JUDGMENT S. B. Sinha, J. This Letters Patent Appeal arises out of a judgment dated 23rd March, 1992 passed in CWJC No. 2476 of 1988 by a learned Single Judge of this court whereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by the petitioners has been dismissed. 2. The petitioner filed the aforementioned writ application inter alia for quashing a notification dated 14.7.l987 as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application, in terms whereof it cancelled an earlier notification dated 21.3.1986 as contained in Annexure-5 thereto, releasing 17.46 acres of lands from the purview of the Land Acquisition proceeding. 3. The State of Bihar with a view to establish an industrial area at Jasidih acquired 330 acres of lands in Village Chhotu Manikpur, Badaldih and Jasidih. 4. Two proceedings being Land Acquisition Case No. 61/73-74 and 86 of 1973- 74 were initiated; the later- case was in relation to 29.47 acres of land whereupon buildings were allegedly constructed. 5. The petitioners questioned the notification issued under the said Act by filing two writ applications in this court being CWJC Nos. 230 of 1974 and 3231 of 1983 which were dismissed. 6. The Petitioner, however, having come to learn that 17.46 acres of lands were not being utilised by the Industries Department for a long time, approached for release thereof, whereupon the Additional Collector, Deoghar upon local inspection reported that the said lands were still in possession of the petitioner. The matter was thereafter processed and ultimately, the Director, Land Acquisition, informed the Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar that a decision had been taken by the Government for release of the aforementioned 17.46 acres of land. He, however, opined that for the said purposes a deed of reconveyance has to be executed by the Deputy Commissioner on the condition that the petitioner should withdraw L.A.R. case No.7 of 1980 filed by him for enhancement of compensation in terms of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 7. According to the petitioner, he relying on or on the basis of the said representation on the part of the State of Bihar, withdrew the aforementioned case, but before a deed of reconveyance was signed by the Deputy Commissioner, the impugned notification was issued. 8. 7. According to the petitioner, he relying on or on the basis of the said representation on the part of the State of Bihar, withdrew the aforementioned case, but before a deed of reconveyance was signed by the Deputy Commissioner, the impugned notification was issued. 8. In the aforementioned writ application, the Patna Industrial Area Development Authority as also M/s Hyderabad Industries Limited intervened and filed counter affidavits wherein it was inter alia contended that out of 37.11 acres of land, 20 acres of land have been leased out in favour of M/s Hyderabad Industries Limited by the Patna Industrial Area Development Authority and in terms of its resolution dated 5.3.1987 6.03 acres of land has been car-marked for development of the railway siding. 9. It was contended that the Government took the decision to release the land exparte and without giving an opportunity of hearing to the intervenor, although the Possession thereof had been given to the Authority on 25.2.1974 and on 9.8.1980 and in that view of the mailer in terms of Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act the State of Bihar had no jurisdiction to withdraw the lands from acquisition. 10. It had been Contended that having come to learn about the decision of the State, a protest was made by the Authority by its letter dated 24.4.1985 and on the basis thereof the entire matter was re-enquired and the mistake having been detected, the impugned notification had been issued. 11. The learned Single Judge having considered the matter in great details inter alia held that as possession had been delivered to the respondents authority and M/s Hyderabad Industry Limited, Section 48 of the Act has no application and in that view of the matter, both the orders dated 21.3.1986 (Annexure-5 to the writ Petition) as also the notification dated 14.7.1987 (Annexure-1) thereto being illegal, the same are liable to be quashed. 12. The learned Judge however, observed as follows : “Although I have held that such action of the Government Officials, on the basis of which the petitioner has withdrawn, the Compensation case, will not give any right to the petitioner to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. But the fact remains that the petitioner has already withdrawn the compensation case. A question arises whether in such a circumstance, the petitioner can claim for enhancement of compensation henceforth. But the fact remains that the petitioner has already withdrawn the compensation case. A question arises whether in such a circumstance, the petitioner can claim for enhancement of compensation henceforth. The learned Advocate, appearing for the State, Patna Industrial Area Development Authority and Hyderabad Industries Limited, have agreed that no objection will he made in case, the L.A.R. case No.7 of 1980 is restored to its original file. Taking into consideration, the peculiar facts of the case as also the stand taken by the respondents it will he in the interest of the petitioner to direct the Subordinate Judge, Deoghar to restore the LAR case No. 7 of 1980 to its original file and start its proceeding from the stage where it was permitted to he withdrawn." 