G. B. PATTANAIK, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under Section 32 (9) of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') against the order of the District Judge, directing that the decretal dues will be the first charge on the immovable properties of defendant No. 2, mortgaged with the Corporation in an application filed by the Corporation under Section 31 of the Act. ( 2 ) THE short question that arises for consideration is whether the mortgaged properties belonging to the guarantor could be sold under the provisions of the Act. ( 3 ) THE Orissa State Financial Corporation filed an application before the District Judge, Puri invoking his jurisdiction under Section 31 of the Act alleging that the principal debtor, respondent No. 2, in the present appeal had applied for a term loan of Rs. 2,00,000/- for purchase of a truk and after consideration of his loan application the Corporation had sanctioned an amount of Rs. 1,80,900/- on 28-3-1981. Out of the said. amount, a truck had been purchased bearing registration No. OSU 2577. The loan agreement was executed in favour of the Corporation on 31-3-1981 and the truck in question was also hypothecated with the Corporation. The present appellant was a surety and had executed a deed of guarantee in favour of the Corporation making himself jointly and severally liable for the payment of the loan. He also offered some of his immovable properties as surety and deposited the title deeds thereof by way of mortgage and a memorandum was executed confirming the said mortgage. The loan in question was to be repaid in 48 monthly instalments, the first instalment commencing from 30-6-1981 and the last instalment supposed to have been paid on 31-5-1985. It carried interest at the rate of 151/2 per cent. When the monthly instalments as accrued upon were not paid, the Corporation seized the vehicle in exercise of power under Section 29 of the Act and the said vehicle being put to auction, it fetched an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/ -. The said amount was credited to the account of the loanee. Thereafter as the balance dues were not paid, the Corporation filed application under Section 31 of the Act. The balance amount was to the tune of Rs. 64,915. 45. 1,50,000/ -. The said amount was credited to the account of the loanee. Thereafter as the balance dues were not paid, the Corporation filed application under Section 31 of the Act. The balance amount was to the tune of Rs. 64,915. 45. The principal-debtor who had taken the loan though initially appeared before the District Judge on being noticed and took time to file written statement but ultimately remained absent and was set ex parte. The guarantor who is the present appellant contested the matter and filed a written statement challenging the averments made in the application. His stand in the written statement was that the principal-debtor on false representation persuaded the guarantor to sign some forms and in good faith he had signed some documents but since he was not conversant with the English language he did not know the contents of those documents. He further stated that the officers of the Corporation also gave him the impression that he was merely a witness to the transaction gf loan and no liability will be fastened on him and thus he was a victim of fraud practised by the principal debtor in collusion with the officers of the. Corporation. He also took the stand that no notice having been served upon him before seizing the vehicle under Section 29 of the Act, the Corporation was not entitled to take recourse to the proceeding under Section 31 of the Act. It is his further stand that a proceeding under Section 31 is not maintainable against the surety. Lastly it is contended that liability against the guarantor can be enforced only after exhausting the remedies available against the principal debtor. ( 4 ) ON these pleadings the learned District Judge framed four issues and came to hold that no notice was required to be served on the guarantor before seizure of the vehicle under Section 29 of the Act belonging to the principal debtor. He further held that there was no material on record to establish the legation of the guarantor that the vehicle could have fetched much more than for what it was sold. On the question of fraud the learned District Judge held that the story of being ignorant signing the documents as a witness and not as a guarantor on misrepresentation has no basis and has been invented as an afterthought. On the question of fraud the learned District Judge held that the story of being ignorant signing the documents as a witness and not as a guarantor on misrepresentation has no basis and has been invented as an afterthought. On the question whether a guarantor could be proceeded under Section 31 of the Act the learned District Judge held that in view of clause (aa) to Section 31 the Corporation could enforce the liability on the surety. Considering the deed of guarantee be held that the principal debtor and the surety were jointly and severally liable to repay the term loan. With these findings he having allowed the application of the Corporation and having directed that the decretal dues will be the first charge on the immovable properties of the defendant No. 2 which had 'been mortgaged to the Corporation by deposit of title deeds, the present appeal has been preferred. ( 5 ) MISS Rath the learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends that clause (aa) of sub-section (1) of Section 31 was inserted into the statute book by Act 43 of 1985 conferring a power of enforcing the liability on any surety under Section 31. But in the case in hand the deed of guarantee having been executed much prior to the aforesaid insertion of clause (aa) and at the time when the appellant stood as a guarantor, the said provision not being there, the liability cannot be enforced against the guarantor by the Corporation by taking recourse to Section 31 of the Act. In support of this contention the learned counsel places reliance on a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Munnalal Gupta v. Uttar Pradesh Financial Corpn. , AIR 1975 All 416 . The learned counsel also places reliance on an observation made by a Bench of this Court in the case of Miss K. T. Sulochana Nair v. Managing Director, Orissa State Financial Corporation, AIR 1992 Ori 157 . , AIR 1975 All 416 . The learned counsel also places reliance on an observation made by a Bench of this Court in the case of Miss K. T. Sulochana Nair v. Managing Director, Orissa State Financial Corporation, AIR 1992 Ori 157 . The learned counsel then urges that even if the Corporation can proceed against the mortgaged properties of the guarantor in an application under Section 31 of the Act but the said mortgaged properties of the guarantor cannot be put to sell and the decretal dues cannot be the first charge in the said property without exhausting the remedies available to the Corporation to proceed against the property of the principal debtor and in support of this contention the learned counsel places reliance on the decision of a learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of M/s. Gulab Ram Subhash Chander v. Kharsitilal, AIR 1988 Pandh 45. ( 6 ) MR. Mohanty appearing for the Corporation, on the other hand, places reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra State Financial Corpn. v. Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. (1991) 1 JT 524: (1991 AIR SCW 612) and contends that under Section 31 (1) of the Act the liability of a guarantor could be enforced and his property mortgaged could be attached and sold and, therefore, there is no infirmity in the decision of the learned District Judge. ( 7 ) IN view of the rival submissions at the bar, the first question that arises for consideration is whether the mortgaged properties of a guarantor could be attached and sold in an application filed under Section 31 of the Act. No doubt the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court as well as the Bench decision of this Court on which Miss Rath has placed reliance supports her contention fully. But in view of the decision of the Supreme Court on which Mr. Mohanty for the respondent has placed-reliance, it must be held that after introduction of clause (aa) to Section 31 (1) by Act 43 of 1985 the matter is now beyond doubt that the procedure contained in Section 31 shall be applicable for the enforcement of the liability of such surety which has given some property in security as well as the surety who has given only a personal guarantee. The fact that the amendment in question came into force in the year 1985 does not alter the position as in the Supreme Court case also the guarantor had executed the deed of guarantee and stood as surety for repayment on 29/06/1979 and yet the Supreme Court held that the provision of Section 31 of the Act can be invoked to proceed against the guarantor also. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of the, Supreme Court, the first contention of Miss Rath for the appellant must fail. ( 8 ) COMING to the second contention of Miss Rath for the appellant no doubt the decision of the learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court supports her contention fully but the learned Judge has not discussed the law on the subject. He has merely stated that the amount due to the Corporation should first be recovered from the properties of the firm being the principal guarantor and if any amount thereafter is left due to the Corporation, the same may be recovered from the properties hypothecated by him and in fact this arrangement was conceded by the parties. But the clear and unambiguous language of Section 31 of the Act is not susceptible of such a view. The proceeding under Section 31 is in the nature of an executive proceeding. A combined reading of Sections 31 and 32 of the Act reveals that an investigation has to be made to find out the terms and conditions on which loan was given by the Corporation to the industrial concern and whether the Corporation is entitled to the relief under Section 31 (1) of the Act on account of breach of the terms of the agreement. The Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Natson Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. , AIR 1978 SC 1765 held that the substantive relief in an application under Section 31 (1) is something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree. In the case of Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs. Pvt. Ltd. , AIR 1978 SC 1765 held that the substantive relief in an application under Section 31 (1) is something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree. In the case of Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs. and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. , (1991) 1 JT (SC) 524: (1991 AIR SCW 612), the Apex Court observed that the object underlying Sections 31 and 32 of the Act appears to be that Parliament intended to place the surety on the same footing as the principal debtor in the matter of enforcement of the claims of the Financial Corporation so as to enable the Financial Corporation to obain relief again the properties of the principal debtor as well as the surety. Under the general law the liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor. No doubt in a decision of the case of Union Bank of India v. Manku Narayana, AIR 1987 SC 1078 , the Supreme Court had observed that in executing a decree, the decree holder should proceed against the principal debtor first and failing to get the decree satisfied thereby could proceed against the guarantor. But this decision was overruled in the case of State of Bank of India v. Indexport Registered, AIR 1992 SC 1740 , wherein after noticing the decision of the Supreme Court in Manku Narayana's case (supra) the Supreme Court observed that the said decision is not based on any established principle of law and/ or reasons and in fact is contrary to law. The learned Judges observed that a decreeholder in principle, cannot be forced to first exhaust the remedy by way of execution of the mortgage decree alone and told that only if the amount recovered is insufficient, he can be permitted to take recourse t o the execution o the personal decree. In view of the aforesaid position of a guarantor under the common law and in view of the special reasons provisions for enforcement of claims by Financial Corporation under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, it is difficult for me to accept Miss Rath's contention that the' mortgaged property of the guarantor could not have been a first charge as directed by the learned District Judge. The second contention of Miss. Rath accordingly fails. The second contention of Miss. Rath accordingly fails. Both the contentions having failed, the appeal fails and is dismissed, 'but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .