SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision application is directed against the judgment and order of Extra Assistant Judge, Vadodara in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 292 of 1992 dated 2-2-1993 whereby he has allowed the appeal preferred by present respondents (opponents) and has quashed and set aside the order passed by the trial Court below Exh. 5 in Reg. C. S. No. 1656 of 1992. ( 2 ) IT appears that the petitioners-plaintiffs are the owners of property bearing City S. No. 461/2, Tikka No. 8/4 of Division "c" situated at sayajiganj, Baroda. In the said property there is one old building known as "rajwadi BUNGALOW" with number of rooms therein. There is open land around said bungalow. On the Southern side of said bungalow there is open land of the measurement of 64 Ft/157 Ft. and towards further south there is public road known as "m. S. Patel Road". Towards South the length of open land is 157 Ft. and width of open plot towards West is 64 Ft. while towards Eastern side it is lesser than 64 Ft. On the Western side of said building there is open space and there are two Gates which open on Kadak Bazar road. It is not disputed before this Court that the petitioners-plaintiffs are the owners of the building in question as well as of the open parcel of land. It is also required to be noted that there are approximately 26 tenants in different rooms of the said Rajwadi bungalow. It is very clear from the topography of the suit property that inhabitants of the aforesaid 26 rooms of the building had their right of ex-gress and in-gress towards West from the two gates. However, since on southern side there was an open parcel of land it may be that said open parcel of land was used for the purpose of going to M. S. Patel road towards South. It is also required to be noted that there is facility of water connection provided in the building itself and there are Chokdis in the building itself. However, there is one open chokdi with water connection in the open land and it is the case of the inhabitants of the building that they were enjoying said open chokdi and water connection and also enjoying said open parcel of land since number of years. However, there is one open chokdi with water connection in the open land and it is the case of the inhabitants of the building that they were enjoying said open chokdi and water connection and also enjoying said open parcel of land since number of years. It is their case that the said open portion of land was adjacent to the leased property, and therefore, the same should be treated as leased "premises" as defined under Sec. 5 (8) of the Bombay Rents and Lodging House Rates Control act, 1947. ( 3 ) IT appears that the owners of the building of the open plot of land wanted to put up construction on the plot of land towards South and therefore they have submitted building plan for commercial complex to Baroda Municipal Corporation. The Baroda Municipal Corporation has sanctioned building plan and pursuant to said sanction the petitioners-plaintiffs wanted to put up construction on said open plot of land. The petitioners have categorically stated before the lower Courts as well as before this court that they do not want, in anyway, to disturb the tenants in Rajwadi bungalow nor do they want to evict them from the premises rented to them. They have also made it clear to the Court that they do not want to diminish any of the facilities available hitherto to the respondentsdefendants (tenants ). However, the inhabitants of the said bungalow have not permitted the petitioners to put up construction on the open plot of land towards South, and therefore, the petitioners-plaintiffs filed Reg. C. S. No. 1656 of 1992 in the Court of Civil Judge (S. D.), Baroda and in said suit they applied for temporary injunction against the respondentsdefendants restraining them from, in anyway, disturbing the plaintiffs in putting up construction on the Southern side as per building permission no. 15/91 granted by Baroda Municipal Corporation. ( 4 ) IT appears that on application for temporary injunction ad-interim injunction was granted by the Civil Judge (S. D.), Baroda on 22-12-1992. After service of summons the respondents-defendants appeared and filed their reply at Exh. 14 and produced documentary evidence in support of their defence. After perusing the pleadings of the parties and the documentary evidence that was produced before it and after hearing the arguments of the advocates of both the parties the trial Court was pleased to grant application at Exh. 14 and produced documentary evidence in support of their defence. After perusing the pleadings of the parties and the documentary evidence that was produced before it and after hearing the arguments of the advocates of both the parties the trial Court was pleased to grant application at Exh. 5 in favour of petitioners-plaintiffs restraining the respondents-defendants from in anyway obstructing the plaintiffs from putting up construction of a multi-storeyed building on Southern side of the property in question consistent with the building permission No. 15/91. