JUDGMENT : D. G. Karia, J. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been directed against the judgment of Gujarat Revenue Tribunal dated August 20,1980, rendered in Revision Application No. TEN. B. S. 145 of 1979 confirming the judgment and order of the Deputy Collector, Vyara, dated May 28, 1979, in Remand Appeal No. 16 of 1978. The Deputy Collector, Vyara, by said order allowed the appeal of the respondent herein quashing and setting aside the order of the Mamlatdar, Uchhal, dated 22nd February, 1978 in Tenancy Case No. 51 of 1975 holding that the petitioner herein was a tenant under section 70 (b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short, "the Bombay Tenancy Act)". 2. The relevant facts leading to the present proceedings may be summarised as follows. The petitioner, Shankarbhai, has been cultivating the agricultural lands of survey no. 17 admeasuring acres 6-16 Gunthas, out of Acres 12-32 gunthas, at Sundarpur, Taluka Vyara, District Surat, for the last about 12 years from the date- September 16, 1965 when the petitioner submitted an application under section 70 (b) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, to the learned Mamlatdar/Agricultural Lands Tribunal to declare the petitioner as a tenant of `the said land'. The petitioner, by his said application, alleged that he is illiterate and ignorant of law and as such his name was not entered as a tenant in the records of rights. He has averred that he has been occupying and cultivating the said lands for the last 12 years. It is not in dispute that the respondent, Bakulal Shah, the owner of the said land, has been residing at Ahmedabad which is admittedly at the distance of about 300 kilometres from village Sundarpur where the land in question is situated. The Agricultural Lands Tribunal after holding necessary enquiry and on appreciation of the evidence, by the judgment dated February 22, 1976, held that the petitioner was tenant in respect of the land in question. The respondent herein being aggrieved by the said judgment of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal preferred appeal No. 26 of 1976 before the Deputy Collector, Vyara, who dismissed the said appeal confirming the judgment and finding of the learned Agricultural Lands Tribunal that the petitioner was the tenant under section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy Act. The respondent herein being aggrieved by the said judgment of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal preferred appeal No. 26 of 1976 before the Deputy Collector, Vyara, who dismissed the said appeal confirming the judgment and finding of the learned Agricultural Lands Tribunal that the petitioner was the tenant under section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy Act. Thereupon, the opponent preferred Revision Application No. TEN.B.S. No.74 of 1977 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal who by its judgment dated June 21, 1978 allowed the Revision Application and remanded the matter back to the learned Deputy Collector for a fresh decision in accordance with law. According to the Tribunal, the order passed by the Deputy Collector, was not a speaking order and therefore the matter was required to be remanded back to the Deputy Collector for its decision after giving full opportunity of hearing to the parties. The Deputy Collector, Vyara, in Remend Appeal No. 16 of 1978, by his judgment dated May 28, 1979, allowed the appeal quashing the judgment and order of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal. Thereupon, the petitioner herein preferred the aforesaid Revision Application No. TEN. B. S. 145 of 1979. The Tribunal dismissed the Revision Application; hence, the present petition. 3. I have heard the learned Counsels for the parties. At the outset, it may be mentioned that this Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, does not act as an appellate Court and that the jurisdiction and power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India of this Court is limited and finding of facts recorded by the courts below should not be disturbed, unless the finding is found to be perverse in law and that no reasonable person could have come to such a finding having regard to the facts and evidence on record. As held in the case of Chandavarkar S.R. Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 , the High Court in its jurisdiction of Article 227 can go into the question of facts or look into the evidence of justice so requires it. However, the High Courts should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 to look into the facts in the absence of clear and cut down reasons where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence. However, the High Courts should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 to look into the facts in the absence of clear and cut down reasons where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence. The High Court should not interfere with the findings within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal or court except where the finding is perverse in law, in the sense that no reasonable person properly instructed in law could have come to such a finding or there is misdirection in law or view of fact