Hari Gyan Singh v. State of Rajasthan — 1993 DIGILAW 241 (RAJ)

Honble AGARWAL, CJ. — This special appeal, under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, has been filed by Dr. Hari Gyan Singh challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge upholding his suspension order dated 5.10.1992. (2). Briefly stated the facts are these. The appellant was appointed as Vice-Chancellor of the Rajasthan Agriculture University, Bikaner on 20.4.1991 for a period of three years from the date of his taking over charge. During his term as Vice-Chancellor, a number of complaints regarding favouritism in the selection of teachers, large scale transfers of the staff members in arbitrary manner, manipulation in the records pertaining to the University bodies and misuse of Doordarshan were received by the Chancellor. By the letter dated 20.4.1992, the Secretary to Chancellor informed the appellant about proposed initiation of enquiry against him under section-9 of the Rajasthan Agriculture University Act (briefly stated the Act). The appellant was called upon to submit his explanation within two weeks. (3). In his explanation, the appellant denied the charges and asserted that he had neither misused his position as the Vice- Chancellor nor he was guilty of having made illegal appointments or transfers. All other charges made against him were also denied as incorrect and wrong. (4). The Chancellor appointed Sh. Mangal Behari, IAS (Retired) as one man commission and directed him to investigate the complaints which were received against the appellant. The Commission was directed to submit its report within a period of three months. (5). Subsequently, on 5.10.1992 the respondent No.2 suspended the appellant on the view that the complaints and charges against him were grave in nature. By the said order, the Chancellor appointed Sh. Rakesh Hooja, IAS Area Development Commissioner to function as Vice-Chancellor on stop gap arrangement. (6). Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant argued four points which have been mentioned at page 3 of the judgment. Those very four points were repeated before us in the appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant laid special emphasize on the submissions one and two urged before the learned Single Judge. Under these submissions, the learned counsel urged that the Chancellor had no power either to suspend the appellant or to initiate enquiry against him. The review of the various provisions of the Act would indicate that none of the two submissions has any merit. (7). Under these submissions, the learned counsel urged that the Chancellor had no power either to suspend the appellant or to initiate enquiry against him. The review of the various provisions of the Act would indicate that none of the two submissions has any merit. (7). The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that as the Vice-Chancellor is appointed on the recommendations of the Selection Committee and also on the advise of the State Government, the Appointing Authority could not be the Chancellor. Sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act negatived the submission of the appellants counsel, inasmuch as, the power to appoint a Vice- Chancellor has been given to the Chancellor. Therefore, the submission of the appellants counsel is not acceptable. (8). The next submission of the appellants counsel was that the proceedings initiated against the appellant under section-9 of the Act was illegal, inasmuch as, the power to order inspection or enquiry conferred by Section-9 of the Act is of a different nature and for a different purpose, hence, the initiation order by the Chancellor was illegal being not in conformity with the provisions of the Act. Sec. 9 of the Act empowers the Chancellor to get an inspection made and enquiry conducted in respect of any of the matters connected with the administrative or the finances of the University. The power conferred is of a wide nature and in exercise of that power, the Chancellor could appoint one man commission for locating the fault and identifying the Officer who was liable for the same. Section-9 of the Act has to be construed in a manner that satisfied its purpose. Strait jacket and narrow interpretation of this Section would defeat the very object and purpose of framing it. The Chancellor has been conferred power by this Section being overall incharge of the Rajasthan Agriculture University. (9). We may refer to Section 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 which lays down, that power to appoint to include power to suspend, remove or dismiss. It is well understood proposition of law that suspension is not punitive. That being so, the legislature has not laid down any guideline for passing an order of suspension. (9). We may refer to Section 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 which lays down, that power to appoint to include power to suspend, remove or dismiss. It is well understood proposition of law that suspension is not punitive. That being so, the legislature has not laid down any guideline for passing an order of suspension. It is understood by all concern that the suspension pending enquiry is for a temporary period to enable the Enquiry Officer to consider the papers brought before him and, thereafter, to submit report to the Appointing Authority. (10). Counsel for the appellant next submitted that making of an order of suspension behind the back of a person to be affected would amount to breach of principle of natural justice. The