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the Civil Judge (S. D.), Baroda the respondents-defendants preferred Civil Misc. Appeal No. 292 of 1992 in the Court of Extra Asst. Judge, Baroda. Extra Asst. Judge, baroda by judgment and order, dated 2-2-1993 allowed the appeal inter alia holding that the defendants-tenants were in possession of open space and were enjoying such open space since long time, and therefore, the petitioners-plaintiffs should not be permitted to put up construction on such open land. He also held that the petitioners-plaintiffs have no prima facie case and that balance of convenience was in favour of respondents-defendants as they were enjoying open space since long and that they cannot be deprived of such enjoyment. ( 6 ) MR. K. G. Vakharia, learned Counsel for petitioners has assailed the order of the lower appellate Court by mainly contending that the lower appellate court has relied upon the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of madhav Vithal Kudwa v. Madhavdas Vallabhdas and Ors. , reported in AIR 1979 Bom. 49 for the purpose of holding that the word "appurtenant" as used in Sec. 5 (8) of the Bombay Rent Act would include the open land towards South of "rajwadi Bungalow". He submitted that the aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court is reversed by the Division Bench of Bombay high Court the case of Morarji Goculdas Deoji Trust v. Madhav Vithal, reported in AIR 1983 Bom 68 , and therefore. the very basis on which the order of the lower appellate Court was dependent is knocked out. He submitted that the aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court is reversed by the Division Bench of Bombay high Court the case of Morarji Goculdas Deoji Trust v. Madhav Vithal, reported in AIR 1983 Bom 68 , and therefore. the very basis on which the order of the lower appellate Court was dependent is knocked out. He further submitted that the entire plot of land towards South was not in any case required for beneficial enjoyment of the rooms rented out to different tenants and that on either side of Rajwadi Bungalow there is sufficient open space which provides full access to the tenants to their property. He further submitted that if reference is made to the panchnama which was made by the Court commissioner it would be clear that there is access to the Rajwadi bungalow by two gates on the Western side and that there is open plot of land towards west, East and South also. He submitted that the petitioners-plaintiffs never wanted and they are ready and willing to give undertaking to the Court that they do not want in anyway to evict the tenants from their suit premises nor do they want to disturb their enjoyment of tenanted rooms being "rajwadi bungalow", and therefore, if the landlord wants to make beneficial use of his own property, namely, open plot towards South of Rajwadi Bungalow the tenants cannot obstruct the landlord from making use of such property. He stated that the judgment and order of the lower appellate Court is also vitiated inasmuch as the lower appellate Court has failed to appreciate the true scope of definition "premises" as given by Sec. 5 (8) of Bombay rent Act. He further submitted that the petitioners-plaintiffs as owner of entire property have right to make use of their own property and the tenants cannot be permitted to obstruct the landlords from making use of their property, and therefore, also the order passed by the lower appellate Court is required to be quashed and set aside. ( 7 ) MR. Mohit S. Shah, learned Advocate for respondents-defendants has on the other hand submitted that the respondents-defendants has also instituted rent Suit No. 552 of 1990 in the Court of Small Causes at Baroda dad in such suit initially injunction was granted against the petitioners-plaintiffs restraining them from putting up construction. ( 7 ) MR. Mohit S. Shah, learned Advocate for respondents-defendants has on the other hand submitted that the respondents-defendants has also instituted rent Suit No. 552 of 1990 in the Court of Small Causes at Baroda dad in such suit initially injunction was granted against the petitioners-plaintiffs restraining them from putting up construction. He submitted that such injunction was subsequently not extended as there were some talks of settlement between the parties. He submitted that the aforesaid suit is pending in a competent court, namely, the Rent Court under Sec. