This revision petition is directed against the order dated 20.1.1986 passed by the learned Munsiff, Udaipur in Title Suit No. 7 of 1985 whereby the learned Munsiff, in view of the provisions contained in section 14 of the Tripura Agricultural Indebtedness Relief Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), rejected the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) prayer for temporary inju­nction and also stayed further proceedings of the suit with a direction to take steps for further proceeding of the suit, if any, after disposal of the proceeding pending before the Tribunal. 2. Shortly put, the facts leading to this revision petition are that the petitioners purchased 1.24 acres of land (hereinafter referred to as the suit land) covered by Plot No. 740 appertaining Khatian No. 361 of Mouja Upendranagar by different sale deeds from the respondent herein for valuable consideration and also got possession of their purchased land. Alike the peti­tioners, one Hiralal Das also purchased a plot of land measuring .20 acres .of Plot No.113 appertaining to Khatian No. 36 from the respondent by dint of a registered kabala dated 7.9.1976. But it was alleged by the petitioners that although Hiralal Das purchased the land of Plot No. 113, the kabala dated 7.9.1976 whereby he purchased the aforesaid land wrongly contained Dag No. 740 of Khatian No. 361 instead of Dag No. 113 and Khatian No. 36 and thus attracted the purchased land of petitioners. The respondent, thereafter repurchased the aforesaid land from Hiralal Das by another deed of sale dated 21.3.1980 with the same description of land i.e.Dag No.740 of Khatian No.36 and soon after the purchase the respondent threatened the petitioners to dispo­ssess them from land measuring .20 acres of their purchased land described in Schedule Ga attached to the plaint. The petitioners, therefore, filed the suit for declaration of their title, and confirmation of possession over the suit land and also prayed for perpetual injunction restraining the respondent from ' interfering with their peaceful possession over the suit land. 3. The respondent resisted the suit by filing a written statement wherein he, inter alia, contended that the sale of land as alleged in the plain! was not out and out sale, but was a mortgage under an agreement to repurchase on repayment of consideration money within the stipulated period. 3. The respondent resisted the suit by filing a written statement wherein he, inter alia, contended that the sale of land as alleged in the plain! was not out and out sale, but was a mortgage under an agreement to repurchase on repayment of consideration money within the stipulated period. The respon­dent also challenged the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain the suit in view of the provisions contained under section 14 of the Act. 4. The trial Court by its order dated 19.12.1985 framed a preliminary issue viz. "Whether the present suit is barred by the Tripura Agricultural Indebtedness Relief Act ?" Thereupon the petitioners filed an application for review of this order on the ground that the issue as framed was not purely a question of law, but a mixed question of law and fact which require inves­tigation into the facts. Hence, all the issues involved in the suit are required to be framed. But learned trial Court after hearing the parties passed the impugned order dated 20.1.1987 holding that it would be a violation of the provisions of section 14 of the Act if the prayer for temporary injunction is allowed. By the same order he also stayed further proceedings of the suit until disposal of the proceeding pending before the Tribunal. 5. Aggrieved by this order the petitioners filed the present revision petition. The foremost and perhaps the only point which calls for determina­tion is whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 6. Before entering into the rival contentions canvassed at the Bar it would be necessary and also useful to quote the long title of the Tripura Agicultural Indebtedness Relief Act, 1979 which reads : ''An Act to provide relief from indebtedness to agricultural labourers, rural artisans and small farmers in the State of Tripura and for matters connected therewith." 7. A reading of this title as quoted above indicates that the object of the Act is to provide relief from indebtedness to agricultural labourers, rural artisans and small farmers. Section 2 (e) of the Act defines the term 'debtor' to mean an individual or an undivided Hindu family who has borrowed or incurred any debt and belongs to any of the following categories, namely : (i) marginal farmer, (ii) landless labourer, (iii) tribal jbumia, and (iv) rural artisan. Section 2 (e) of the Act defines the term 'debtor' to mean an individual or an undivided Hindu family who has borrowed or incurred any debt and belongs to any of the following categories, namely : (i) marginal farmer, (ii) landless labourer, (iii) tribal jbumia, and (iv) rural artisan. Section 2(h) further envisages that a 'marginal farmer' in relation of a person and not belonging to Scheduled Tribe means a farmer who owns or cultivates as share cropper land measuring not more than one hectare of nal or lunga or two hectares