has been taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence or the finding is not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice. This Court being conscious of this concept of law has to look into the question of facts and look into the evidence in view of the following peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 4. It is an admitted position that the opponent Bakulal Shah has been residing in Ahmedabad. The petitioner is an illiterate and ignorant person of law. The lower appellate Court and the tribunal without dealing with or discussing the evidence of the petitioner's witness, Ravjibhai, discarded his evidence on the ground that the said Ravjibhai was a close relative of the petitioner and therefore, he was not a reliable witness. The appellate Court and the Tribunal, at the same time, appreciated and acted upon the evidence of Shantilal Dhirajlal Shah who was admittedly cousin brother of the opponent-landlord without applying the yardstick which was applied in case of petitioner's witness Ravjibhai. It is true that the evidence of a witness cannot be discarded only on the ground that the witness happens to be relative of a party. In the instant case, the lower appellate court and the tribunal just ignored the material evidence of Ravjibhai on the ground that he happens to be the relative of the petitioner. Similarly, evidence of Kathadiabhai, a witness for the petitioner, who supported the petitioner's case entirely, was discarded on the ground that the field of Katudiya was about three fields away from the land in question. The evidence of Katudiyabhai was also ignored in its material aspects. In this view of the matter, the finding recorded by a lower appellate court and that of the Tribunal became perverse and as such it was necessary to look into the evidence as justice so required. The evidence of Katudiyabhai was also ignored in its material aspects. In this view of the matter, the finding recorded by a lower appellate court and that of the Tribunal became perverse and as such it was necessary to look into the evidence as justice so required. Having perused the evidence of the parties and the witnesses, I am of the view that the findings recorded by the lower appellate court and that of the tribunal upsetting the findings of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, are perverse and no reasonable man could have reached that conclusion having regard to the facts and evidence on record. 5. The Tribunal did not accept the case of the petitioner on the ground that there was discrepancy in two applications of the petitioner. The petitioner in his application dated September 10,1975 stated that he had been cultivating the entire land of survey no.17 admeasuring A12-32 gunthas for the last six to seven years whereas in his another application dated September, 1975 the petitioner stated that he had been cultivating the land admeasuring A 6 - 16 gunthas for the last about 12 years. The Tribunal without referring to the evidence of the petitioner in this regard and without any explanation having been sought in cross-examination of the petitioner, just disbelieved the petitioner holding that the claim of the petitioner was inconsistent in terms of area of the land and the number of years during which he cultivated the land. The Tribunal also discarded the claim of the petitioner to be the tenant under section 70 (b) of the Tenancy Act on the ground that in the record of right the name of the petitioner was not entered. It is the precise case of the petitioner that as his name was not recorded in the revenue records, he was required to make the application to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal to treat him as a tenant under section 70 (b) of the Bombay Tenancy Act in respect of the land in question. The petitioner in furtherance of his case has testified that he has been cultivating the said land for the last about 12 years on half share crop basis. The petitioner used to give half crop share to one Hiralal Chunilal who is admittedly a relative of the respondent-landlord. However, the said Hiralal Chunilal did not issue any receipts for this share which he acquired. The petitioner used to give half crop share to one Hiralal Chunilal who is admittedly a relative of the respondent-landlord. However, the said Hiralal Chunilal did not issue any receipts for this share which he acquired. In support of his case, the petitioner examined Ravjibhai who has deposed that he knew the parties. He has further deposed that the petitioner has been cultivating the land in question for the last about 12 years and that he had grown cotton in half of the field. He has deposed that the actual possession of the field in question was with the petitioner and the landlord-Bakulal Shah has been residing at Ahmedabad. In the cross-examination, Ravjibhai has deposed that when RTS party had come to village Sundarpur a Panchnama was drawn at the residence of Sarpanch and that the team had not visited the field in question. In the cross-examination of Ravjibhai it is not even suggested that Ravjibhai was the sister's son of the petitioner and therefore he deposed falsely. In absence of any such suggestion or putting any such case it is not understood as