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act and that being the only Court competent to try the suit or dispute between the landlord and tenant, the suit of the petitioners-plaintiffs in ordinary Civil court was not maintainable. He further submitted that one of the tenants has filed Rent Suit No. 514 of 1992 in the Small Causes Court at Baroda and in said suit he has obtained ad interim injunction restraining the petitionersplaintiffs from putting up construction towards West of "rajwadi Bungalow" and from in anyway interfering with the possession of chokdi towards South of Rajwadi Bungalow. He submitted that so long as such injunction granted by Rent Court is operative this Court should not grant injunction which would run counter to the injunction granted by the Rent Court in favour of one of the tenants. Lastly, he submitted that the injunction as prayed for should not be granted to the petitioners because granting such injunction, in substance, would amount to decreeing the suit of the petitioners-plaintiffs and that if such a big construction like multi-storeyed building is permitted to be constructed irreparable loss will be caused to the defendants-tenants which cannot be compensated in terms of money. Re : Definition of premises" as given under Section 5 (8) and Question as to whether open land towards South is Adjacent to rented Premises section 5 (8) of Bombay Rent Act reads as under : "premises" means - (a) any land not being used for agricultural purposes : (b) any building or part of building let separately (other than a farm building) including - (i) the garden, grounds, garrages and out-houses, if any appurtenant to such building or part of a building; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building; (iii) Any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof but does not include a room or other accommodation in a Hotei or Lodging house. " ( 8 ) THE respondents mainly relied upon clause (b) (i) which provides that premises means any building or part of building let separately including, garden, grounds. garrages and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building. It is the submission of the respondents-defendants that she land towards South of Rajwadi bungalow was appurtenant to said building and it was therefore, part of demised premises within the meaning of Sec. 5 (8 ). Since it was part of demised premises the petitioner-landlord cannot be and should not be permitted to make any construction on such open land inasmuch as such construction would diminish their enjoyment of Rajwadi bungalow. In this connection attention of the Court was invited to the decision of the learned single Judge of Bombay High Court in the case of Madhav vithal Kudwa v. Madhavdas Vallabhdas and Ors , reported in AIR 1979 Bom. 49. However, Mr. K. G. Vakharia, learned Advocate for plaintiffs has submitted before this Court that said decision of the learned single Judge of Bombay high Court is reversed by the Division Bench in L. P. A. in the case of morarji Goculdas Deoji Trust v. Madhav Vithal Kudwa, reported in AIR 1983 born. 68. Before the Division Bench of Bombay High Court the defendant was the tenant of room No. 18 on the first floor of building belonging to the plaintiff. In or about October, 1968 he purchased a car which he commenced to park in the open space on the said building. 68. Before the Division Bench of Bombay High Court the defendant was the tenant of room No. 18 on the first floor of building belonging to the plaintiff. In or about October, 1968 he purchased a car which he commenced to park in the open space on the said building. The plaintiffs objected to and as many as three notices were issued to remove the car from the said compound. The defendant did net comply. with the notices. Thereupon suit was filed by the plaintiff for a declaration that the defendant by parking his car in compound was committing trespass and for permanent injunction restraining him from doing so. The defence of the tenant was that he was parking car under express permission from one of the trustees and secondly his defence was that in any event he has statutory right to do so as the open land area around the building was appurtenant to leased room on the first floor within the meaning of Sec. 5 (8) (b) of the Act. The learned single Judge held that the parking of car was essential supply within the meaning of Sec. 24 (1) of the Act, and therefore, he held that the plaintiff cannot cut or withhold the same. In appeal the Division Bench of Bombay high Court construed Sec 5 (8) (b) of the Act. The Division Bench observed as under :"now though one wishes that on the question here the law was certain and succinct, it would, in the very nature of things, not be possible to formulate a precise and singular test or a principle of universal application for determining what is appurtenant. The diversity and the indeterminate nature of the term "appurtenant" and colour, form and shape it can take from case to case can be very interesting indeed. . It is a term of variable import, scope and ambit. There can, therefore, be no fixed invariable or strait-jacket approach or formula in this regard. Besides, whether a thing is appurtenant and if so, to what extent, would be a mixed question of fact and law. The resultant answer must, in each case turn and depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case and the context in which the question arises. "the Division Bench also referred to the meaning of word "appurtenant" in various law dictionaries and ultimately concluded in paras 7. The resultant answer must, in each case turn and depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case and the context in which the question arises. "the