Judgment S.B.SINHA, J. 1. Whether the homestead land of a landholder can be taken into consideration for the purpose of computation of the ceiling area in terms of Sec. 4 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred as the said Act) is the question involved in this application. 2. Before adverting to the aforementioned question the fact of the matter, in brief, may be noticed. A ceiling proceeding was initiated against the petitioners family in which apart from other lands, land situated at Mauza Naranga, Mohalla Par Nadi Lakhi Bag, Khata No. 197, Plot No. 1124, area 16 decimals, plot No. 1068, area 1.62 acres, Khata No. 204, Plot No. 1091 area 12 decimals, Khata No. 226, Plot No. 1092 area 2 decimals, old ward No. 10 now 32 falling within the municipal area was included in the ceiling proceedings. Upon the said lands there exists a pucca house wherein the petitioner resides with his family members. Admittedly the said land was within the Gaya Municipality and now within Gaya Municipal Corporation. The petitioner contends that some portions of the lands are lying vacant and the said land is used for sahan and not for agricultural purpose. 3. The matter came up before this Court earlier in C.W.J. No. 2524 of 1989 and by an order dated 10-4-1989 which is contained in Annexure I to the writ application, the case was remitted to the Collector for deciding the question as to whether the land in question is within Gaya Municipality or not in the following words: "The third question is about 1.52 acres of land being within Gaya Municipality, Annexure-4 to this application seems to support the petitioners. This matter also will, therefore, be considered afresh by the Collector after affording opportunity to the parties." Pursuant to the said order of this Court a report was called for and the Land Reforms Deputy Collector inter alia held that the land in question was within the municipal area from before and now is within the Gaya Municipal Corporation. It was further stated therein that at that time no agricultural operation was being carried out. The said report is contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application. 4. It was further stated therein that at that time no agricultural operation was being carried out. The said report is contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application. 4. By an order dated 8-4-1991 the Collector, Gaya, however, decided the said question as a preliminary issue and inter alia held that in view of the definition of the land as contained in S. 2(f) of the said Act, the homestead land of the petitioner would also come within the purview thereof. The petitioner filed revision application against the said order which was dismissed summarily. 5. Mr. B. P. Pandey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised a short question in support of this application. Learned counsel submitted that in view of the object and purport of the Act as would appear from the preamble thereof, it is evident that a land upon which a residential house has been constructed and is within the municipal area, the said Act cannot have any application. According to the learned counsel only such lands are to be acquired which are used or are capable of being used for agricultural purpose and in view of the fact that in, Annexure-2 it has clearly been reported that the lands are not used for agricultural purpose, the impugned order must be held to be illegal. It was further submitted that in order to include the homestead land of a landholder the question as to whether the land is held by the landholder as raiyat or as an under-raiyat is relevant. It has further been brought to the notice that in the original Act homestead"was included in Sec. 4 of the Act but by reason of Bihar Act I of 1973 the word homestead"was deleted therefrom. Learned counsel submitted that although Bihar Act 1 of 1973 was further amended by Bihar Act No. IX of 1973 in terms whereof Sec. 4(c) as also Sec. 4(f) was amended but homestead"lands were not included therein. 6. Mr. Hemendra Prasad Singh, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State, on the other hand, submitted that homestead would come within the purview of clause (d) of S. 4 of the Act. In support of the said contention strong reliance has been placed upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Mahabir Prasad V/s. State of Bihar reported in 1976 Pat LJR 134: AIR 1976 Pat 256 . 7. In support of the said contention strong reliance has been placed upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Mahabir Prasad V/s. State of Bihar reported in 1976 Pat LJR 134: AIR 1976 Pat 256 . 7. According to the learned counsel cl. (d) of S. 4 of the said Act is a residuary clause and thus homestead land would also come within the purview thereof. 