Bombay Public Trusts Act, is a separate entity by itself and is the 'employer' in relation to its workers. Membership in the Society may promote self-employment but for this reason alone members do not become either the owner of the Society or employers in relation to themselves or other employees. 5. Membership in the Society may promote self-employment but for this reason alone members do not become either the owner of the Society or employers in relation to themselves or other employees. 5. "Employee" as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act means "any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of the establishment and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from his employer." That the lady members are employed for wages in manufacturing Papad and Badis which is the work of the establishment and are paid wages is not in dispute. The only dispute is whether they are paid wages by the employer or they pay themselves. An employer as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act means owner or occupier or Manager of a factory as per Section 7(1)(f) of the Factories Act, 1948. In relation to other establishments, it means a person or authority who has ultimate control over the affairs of the Establishment and where the said affairs are entrusted to a Manager, Managing Director or the Managing Agent, such Manager, Managing Director or the Managing Agent. Memorandum and Articles of Association (Annex.P-1), by which the petitioner society is governed, show that the Society is authorised to open its branches. The management of a Branch like the one at Jabalpur is entrusted to a Branch Committee consisting of not more than 9 members, representing its membership. Article 3-A(g) mentions Sanchalika of a Branch without specifying her duties and obligations. The word is equivalent to Director or Manager in English. It is therefore reasonable to hold that Sanchalika is responsible for management of the branch. It is not in dispute that the Sanchalika actually pays wages to the working members and otherwise manages the business of the Branch. Article 9 provides for a Managing Committee of the Society consisting of 21 members, who are authorised to appoint a President, a Vice-President, two Secretaries and two Treasurers from among themselves. This Managing Committee is the authority responsible for management of the society and has the right to appoint and remove workers. This committee also manages funds of the society. The members of the Managing Committee are elected by members at the Annual General Meeting. This Managing Committee is the authority responsible for management of the society and has the right to appoint and remove workers. This committee also manages funds of the society. The members of the Managing Committee are elected by members at the Annual General Meeting. As regards removal of member of the Managing Committee, Article 10 provides that a member not performing his duty may be removed by the Managing Committee on a report of the President, but his ultimate removal is with the consent of the Annual General Meeting. It would therefore appear that the Managing Committee is the body responsible for business, finance and administrative management of the society. It seems to be a permanent body. Article 9(c) however provides that 4 of its members shall retire by rotation and new members elected in their place. This provision also does not lay down the period when the members have to retire. Even if it is assumed that 4 members of the Managing Committee retire every year by rotation, the function of Annual General Meeting would be to elect 4 new members each year in their place and nothing more. The members of the Society do not seem to have any power or responsibility, financial, administrative or otherwise, except the aforesaid i.e. meeting once in a year to elect 4 new members of the Managing Committee. Article 8 dealing with the Agenda of the Annual General Meeting indicates that it has no special administrative functions or powers except receiving annual report, appointing chartered accountant and receiving the programmes and the budget passed by the Managing Committee. It is therefore clear that a member of the Society has nothing whatsoever to contribute to the administration or management of the society. It has no control whatsoever on finances or business, etc. The ultimate control of the business, management and finances of the society is vested in the Managing Committee. As regards Branch like the Jabalpur branch, its members do not enjoy even this privilege. Though Article 3A(b) provides that branches may form its own Branch Committee from its own members, there is nothing to indicate that members are required to elect the members of this Committee in any manner. Clause (e) of this Article however indicates that Branches are supposed to be independent and self-sufficient and have all administrative powers for this purpose. Though Article 3A(b) provides that branches may form its own Branch Committee from its own members, there is nothing to indicate that members are required to elect the members of this Committee in any manner. Clause (e) of this Article however indicates that Branches are supposed to be independent and self-sufficient and have all administrative powers for this purpose. It is, therefore, possible to hold that though Branch Committee is really responsible for administration of the Branch, it is not elected by the members of the Branch in any manner or for any term. Status and manner of appointment of Sanchalika is not clear but it is clear that she manages the Branch which is independent of the Managing Society. Can it then be held that members of Jabalpur Branch are "owners" thereof and 'employers' in relation to the branch establishment. The answer in the context of Section 2(e) of the Act must be in the negative. Ultimate control of the Branch vests either in the Managing Committee or the Branch Committee or the Sanchalika who do not work under direction or control of the members. Members of the Branch have no power to control the Branch Committee or the Sanchalika. Such members cannot, in our opinion, claim ownership of the Branch. Indeed, they have no claim to anything except the wages for work done. They cannot therefore be termed as 'employer' in relation to the establishment. Even if the position of members is considered under general law, they would not be termed as 'employers' in view of their status aforesaid as the law does not contemplate an employer without financial control or management and supervision of the establishment. This Court has, therefore, no hesitation in holding that members of the Petitioner-Society are not 'employers' within the meaning of the term under the Act. It must consequently be held that since employees get their wages from the Sanchalika or Branch Committee who would be 'employer' in relation to the establishment in question. This would be sufficient to hold that members working for wages in the establishment and manufacturing papad and badis are employees of the establishment within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act and are entitled to benefit thereof. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, relied upon Regional Director, ESIC, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries (1985-I-LLJ-69), to support his aforesaid submission. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, relied upon Regional Director, ESIC, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries (1985-I-LLJ-69), to support his aforesaid submission. In this case, three partners of the firm who were drawing salary from the firm were treated as employees within the meaning of the term under that Act. The Supreme Court deciding the appeal held that a partnership firm has no legal entity of its own under the Partnership Act and every partner of the firm is an agent of the firm for purposes of its business. The Court, therefore, held that because of these statutory provisions, partner of the firm is the agent of other partners and his position vis-a-vis the firm is not that of a master and servant or employer and employee. The Court thus held that partners could not, only because they get paid wages, be treated as employees of the firm. The Supreme Court reached the aforesaid conclusion because of the provisions of the Partnership Act under which the firm has no legal entity of its own. The legal position in the instant case is, however, different. The petitioner-Society is a separate legal entity and relationship of its member with the society is not that of an agent. Indeed, a member of the petitioner-Society has no say in the management or administration as detailed above and hence there is nothing common between her and the partner of a partnership firm. As regards separate legal entity of a registered society, the legal position seems to be well settled by a catena of cases of various High Courts. This Court's decision in Baijnath v. Motilal AIR 1934 Nag. 207 and Radhasoami S. Sabha v. Hanskumar, AIR 1959 MP 172 , are worth noticing. Similar view has been taken by Bombay High Court in Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj, Bombay AIR 1946 Bom. 516; Rukminamma v. Venkala Ramadas, AIR 1940 MDS. 949; Ganga Sahai v. Bharat Bhan and Ors., AIR 1950 All. 480 ; P.B.N.C. Committee v. Government of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1958 AP 773; Nabadwip Bhajan Asram v. Commissioners of Nabadwip Municipality, AIR 1959 Cal. 361 and Sonar Bangla Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Engineering College, AIR 1960 Cal. 409 and Patna High Court in K.G. Thomas v. R.L. Gadeock and Ors., (I970-I-LLJ-599) have also held similarly. 480 ; P.B.N.C. Committee v. Government of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1958 AP 773; Nabadwip Bhajan Asram v. Commissioners of Nabadwip Municipality, AIR 1959 Cal. 361 and Sonar Bangla Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Engineering College, AIR 1960 Cal. 409 and Patna High Court in K.G. Thomas v. R.L. Gadeock and Ors., (I970-I-LLJ-599) have also held similarly. It is, therefore, not possible to find identity between the member and the society and hence it is not possible to give any benefit of the aforesaid decisions to the petitioner. 7. Considering the fact that position of members of the petitioner-Society is somewhat similar to the shareholders of a Company, it is useful to recall the decision of the Supreme Court in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 , wherein it was held: "A company registered under the Companies Act is a legal person, separate and distinct from its individual members. Property of the Company is not the property of the shareholders. A shareholder has merely an interest in the company arising under its Articles of Association, measured by a sum for the purpose of liability and by a share in the profit." Indeed legal status of members of the petitioner-Society under its Articles of Association is much weaker than shareholders in a company. A member of the petitioner-Society does not subscribe to any capital and sharing of profit by her is a myth. Audited accounts indicate that no profit is earned during 1990 and 1991 and registered Articles of Association have no provision for distribution of profits among members. 8. Submission of self-serving institutions that they are not engaged in any relationship of employer and employee was accepted by the Supreme Court in Madras Gymkhana Club's case (1967-II-LLJ-720). But, the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply Co. case (1978-I-LLJ-349) specifically overruled it and held that even employees of self-serving institutions were having relationship of master and servant with the institutions. In this case dealing with the cases of Co- operative Societies the Court clearly and specifically held that merely because the employees were also the members of the Society it was not enough to hold that they were not employed in an industry or that there was no relationship of employer and employee between them and the society. After this decision there is little scope for the submission based on self-serving nature of the institution. After this decision there is little scope for the submission based on self-serving nature of the institution. In this connection, decision of this Court in Mahila Samiti v. State of M.P., 1988 MPLJ 146 is also worth noticing where the Court following the dicta of Bangalore Water supply case, has held that women employed by the institution for purposes of family planning programme were employees of the Society. The Society in the said case was, like the Petitioner-Society, engaged in advancement of social, economic, educational and cultural standard of women. There is, therefore, overwhelming authority of this Court and the Apex Court against the petitioner and hence this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the submit sion. 9. The petition fails and is dismissed.