JUDGMENT : B.L. Hansaria, C.J. - Some cases have a message and it becomes necessary at times even to see beyond a case to maintain the purity in life and to take case to the extent possible and permissible in law of tailing moral values of the society. When a case is brought to the Court, no matter what is the status of the Court, a ligant is expected to tell the truth. It is for this reason that affidavits are required to be filed in those Courts where a matter is not decided on oral evidence which is led on oath. When a parson is administered oath, he is required to state, "I shall speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth". When Courts decide cases on affidavits, the deponent has to solemnly affirm and state the truth as ha knows it and sees it. If to serve personal gain or end or purpose, wrong statements are made : Court would be justified in taking a serious view of the same. 2. Here is a case where the petitioner approached this Court first in OJC No. 1835 of 1978 with the grievance that though he had joined Mukundadev Madhya Vidyapitha as peon on 24-7-1974, he had been prohibited from discharging his duties with effect from 5-7-1978. This Court by its judgment rendered on 11-12-1986 stated that as there was no valid order of termination, the petitioner is deemed to be continuing as a peon of the school. It concluded that the petitioner's service h3d not been terminated. However, the prayer for arrear salary was not granted in the circumstances of the case. May it be stated here itself that the managing committee of the school was arrayed as opposite party No. 5 in that case, as to which the Bench disposing of that OJC stated in paragraph 3 that in spite of valid service of notice on this opposite party, no appearance had been made. 3. The petitioner's case is that after the aforesaid judgment was rendered, he joined the school on 2-1-1987 but had not been paid his salary, which led him to approach this Court again in OJC No. 94 of 1990, which was disposed of on 25-2-1991 by stating that if the averment of the petitioner be correct, he has to be paid his salary. The management (which word should have perhaps been the "managing committee") was, therefore, directed to pay his current salaries if the petitioner had joined the school pursuant to the order in the first OJC. 4. In the present proceeding, the petitioner alleges that despite the aforesaid order, his dues have not been paid because of which contempt of this Court has been committed The are two opposite parties in the present proceeding. They are : (1) Bhaskar Chandra Behera, District Inspector of Schools, Bhadrak : and (2) Karunakar Khatua, Secretary, Mukundadev Madhyamik Vidyapitha. Though these persons were made opposite parties, notice was issued on opp. party No. 2 alone and his averment in paragraph' 3 of the show-cause is that in OJC No. 1835/78, the Secretary of the school was not a party. The second relevant everment is that the petitioner had never joined the school. 5. Shri Patnaik submits that the petitioner had, in fact joined the school, which is sought to be brought home to us by referring to Annexures 2(a) and 2(b) to OJC 94/90, which are his applications to the Headmaster of the School seeding permission to sign the attendance register and for payment of salary and his representation to the District Inspector of Schools with the self-same prayers respectively. We have perused these annexures which do state that the petitioner had joined on 2-1-1987 but was not allowed to sign the attendance register, which was brought to the notice of the aforesaid two persons on 28-7-1987. In that OJC 94/90, though the managing committee was made a party, counter affidavit was filed by the State and its officers stating that the contention of the petitioner that he joined the school on 2-1-1987 was false and untrue since one khatoi had been serving as peon in the school effectively. It was, therefore, questioned as to how the petitioner could be allowed to join his duty ? To this affidavit, a rejoinder was filed by again asserting the case of the petitioner. 5. The aforesaid are the factul materials. Let it be seen as to whether a case for contempt is made out and, if so, what relied is due to the petitioner ? To this affidavit, a rejoinder was filed by again asserting the case of the petitioner. 5. The aforesaid are the factul materials. Let it be seen as to whether a case for contempt is made out and, if so, what relied is due to the petitioner ? In OJC No. 1835 of 1978, it having been stated by this Court that there being no valid order of termination, the petitioner "is deemed to be continuing as a peon of the school", the fact that in that OJC, there was no further direction for reinstating the petitioner, as feebly submitted by Shri Misra appearing for opp. party No. 2 cannot be called in aid at all by this opposite party, because if this Court stated that the petitioner was deemed to be continuing as a peon, nothing was required to be stated further to require the managing committee to reinstate the petitioner. Being armed such an order, the petitioner reported for duty, which is all he could have done. A valid legal order passed by a Court cannot be allowed to be frustrated by not allowing such an incumbent to join the school. According to us, he must be deemed to have joined the school. Any other view would allow any employer to set at naught legal and valid orders passed by competent Courts, which would be totally against public interest and in the long run affect the very system of administration of justice. In this view of the matter, though in the order of 25-2-1991 passed in OJC No. 94 of 1990 this Court had stated that the managing committee would pay the current dues if the petitioner had joined the school, that should be read in light of what has been stated above, and so, the direction to the managing committee by the order to pay to the petitioner if joined, should be read as a direction to pay even if the petitioner is deemed to have joined the school. 7. Another averment made by opp. party No. 2, to which our attention has been tangentially invited by Shri Misra, is that the Secretary of the school was not made a party in OJC No. 1335 of 1978, as stated in paragraph 3 of the show-cause, is a false statement outright in view of what has been noted above. 7. Another averment made by opp. party No. 2, to which our attention has been tangentially invited by Shri Misra, is that the Secretary of the school was not made a party in OJC No. 1335 of 1978, as stated in paragraph 3 of the show-cause, is a false statement outright in view of what has been noted above. The order in OJC No. 1835 of 1978 was, therefore, absolutely binding on the managing committee and it could not have frustrated this Court's order by not allowing the petitioner to join the school, if that was the correct state of affairs. 8. Shri Misra finally submits that opp. party No. 2 is presently in a very bad state of health inasmuch as though he is young in age has became old in life as he has become bent like an old man and is not even able to move. Place in such a situation, we have not deemed it fit to award any punishment of imprisonment on him, though otherwise in a case of the present nature that ought to have been the correct sentence to be awarded. As to fine, which is the other alternative sentence visualised by Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act the limit is Rs, 7,000/-. We are of the view that in a case of the present nature, the proper order to be passed is to award exemplary cost, which is permissible, as stated in paragraph 7 of Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 1026 . Chapter XVII of the Orissa High Court Rules, Vol. I, regulating contempt proceedings also permits awarding of such cost as may be deemed fit in the circumstances of the case, as stated in Rule 21 (a). We may also refer in this connection to Lt. Col. K.D. Gupta v. Union of India AIR 1989 SC 1393 in which the Apex Court awarded a compensation of Rs. 4,00,000/-. 9. What should be the amount of cost to be awarded is another question to be decided. According to us this should be 50% of the salary which would have become payable to the petitioner if he would have been allowed to join on 2-1-1987 and which had accrued till 31-3-1991, as from 1-4-1991 the school in question was taken over by the Government. According to us this should be 50% of the salary which would have become payable to the petitioner if he would have been allowed to join on 2-1-1987 and which had accrued till 31-3-1991, as from 1-4-1991 the school in question was taken over by the Government. As Shri Patnatk appearing for the petitioner is not instructed about the salary which have been payable to the petitioner on 2-1-1987, we fix this case for deciding this aspect of the matter on 14-9-1993. R.K. Patra, J. 10. I agree.