of other agricultural land and in relation of a person belong­ing to a Scheduled Tribe means a farmer who owns or cultivates as share cropper land measuring not more than two hectares of nal or lunga or four hectares of other agricultural land. 8. Chapter II of the Act starts with the title 'Relief from indebtedness' and section 3 under this Chapter states that no civil Court shall entertain any suit, appeal, or proceeding against a debtor for the recovery of any amount of such debt including interest, if any. Section 4 (1) says that : “Every creditor referred to in clause (f) section 3 shall, within such period as may be prescribed, furnish to the Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area where such creditor has his ordinary place of business a state­ment in such form as may be prescribed containing the names of all persons who have pledged movable property with him, the nature and description of such property the amount advanced and due as on the commencement of this Act, the rate of interest and such other particulars as may be prescribed." And sub-section (2) of section 4 states that: "A debtor referred to in clause (f) of section 3 may also make an applica­tion to the Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area where his creditor has his ordinary place of business for an order for the delivery of the movable property pledged by the debtor." Section 4 (3) of the Act makes provision that on receipt of a statement under sub-section (1) or an application under sub-section (2), the Tribunal shall make an enquiry and determine whether the debtor is entitled to relief under section 3. Ssction 5 (2) envisages that on receipt of such application and after such enquiry conducted in the manner prescribed, the Tribunal shall pass an order releasing the mortgage property and grant a certificate of redemption in the prescribed form which shall be admissible as evidence of such redemp­tion in any proceeding before any Court or other authority. Section 6 of the Act further envisages that in case any person is aggrieved by the order of the decision made by the Tribunal under section 4 or section 5 he, within a period of 60 days, may appeal to the appellate Tribunal subject to payment of such fees as may be prescribed. In this context, the most important section namely, section 14 (1) may be quoted as under : "No civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine." 9. It would thus be seen from the provisions quoted above that through Tribunal the Government has created a machinery to give relief to the persons who fall under the categories of (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of section 2 (e) of the Act and section 4 (3) confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to decide whether a debtor is entitled to relief under section 3. It will further appear from section 14 (1) as quoted above that civil Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain any matter which the Tribunal or appellate Tribunal is empo­wered under the Act to determine. 10. In the case in hand, the petitioners allegation was that although they purchased the land in suit on payment of valuable consideration. the defendant after repurchase of .20 acres from Hiralal Das threatened them to dispossess and hence they filed the suit for declaration of their title, confirmation of possession and perpetual injunction restraining the respondent from entering into the suit land. The contention of the respondent on the other hand was that he did not sell the land in suit to the petitioners but he mortgaged the suit land on condition of repurchase in case he could make the payment within the stipulated period. 11. The only point urged by Mr. The contention of the respondent on the other hand was that he did not sell the land in suit to the petitioners but he mortgaged the suit land on condition of repurchase in case he could make the payment within the stipulated period. 11. The only point urged by Mr. MC Deb Roy, learned counsel appea­ring for the petitioner is that the order of learned trial Court is perverse and not tenable in law as the order does not indicate as to whether he was prima facie satisfied that it was a mortgage and not out and out sale. But Mr. S Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has repelled the contention of Mr. Deb Roy by submitting that the very order of the learned Munsif will show that the respondent filed letter No. 478/SDO/DDP/REV/ 86 dated 18.1.1986 of SDO, Udaipur which shows that he received an application from the respondent for relief under Agricultural Indebtedness Relief Act against the petitioner. So according to Mr. Deb this letter is quite indicative of the fact that under section 5 (1) of the Act the respondent approached the SDO who is the Tribunal under the Act for relief Mr. Deb has, therefore, submitted that this finding of fact is enough that the matter is pending before the Tribunal and hence the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 12. Mr. Deb Roy, has however, reiterated that it is incumbent upon the learned Munsiff to make a finding that he was prima facie satisfied that it was a mortgage and not a sale and that the defendant also falls under the expression 