George Mampilly v. Mrs Karthyani Sambu — 1993 DIGILAW 243 (KER)

JUDGMENT P.A. Mohammed, J. 1. In this writ petition, the landlord of a building challenges an order of the Revisional Authority under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short 'the Act') setting aside the decree of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority under S.11(8) of the Act. 2. A short history of the case is found to be relevant for formulating resoluteness on the dispute enwrapped in this case. It can be condensed thus: The building involved in the present petition called 'Mampilly building' was erected by one Ephrain Mampilly, and after his demise it was partitioned between petitioner and his brother who are his legal heirs. In the partition, the northern block of the building was allotted to the petitioner whereas the southern block was apportioned to the share of Dr Kurien Mampilly. The rooms in the northern block were occupied by Federal Bank and one S. N. Menon and they were evicted through the Court Proceedings. In the upstair rooms of the building the petitioner and his wife Dr Lalitha Mampilly were residing. They started a clinic with a dispensary under the name of 'Mampilly Clinic' in the down stairs. The petitioner and his wife being practising Doctors, had decided to outspread the existing clinic into a full fledged Nursing Home with all modern medical facilities. With that end in view, the petitioner later purchased the southern block of the building from his brother Dr Kurien Mampilly as per the assignment deed dated 2-3-1977. There were in all eight rooms in the southern block, five in upstairs and three in downstairs, Five tenants in the upstairs had vacated the rooms and capitulated possession to the landlord. Out of three rooms in the downstairs. one room was occupied by the first respondent (hereinafter called as 'the tenant') on a monthly rent of Rs 80/-, A notice was issued to him on 4-9-1978 requesting to vacate the room in his possession. However, the tenant refused to surrender and consequently a petition for eviction was moved before the Rent Control Court under the provisions of the Act. The above petition was resisted by the tenant and the Rent Control Court finally dismissed it on the ground that the landlord was not entitled to evict the tenant on any of the grounds alleged in the petition. The above petition was resisted by the tenant and the Rent Control Court finally dismissed it on the ground that the landlord was not entitled to evict the tenant on any of the grounds alleged in the petition. Being aggrieved by the said order, the landlord filed an appeal before the Rent Control Appellate Authority under S.18 of the Act. The Appellate Authority found that the averments in the petition for eviction would constitute the ground as one under S.11(8) namely; additional accommodation for personal use. Ultimately the Appellate Authority ordered eviction under S.11(8) of the Act finding that the ground of additional accommodation was made out. As against the said judgment, the tenant filed a revision before the Rent Control Revisional Authority under S.20. The revisional authority by order dated 7-12-1983 (Ext. P3) found that the claim of the landlord would definitely come under S.11(8). However, it further found that the claim that the landlord should get eviction of the room for the purpose of expansion of his clinic into a nursing home is not bona fide. The revisional authority also observed that in case eviction under S.11(8) of the Act was to be allowed, proviso to S.11(10) of the Act would not stand in the way of the order of eviction being passed on that ground. Being aggrieved by the said order refusing eviction, the landlord filed C. R. P. No. 752 of 1984 before this court. The tenant also filed a revision (C. R. P. No 998/1984) before this court as against certain findings entered against him. Both the revisions were disposed of by this court in view of the decision in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasiva Pillai, reported in 1987 (1) KLT 53 , holding that a revision petition under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not maintainable against an order made under S.20 of the Act. The petitioner thereupon filed a Special Leave Petition, S. L. P. No 7958 of 1987, before the Supreme Court against the order of this court in C. R. P. No 752 of 1984. After bearing, the Supreme Court allowed the Special Leave Petition and accordingly set aside the order of this court in the above C. R. P. Pursuant to the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, this writ petition has been filed by the landlord under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash Ext. After bearing, the Supreme Court allowed the Special Leave Petition and accordingly set aside the order of this court in the above C. R. P. Pursuant to the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, this writ petition has been filed by the landlord under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash Ext. P3 order of the revisional authority. 3. Before dealing with the crucial question whether Ext. P3 order of the revisional authority is legal and valid, there are certain points to be considered and decided primarily. The Supreme Court while disposing of the S. L. P. No 7958/1987 observed in Ext. P5 order thus : "Special leave granted. The order of the High Court is set aside. It will be open to the appellant to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution, but such a step will be subject to all the objections which can be raised against such procedure. The appeal is disposed of accordingly." (Italics supplied) In view of the above observation, the tenant had raised the objection that writ petition under Art.226 would not lie inasmuch as the order sought to be quashed is the order of the civil court. A Division Bench of this court in Ramachandran Nair v. Krishna Pillai 1991 (2) KLT 162 ) observed : "District Court under S.20 of the Act is a civil court in the hierarchy of courts. This has been laid down by a Division Bench of this court in Anandan v. Soumini (1991) (1) KLT 53). The order of the District Court being the decision of a civil court cannot be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari under Art.226 of the Constitution of India''. See also: Union of India v. Vijayamohini Mills (1992) (1) KLT 404), Nallakoya v. Administrator, U. T. of Laccadives ( 1968 KLT 60 ) and A. V. Kammath v. Chandran ( 1989 (1) KLT 473 ). In view of the above decisions, the objection raised by the tenant is liable to be upheld. 4. The next question is whether the present petition can be treated as one under Art.227 of the Constitution and if so whether such petition is maintainable. This question arose directly before the Supreme Court in Nataraja Chettiar v. Sulekha Amma ( 1987 (1) KLT 829 ). 