13. Mr. K. K. Mishra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant inter alia submitted that as the petitioner withdrew his application under Section 18 of the Act, the Slate, is hound by the doctrine of 'promissory estoppel', particularly in view of the fact that in terms of Order 23, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure the petitioner would not be in a position to file another application under Section 18 of the Act as the said application has become barred under the law of limitation. 14. It was further submitted that the learned Single Judge has failed to take into consideration the report of the Director Land Acquisition as also that of Additional Secretary to the effect that the petitioner had been continuing in possession, and thus it was wrongly held that the provisions of Section 48 of the Act had no application in the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned Counsel in support of this contention has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay Vs. M/s Godrej & Boyee reported in AIR 1987 S.C. 2421 . 15. Mr. J. P. Karn the learned Standing Counsel No.5, however, submitted that as the delivery of possession had been effected on 9.8.1980 in the Land Acquisition proceeding Nos. 61 of 1973-74 and 86 of 1973-74, the provisions of Section 48 of the Act could not have been taken recourse to and in that view of the matter, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 16. Dr. 61 of 1973-74 and 86 of 1973-74, the provisions of Section 48 of the Act could not have been taken recourse to and in that view of the matter, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 16. Dr. Alak Ranjan Pandey learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Patna Industrial Area Development Authority and Mr. L. K. Bajla learned counsel appearing on behalf of M/s Hyderabad Industries Limited also submitted that for the purpose of passing a valid order a notification under Section 48 of the Act has to be issued and in view of the fact that no such notification had been issued, it was open to the Government to change its opinion at any stage prior thereto. 17. It was further submitted that even assuming that the State has no power to review its earlier order as was contended by the petitioner, this court cannot he said to have committed any illegality in quashing both the notifications. The learned counsel in support of this connection has relied upon a decision of this court in 1991 (1) PLJR 636. The learned counsel has also relied upon decision Lt. Governor, H. P. vs. Avinash Sharma reported in AIR 1970 S.C. 1576 , Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs. M. D. Bhagwat and others reported in AIR 1975 S.C. 1767 and Khan Bhahadur Chowkaran Kaloth, Mammad Koyi vs. Province of Madras reported in AIR 1946 Madras 450. 18. Section 48(1) of the Act reads thus : "Complication of acquisition not compulsory but compensation to be awarded when not completed-(1) Except in the case provided for in Section 36 the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken." 19. It is, thus clear that the provisions of Section 48 would be applicable only in a case where possession of the land had not been taken. 20. From a perusal of a letter dated 2.11.1985 issued by the Additional Collector, Deoghar to the Additional Secretary Land Acquisition, it appears that the possession of the lands in question was handed over to Patna Industrial Development Authority. The Additional Collector, however in his report dated 9.8.1980 stated that 17.46 acres of land were still in possession of the petitioner. 21. The Additional Collector, however in his report dated 9.8.1980 stated that 17.46 acres of land were still in possession of the petitioner. 21. However, a letter dated 21.7.1986 addressed by the Director Land Acquisition to Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar as contained in Annexure-3 to the writ application which is the sheet-anchors of the petitioner's claim, it appears that therein it had been stated that legal possession of the land in question had been delivered. 22. It would therefore not he correct to contend that no possession was delivered in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition to the Industries Department. 23. In the application for intervention filed by the Patna Industrial Area Development Authority, it has been contended that it had been put in possession of the land including the house, and out of the said area, 20 acres of land had been leased out to M/s Hyderabad Industries Limited and thereupon a factory has a also been constructed. 24. The petitioner has further accepted the position that it had filed an application under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement in the amount of compensation. In that view of the matter, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to contend that the land acquisition proceedings had not validly come to an end. 25. From a perusal of Annexure-G to the writ application it appears that it had specifically been mentioned therein that possession of the lands has been given to the Patna Industrial Area Development Authority. 