Division Bench also referred to the meaning of word "appurtenant" in various law dictionaries and ultimately concluded in paras 7. and 8 as under:"in the context of Sec. 5 (8) (b) of the Act the term "appurtenant" has to be. construed not in its primary sense but in the secondary non-technical sense such as "usually enjoyed with" The concept indicates something appurtenant to the lease and no. the lease itself so construed it would mean "relating to" "adjoining" "an adjunct or accessory" to the premises let. Plain meaning of the provision simpliriior indicates a nexus between the premises leased and the premises appurtenant thereto. There has to be fair and rational correlation between the two premises to be appurtenant must be premises inevitably implied in and essential to the use and enjoyment of the premises lit. Not a constituent part of the lease but necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the lease and therefore, intended to be "premises" within ifs definition in Sec 5 (8 ) (b) of the Act. "considered in this context what would be the position here ? Is it possible reasonably speaking to hold that the open space in the compound on the groundfloor of the suit building is appurtenant to the leased room on the first fleor ? The obvious answer is no. The very location of the leased premises on the first floor negatives the defendants case. After all to what extent can the term "appurtenant" go ? Can it here be extended to the open space in the compound on the ground-floor ? We think not. Is this groundfloor space necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the room on the first floor ? Once again, our answer is no. It would be a misnomer to describe the groundfioor area as appurtenant to the first floor room. The groundfloor area nether pertains nor relates nor adjoining the first floor room. Nor can it legitimately be said that the groundfloor area is usually enjoyed or occupied with the first floor room. It is neither an adjunct nor an accessory nor an appendage qua the first floor room". 8 (A ). The groundfloor area nether pertains nor relates nor adjoining the first floor room. Nor can it legitimately be said that the groundfloor area is usually enjoyed or occupied with the first floor room. It is neither an adjunct nor an accessory nor an appendage qua the first floor room". 8 (A ). From the aforesaid quotation it becomes clear that it is not possible to give 01 formulate a precise meaning of the word "appurtenant". The word has diverse meanings depending upon the context in which it is used. It is a term of variable import, scope and ambit. In its primary sense it imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to the subject-matter of demise or grant, and which would in truth, pass without being specially mentioned. In The Hvlshurys Law of England (4th Edition Vol. 27, Page 103) following statement of law is found : "the words with the appurtenances do not extend the demise so as to include land or buildings which are used with the demised property, but are not parcel of it; nor do they include a part of the building which has been separated from it and has not been occupied with it for many years previous to the demise. The word lands appertaining to or lands belonging to are more easily extended to land usually occupied with the demised premises,"wood/all on Law of Landlord and Tenant (28th Edition, Vol. 1, 1978) observed at page 195 as under :"according to the current of the most recent decisions it would seem that nothing will pass under the word appurtenances which would not equally pass by a conveyance of the principal subjcct-maitcr, without the word appurtenances. The word appurtenanees is not properly apt for the creation of a new right but the word easily admits of a secondary meaning, where the circumstances require as equivalent to usually occupied. Where a strip of ground formed a convenient means of access to the back doors of a row of cottages which were in common ownership, and the cottages were sold to different purchasers, each grant being of a cottage with the garden, outbuildings and appurtenances and including the part of the strip adjoining that cottage, it was held that the right of way de facto enjoyed by the tenants by way of express grant under the word "appurtenances although there was no made road over the strip. "from the aforesaid quotations it becomes clear that the entire land which is adjoining to the demised property is not necessarily appurtenant to the demised property. Entire open parcel of land would not equally pass with a conveyance, viz. Rent note of the principal subject-matter, viz. , room in "rajwadi Bungalow". What was leased to each tenant was a room in the bungalow. The room was the principal subject-matter of the demise. The question is whether along with such room vast portion of open land towards south was intended to be conveyed and in my opinion such intention cannot be inferred in absence of express grant. It is also pertinent to note that the tenants of Rajwadi Bungalow had their right of egress and ingress from two gates towards West and therefore incidental use of open land towards south do not make such open land appurtenant to demised premises. Therefore, while agreeing with the reasoning which found favour with the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court and without expressing any opinion about the conclusion reached by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, I am of the opinion that open land towards South of Rajwadi Bungalow cannot be said to be appurtenant to the leased premises. 