4. The next question is whether the present petition can be treated as one under Art.227 of the Constitution and if so whether such petition is maintainable. This question arose directly before the Supreme Court in Nataraja Chettiar v. Sulekha Amma ( 1987 (1) KLT 829 ). There the point considered was whether a party who is aggrieved by a decision of the District Judge under S.20 of the Act can invoke jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held : "......While a revision petition under S.115 CPC. may not lie to the High Court against the revisional order passed by the District Judge in view of the decision in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai aforecited it will be perfectly open to the party aggrieved by the decision of the District Judge to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution." In view of the above position, counsel for the tenant fairly conceded that the present writ petition seeking to quash Ext. P3 order of the District Judge under S.20 of the Act could be treated as one under Art.227 of the Constitution and it is maintainable in law. 5. The next question that consequentially arises before this Court is to find out what exactly is the nature of the power under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. Art.227(1) dealing with the power of superintendence over all the courts by the High Court, reads thus: "Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction". The material part of Art.227 is substantially the same as that of the provision contained in S.107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 except that the power of superintendence has been extended by the Article also to Tribunals. While dealing with the power of superintendence under S.107, Rankin C. J. of the Calcutta High Court in Manmatha Nath Biswas v. Emperor (AIR 1933 Cal. 132) observed; "The general superintendence which this Court has over all jurisdiction subject to appeal is a duty to keep them within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. It doe's not involve responsibility for the correctness of their decisions, either in fact or law". It doe's not involve responsibility for the correctness of their decisions, either in fact or law". (Italics supplied) A similar question arose before the Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee ( AIR 1951 Cal. 193 ). In that case, Harries. C. J. observed: "Though this court has a right to interfere with decisions of Courts and Tribunals under its power of Superintendence, it appears to me that that right must be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases." The learned counsel on behalf of the tenant points out particularly relying on the observation of Harries C. J. that the power under Art.227 is nebulous and indeterminate. In this connection it is necessary to point out that the factual background of that case did not justify an interference and that was why the court said that the power should be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases. There the petitioners wore employers of the opposite party, an employee. As per the terms of employment, the opposite party was entitled to a mouth's leave on full pay every year. The employers decided to end the services of the employee giving him a month's wages and terminated his employment summarily. The employee made a claim in the court of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act for a month's pay in lieu of the period of leave, which he was unable to make use of. The court held that he was entitled to the payment of a month's wages in lieu of the period of leave. On behalf of the employers it was contended that the decision of the court was clearly erroneous, on the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the employee that the court had no authority at all to interfere in the matter. While refusing to interfere under Art.227 of the Constitution in the background of the aforesaid factual situation the above observation was made by the court. Therefore the said observation does not minimise or curtail tine power under 227 in any manner, but only restricts its application in appropriate cases. That does not mean the power is vague or uncertain. This is abundantly clear from the following passage contained in the same decision. "The right should be exercised only in cases where the courts have clearly done something which they were not entitled to do. That does not mean the power is vague or uncertain. This is abundantly clear from the following passage contained in the same decision. "The right should be exercised only in cases where the courts have clearly done something which they were not entitled to do. The power must be used to keep the courts below within the bounds prescribed by law for such courts. Here, as I have said, the most that can be said if anything can be said, is that the court erred in law in treating a month's wages in lieu of leave as due. Further, it appears to me that there is so injustice in this case. The employers, for reasons best known to themselves, desired to get rid of this employee immediately. They made it impossible for him to take his month's leave and the order of the court below even if it was not legally justified, could never be described as unjust or harsh." (Italics supplied) 6. The nature of the power of superintendence under Art.227 of the Constitution came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Waryan Singh and another v. Amarnath and another ( AIR 1954 SC 215 ) The question that arose before the Supreme Court in an appeal by special leave petition was against an order made by the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh in a proceeding instituted under Art.227 of the Constitution. On behalf of the Bench, S. R. Das, J. observed: "This power of superintendence conferred by Art.227 is, as pointed out by Harries C. J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB) to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting more errors. As rightly pointed out by the Judicial Commissioner in the case before us the lower courts in refusing to make an order for ejectment acted arbitrarily. The lower courts realised the legal position but in effect declined to do what was by S.13(2) (i) incumbent on them to do and thereby refused "to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. It was, therefore, a case which called for an interference by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and it acted quite properly in doing so". The lower courts realised the legal position but in effect declined to do what was by S.13(2) (i) incumbent on them to do and thereby refused "to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. It was, therefore, a case which called for an interference by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and it acted quite properly in doing so". In Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat 1991 (4) SCC 406 ) the Supreme Court held : "Article 227 confers supervisory jurisdiction on the High Court and in exercise of that power High Court may correct judicial orders of subordinate courts, in addition to that, the High Court has administrative control over the subordinate courts". The Supreme Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram ( AIR 1987 SC 117 ) held thus: "It is true that in exercise of jurisdiction under Art.227 of the Constitution the High Court could go into the question of facts or look into the evidence if justice so requires it if there is any misdirection in law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence," (Italics supplied) The Supreme Court in Venkatlal G. Pittie v. M/s Bright Bros. (Pvt.) Ltd. ( AIR 1987 SC 1939 ), after discussing the decisions in Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde ( AIR 1978 SC 955 ), India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M. A. Baker ( AIR 1978 SC 45 ), Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale ( AIR 1960 SC 137 ), Mrs. Labhkuwar Bhagweni Shah v. Janardhan Mahadeo Kalan (AIR 1983 SC 538) and Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata ( AIR 1987 SC 117 ) has apparently contemplated certain situations where intervention under Art.227 would be justified. Those situations are: 1. That the finding of the inferior tribunal is perverse in law in the sense that no reasonable person properly instructed in law could have come to such a finding. 2. That there is misdirection in law. 3. That view of fact has been taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence. 4. That the finding is not based on any material evidence 5. That it resulted in manifest injustice. Thus now it can be said that interference by the High Court under Art.227 would be justified only when any one of the above situations is present in a case. 4. That the finding is not based on any material evidence 5. That it resulted in manifest injustice. Thus now it can be said that interference by the High Court under Art.227 would be justified only when any one of the above situations is present in a case. Except to that extent this court has no power to interfere in the findings of the revisional authority under S.20 of the Act. Therefore the task before this court is to scan whether any one or more of the situations referred to above is or are available in the present case justifying interference under Art.227. 7. It is apodictic that the present application for eviction has been filed by the landlord under S.11(2), 11(3) and 11(4) (iii) of the Act. However, a cursory glance of notice dated 4-9-1978 (Ext. A 2 marked in Ext. P 1) and the petition for eviction would reveal that the eviction was sought by the landlord for additional accommodation, that is to say, for expansion of the existing clinic into a nursing home. However, it was argued on behalf of the tenant even at this stage that the claim for eviction was under S.11(3) and not under S.11(8), It is unnecessary for this court to extract the averments contained in the aforesaid notice and the petition for eviction inasmuch as the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority have concurrently found that the application is primarily one for eviction under S.11(8) of the Act. After making reference extensively to the statements contained in the petition for eviction, the appellate authority ultimately found: "As I have already stated above, the petition schedule building is a part of the southern block of the entire Mampilly building. In the first floor of that building the petitioner and his wife, two Doctors are residing. They are running a drug house and clinic in another part of that building. The petitioner's case in the petition is that they wanted to expand the drug house and the clinic and also to start a nursing home for which the new available space is quite insufficient and therefore they seek to evict the respondent tenant from the petition schedule building for the sake of additional space. When the petitioner was examined as P.W. 1 he has given up his idea to expand the drug store. When the petitioner was examined as P.W. 1 he has given up his idea to expand the drug store. So his only case at present is that he wanted to expand the clinic and to start the nursing home. P. W. 1 has definitely stated that it was for the purpose of starting a nursing home in the memory of his late father that he purchased the southern block from his brother Dr Kurien Mampilly. Under S.11(8) of Act 2/65 a landlord who is occupying only a part of building may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his purpose. It is clear that from the allegations in the petition and the evidence adduced by P. W. 1 that he requires additional accommodation for his personal use and for the purpose he wants to evict the respondent tenant from the petition schedule premises." The above finding of the appellate authority has been confirmed by revisional authority in Ext. P3 order. This concurrent view of the authorities below can be said to be justified in law inasmuch as this court is concerned with the substance of the petition and not the form in which it is framed. The Supreme Court in Vice Chancellor, Utkal University v. S. K. Ghosh (AIR 1934 SC 217) observed thus: "The substance is more important than the form and if there is substantial compliance with the spirit and substance of the law, we are not prepared to let an unessential defect in form defeat what is otherwise a proper and valid resolution." When there are sufficient materials in the petition for eviction justifying the ground of additional accommodation under S.11(8), the fact that the landlord has not made mention of the said provision in the petition for eviction does not rule out him from raising that plea. According to me, the concurrent view of the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority is in consonance with well settled principles of law and hence it is only to be upheld. 8. According to me, the concurrent view of the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority is in consonance with well settled principles of law and hence it is only to be upheld. 8. S.11(8) of the Act reads thus: "A landlord who is occupying only a part of the building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use." The above sub-section is subject to the provisions contained in sub-s.(10), the relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder: "The Rent Control Court shall, if it is satisfied that the claim of the landlord under sub-s.(3), (4), (7) or sub-s.(8) is bona fide make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Rent Control Court, and if the Court is not so satisfied, it shall make an order rejecting the application: Provided that, in the case of an application made under sub-s.(8) the Rent Control Court shall reject the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord." A conjoint reading of sub-s.(8) and (10) will make it crystal clear that an order of eviction on the ground of additional accommodation for personal use shall be passed only if the Rent Control Court is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide. The learned counsel appearing for the tenant advanced an argument that the claim for eviction under sub-s.(8) by the landlord in this case is not bona fide. The word 'bona fide' has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "In or with good faith; honestly, openly and sincerely; without deceit or fraud,... truly; actually; without stimulation or pretense; innocently; in the attitude of trust and confidence; without notice of fraud etc". The bona fide requirement is essentially a subjective process of feeling and therefore the requirement outlined by the landlord in his petition as well as in his oral testimony will be given due efficacy. When the requirement is put openly, honestly and sincerely it cannot be disparaged as subterfuge for eviction. The bona fide requirement is essentially a subjective process of feeling and therefore the requirement outlined by the landlord in his petition as well as in his oral testimony will be given due efficacy. When the requirement is put openly, honestly and sincerely it cannot be disparaged as subterfuge for eviction. The Supreme Court in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal ( AIR 1974 SC 1596 ) has observed that it is for the court to determine the truth of the assertion and also whether it is bona fide and the landlord must show that he genuinely requires the shop or building. The claim of the landlord in this case is that he needs the room sought to be evicted for the expansion of his existing clinic into a nursing home. There is nothing on record to characterise this requirement as dishonest or insincere. The landlord in this case is a qualified medical practitioner and his wife is also a Doctor. Both of them together had been running a clinic in the aforesaid building. They had taken a decision to start a nursing home as a project of expansion of the existing clinic. They therefore purchased the southern block of the building so as to make available the adequate space required for a nursing home with all modern equipments. Under this situation it is arduous for this court