'marginal farmer'. Mr. Deb Roy, however, has placed reliance upon a decision rendered in the case of Daulatram Lakhani vs. State of Assam & others reported in AIR 1990 Gauhati 17 [1989 (1) GLJ 37]. This case relates to Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886. Regulations 154,154A and Rule 18 of the Settlement Rules framed under the aforesaid Regulation. Realising the importance of the subject the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hansaria, as then he was, sitting singly referred the following question of law for answer : "Where a civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit which challenges or is connected with, any act done or purported to have been done under Rule 18 of the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 ? Justice Hansaria, as then he was, sitting singly referred the following question of law for answer : "Where a civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit which challenges or is connected with, any act done or purported to have been done under Rule 18 of the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 ? If so, under what circumstance ?" The question was decided by a Full Bench of this Court after analysing a number of decisions of the Privy Council as well as Supreme Court. It was held that civil Courts' jurisdiction would not be barred in the following cases : "1. when the order under Rule 18 is patently illegal or without jurisdiction; 2. where the remedy provided by the Regulation to adjudge the objection raised is not sufficient; 3. where complicated questions relating to title are involved; or 4. where the plaintiff seeks declaration of his title over the land from which he is sought to be evicted." 13. It was also observed that as to point 3 and 4 above the assertion of title must be genuine and not a mere pretext a bonaflde claim of having title and not having only a husk of title. 14. It will appear from the above conclusions that civil Court will have jurisdiction in case the order passed under the special Act is patently illegal and without jurisdiction. 15. In support of his contention Mr. S. Deb, the learned senior counsel placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Gundaji Satwaji Shiode vs. Ramchandra Bhikaji Joshi reported in AIR 1979 SC 655 where a question arose as to whether plaintiff was an agriculturist under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Act, 1948. The plaintiff produced a certificate (Ext.78) issued by the Mamlatdar certifying that the plaintiff was an agricultural labourer. The trial Court held that this certificate had no evidentiary value and was not valid. The plaintiff produced a certificate (Ext.78) issued by the Mamlatdar certifying that the plaintiff was an agricultural labourer. The trial Court held that this certificate had no evidentiary value and was not valid. On the question of plaintiff being an agriculturist, the trial Court itself recorded finding that plaintiff was not agriculturist and the trial Court also held that whether the plaintiff was an agriculturist or not being an incidental issue in a suit for specific performance of a contract the civil Court has jurisdiction to try In appeal by the plaintiff the High Court agreed with the finding of the trial Court with regard to the validity of the certificate Ext. 78. On the question of jurisdiction of the trial Court to decide the issue about the plaintiff being an agriculturist the High Court also agree i with the finding of the trial Court. The matter thereafter came up before the Supreme Court which held "The combined effect of sections 70,85 and 85A of the Act is that where in a suit properly constituted and cognizable by the civil Court upon a contest an issue arises which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a competent authority under the Tenancy Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to settle, decide or deal with the same is not only ousted but the civil Court is under a statutory obligation to refer the issue to a competent authority under the Tenancy Act to decide the same and upon the reference being answered back to dispose of the suit in accordance with the decision of the competent authority under the Tenancy Act." 16. It would appear from the facts of the above noted case that the question which posed for determination in that case was whether the plaintiff was an agricultural labour or not and that was a question required to be settled and decided by the competent authority under the Tenancy Act, But in the instant case the plaintiffs-petitioners filed the suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession and perpetual injunction. The provisions contained under section 4 (2) of the Act as referred to above will show that on receipt of an application from a debtor the Tribunal will hold an enquiry in the manner provided to determine as to whether the debtor is entitled to relief under section 3 of the Act. The provisions contained under section 4 (2) of the Act as referred to above will show that on receipt of an application from a debtor the Tribunal will hold an enquiry in the manner provided to determine as to whether the debtor is entitled to relief under section 3 of the Act. This