26. The petitioner in reply to the said counter affidavit had not controverted the statements made therein. It is also evident that proceedings under Section 144 of the Cr. P. C. was initiated as there has been apprehension of breach of peace with regard to possession of the land. 27. The learned Single .Judge upon taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case has come to the conclusion that possession had been delivered by the State of Bihar in favour of Patna Industrial Area Development Authority. If possession had had been delivered in terms of Section 16 of the Act any subsequent encroachment made by the petitioner would not confer him any right. In terms of Section 16 of the Act, the land vested in the State of Bihar under the provision of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be divested. If possession had had been delivered in terms of Section 16 of the Act any subsequent encroachment made by the petitioner would not confer him any right. In terms of Section 16 of the Act, the land vested in the State of Bihar under the provision of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be divested. In Maharaj Singh vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1976 S.C. 2602 : 1977 (1) S.C.C. 155 it has been held as follows : "True, this cutback on the amplitude of the vesting is not an incident of the estate created hut is provided for by the Act itself. Even so, we have to envision, in terms of realty law, what are the nature and incidents of the interest vested in the sabha-full ownership divestible under no circumstances or partial estate with the paramount interest still surviving in praesenti in the State. It is reasonable to harmonize the statutory provisions to reach a solution which will he least incongruous with legal rights we are congnisant of in current jurisprudence. Novelty is not a favoured child of the law. So it is right to fix the estate created by Section 1l7 into familiar moulds if any. Such an approach lends to the position that the vesting in the State was absolute but the vesting in the Sabha was limited to possession and management subject to divestiture by Government. Is such a construction of 'vesting' in two different senses in the same section, sound? Yes. It is, because 'vesting' is a word of slippery import and has many meanings. The context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. That is why even definition clauses allow themselves to be modified by contextual compulsions. So the sense of the situation suggests that in Section 117 (1) of the Act 'vested in the State' carries a plenary connotation, while 'shall right to full possession and enjoyment so lung as it lasts. Lexicographic support is forthcoming, for this meaning. Black's Law Dictionary gives as the sense of 'to vest' as give an immediate fixed right of present or future enjoyment, to clothe with possession, to deliver full possession of land or an estate, to give sesin: Webster's Third International Dictionary gives the meaning as to give to a person a legally fixed immediate right of present or future enjoyment." 29. In this view of the matter, Section 48 of the said Act cannot he said to have any application whatsoever in the facts and circumstances of this case. 30. In Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay and others vs. M/s Godrej and Boyce reported in AIR 1987 S. C. 2421 it has been held that unless possession is taken over the ownership of the land continues with the original owner. It was therefore held : "It is in view of this position, that the owner's interest remain unaffected until possession is taken, that Section 48 gives a liberty to the State Govt. to withdraw from the acquisition at any stage before possession is taken. By such withdrawal no irreparable prejudice is caused to the owner of the land, and if at all he has suffered any dal.l1age in consequence of the acquisition proceedings or incurred costs in relation thereto, he will be compensated therefor under Section 48 (2). In this view of the matter, it docs not matter even if there is lapse of considerable time between the original notification and the withdrawal under Section 48 as held in Trustees of Bai Sarth Jain Shvetambar Mutipujak Gyanochaya Trust V. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 Guj, 107. It also follows that the State can be permitted to exercise its power of withdrawal unilaterally and no requirement that the owner of the land should be given an opportunity of being heard before doing so should be read into the provision." 31. However, in that case the Supreme Court was not required to take into consideration a situation where possession has already been delivered to a third party and who had also deposited the amount of compensation. 32. The lands in question, as noticed hereinbefore, were acquired for the purpose of establishing an industrial area. The lands by reason of the acquisition vested in the Patna Industrial Area Development Authority who in turn allotted various plots to the interveners. The lands in question, as noticed hereinbefore, had been given possession in favour of M/s Hyderabad Industries Limited. In this situation, in my opinion, it was obligatory on the part of the State to give an opportunity of hearing Patna Industrial Area Development Authority as also the aforementioned M/s Hyderabad Industries Limited as by reason thereof, they would be adversely affected. 