to say such a requirement pleaded by the petitioner is dishonest or is made in bad faith. The circumstance that the petitioner and his wife are the qualified medical practitioners can be adjudged to be transcendental in evaluating the requirement pleaded by the landlord. The availability of professional service of two doctors is a primordial resource for starting a nursing home. In the same building the landlord has got empty rooms which are conserved for the very purpose in addition to the room which is sought to be ejected. As far as the availability of funds, it has come out in evidence that the petitioner had collected a sum of Rs. 15,000/- for the purpose. These reflecting credentials forcefully forbid this court from pronouncing that the landlord was setting up an excuse to obtain dispossession. The appellate authority after appraising the evidence came to the finale that the avowal of the landlord for additional accommodation for his personal use is bona fide. 15,000/- for the purpose. These reflecting credentials forcefully forbid this court from pronouncing that the landlord was setting up an excuse to obtain dispossession. The appellate authority after appraising the evidence came to the finale that the avowal of the landlord for additional accommodation for his personal use is bona fide. I find no reason at all to run counter to the aforesaid conclusion of the appellate authority. 9. The revisional authority however disagreed with the finding of the appellate authority in so far as the bona fide requirement supplicated by the landlord. Let us see how the appellate authority expressed itself on this question in Ext. P2 judgment. It says in para 10 thus: "10. Another case put forward by the respondent tenant to disprove the bona fides of the petitioner's claim for additional accommodation is that the latter has got sufficient space available in the first floor of the Mampilly buildings and that he could have started the nursing home in that available space. The petitioner is of opinion as P. W. 1 that he will be getting sufficient space for starting the Nursing home only if the available space in the upstair room and the petition schedule building and other portions occupied by the tenants are utilised for that purpose. According to him only six or seven beds can be put in the first floor of the southern block and that is quite insufficient for the starting of the nursing home which is in his contemplation. No other oblique motive is seen suggested by the respondent - tenant in his counter - statement. Therefore I am of opinion that the petitioner's claim for additional accommodation for his personal use is bona fide." Ext. P2 judgment has been rendered by the Appellate Authority in wield of power under S.18 of the Act, Sub-s.(5) thereof makes the position perspicuous. It mandates; "The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court, shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided in S.20". What is intended by this provision is to have finality to the order of the appellate authority. It mandates; "The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court, shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided in S.20". What is intended by this provision is to have finality to the order of the appellate authority. The acrimonious debate here is with regard to the nature and amplitude of revisional power under S.20 of the Act conferred on the revisional authority vis a vis the appellate power under S.18 of the Act conferred on the appellate authority. The provisions contained in S.20 authorises the revisional authority to call for and examine the records relating to any order passed by the appellate authority under S.18 of the Act, "for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding". 10. With great respect, I am being persuaded to draw the difference between appellate and revisional powers under the Act as laid down in the earlier decisions of this court. Nowhere has this distinction been more felicitously expressed than in Doreswami Chettiar v. Nhandammadan Kunhiraman and others ( 1969 KLJ 227 ) where Balakrishna Eradi, J. (as he then was) held : "It is true that the powers of revision under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are wider than those conferred on the High Court under S.115 of the Civil Procedure Code and that the words 'legality, regularity, or propriety of the order" are wide enough to cover both questions of law and fact - see Perumal Pillai v. Venkiteswara Iyer 1965 KLT 476 . But there is nonetheless an essential distinction between an appeal and a revision, a distinction based on difference implicit in the two expressions. An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings; in effect the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority and it has power to review the evidence subject to the statutory limits prescribed. But in the case of a revision, even where the revisional authority is empowered to examine the propriety of the order impugned before it, its jurisdiction does not extend to a complete reopening and rehearing of the case and reviewing the entire evidence with a view to substitute the findings arrived at by it in the place of those recorded by the subordinate tribunal. The legislature while enacting the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 has thought fit to confer a right of appeal by S.18 of the Act only at the earlier stage when the order of the Rent Controller is sought to be questioned and to provide for only a discretionary remedy of revision at the later stage when the challenge is raised against the appellate authority's order. When it thus introduced the familiar concepts of appeal and revision at the two different stages, it is, in my view, reasonable to assume that the well known distinction between these two jurisdiction was clearly in the contemplation of the legislature. It would not, therefore, be right to regard the appellate and revisional remedies provided for under S.18 and S.20 as coextensive. The difference, according to me, consists in this, namely, that the revisional authority, while endowed no doubt with the power to examine the propriety of the order passed by the appellate authority, is not to treat the proceeding before it as in appeal and its jurisdiction to interfere with findings of fact is limited to cases where such findings can be regarded as 'improper'. It is not in every instance where the revisional authority is inclined to arrive at a different conclusion on an appreciation of the evidence available on record that the finding recorded by the Subordinate Tribunal can be said to be improper. It is not in every instance where the revisional authority is inclined to arrive at a different conclusion on an appreciation of the evidence available on record that the finding recorded by the Subordinate Tribunal can be said to be improper. I am of the view that in order that a finding can legitimately be characterised, as 'improper' it must be so wholly unreasonable or perverse that no reasonable tribunal or authority could have come to such a conclusion on the evidence on record, or as in the case which came up for decision before the Supreme Court in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal ( AIR 1963 SC 499 ) the subordinate tribunal should have recorded its finding without adverting to a single piece of evidence." This decision was later followed by Khalid, J. (as he then was) in Mandal Gopalan v. Rohini ( 1977 KLT 386 ) where His Lordship has laid down the precinct of power under S.20 of the Act thus: "An interference at the hands of the revisional court under S.20 of the Act is permissible only