8. The question posed in this case is an intricate one. The interpretation clause in S. 2 begins with the words in this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. Land"has been defined in S. 2(f) in the following terms " Land"means land which is used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture and includes land which is an orchard, kharhur or pasturage or forest land or even land perennially submerged under water or the homestead of a land holder." Explanation I of the aforesaid clause reads thus: " "Homestead" means a dwelling house for the purpose of living or for the purpose of letting out on rent together with any courtyard, compound, attached garden orchard and out building and includes any out building for the purpose connected with agriculture or horticulture and any tank, library and place of worship appertaining to such dwelling house." 9. From a bare perusal of the aforementioned definition of land, it is evident that the land has not only to be agricultural land but it also brings within its premises the well known concept of homestead land of the land-holder"as defined in clause (f) of S. 2 and includes an orchard, kharhur or pasturage or forest land or even land perennially submerged under water. However, although a land"would include homestead land of the land-holder, but the same cannot be held as raiyati or under-raiyati land"unless the homestead is held by the land-holder for agricultural purposes. It is also well known that all lands on which permanent structure exists cannot be included in the definition of the land except such lands which come within the purview of homestead. It is also well known that an interpretation clause is not a positive enactment. 10. In the aforementioned backdrop, the relevant provisions of the Act have to be interpreted. It is also well known that an interpretation clause is not a positive enactment. 10. In the aforementioned backdrop, the relevant provisions of the Act have to be interpreted. Clauses (c), (d) and (e) of S. 4 of the original Act read thus:- "(c) forty acres of land which is orchard or used for any other horticultural purpose or any land other than land referred to in clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e) (hereinafter referred to as Class III land), or (d) fifty acres of diara land (hereinafter referred to as Class IV land), or (e) sixty acres of hilly, sandy, surplus homestead land or other land none of which yields paddy, rabi or cash-crop (hereinafter referred to as Class V land)." 11. It is, therefore, clear that the legislature specifically included surplus homestead land in clause (e) of Sec. 4 thereof in terms whereof the ceiling area was to be determined. The said Act was amended by Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Bihar Act 1 of 1973), by reason whereof clauses (c), (d) and (e) of S. 4 of the Act was amended in the following terms "(c) thirty acres equivalent to, 12.141 hectares of land other than those referred to in clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e) or land which is an orchard or used for any other horticultural purpose (hereinafter referred to as Class III land), or (d) thirty seven and a half acres, equival, nt to 15,368 hectares of diara land or chaur (hereinafter referred to as Class III land), or (e) forty five acres, equivalent to 18,211 hectares of hilly, sandy or other kind of land none of which yields paddy, rabbi or cashcrop (hereinafter referred to as Class V land)." 12. Thus, in terms of the said amendment the word homestead"was deleted from clause (e) thereof. However, by reason of the, said amendment sub-sec. Thus, in terms of the said amendment the word homestead"was deleted from clause (e) thereof. However, by reason of the, said amendment sub-sec. (2) of S.5 was inserted by the aforementioned Bihar Act 1 of 1973 in the following terms "(2) A land-holder may in addition to the ceiling area retain - (i) any land forming part of his homestead not exceeding one acre equivalent to 0.4047 hectares in area : Provided that the land-holder shall be entitled to retain all permanent structures and the land as may, in the opinion of the Collector, be necessary for the use and enjoyment thereof and shall continue to retain the same only so long as the land remains his homestead". 13. It is, therefore, clear from the aforementioned provision that in terms of subsec. (2) of S. 5 of the said Act as amended by Bihar Act 1 of 1973 a land-holder was not only entitled to retain the lands falling within the ceiling area and any land forming part of the homestead not exceeding one acre, but also all other permanent structures and the land, which in the opinion of the Collector may be necessary for the use and enjoyment thereof and shall continue to retain the same as the land remains as homestead. 