S.B. SINHA, J. 1. All the aforementioned writ applications wore heard together but the learned counsel appealing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that he may be permitted to withdraw C.W.J.C. No. 732/733 & 735 of 1993 as the said writ applications are mere duplication of C.W.J.C. No. 742 of 1993. In this view of the matter, only C.W.J.C. No. 742 of 1993 is being taken into consideration. 2. In this writ application, petitioners have sought for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing an order dated 12.10.1992 passed by the Additional Member- Board of Revenue as contained in Annexilre-3 to the writ application and the order dated 1.8.1990 passed by the Additional Collector in Land Ceiling Appeal No. 43 of 1989 as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application. 3. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 4. A sale deed was executed by respondent no. 2 on his own behalf as also on behalf of the respondents 3 to 5 in favour of respondent no. 1. The father of petitioner no 1 (since deceased) and petitioner no. 1 filed an application for presumption under section 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act') By an order dated 24.6.1989 the Collector under the said Act allowed the said application holding that the land in question is agricultural in nature and the preemptors arc adjoining raiyats. An appeal was preferred against the said order and by an order dated 1.8.1990 the said appeal was allowed. The appellate authority held that the land in dispute is homestead and the vendee purchased the said lands for the purpose of construction of a house and thus the application for pre-emption was not maintainable. Petitioners filed revision application under section 32 of the said Act which was also dismissed by reason of an order 12.10.1992 as contained in Annexure-3 to the writ application. 5. Mr. Rameshwar Nath Rai, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has inter alia submitted that as the land has been recorded as kast kaimi the appellate and revisional authority have mis-directed themselves in holding that the lands in question are homestead in nature. Learned counsel submitted that the word kast' means agricultural in nature, whereas the word 'kaimi' means permanent and inheritable. Learned counsel submitted that the word kast' means agricultural in nature, whereas the word 'kaimi' means permanent and inheritable. It was submitted that as the said Act applies to the entire State of Bihar, no exception can be taken with regard to its applicability in or over the, Municipal or Bazar area. Learned counsel in support of his contention relied upon a decision in the case of Chandrika Sah Vs. The Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna & others (1981 P.L.J.R. l24) Ram Chandra Singh & ors. Vs. Sub divisional Officer, Hajipur & ors. (1988 B.B.C.J. 769) and Lal Mohan Bei Vrs. The State of Bihar & ors, [1990 (1) P.L.J.R. 750. - 6. Mr. K.N. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of private respondents, on the other had, Submitted that this application is not maintainable as four applications for pre-emption had been filed in respect of four deeds or sale executed in favour of four brothers and against the orders passed in each of the aforementions four applications, four appeals and revisions have been filed but in C.W.J.C. No. 735 of 1993 only Chandra Bhusan Maharaj is the purchaser; where as in other cases giving rise to C.W.J.C. Nos. 732, 733 and 742 of 1993, other brothers are purchasers. It is stated that in other cases, other brothers have not been impleaded as party and in all the cases Chandra Bhusan Maharaj has only been impleaded as party and, therefore, this application is not maintainable. Learned counsel further submitted that the nature of the land recorded in cadestral survey settlement records of fight, which was prepared in 1917 cannot be the criteria for determining the nature of the land when the deeds of sale were executed which has undergone a change. 7. Learned counsel further pointed out that half the plots in question were purchased by pre-emptor himself and he has been running an Attachakki therein. It has further been submitted that the lands surrounding the lands in question are being used for commercial purpose and not for agricultural purpose. It has further been submitted that there has been a concurrent finding of fact that the lands in question are suitable for cultivation and thus the same is binding on this Court. 8. There cannot be any doubt that definition of the 'land' includes 'homestead land of the landholder. It has further been submitted that there has been a concurrent finding of fact that the lands in question are suitable for cultivation and thus the same is binding on this Court. 