when the conclusions arrived at by the appellate authority could be characterised as "so wholly unreasonable or perverse that no Tribunal could arrive at such a conclusion on the evidence on record." Simply because a different conclusion is possible, the revisional court will not be justified in upsetting the orders of the appellate authority and the Rent Control Court." A Division Bench of this court in Madhavan v. Leelamma ( 1991 (2) KLT 32 ) while dealing with the same question observed: "S.20 of the Act of course allows this court to examine the evidence to satisfy whether the orders passed by the lower authorities did not suffer from the vice of illegality, irregularity and impropriety. In considering this aspect of the matter, this court had occasion to say that the revisional court has got the power to examine the evidence. In considering this aspect of the matter, this court had occasion to say that the revisional court has got the power to examine the evidence. But the examination should not be a reappraisal of the evidence for the purpose of recording an independent finding, but the reappraisal of the evidence should be for the purpose of testing whether the order and judgment of the Rent Control Court and the appellate authority are not vitiated by any of the vices stated in S.20 of the Act." The Supreme Court while dealing with a case directly arising under the Act in K. A. Authappai v. C. Ahammed ( 1992 (2) KLJ 376 ) observed: "It is no doubt true that the scope of the revisional jurisdiction conferred under S.20 is wider than that conferred under S.115 CPC. But at the same time, a revision under S.20 cannot be equated with an appeal. Moreover, the revisional power conferred under S.20 also embraces an order passed by the appellate authority. While considering the provisions conferring revisional power couched in a language similar to that contained in S.20 of the Act, this court has laid down that the power conferred on the High Court is essentially a power of superintendence and despite the wide language employed, the High Court should not interfere with the findings of fact of the subordinate authority merely because it does not agree with the said findings." The apex court further reminded that the "revisional court must be reluctant to embark upon an independent reassessment of the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted of and supported the one reached by the court below." (Sec. Rajbir v. S. Chokesiri & Co. ( 1989 (1) SCC 19 ). What emerges from these precedents on the question of powers under S.18 and 20 of the Act would be nothing other than to prescribe parameters for interference in an appellate judgment by the revisional authority in exercise of revisional powers under the Act. All the decisions are at one in so far as the point that the revisional authority cannot substitute its own conclusion although a different conclusion is possible on the same set of evidence. All the decisions are at one in so far as the point that the revisional authority cannot substitute its own conclusion although a different conclusion is possible on the same set of evidence. The interference by the revisional authority is called for only in a case where the order of an appellate authority is proved to be "wholly unreasonable or perverse and that no tribunal could arrive at such a conclusion on the evidence on record". The reappraisal of evidence is permitted only to a limited extent of testifying the presence of this requirement in a given case. 11. Bearing in mind the aforesaid tests, let us examine how for the revisional authority in the present case is justified in upsetting the degree of eviction passed by the appellate authority. The point requires to be examined in this connection is whether the finding of the appellate authority that the requirement pleaded by the landlord is bona fide, can be said to be unreasonable or perverse in any manner. I have already expressed the view that a different conclusion from that of appellate authority on this question is not possible at all in this case. The aforesaid finding by the appellate authority is based on well marked evidence and therefore it is neither perverse nor unreasonable. Nonetheless a further examination may be necessary in this proceeding, in order to ascertain whether the revisional authority had acted within its bounds or overstepped its limits while passing Ext. P 3 order and whether the said order is perverse or unreasonable. The revisional authority in this case is expected to examine whether the requirements pleaded by the landlord is bona fide or not in the background of the plea put up by him. The essence of the plea of the landlord is that all the rooms in the "Mampilly building' including the disputed room are required for establishing the proposed nursing home as a project of expansion of the existing clinic. The landlord has been examined as P.W. 1 by the Rent Control court and the appellate authority correctly observed "The petitioner landlord may have his own idea and plan in the matter of shaping his nursing home proposed to be constructed in the vacant place and that he may be waiting to get the entire portion occupied by the tenants vacated for that purpose". Thus there is no doubt that the plea of the landlord that without getting possession of the entire rooms in southern block, the proposed nursing home could not be started, had been proved. How could such a plea established and proved by overwhelming evidence to be characterised as more assertion by the revisional authority? There is a difference between plea proved and plea asserted. The error committed by the revisional authority is that it had proceeded on the basis that there was only an assertion by the landlord and the plea was not proved. The revisional authority observes: it is really difficult for this court to accept these assertion at its face value." This would be sufficient to hold that the finding of the revisional authority is palpably perverse and unreasonable. The infirmity that has come to light is fundamental and this vice is seen spread out entirely. 12. Now let us examine the correctness of the circumstances pointed out by the revisional authority for holding that the claim of the landlord for additional accommodation is not bona fide. It was argued that the landlord should have started the nursing home in the rooms kept vacant in the upstair portion of the southern block and in the one room available in the downstairs. The landlord has no case that these rooms are set apart for some other purpose. On the other hand his formidable and well set case is that these rooms are being kept vacant only for the purpose of starting a full fledged nursing home. A nursing home in the contemplation of landlord could not be started part by part. When all the rooms are made available, landlord will work out the details according to his plan and ideas. That stage has not reached yet. Therefore the insistence that the landlord should start the nursing home in the vacant rooms in his possession is unreasonable and beyond one's comprehension. It is true that one room in the downstairs where the Mathrubhoomi book stall was housed, was got vacated some where in the year 1977. The landlord candidly admits that a business in electrical goods (Bhavana) had been started in that room though it was set apart for the nursing home. It is true that one room in the downstairs where the Mathrubhoomi book stall was housed, was got vacated some where in the year 1977. The landlord candidly admits that a business in electrical goods (Bhavana) had been started in that room though it was set apart for the nursing home. His case is that this room having high business potentialities as it is located in a prominent business place need not be kept idle till the disputed room got surrendered. This appears to be reasonable because present business in that room could be discontinued at any time without much difficulty inasmuch as the person who conducts the business is none other than the landlord himself. Whatever may be the case of the landlord, the tenant cannot insist that the said room should be kept vacant all along exhibiting the bona fides of the claim till the matter is finally adjudicated by the courts. That the failure to initiate/eviction proceedings against another tenant in the building is not a circumstance which would disprove the bona fides of the requirement. Here the case of the landlord is that the tenant had agreed to surrender unconditionally when all other rooms are got vacated. It is idle to contend that the surrender of tenanted room can always be had through eviction proceedings. 