14. Clause (ii) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 5 also permitted the land-holder to retain any land in compact block or blocks not exceeding three acres which is orchard or bansbari so long as the land remains or is used as such. The said Act was preceded by various ordinances beginning from Ordinance No. 6 of 1970 which came into force with effect from 9-9-1970. The aforementioned Bihar Act 1 of 1973 was also given retrospective effect and retrospective operation with effect from the said date. Sec. 4, however, had undergone amendment again by reason of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land (Amendment)) Act, 1973 (Bihar Act IX of 1973) S. 2 of the said Bihar Act IX of 1973 substitutes a new S.4 of the Bihar Act XII of 1962 in the following terms "4. Sec. 4, however, had undergone amendment again by reason of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land (Amendment)) Act, 1973 (Bihar Act IX of 1973) S. 2 of the said Bihar Act IX of 1973 substitutes a new S.4 of the Bihar Act XII of 1962 in the following terms "4. Fixation of ceiling area of land - The following shall be the ceiling area of land for one family consisting of not more than five members for the purposes of this Act - (a) fifteen acres, that is equivalent to 6.0705 hectares of land, irrigated or capable of being irrigated by flow of irrigation work or tube wells or lift irrigation which are constructed, improved or controlled by the Central or the State Government or by a body corporate constituted under any law and which provide or are capable of providing water for more than one season (hereinafter referred) to as Class I land. Explanation :- A land shall not be regarded as Class I land unless it is capable of growing at least two crops in .a year, or (b) eighteen acres, equivalent to 7,2846 hectares of land irrigated by such private lift irrigation or private tube wells as are operated by electric or diesel power, and provide or are capable of providing water for more than one season (hereinafter referred to as Class II land). Explanation:- Private lift irrigation or private tube-wells mean those which are not constructed, maintained, improved or controlled by the Central or the State Government or by a body, corporate constituted under any law; or (c) twenty five acres, equivalent to 10,1175 hectares of land irrigated or capable of being irrigated by works which provide or are capable of providing water for only one season (hereinafter referred to as Class III land), or. (d) thirty acres, equivalent to 12,141 hectares of land, other than those referred to in clause (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) or land which is an orchard or used for any other horticultural purpose (hereinafter referred to as Class IV land), or (e) thirty seven and a half acres, equivalent to 15,368 hectares of diara land, or chaur (hereinafter referred to as Class V land), or (f) fortyfive acres, equivalent to 18,211 hectares of hilly, sandy or other kind of land none of which yields paddy, rabbi or cash crop (hereinafter referred to as Class VI land)." 15. By reason of Sec. 3 of the aforementioned 1973 Amendment, sub-sec. (2) of S. 5 of the Act ryas directed to be omitted and the same would always be deemed to be omitted. 16. It is, therefore, clear that clauses(c), (d) and (e) of S. 4 of the Act of Bihar Act XII of 1962 as amended, by Bihar Act 1 of 1973 yeas substantially retained as clause (d), (e) and (f) of S.4 subject to the amendments made therein. 17. Sec. 4 of the Act had undergone further amendment by reason of Bihar Act 22 of 1976 by reason whereof the words the following shall be the ceiling area of land for one family consisting of not more than five members for the purposes of this Act"were substituted by the words on the appointed day, the following shall be the ceiling area of land for one family consisting of not more than five members for the purposes of this Act. 18. By reason of the said amendment Act Ss. 4A. and 4B were also inserted which read thus: "4A. Re-determination of ceiling area -where the ceiling area of the land for any family or any member of the family constituting the family on the appointed day has been determined by any order passed by any authority in accordance with the provisions of this Act prior to the commencement of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Bihar Act 1 of 1973) the ceiling area of such family or member of the family shall be re-determined under this Act with reference to the appointed day in accordance with the amended provisions. Explanation:- In this section authority includes the Collector, Commissioner of the Division and the Board of Revenue. 4B. Explanation:- In this section authority includes the Collector, Commissioner of the Division and the Board of Revenue. 4B. Validation - Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court the determining of ceiling area of any family with reference to the appointed day in any proceeding under this Act shall be deemed to be valid and effective." 