submission is not tenable. The principle of natural justice or holding of an enquiry is neither a universal principle of justice nor inflexible dogma. The principles of natural justice are not incapable of exclusion in a given situation. For example, Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India which essentially embodies the concept of natural justice, itself contemplates that there may be situations which warrant or permit the non-applicability of the principles underlying Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court has also recognized that the rule of audi alteram partem can be excluded where having regard to the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provision, fairness in action does not demand its application and even warrants its exclusion. If importing the right to be heard has the effect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demands, natural justice could be avoided. See Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (1). (11). In Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel (2), the Supreme Court held that the principles of natural justice must not be displaced save in exceptional cases. (12). We have already pointed out that the proposition of law tested time and again in matters of suspension pending enquiry is that no opportunity is required to be given. (13). (11). In Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel (2), the Supreme Court held that the principles of natural justice must not be displaced save in exceptional cases. (12). We have already pointed out that the proposition of law tested time and again in matters of suspension pending enquiry is that no opportunity is required to be given. (13). In Pratap Singh vs. State of Punjab (3), the Supreme Court took resort to Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 for holding : — "The power of suspending a Government servant is vested in the authority which appoints the Government servant in view of S. 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897." (14). General Clauses Act lays down the rules of interpretation of the enactments framed by the Parliament and the State Legislature. Section 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 is in para materia with Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It reads as under :— "16. Power to appoint to include power to suspend or dismiss.- Where, by any Central Act or Regulation a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having (for the time being) power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed (whether by itself or any other authority) in exercise of that power." (15). The purpose of the General Clauses Act, 1897 has been best stated by the Supreme Court in Chief Inspector of Mines vs. K.C. Thapar (4). The purpose of this Act, as stated by the Supreme Court, is to place in one single statute different provisions as regards interpretations of words and legal principles which would otherwise have to be specified separately in many different acts and regulations. (16). As there is nothing in the Act demonstrating or establishing that the different intention was desired by the provisions, the resort or help could be derived from the Rajasthan General Clauses Act for tracing the power of the Appointing Authority with regard to suspension. (17). Sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Rajasthan Agriculture University, Bikaner Act, 1987 provides that the Vice-Chancellor shall be principal acamedic and executive officer of the University and shall exercise overall supervision and control over the affairs of the University. (17). Sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Rajasthan Agriculture University, Bikaner Act, 1987 provides that the Vice-Chancellor shall be principal acamedic and executive officer of the University and shall exercise overall supervision and control over the affairs of the University. He shall have all such powers as may be necessary for true observance of the provisions of the Act and the Statutes. (18). Section 29 deals with Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations of the University. The relevant clauses (1) to (5) of Statute (1) are being reproduced below: - "Vice-Chancellor (1) The Vice-Chancellor shall be a whole time officer of the University and shall be appointed by the Chancellor on the advice of the Government upon the recommendation of a Selection Committee consisting of three members as under : (a) One person nominated by the Board not connected with the University or any college thereof. (b) One educationist nominated by the Chancellor; and (c) One person nominated by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research. (2) One of the persons nominated under clause (1) shall be appointed by the Chancellor to be the Chairman of the Committee. (3) The term of office of the Vice-Chancellor shall be three years from the date on which he enters upon his office or until he attains the age of sixty five years, whichever is earlier; Provided that the Chancellor may require the Vice-Chancellor whose term is expiring to continue in office for such period, not exceeding one year, as may be specified by the Chancellor; Provided further that a person shall be eligible for appointment as the Vice-Chancellor for the second term. (4) Where a permanent vacancy in the office of the Vice- Chancellor occurs by reason of his death, resignation, removal or expiry of the term or on any other ground, it shall be filled by the Chancellor in the manner specified in