provision, therefore, makes it clear that the Tribunal during its enquiry will have to determine whether the debtor falls within the categories of 'debtor' under section 2 (e) of the Act. The provision as extracted above do not even remotely say that a suit for declaration of the title, confirmation of possession and perpetual injunction can be decided by the Tribunal. The jurisdiction conferred under section 4 (2) (ii) is a limited jurisdiction and it is very much circumscribed by the aforesaid provision. Section 14 (1) envisages that civil Court shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Tribunal or the appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine. It is manifest from this provision that there is no express bar whatsoever and need not even a hint of an implied bar against the jurisdiction of a civil Court to determine other questions. It is a settled principle of law that even where there is provision in the statute regar­ding exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil Courts it has to be strictly construed. 17. In the case of Dhulabhai etc. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & another, reported in AIR 1969 SC 78 it has been observed by Hidayatullah, CJ (as then he was) that "the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is all embracing except to the extent it is excluded by an expressed provision of law or by clear intendment arising from such law. This is the purport of section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. In this context, the observation of Judicial Committee may also be quoted as under : "It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. This is the purport of section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. In this context, the observation of Judicial Committee may also be quoted as under : "It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so, excluded, the civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into case where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundame­ntal principles of judicial procedure." 18. In the case of Smti Bismillah vs. Janeshwar Prasad & others reported in AIR 1990 SC 540 it has also been reiterated by the Supreme Court: "It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. The provisions of law which seek to oust the jurisdiction of civil Court needs to be strictly construed." 19. It is in the light of the aforesaid well established principles of law that the question regarding exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts in the present case has to be examined with reference to the provisions of the Act. 20. Here it is pertinent to mention that onus is on the party seeking to oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court to establish its stand. In the instant case the respondent adduced no evidence whatsoever or submitted even a copy of the sale deed to show tnat it was mortgage. 21. I am therefore to turn to section 14(1) of the Act for decision of the question involved. This section as quoted above envisages that civil Courts shall have do jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Tribunal or the appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine. As stated earlier, it will appear from section 4 (3) (ii) of the Act that the question which the Tribunal is empowered to determined is whether the applicant is a debtor entitled to relief under section 3 of the Act. As stated earlier, it will appear from section 4 (3) (ii) of the Act that the question which the Tribunal is empowered to determined is whether the applicant is a debtor entitled to relief under section 3 of the Act. Whether a person is debtor or not is a question to be decided in the light of the provisi­ons contained under section 2 (e) of the Act, This section 2 (e) read with section 5 (3) (ii) clearly indicates that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is very much limited and cirumscribed. 22. For the reasons stated above, I am of opinion that there is nothing in the language or context of section 14(1) or section 3(o) of the Act to sugg­est that jurisdiction of the civil Court is expressly or by necessary implication barred with regard to the question whether the purchase of the suit land by the plaintiffs petitioners was out and out sale or a mortgage with a stipulation for reconveyance. I therefore, hold that the learned trial Court exercised its jurisdiction illegally in passing the impugned order which is accordingly set aside. 23. The result is that the suit is remanded to the trial Court for holding trial after framing of all the necessary issues and in case it is found that it was a mortgage and comes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal it shall return the plaint. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. 24. Before parting with the records, I feel it necessary to point out that Tripura Agricultural Indebtedness Relief Act, 1979 does not contain any provision of making reference to Tribunal of cases falling with its jurisdict­ion. Such a provision may, therefore, be incorporated for prompt enforce­ment of the remedy provided under the Act. A copy of the judgment be sent to the Secretary (Law), Government of Tripura.