19 From the various amendments in Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act as noticed hereinbefore, it is evident that whereas by reason of Act XII of 1962 homestead land was included in clause (e) of Sec. 4 thereof the same was deleted (sic) by reason of Bihar Act I of 1973 subject to the condition that a person would be. entitled to hold homestead .land and orchard etc. to the extent of homestead land and other structures of land used for homestead purpose as also orchard etc. in terms of sub-sec. (2) of S. 5 of the Act, but despite the fact that sub-sec. (2) of S. 5 was omitted with retrospective effect the word homestead has not been included in clause (f) of S. 4 which replaces clause (e) of S. 4 of the original text of the said Act in Bihar Act XII of 1962. It is now well known that the Act has to be interpreted keeping in view the intent and purport of the legislature. 20. It is also well known that the objects and reasons of the Act are of much assistance in the case the statute is vague. The said Act is exproprietary legislation. Such expropriation of legislation as is well known has to be strictly construed. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in the case of Bain V/s. Central Vermont Rly. Co. (AIR 1921 PC 221) and Nazir Ahmad V/s. Tamijaddi Ahmed (AIR 1929 Cal 430). 21. The intent and purport of the legislature has to be found out from the phraseology used in the statute itself. It is significant to note that other kinds of lands which are not capable of being used for agricultural or horticultural purpose have specifically been retained in S. 4 of the Act, namely, orchard, kharhur or pasturage or forest land, hilly land, sandy land or land perennially submerged under water except that submerged in the bed of the river. 22. It is significant to note that other kinds of lands which are not capable of being used for agricultural or horticultural purpose have specifically been retained in S. 4 of the Act, namely, orchard, kharhur or pasturage or forest land, hilly land, sandy land or land perennially submerged under water except that submerged in the bed of the river. 22. However, although the legislature specifically included homestead land in the original Act, the same was deleted from clause (e) of S. 4 of the Act by reason of Bihar Act 1 of 1973. Such deliberate act on the part of the legislature in deleting the word homestead"in my opinion, has not to be given full effect to as evidently the legislature did no intend to deprive the land-holder of his homestead land by including the same in the ceiling area. There cannot be any doubt that the definition of the land as contained in S. 2(f) of the Act having used both terms -means"and includes"must be held to be exhaustive in nature. It is also true that if a word has to be defined in the interpretation clause of the Act, the same meaning should be attributed to the said word in other provisions of the statute. But, this definition of land as contained in S. 2(f) cannot be given effect to in S. 4 of the Act, as the same is repugnant to the context. As noticed hereinbefore S.4 is the charging section. In this context, it is relevant to note the definition of ceiling area as contained in S.2(aaa) which means the area of the land fixed in S.4 as the ceiling area. There is, thus, in my opinion, no escape from the conclusion that despite the fact, land"includes homestead of the land-holder, the same having not been included in the charging section, viz., S. 4 of the Act, cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the ceiling area of the landholder. 23. In other words, it must be held that only the area of land fixed under S. 4 has to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determination of the ceiling area which in turn means that only such types of land are to be taken into consideration for that purpose which had been mentioned therein. 23. In other words, it must be held that only the area of land fixed under S. 4 has to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determination of the ceiling area which in turn means that only such types of land are to be taken into consideration for that purpose which had been mentioned therein. As homestead is not mentioned in S. 4, the same, in my opinion, cannot be included for the purpose of determination of the ceiling area. 24. In view of the fact that the word homestead was purposely deleted from cl. (e) of S. 4, it goes to make the intention of the legislature very clear. By reason of such an amendment, mischief"was sought to be suppressed by the legislature. An amendment which seems to suppress such mischief i.e. mischief of including even the dwelling house or other permanent structures belonging to a person becomes obvious in view of the aforementioned amendment in clause (e) of S. 4 of the Act carried out in terms of Bihar Act 1 of 1973. 25. It is now well known that a decision is an authority for the proposition what it decides. A decision which has not taken into consideration the provisions of the statute or has been passed in ignorance of the statute or any earlier decision does not create any binding precedent having been rendered per incuriam or having passed sub-silentio. 