13. During the course of examination, the landlord said when suggestion was put to him by the counsel appearing for the tenant, that the petition schedule building would fetch a monthly rent of Rs. 500/ if it is let out now and that a lump sum amount would also get as 'pakidi'. This is a straight, honest and sincere answer given by the landlord in consideration of the conditions prevalent in the present system of leasing out the rooms and buildings. There is no further statement at all to the effect that after obtaining the eviction, the disputed room would be let out again in order to obtain the 'pakidi' and enhanced rent. There is absolutely no material in this regard anywhere in his deposition or elsewhere in the proceedings. It was in that background the appellate authority found that the evidence given by landlord would not indicate that his desire is to get the enhanced rent on granting fresh lease. There is absolutely no material in this regard anywhere in his deposition or elsewhere in the proceedings. It was in that background the appellate authority found that the evidence given by landlord would not indicate that his desire is to get the enhanced rent on granting fresh lease. Then how could the revisional authority affirm the finding of the Rent Control court that the idea of the landlord is to get enhanced rent in respect of the disputed room? There is no connecting evidence to show that the landlord would let out the room in case the eviction is ordered, The circumstances relating to the filing of the R.C.OP. 260/1976 by the landlord on behalf of his brother and its subsequent dismissal are irrelevant for deciding the issue and these circumstances at any rule cannot be regarded as a connecting evidence which is manifestly lacking in the case. The cumulative effect of above discussion on the circumstances highlighted for disproving bona fides of the claim of the landlord is to drive this court to the conclusion that the views expressed by the revisional authority in this regard are nothing but unreasonable and perverse. 14. It is the case of the tenant that he is entitled to not only to see that findings in his favour are sustained but to demolish the findings went against him in the impugned order, The argument is that the provisions contained in O.41 R.22 CPC can be called in aid thereof. Strong credence was placed on the decisions of Supreme Court in Remanbhai v. Debhi Ajitkumar ( AIR 1965 SC 669 ) and N. R. Cooperative Credit Society v. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan ( AIR 1967 SC 1182 ). Both these cases come up before the Supreme Court by way of appeal by special leave under Art.136. The former decision was relied on in the latter case and whole issue relating to the question on hand was summed up in para 18 of the judgment in Ramanbhai's case ( AIR 1965 SC 669 ). Both these cases come up before the Supreme Court by way of appeal by special leave under Art.136. The former decision was relied on in the latter case and whole issue relating to the question on hand was summed up in para 18 of the judgment in Ramanbhai's case ( AIR 1965 SC 669 ). It is extracted hereunder: "Apart from that we think that while dealing with the appeal before it this Court has the power to decide all the points arising from the judgment appealed against and even in the absence of an express provisions like O.41 R.22 of the Code of Civil Procedure it can devise the appropriate procedure to be adopted at the hearing. There could be no better way of supplying the deficiency than by drawing upon the provisions of a general law like the Code of Civil Procedure and adopting such of those provisions as are suitable. We cannot lost sight of the fact that normally a party in whose favour the judgment appealed from has been given will not be granted special leave to appeal from it. Considerations of justice, therefore, require that this Court should in appropriate cases permit a party placed in such a position to support the judgment in his favour even upon grounds which were negatived in that judgment." I find it difficult to apply the above principles straightaway without further elucidation to the proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 or to the proceedings under Art.227. The above decision of Supreme Court points out that it has got inherent power to adopt its own procedure in the absence of express provision like O.41 R.22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court can devise the appropriate procedure to be adopted at the hearing. Therefore what the apex court did was to devise its own procedure for tackling appeals under Art.136. In B. Prabodhini v. P. Rajammal and others ( 1991 (1) KLJ 113 ) this court has observed that the power of the District Court under S.20 of the Act cannot be treated as akin to the appellate jurisdiction. Therefore this court said: "In this view provisions of O.41 R.22 of the Code cannot be applied in the exercise of power under S.20 of the Act.". Therefore this court said: "In this view provisions of O.41 R.22 of the Code cannot be applied in the exercise of power under S.20 of the Act.". It further said: "...that if the landlord has been allowed recovery of the buildings on one of the grounds urged by him alone, then he will not be in a position to sustain the order on another ground which is entirely independent. If the landlord wants to challenge the order of the appellate authority rejecting his prayer to recover the building on one of the grounds put forward by him, he should prefer revision against that part of the order which disallowed eviction on that ground." The question is whether the same principle can be applied in a proceeding under Art.227 where the order of the revisional authority is under challenge. However in Sukumaran v. Susy Issac ( 1985 KLT 1128 ) this court took the view that O.41 R.22 CPC or in any case the principles contained in that rule are applicable to the proceedings before the appellate authority under the Act. The court said: "As noticed above there is no statutory provision enabling any party to a rent control proceeding to file a memorandum of cross objections or cross appeal in an appeal filed by the opposite party. The provisions of O.41 R.22 CPC are not inconsistent with any of the provision of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and therefore, on the reasoning adopted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court (B. Pullayya v. M. A. Chetti AIR 1972 And. Pra 68) I hold that O.41 R.22 CPC or in any case the principles contained in that rule are applicable to the proceedings before the Appellate Authority under the Kerala Rent Control Act also." 15. Though the tenant has filed