8. There cannot be any doubt that definition of the 'land' includes 'homestead land of the landholder. However, there cannot be any doubt that the said Act cannot have any application with regard to such lands which do not come within the purview thereof. In this connection, the definition of the word 'landholder, 'raiyat' and underraiyat' have to be noticed. From a conjoint reading of the definition of the word 'land' as contained in Section 2 (f) together with the definition of the words 'land-holder', 'raiyat' and 'under-raiyat' as contained in Section 2 (g), 2 (k) and 2 (m) of the said Act there cannot be any doubt that only such agricultural lands which are held by the landholder for agricultural purpose would come within the purview thereof. The landholder must be a raiyat of an under-raiyat which means that he must hold the land as raiyat or under raiyat. A raiyat is a person who has acquired the right to hold the lands by himself or by members of his family on the relevant date. 9. There cannot be any doubt that the main aim of the legislature in passing the Act was to facilitate personal cultivation of the land by certain classes of raiyats and allow the under-raiyats to acquire the status of raiyats. The definition of raiyat and under-raiyat as given in clauses (k) and (m) of Section 2 of the said Act are based on the corresponding provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act which clearly shows that such person must acquire land for cultivation purposes. It is clear from the definition of 'land' itself that it must be a land which is either used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture purpose and even if it is homestead as defined in the explanation appended to clause (f) of Section 2 of the Act, it must be a homestead of a landholder as defined in clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. This brings about distinction that if' the land is not a homestead land of a landholder that means of a raiyat engaged in agricultural operation, it would not be a 'land' within the meaning of the Act. This brings about distinction that if' the land is not a homestead land of a landholder that means of a raiyat engaged in agricultural operation, it would not be a 'land' within the meaning of the Act. Reference In this connection may be made to Kamlakant Goswami Vs. Balgobind Sah & others (1971 B.L.J.R. 974) and Uma Devi vs. Raktoo Thakur & others (1977 Bihar Revenue & Labour Journal 184). 10. In Chandrika Sah v. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar & others (1981 P.L.J.R. 124), it has been held that the said Act will apply also to Bazar area but in that case the land in question was found to be agricultural land situated within Bazar area. 11. In Ram Chandra Singh & ors. vs. Subdivision Officer, Hajipur & ors. (1988 B.B.C.J. 769: A.I.R. 1989 Patna 50), I had occasion to deal with the matter and in that case I held as follows: "However it may be observed that the Act applies to the whole of the State of Bihar. There however cannot be any doubt that the provisions of the Act apply only in respect of the agricultural lands arid have no application to Urban lands." This aspect of the matter bas also been considered in Lal Mohan Bej Venus The State of Bihar & others [1990 (1) P.L.J.R. 750] 12. It is, therefore, clear that the Act applies to the entire State of Bihar and consequently would apply to a municipal area also. In order to invoke the provisions of the Act, however, the land must be agricultural in nature. 13. It is true that the lands in question has been recorded in the cadestral survey records of right as Kast Kaimi but it is now well known that a land which has been used for commercial purpose for a long time its character may be presumed to have undergone a change. In this case it has been found as a fact that the land is situated within the commercial area and in fact over half of the plot in question the petitioners themselves are running Attachakki. 14. Further the purchasers who are four in number have purchased four kathas of land (one katha each) for the purpose of construction of house. It has also been found as of fact that the lands are surrounded by houses. 14. Further the purchasers who are four in number have purchased four kathas of land (one katha each) for the purpose of construction of house. It has also been found as of fact that the lands are surrounded by houses. It is, therefore, clear that the lands in question have lost the character of a raiyati holding and thus they are neither used nor capable of being used for agricultural operation. Such a land which has lost the character of raiyati holding do not retain the character of agricultural land. 15. Further the object of the Act is evidently to prevent fragmentation of agricultural holdings. Such a purpose of the Act would not be achieved by allowing pre emption application in respect of such small pieces of lands meant for construction of house in an area which is essentially a commercial area. 16. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, it is not a fit casein which this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. 17. For the reasons aforementioned this writ application is dismissed and CWJC No. 733, 732 and 735 of 1993 are permitted to be withdrawn but without any order as to costs. I agree. Applications disposed as indicated.