26. In the case of Kalika Kuer V/s. The State of Bihar, reported in 1989 Pat LJR 1203, it has been held by this Court that when decision has been rendered without taking into consideration any earlier decision or a provision of statute, the same does not create a binding precedent. It was, further held that a point not argued before a Bench cannot deter a subsequent Bench to decide the same. The same view has been reiterated by and Full Bench of this Court in Md. Jainul Ansari V/s. Md. It was, further held that a point not argued before a Bench cannot deter a subsequent Bench to decide the same. The same view has been reiterated by and Full Bench of this Court in Md. Jainul Ansari V/s. Md. Khalil, reported in (1990) 2 Pat LJR 378, upon taking into consideration the decisions of A. Antulay V/s. R. S. Nayak, (1988) 1 SCC 602: ( AIR 1988 SC 1531 ); Municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101 : ( AIR 1989 SC 38 ); Union of India V/s. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754 : ( AIR 1989 SC 1933 ) and M/ s. Goodyear India Ltd. V/s. State of Haryana, analogous cases, (1990) 2 SCC 72. 27. Again this view has been taken by this Court in Md. Nazimuddin V/s. State of Bihar, reported in (1990) 2 Pat LJR 505. 28. Yet recently in Durga Pada Banerjee V/s. Smt. Sushmita Banerjee, (1993)1 BLJ 313 , it has been held : "Question which now arises for consideration is as to whether the decision of this Court in Bankim Chandra Roys case (supra) is binding on me?" There is no doubt that a co-ordinate Bench is bound by judgment of another co-ordinate Bench of the same Court. But as noticed in Bankim Chandra Roys case ( AIR 1972 Pat 80 ), the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to S. 26 of the Act nor the submissions which have been made before me were made in the said case. It is well known that a judgment which is rendered without considering the statutory provisions passes sub-silentio. It is also well known that a decision on the question which has not been argued cannot be treated as a precedent. Reference in this connection may be made to A. R. Antulay V/s. R. S. Nayak reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602 a), in Municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Gurnam Kaur reported in (1989) 1 SCC 101 , in Union of India V/s. Raghubir Singh reported in (1989) 2 SCC 754 ; M/s. Goodyear India Ltd. V/s. State of Haryana reported in (1990) 2 SCC 72 at page 96, which have been followed by me in a recent Full Bench decision in Md.Zaimul Ansari V/s. Md. Khalil, reported in 1990 BLT 371. Khalil, reported in 1990 BLT 371. It, therefore, must be held that the decision of this Court in Bankim Chandra Roys case (supra) is not a binding precedent and must be held to have been passed sub-silentio." 29. For the reasons aforementioned, it has to be held that earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in Mahabir Prasad (supra) does not create a binding precedent. 30. As discussed hereinbefore, in Mahabir Prasads case (supra), the effect of amendment in S. 4 by subsequent Acts were not considered and thus the same is not a binding precedent. 31. In Goodyear India Ltd. V/s. State of Haryana, (1990) 2 SCC 72it was held "In my opinion, the High Court correctly noted in the said decision that the provisions of constitutional change have to be construed; and such problems should not be viewed in narrow isolationism but on a much wider spectrum and the principles laid down in Heydon case ((1584) 3 Co Rep 7a) are instructive. Hence, in a situation of this nature, it was just and proper to see what was the position before the Forty sixth Amendment of the Constitution, and find out what was the mischief that was sought to be remedied and then discover the true rationale for such a remedy. In Black Clawson International Ltd. V/s. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg Ag. ((1975) 1 All ER 810 : 1975; AC 591: (1975) 2 WLR 513 (HL)) Lord Reid observed as follows: (All ER, p: 814) "One must first read the words in the context of the Act as a whole, but one is entitled to go beyond that. The general rule in construing any document is that one should put oneself in the shoes"of the maker or makers and take into account relevant facts known to them when the document was made. The same must apply to Acts of Parliament subject to one qualification. An Act is addressed to all the lieges and it would seem wrong to take into account anything that was not public knowledge at the time. That may be common knowledge at the time or it may be some published information which Parliament can be presumed to have had in mind. It has always been said to be important to consider the mischief"which the Act was apparently intended to remedy. The word mischief"is traditionally I would expand it