33. In this situation, in my opinion, it was obligatory on the part of the State to give an opportunity of hearing Patna Industrial Area Development Authority as also the aforementioned M/s Hyderabad Industries Limited as by reason thereof, they would be adversely affected. 33. It is now well known that principles of natural justice arc required to be complied with even in a case where civil or evil consequences ensue by reason of passing an administrative order. 34. As the principles of natural justice have not been complied with, the order dated 21.3.1986 (Annexure-5) was passed. 35. The State of Bihar, in such a situation, was entitled to rectify its own mistake. Such a power is inherent in the Stare. Recently in Jai Singh Dalal Vs. State of Haryana reported in 1992 AIR Supreme Court Weekly page 632 has held as follows: "It was then argued that the State Government had no power to withdraw or rescind the earlier notifications of December, 20, 1990 and January, 25, 199I. On behalf of the State Government Counsel submitted that the State Government had inherent power to withdraw, rescind or cancel the notifications it had issued on the principle that the authority in whom the power to create is vested has that power to destroy or mould its creation. Reliance was also placed on Section 19 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898, which reads as under: "19. Power to make to include power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind orders, rules or bye-laws where, by any Punjab Act, a power to issue notifications or make orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to like sanction and conditions (if any) to add, to amend, vary or rescind any notifications orders, rules or bye-laws so issued or made." Counsel for the appellants argued that since the notifications were issued under the Rules and not any statute the said provisions would not be applicable. It was further submitted that the power, even if exercisable, could be exercised 'in the like manner and subject to like sanction and conditions', which necessitated consultation with the HPSC before the issuance of the notification dated December, 30, 1991 by which the earlier two notifications were cancelled or withdrawan. It was further submitted that the power, even if exercisable, could be exercised 'in the like manner and subject to like sanction and conditions', which necessitated consultation with the HPSC before the issuance of the notification dated December, 30, 1991 by which the earlier two notifications were cancelled or withdrawan. We see no merit in these submissions." The Supreme Court proceeded to observe : "Even if Section 10 does not apply, stricto sensu, we see no reason to hold that a State Government which has the power to specify the method of special recruitment by notification has no inherent power to revise the same if it for good reasons considers the same necessary. To so hold would mean that even if the State Government had committed a mistake it has no power to rectify or correct the same." 36. In Khan Bhahadur Chowkaran Keloth Mammad Koyi Vs. Province of Madras reported in AIR 1946 Madras 450 it has been held that where Government decided to withdraw the acquisition proceedings and directed the Collector to submit through the Board of Revenue the necessary notification for publication, but before it was published it again decided to go on with the acquisition, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the Government, in a fresh notification under Sections 4 and 5 was necessary. 37. By reason of Annexure-5 to the writ application, no finality can be said to have been attached to the proceeding for renewal of the land. The State therefore, could change its mind for valid reasons. 30. In Lt. Governor of H. P. v. Sr. Avinash Sharma reported in 1970 (2) SCC 149 it has been held : "Power to cancel a notification for compulsory acquisition is, it is true, not affected by Section 48 of the Act; by a notification under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, the Govt. may cancel, or rescind the notification issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. But the power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be exercised after the land statutorily vests in the State Government." 39. The same view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in M/s Jethmal Bhojraj and another vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1975 Patna 339. 40. But the power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be exercised after the land statutorily vests in the State Government." 39. The same view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in M/s Jethmal Bhojraj and another vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1975 Patna 339. 40. Further in this case, the petitioner shall not be prejudiced at all in view of the fact that the learned Single Judge has also directed restoration of the• reference case which was initiated on the basis of an application filed by the petitioner for enhancement of compensation under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and in that view of the matter, neither the doctrine of promissory estoppel nor the provisions of Order 23 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be said to have any application. 41. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. A. N. Chaturvedi J.-I agree.