clause (1) and for so long as it is not filled, stop-gap arrangement may be made by the Chancellor under and in accordance with clause (5). (5) In the case of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice- Chancellor by reason of leave, suspension or otherwise or when a stop-gap arrangement is necessary under clause (4), the Chancellor may, on the advice of the Government, make such arrangements for carrying on the functions of the Vice-Chancellor as he deems fit." (19). Mr. (5) In the case of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice- Chancellor by reason of leave, suspension or otherwise or when a stop-gap arrangement is necessary under clause (4), the Chancellor may, on the advice of the Government, make such arrangements for carrying on the functions of the Vice-Chancellor as he deems fit." (19). Mr. Rathore, learned counsel for the appellant relied on several decisions of this Court and of other courts for the proposition that the suspension being serious in nature which may some time involve humiliation of the person as against whom it was passed, it should be exercised cautiously. That may be so, but it does not mean that where grounds for exercise of power suspending the Vice-Chancellor have been made out, the Authority should deter from doing so merely because it will involve serious consequences. The Officer holding high post of a Vice-Chancellor is expected to keep himself much above the day to day quibbles and should not indulge in making wrong appointments or transfers. (20). On the material, the Chancellor was satisfied that public interest and the interest of the University required placing the appellant under suspension. That was his discretion. It was wrong to argue that he acted arbitrarily. On materials, the action placing the appellant under suspension cannot be branded as illegal. (21). The next submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the Chancellor has acted malafidely in suspending the appellant. We are unable to find any substance in this submission. (22). The plea of mala fides is raised often but it is only rarely that it can be substantiated to the satisfaction of the Court. Merely raising a doubt is not enough, there should be something specific, direct and precise to sustain the plea of mala fides. The burden of proving mala fides is on the individual making the allegation. This burden is not easy to discharge as it requires going into the motives or the state of mind of an authority, and it is hardly possible for an individual to know the same and it is all the more difficult to establish it before a court. The difficulties inherent in proving mala fides have been brought out by the Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa vs. Tamil Nadu (5). (23). The difficulties inherent in proving mala fides have been brought out by the Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa vs. Tamil Nadu (5). (23). It was submitted by the appellants counsel that the suspension of the appellant was discretionary with the Chancellor and in exercise of that discretion he was actuated by a motive to punish the appellant and not for any justified purpose. The submission has no substance. As against the Chancellor, such an allegation made by the appellant is not believable. The mala-fide exercise of the discretionary power would have amounted to abuse of power had it been so. That is not so in the instant case. There was no private or personal grudge of the respondent in suspending the appellant. The suggestion made by the learned counsel for the appellant by taking into account the background of the case about the passing of a stay order is not established. (24). It is said that the courts are concerned with the flesh and blood of an actual case whereas statutes deal typically with abstract or dimly foreseen problems. (25). In the instant case, no facts could establish that the respondent-Chancellor acted for ulterior purpose. Such an argument was advanced, but has no merit at all. (26). The learned counsel for the appellant urged that although more than three months have passed since the judgment of the learned Single Judge, but one man commission has not touched any papers, registers or ledgers which could show that the charges against the appellant were being investigated. Mr. B.P. Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondents produced before us a copy of the interlocutory report of the Commission to controvert the submission of the appellant. (27). Be that as it may, it appears from the papers produced before us that nothing concrete has been done up-till-now. A prayer was made by Mr. B.P. Agrawal learned counsel for the respondents for giving time to the Commission upto 15.07.1993 for submission of the report and, thereafter, 15 days for the State Government to make up its mind about the course of action. (28). Realizing the difficulties and hurdles that came in the way of the Com-mission, we extend the time for submission of the report upto 31.07.1993. On failure of the Commission to do so, the appellant would be entitled automatically to be reinstated on the post of the Vice-Chancellor. (29). (28). Realizing the difficulties and hurdles that came in the way of the Com-mission, we extend the time for submission of the report upto 31.07.1993. On failure of the Commission to do so, the appellant would be entitled automatically to be reinstated on the post of the Vice-Chancellor. (29). For the reasons given above, the special appeal fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.