in this way. That may be common knowledge at the time or it may be some published information which Parliament can be presumed to have had in mind. It has always been said to be important to consider the mischief"which the Act was apparently intended to remedy. The word mischief"is traditionally I would expand it in this way. In addition to reading the Act you look at the facts presumed to be known to Parliament when the Bill which became the Act in question was before it, and you consider whether there is disclosed some unsatisfactory state of affairs which Parliament can properly be supposed to have intended to remedy by the Act." 32. Francis Bennion in its statutory interpretation 1984 Edition at page 633 stated thus: "301. The resolution in Heydons case. In Heydons case the Barons of the Exdhequer resolved as follows - That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered (1) What was the common law before the making of the Act; (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide; (3) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth, and (4) The true reason of the remedy, and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall - (a) suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and (b) suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief proprivato commodo (for private benefit), and (c) add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro bono publico (for the public good). Commentary This section sets out a slightly modified version of the resolution in Heydons case ((1584) 3 Co Rep 7a. See also Blackwell V/s. England (1857) 8 E 1 and B 1 Rep 541). It embodies immaterial changes designed to assist reference and improve clarity. The famous resolution in Heydons case has been of great importance in the development of statutory interpretation, and continuous to be cited today. Like many judicial dicta on the subject, it somewhat rashly attempts to be all embracing in a few words. It embodies immaterial changes designed to assist reference and improve clarity. The famous resolution in Heydons case has been of great importance in the development of statutory interpretation, and continuous to be cited today. Like many judicial dicta on the subject, it somewhat rashly attempts to be all embracing in a few words. Nevertheless it marks the first and indeed only attempt by the judges fully to rationalise the important part of their function which concerns statutory interpretaion." 32A. The said reason was again applied while interpreting the provisions of the proviso appended to Sec. 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act by a Full Bench of this Court in M/s. Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. V/s. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi reported in (1990) 2 Pat LJR 797 in the following terms: "In the light of the aforesaid observations let us see what was the position before insertion of Sec. 11 A in the Act and whether it disclosed some unsatisfactory state of affairs which Parliament can properly be supposed to have intended to remedy by the Amending Act." 33. In any event the deletion of the word homestead"from the purview of clause (e) of Sec. 4 of the Act in 1962 Act and non-insertion thereof subsequently in Bihar Act No. IX of 1973 must be held to be causus omissus which cannot be supplied by the Court. It is now well known that causus omissus is an application of the principle that the matter which should have been, but has not been provided in statute cannot be supplied by the Court as to do so will be legislation and not construction. Reference in this connection may be made to Wali Ram Banan Hirai V/s. Mr. Justice B Lendi, ( AIR 1988 SC 2267 at 2283). 34. In P.K. Unni V/s. Nirmala Industries, [ (1990) 2 SCC 378 ] : AIR 1990 SC 933 , it has been held as follow (at p 936 of AIR): "Where the language of the statute leads to manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, the court can of course, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. In doing so "a judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases." Per Denning, L.J., as he then was, Seaford Court Estates Ltd. V/s. Asher [(1949) 2 All ER 155, 164] See the observation of Sarkar, J. in M. Pentiah V/s. Muddala Veeramallappa [ (1961) 2 SCR 295 , 314: AIR 1961 SC 1107 "]". 35. In this connection, it has been found as a fact that the lands are situated within the Gaya Municipality. It is not the case of the respondents that the lands in question are situated at a nearby place of agricultural holdings of the landholder. 36. In this view of the matter, I have no other option but to hold that the homestead land of the landholder does not come within the purview of Sec. 4 of the Act for purpose of determining the ceiling area. 37. This application is, therefore, allowed and the impugned orders as contained in Annexures 3 and 4 are quashed. A. N. CHATURVEDI, J. :- 38. I agree. Application allowed.