8 (B ). In the case of Maharaja Singh v. State of U. P. , reported in 1977 (1) SCC 155 , the Court was called upon to consider the meaning of the expression appurtenant to building. There the question was whether the land on which a cattle fair was being held could be said to be appurtenant to the building situated on the land. The Supreme Court observed as under : "the heated debate at the bar on this and allied aspects need not detain us further also because of our concurrence with the second contention of the Solicitor General that the large open spaces cannot be regarded as appurtenant to the terraces, stands and structures. What is integral is not necessarily appurtenant. A position of subordination, something incidental or ancillary or dependent is implied in appurtenance. Can we say that the large spaces are subsidiary or ancillary to or inevitably implied in the enjoyment of the buildings qua buildings ? That much of space required for the use of the structures as such has been excluded by the High court itself. A position of subordination, something incidental or ancillary or dependent is implied in appurtenance. Can we say that the large spaces are subsidiary or ancillary to or inevitably implied in the enjoyment of the buildings qua buildings ? That much of space required for the use of the structures as such has been excluded by the High court itself. Beyond that may 01 may not be necessary for the hat or mela but not for the enjoyment of the chabutras as such. A hundred acres may spread out in front of a club-house for various games like golf. But all these abundant acres are unnecessary for nor incidental to the enjoyment of the house in any reasonable manner. It is confusion to miss the distinction, fine but real. " the Supreme Court thereafter referred to the meaning of the word "appurtenance" as given in Butterworths, "the words and Phrases Legally defined" and found that the word "appurtenances" has a distinct and definite meaning. Prima facie it imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to the subject matter of the demise or grant, and which would, in truth, pass without being specially mentioned. Ordinarily, what is necessary for the enjoyment and has been used for the purpose of the building, such easements, alone will be appurtenant. Therefore, what is necessary for the enjoyment of the building is alone covered by the expression "appurtenances. The word appurtenances includes all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised, such as rights of way, but it does not include lands in addition to that granted. " the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court was once again considered and approved by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. Trustees of Dharmamurthy Rao Bahadur Calavala cunnan, reported in 1988 (4) SCC 260 . In the said decision large piece of laud together with a bungalow was leased and the question arose as to whether it was a. lease of a bungalow and the land was appurtenant. In the said decision large piece of laud together with a bungalow was leased and the question arose as to whether it was a. lease of a bungalow and the land was appurtenant. Having regard to the position pertaining at the time when the lease was executed, i. e. , in 1951 when residential houses occupied large extents of land, the description of the building in the lease as "club Chambers" with Municipal door number, the building itself being a substantial one occupying about oneeighth of the total area which was used as a residential building by a very affluent person and was later given to the charity on a will executed by him, the first appellate Court and the High Court came to the conclusion that the land in question was appurtenant to the building. The Supreme Court held that the question whether certain land is to be treated as appurtenant or rot was one of fact. While construing the lease the Supreme Court held that the lease was a composite lease, with composite rent of a bungalow with appurtenant land. The Court held that whether the land is appurtenant or not would depend upon the extent and the nature of the land and its situation vis-a-vis the building and not on its description in the lease, the court found that the bungalow was let as Club-house of the Company and the use of the land was incidental to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the building. Applying the aforesaid test can it he said that the use of the open land towards South was incidental to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the building ? Can it be said that open land towards South was so