a revision petition (CRP No 998/84) before this court as against certain findings entered against him by the revisional authority, it was dismissed by this court as per the order dated 16th January, 1967. However the tenant did not pursue the matter though the landlord filed petition for special leave before the Supreme Court which was ultimately allowed as per Ext. P5. However the tenant did not pursue the matter though the landlord filed petition for special leave before the Supreme Court which was ultimately allowed as per Ext. P5. However, the tenant projects the view that a party in whose favour the judgment appealed from has been given, will not be granted special leave to appeal from it as observed in Ramanbhai's case ( AIR 1965 SC 669 ). Whatever that be, the tenant did not file any writ petition challenging the findings went against him in Ext. P3 particularly when the writ petition filed by the landlord under Art.227 was pending No cross objections has been filed by the tenant in the present writ petition under O.41 R.22 CPC or by following the principles contained therein. Even then the tenant yearns for a chance to canvass the points decided against him in Ext. P3. However, without deciding the question whether the tenant is entitled to such an opportunity in this proceeding in the above backdrop of the case, I am inclined to consider all the points that he had in as much as I feel, such a course of action would be in the interest of justice. In this connection I may also add that two of the contentions raised by the tenant, namely (i) the application for eviction is only under S.11(3) and not under S.11(8) and (ii) the requirement of additional accommodation under S.11(8) is not bona fide, have been discussed and decided hereinbefore and the rest of the contentions are being examined hereunder. 16. The tenant contents that he is entitled to the benefits available under the proviso applicable to Sub-s.(8) of S.11. The provisions contained in the said proviso authorises the Rent Control Court to reject an application for eviction if it is satisfied that 'hardship' which may be caused to the tenant by granting eviction will outweigh the 'advantage' of the landlord. The contention based on this proviso was examined by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority. The concurrent view is that the hardship caused to the tenant will not outweigh the advantage available to the landlord. The requirement voiced by the landlord would be frustrated if eviction of the disputed room is not allowed. Almost all rooms were kept vacant from the year 1977 onwards for the purpose. The concurrent view is that the hardship caused to the tenant will not outweigh the advantage available to the landlord. The requirement voiced by the landlord would be frustrated if eviction of the disputed room is not allowed. Almost all rooms were kept vacant from the year 1977 onwards for the purpose. There is an existing clinic with modern equipments awaiting to merge with the nursing home to be started. Now let us examine the 'hardship' that may be caused to the tenant. The tenant is conducting an ayurvedic vaidyasala in the disputed room and in case eviction is ordered the entire vaidyasala will have to be removed to another site. If no shop which was reasonably sufficient for carrying on the said business was available, probably the hardship that may be caused to the tenant may require greater scrutiny. However, it is difficult to countenance this situation inasmuch as there is abundant evidence to the contrary. The evidence clinchingly reveals that during the year 1978 alternative buildings were available in the locality where the petition schedule building is situated. The other convenient buildings were also available within a distance of three furlongs away from 'Mampilly building'. These materials were made available by a witness who was none other than the Accommodation Controller, a statutory authority who had been examined as CPW 2. In the present case the notice to surrender possession of the disputed room was issued to the tenant on 4-9-1978. Had the tenant made some effort immediately thereafter, the difficulty faced by him would have been avoided and the whole problem would have been solved forever. The evidence of CPW 2 would reveal that in Divisions 36 and 38, two buildings fell vacant on 8-9-1978 and 27-10-1978 and those buildings remained unoccupied as per the records maintained by him. Immediately before and after the filing of the rent control petition in this case, there were vacant buildings in Divisions 36, 37, 39 and 41 of Cochin Corporation. In view of this strong evidence, it is difficult for this court to upset the conclusions of the appellate authority and the revisional authority that there were alternate buildings reasonably sufficient to meet the requirements of the tenant. In view of this strong evidence, it is difficult for this court to upset the conclusions of the appellate authority and the revisional authority that there were alternate buildings reasonably sufficient to meet the requirements of the tenant. When the availability of alternate buildings has thus proved beyond any shadow of doubt, the shifting of the existing business to an alternate building does not involve any hardship at all, In the New Webster's Dictionary the meaning given to the word 'hardship' is this: "A condition that is hard to bear; suffering; severe trial; oppression, or want; an instance of this; anything hard to bear" There is nothing hard to bear in shifting the shop. There is no case that there are permanent fixtures in the room which cannot be removed. What is contained in the disputed room is only movable items of goods. Therefore in the final analysis what this court can see is only a situation where the tenant will have to make arrangements to transport the movable items of goods to an alternate building. This is only a minor inconvenience that may be caused to the tenant in the case of eviction. The inconvenience of this nature cannot be said to be a 'hardship' contemplated in the proviso to sub-s.(10) as applicable to sub-s.(8). It is needless to point out that this court is concerned only with a situation prevalent at the time of filing the application for eviction and the circumstances existed now do not govern the situation. Of course the tenant has advanced a plea that he is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from the business carried on in the disputed room. This defence is not available in a case where eviction is found to be on the ground of additional accommodation under S.11(8). This is an independent defence available to the tenant in case eviction is Sought under S.11(3). Even there also in order to have a successful plea a further condition that there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business is to be fulfilled. When reasonable alternative buildings were found to be available for carrying on the existing business, the apprehension as to the deprivation of the livelihood of the tenant would disappear from the scene. When reasonable alternative buildings were found to be available for carrying on the existing business, the apprehension as to the deprivation of the livelihood of the tenant would disappear from the scene. My irresistible conclusion therefore is that the tenant is not entitled to the benefits claimed by him by reason of the first proviso to sub-s.(10) of S.11 which is made applicable to sub-s.(8) thereof. 17. The next point canvassed by the tenant is that he is entitled to the protection available under sub-s.