to how the lower appellate court and the Tribunal could have discarded the evidence of Ravjibhai merely because he was the relative of the petitioner and at the same time accepting the evidence of the close relatives of the respondent. Similarly, Katudiyabhai has also supported the case and claim of the petitioner testifying that the landlord Bankulal has been residing at Ahmedabad and that the applicant was cultivating the land for the last 12 years; and as his field being nearby to that of the petitioner he know that Hiralal used to come and collect half share of the crop on behalf of the landlord-Bankulal. The evidence of this witness Katudiyabhai has been discarded by the Tribunal on the ground that the field of Katudiyabhai is at the distance of 2 to 3 fields from the field in occupation and cultivation of the petitioner. It is painful to note that the Tribunal has ignored the evidence of this witness Katudiyabhai on material aspects without dealing or discussing it in its proper perspective, for his evidence could not be discarded because of the fact that his field was situated near the field in question. It is also in evidence that the applicant has produced a certified copy of the receipt of Rs. 62.51. ps. It is also in evidence that the applicant has produced a certified copy of the receipt of Rs. 62.51. ps. paid by Hiralal on behalf of the opponent which clearly shows that Hiralal who is a relative of the opponent-landlord was managing the affairs of the land in question and was getting the field cultivated by the petitioner on share crop basis. The Tribunal has relied upon the evidence of Shantilal Dhirajlal Shah who was power-of-attorney holder of the respondent Bankulal Gokuldas Shah. Shantilal is admittedly nephew of the respondent. According to Shantilal Shah, the applicant never cultivated the land and the opponent is in possession of the land in question. In view of the power-of- attorney document dated September 30, 1975 it clearly appears that the landlord-respondent-Bankulal Shah, who was residing at Ahmedabad, had to depend upon Shantilal Shah who managed and looked after his field. The Tribunal has relied on the witness of respondent namely Madhav Patel who has deposed that he did not know as to who was in actual possession of the land. 6. In the above view of the matter, it is abundantly clear that the lower appellate court and the Tribunal have ignored the material evidence on record and by applying erroneous and improper yardstick as to appreciation of the evidence, have recorded a perverse finding and quashed and set aside the verdict of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal. 7. Miss V.P.Shah, learned Advocate for the respondent, relied upon the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim, reported in AIR 1984 SC 38 . The Supreme Court has held that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. Miss Shah next relied upon the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141 wherein the Supreme Court observed that in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of an inferior court or tribunal if there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to, or in other words it is a finding which was perverse in law. Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact. I appreciate and accept the ratio laid down in both the aforesaid citations. In my view, on perusal of the pleadings and evidence recorded by the lower appellate court and that of Tribunal, it becomes clear that the lower courts have ignored the material evidence on record and therefore their findings were perverse resulting in miscarriage of justice. Having considered this aspect of law and the limitation of this Court, the evidence on record was perused. 8. In the result, the petition succeeds and it is allowed. The impugned judgment and order by Gujarat Revenue Tribunal confirming the order of the Deputy Collector, Vyara, dated May 28, 1979 is quashed and set aside. The judgment of the learned Mamlatdar dated February 22, 1976 in Tenancy Case No. 51 of 1975 declaring the petitioner as tenant of the land in question is hereby restored. Rule is made absolute with costs. 9. At this stage, Miss V.P.Shah learned Advocate for the respondent, requests to stay the operation and execution of this judgment in order to enable the respondent to approach the higher forum. This court, at the time of admitting this petition on April 29, 1982, granted interim relief in terms of para 5(b) of the petition, that is, operation and execution of the judgment and order of the Tribunal was stayed. According to Mr. This court, at the time of admitting this petition on April 29, 1982, granted interim relief in terms of para 5(b) of the petition, that is, operation and execution of the judgment and order of the Tribunal was stayed. According to Mr. H.M. Mehta, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, the possession of the land in question is with the petitioner and as such no stay is required to be granted. In the facts and circumstances of the case, status quo as on today in respect of the land in question, be maintained for eight weeks from today and the operation of this judgment is also stayed for a period of eight weeks from today. Rule made absolute.