situated with rented rooms in the bungalow so as to form part and parcel of the lease ? While applying the aforesaid test it shall have to be kept in mind that the tenants in the Rajwadi Bungalow had open compound on three sides of the bungalow and open land towards West is used in common for ingress and egress. While applying the aforesaid test it shall have to be kept in mind that the tenants in the Rajwadi Bungalow had open compound on three sides of the bungalow and open land towards West is used in common for ingress and egress. That portion of the land towards West may be said to be necessary fur the convenient use and enjoyment of the rooms in the bungalow, but entire open land towards South which remained open as it was not put to any use by the landlord, do not necessarily become appurtenant to the demised premises. ( 9 ) IN my opinion, therefore, when the respondents-defendants are in possession of rented premises being 26 separate rooms in "rajwadi bungalow" what is leased out to them is a room in the "rajwadi bungalow". The right to use chokdi situated in the middle of the rooms and right to have ex-gross and in-gress out of said bungalow through the main gate and through two gates situated on the Western hide. That portion of land which is closely connected with the building of Rajwadi bungalow may be included as part and parcel of demised premises so that the inhabitants of the bungalow may have right to have ex-gress and ingress on either side of the bungalow. However, such a right cannot be extended in the entire open parcel of land so as to make the entire open parcel of land a part of demised premises. In my opinion, portion of land so as to provide access to the Rajwadi Bungalow and so as to provide some right of movement around the bungalow would be included in the definition, as that may be said to be appurtenant to the rented premises. The object of the legislature by use of word "appurtenant" was to see that bare right necessary for beneficial enjoyment of the rented premises is available to the tenant. However, the legislature never wanted to create a wider right in the tenant of the premises like Rajwadi Bungalow or multi-storeyed building over tint entire portion of land which belonged to the landlord and which was not constructed upon at the time of letting. What the landlord rented out was room in the building and therefore, everything that was barely necessary for the purpose of enjoyment of portion of rented premises should be included in the definition of "premises" by resort to word "appurtenant". What the landlord rented out was room in the building and therefore, everything that was barely necessary for the purpose of enjoyment of portion of rented premises should be included in the definition of "premises" by resort to word "appurtenant". Attempt of the respondents-tenants therefore to keep the entire open land towards South as part and parcel of demised premises must fail and their claim over such open plot of land cannot be accepted What was leased to these 26 tenants each was only a room in Rajwadi Bungalow and therefore amenities such as bathroom, lavatory, chokdi which were hitherto enjoyed by them should be protected and it should also be seen that they must have right of ex-gress and in-gress to the said building. It must also be seen that some open land so as to provide passage is left. open. The claim of the tenants that entire land towards South was part and parcel of demised premises cannot be accepted. The rent note in favour of each tenant clearly goes to establish that what was leased out was only a room in Rajwadi Bungalow and nothing beyond that. In that view of the matter, submission of Mr. Shah, learned Advocate for respondents that within the meaning of Sec. 5 (8) of Bombay Rent Act the open land towards South of Rajwadi Bungalow would be included as land appurtenant to rented premises and therefore the tenants would be entitled to enjoyment and occupation thereof cannot be accepted and it must fail. ( 10 ) AT this stage, if reference is made to the report prepared by the court Commissioner, it would be clear that towards West of Rajwadi bungalow there were two gates, one gate was opposite Mamta Clinic on kadak Bazar road while the other was opposite Pratap High School. It is found that towards South of the said building there was one chokdi and water connection and there were two old lavatories. It was also found that there were 4 to 5 water connections also. Towards further South there was open land and it is on such open land that the petitioners-plaintiffs want to make construction. The area of such open land is 64 Ft. in width and 157 Ft. in length. Towards North of this open portion there is some open land and thereafter there is Rajwadi Bungalow. By the impugned construction the portion of chokdi. The area of such open land is 64 Ft. in width and 157 Ft. in length. Towards North of this open portion there is some open land and thereafter there is Rajwadi Bungalow. By the impugned construction the portion of chokdi. and lavatory towards South is not going to be affected. However, in the order which this Court would ultimately pass appropriate directions shall have to be given so as to see that chokdi, water taps and lavatory are provided for so that no hardship is caused to the respondents-tenants. ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that Extra assistant Judge, Vadodara was wholly wrong in allowing the appeal, dated 2-2-1993 and in quashing and setting aside the order passed by the trial court below Exh. 5 in Reg. C. S. No. 1656 of 1992. Having rightly not decided the question of jurisdiction of (he Court, he unfortunately erred in concluding that there was dispute of possession and enjoyment of open land. He failed to note that the defendants-tenants were claiming to be the tenant of room in the Rajwadi Bungalow and the various rent notes referred to the room only and not to the open parcel of land. He ought to have noted that there is no prima facie evidence in support of the plea that open parcel of land was leased out to the defendant-tenant. Therefore, excepting the plea of the defendant in the written statement there was no material worth the name to reach prima facie finding that the open space towards South was leased out to the tenants. He mainly relied upon the decision of the single judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Madhav Vithal Kudwa v. Madhmdas Vallabhdas, reported in AIR 1979 Bom. He mainly relied upon the decision of the single judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Madhav Vithal Kudwa v. Madhmdas Vallabhdas, reported in AIR 1979 Bom. 49 for the purpose of holding that the open land would fall within the meaning of word premises" as defined by Sec. 5 (8) of the Act because the land was appurtenant to rajwadi Bungalow but unfortunately the said decision of the learned single judge was also overruled in the case of Morarji Goculdas Deoji Trust v. Madhav Vithal, reported in AIR 1983 Bom 68 as stated hereinabove, and therefore, the very foundation of his order is knocked out and therefore the order passed by the lower appellate Court is required to be quashed and set aside and is hereby quashed and set aside. ( 12 ) HOWEVER, with a view to seeing that the plaintiffs-landlords do not deprive the respondents-defendants of their right of enjoyment of the rented premises attempts were made by this Court to see that all reasonable conditions which the tenants may suggest are accepted by the landlord. Unfortunately, despite granting adjournments for a month the tenants have refused to appear before this Court. It has, therefore, become necessary for this Court to see that some reasonable conditions are imposed on the plaintiffs-landlords to safeguard the interest of the defendants-tenants. It is accordingly directed that injunction shall be granted in favour of petitioners-plaintiffs and against respondents-defendants on the application Exh. 5 before the trial Court subject to following conditions : (a) that the petitioners-landlords shall file undertaking in this Court within 4 weeks from today stating that they do not want to evict the defendants from their rented premises nor do they want to demolish rajwadi Bungalow as on today. (b) The landlords shall not take any action to diminish or obstruct enjoyment of Rajwadi Bungalow by the defendants-tenants and all other amenities which are hitherto enjoyed by the tenants such as use of two gates towards West. we of open chokdi in the middle of Bungalow, use of water taps and old latrine towards South shall be kept intact and in no way such uses will be obstructed. (c) The petitioners-plaintiffs shall construction at their own cost the chokdi with water taps towards South if the old chokdi towards south is going to be demolished by them. we of open chokdi in the middle of Bungalow, use of water taps and old latrine towards South shall be kept intact and in no way such uses will be obstructed. (c) The petitioners-plaintiffs shall construction at their own cost the chokdi with water taps towards South if the old chokdi towards south is going to be demolished by them. Similarly, if the two old latrines towards South are going to be affected, the petitionersplaintiffs shall make new latrines at their own cost towards South of Rajwadi Bungalow within a month from today. (d) The petitioners-plaintiffs shall deposit amount of Rs. 1,50,000. 00in the trial Court which will be invested in Fixed Deposit Receipts by the trial Court and shall ultimately abide by the decision of the trial Court as to whether any compensation is required to be paid to the respondents-tenants for diminishing right of enjoyment of rented premises. ( 13 ) IN the result the C. R. A, succeeds. The judgment and order of the extra Assistant Judge, Vadodara in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 292 of 1992 is hereby quashed and set aside and injunction as prayed for in Exh. 5 is granted in favour of petitioners-plaintiffs and against defendants-tenants during the pendency of suit subject to aforesaid conditions. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. (Rest of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.) .