(17) of S.11 which runs thus : "(17) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Section a tenant who has been in continuous occupation of a building from 1st April 1940 as a tenant, shall not be liable to be evicted for bona fide occupation of the landlord or of the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him, provided that a landlord of a residential building shall be entitled to evict such a tenant of that building if the landlord has been living in a place outside the city, town or village in which the building is situated for a period of not less than five years before he makes an application I to the Rent Control Court for being put in possession of the building and requires the building, bona fide for his own permanent residence of any member of his family or the landlord is in dire need of a place for residence and has none of his own." The argument advanced is that the above provision will apply even in a case where the eviction is sought under S.11(8). It is difficult for me to countenance this plea. On reading of the above provision it appears that the said provision will apply in the case of eviction sought for under S.11(3). However, further examination of this question is found to be unnecessary for the reason that a Division Bench of this court recently held in Damodara Prabhu v. Jagannadha Prabhu reported in (1993 (1) KIT 614) thus: "The words for bona fide occupation of the landlord or for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him' which appear in S.11(17) of the Act is a reproduction of the same words in S.11(3) of the Act. S.11(8) of the Act does not contain those words. S.11(8) of the Act does not contain those words. From this it is clear that sub-s.(17) of S.11 docs not confer the benefit of that provision on a tenant who is sought to be evicted under S.11(8) of the Act. Accordingly we hold that the protection of S.11(17) of the Act can be claimed only by a tenant who is sought to be evicted under S.11(3) of the Act and not by a tenant who is sought to be evicted under S.11(8) of Act." The fact remains that the revisional court has elaborately considered this question on merits and found against the tenant. According to me in view of the decision of the Division Bench supra, the position is well settled and therefore the tenant in this case cannot claim the protection available under sub-s.(17) of S.11. 18. One more point raised by the tenant remains to be considered. The point is this: The ingredients necessary for invoking S.11(8) are not satisfied in the present case. The argument is that there are buildings more than one in which case sub-s.(8) will not apply. Possibly there Cannot be any dispute on this point. But the question is whether there is a single building or two different buildings. I have already found that the order of eviction sought for in the present case would come under sub-s.(8) of S.11 and not under S.11(3). In that situation the examination of the contention advanced on behalf of the tenant is not called for. However, I will examine whether there is any substance in the said contention as framed now. On behalf of the landlord it was contended that the tenant had no case that there were two separate buildings and such a case was for the first time developed in this writ proceeding only. In Ext. A11 assignment deed and Ext. B4 registered rent deed (marked as exhibits in Ext. P1) the building in question is described as one single structure. This position was well accepted by all concerned. In para 3 of the petition for eviction the case of the landlord is "the room taken by the counter petitioner for rent is part of a big building by name Mampilly building". This statement remains uncontroverted by the tenant in the coundet statement. This position was well accepted by all concerned. In para 3 of the petition for eviction the case of the landlord is "the room taken by the counter petitioner for rent is part of a big building by name Mampilly building". This statement remains uncontroverted by the tenant in the coundet statement. In view of the clear cut factual situation it is difficult for the tenant to take up such a plea at this stage. Sub-s.(8) allows the landlord to file an application for eviction only if the tenant is occupying whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building. The words 'remaining part of the building' indicate that this sub-section will apply only in the case of a single building and not in the case of two or more buildings. 19. The appellate authority after conscientiously considering the bona fide nature of the requirement passed a decree for eviction in the year 1983. While setting aside the said decree the revisional authority has exceeded its powers prescribed under S.20 of the Act. I have already found that the conclusions of the revisional authority in so far as the bona fide nature of the requirement, are manifestly perverse and I have no hesitation to add that no authority properly instructed in law would come to such conclusions. This alone would be sufficient for this court to set aside Ext. P3 order of the revisional authority. 20. The only point raised on behalf of the landlord now remain to be considered, is about the manifest injustice caused to him by the reason of the revisional order setting aside the decree of eviction passed by the appellate authority. If the order impugned is resulted in manifest injustice this court can definitely interfere and set right matters in exercise of power under Art.227 of the Constitution as observed by the Supreme Court in Venkattal G. Pittie's case ( AIR 1987 SC 1939 ). In the present writ petition, the landlord has stated his grievance as below : "Apart from the fact that the petitioner and his wife are both qualified doctors, their elder son has passed B. D. S examination and the second son is studying for M. B. B. S. course. In the present writ petition, the landlord has stated his grievance as below : "Apart from the fact that the petitioner and his wife are both qualified doctors, their elder son has passed B. D. S examination and the second son is studying for M. B. B. S. course. The petitioner is seriously prejudiced in not being able to make use of his Mampilly building for running a full fledged nursing home for which it is ideally suited and the vacated portions are being kept vacant by him for the last several years only for the purpose of using it as a nursing home." The above position has been emerged sufficiently well and that has not been challenged by the tenant, either in the counter affidavit or anywhere else. The landlord has got possession of the building in the year 1976-77. Many of the rooms in the building were got surrendered thereafter. Those rooms were preserved for the purpose of the nursing home in contemplation. The case of the landlord is that only when the entire building is made available he will be able to start the nursing home according to his plan as a project of expansion of the existing clinic into a nursing home. Now everything stands unpredictable and the family of the landlord is put to severe trial. The injustice caused to the petitioner and his family is thus apparent. Therefore, I have absolutely no doubt in my mind, that by reason of the order passed by the revisional authority upsetting the decree of eviction, a situation has now visibly arose where manifest injustice is allowed to pervade. 21. In view of the conclusions, Ext. P3 order of the revisional authority is set aside and Ext. P2 order of eviction passed by the appellate authority is restored. The tenant is granted one month's time for surrendering possession of the room involved in the case to the landlord. The writ petition is allowed as above. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.