Honble BALIA, J.—This is defendants second appeal against the judgment and the decree for eviction passed in a rent- ejectment suit on the ground of default. The suit for eviction against the defendant-appellant Shankarlal was field by Shri Vedprakash, the respondent-plaintiff, on or about 6.7.1976, inter alia, on the ground that the defendant has committed default in payment of rent for a period of more than 6 months, a she has not paid or tendered rent since 31.10.1975; and that rendered him liable to be evicted under sec. 13 (1) (a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1950). The disputed premises is a shop. The rate of rent is alleged to be Rs. 35/- per month. The plaintiff also asked for determination of standard rent, as the shop was let out in December, 1962. It was claimed that the rent rent was at too low a rate. Prayer for fixing Standard Rent under the Act was also made. (2) The trial court by its order dated 2.2.1977, determined the amount of rent payable to the landlord-plaintiff under Sec. 13 (3) of the Act of 1950, amounting to Rs. 525/- at the rate of Rs. 35/- per month and interest, amounting to Rs. 18.40, totalling Rs. 543.40. The court ordered that the amount be deposited within 15 days from the date of the order. The period for depositing the amount Rs. 595/-, as rent upto 31.03.1977 and interest Rs. 18.40, totalling Rs. 613.40 and, thereafter continued to deposit the rent month by month, until the decision of the suit by the trial court. (3) While deciding the issues No. 1 and 2, the trial court held that the defendant was a defaulter within the meaning of Sec. 13 (1) (a) of the Act. It further held that after determination of rent payable under Sec. 13 (3), upto 31.01.1977, as per the order dated 2.02.1977; it was obligatory upon the defendant to have deposited alongwith the amount determined under Sec. 13 (3), he has committed default in making payment of monthly rent under Sec. 13 (4). As he has failed to deposit the rent as required by Sec. 13 (4), he is not entitled to protection under Sec. 13 (6). As he has failed to deposit the rent as required by Sec. 13 (4), he is not entitled to protection under Sec. 13 (6). For these reasons, the court also held that even the defence of the defendant is liable to be struck off, though no formal order of striking out defence was made. The finding on the question of default was arrived at after taking into consideration the entire evidence on record, including that of the defendant. The trial court determined the standard rent payable for the suit shop at Rs. 75/- per month and passed a decree for arrears of rent in terms thereof also, alongwith decree for ejectment. (4) On appeal, the decree for ejectment and fixation of standard rent was maintained. However, the effective date of standard rent was shifted from the date of filing of the suit, that is, 7.7.1976 to 12.10.1978.. Hence this Second Appeal. (5) The Court, while admitting the second appeal, framed the following substantial questions of law involved in the appeal: "(1) whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the learned Civil Judge was not right in maintaining the decree for ejectment passed by the Munsif, Bikaner after striking out the defence suo moto on the ground that the defendant has no deposited the monthly rent of February, 1977 in time as envisaged by s. 13 (4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (No. XVII of 1950)?" (6) On 16.7.1981, the Court also passed the interim order in the following terms: "The appellant shall not be dispossessed from the premises in dispute until the decision of the appeal provided he pays all the arrears of rent as well as the rent month by month as directed by the Munsif in his judgment dated October 6, 1980." (7) The defendant-appellant again failed to deposit the monthly rent in time as per order dated 16.7.1981. The plaintiff the upon moved an application for execution of decree for ejectment. The Executing Court though found in its order dated 4.2.1992 that the defendant has not paid or deposited rent in time, in terms of the orders of Court, however, had come to the conclusion that since there was no order by the appellate court for depositing rent in executing court, the decree could not be executed for not depositing the rent in time in the court. The plaintiff moved this Court on 24.1.1992, bringing these facts to the notice of the Court and claiming that as the appellant-defendant has failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the interim order dated 16.7.1981, the interim order has automatically come to an end and the executing court be directed to execute the decree. When this application was moved, the appellant moved a Second Stay Application 23.11.1992, alleging that the entire rent has been deposited and he could not be dispossessed during the pendency of the appeal. He also claimed that he has deposited or paid entire rent in advance; to which a reply was filed by the respondent plaintiff, giving details of the dates on which the amount has been paid or deposited, bringing out the fact that he has committed default in making payment of rent for October, 1982; May, 1983, September, 1983; July, October a.11.1984; February, March a.09.1985; August a.09.1987; June a.11.1988; June to December, 1989; a.06.1990 to February, 1991. The defendant again committed default in making payment of rent in time for the months of June a.07.1991. When this application came up for orders, the appeal itself was heard. (8) It may also be noticed that the defendant-appellant, for the first time, moved an application for condonation of delay in payment of rent for the month of February, 1977 on 21.4.1981, alongwith the Second Appeal. The defendant-appellant again moved an application for condonation of delay in making delayed payment of February, 1977 on 4.2.1993 and another application for condonation of delay in making payment of rent in terms of the order dated 16.7.1981 was moved on 23.2.1993, after the arguments were heard and judgment was reserved. (9) It was first contended by learned counsel for the appellant that on true interpretation of Sec. 13(3) and 13(4), the amount of monthly rent subsequently, to the period upto which the amount of rent payable has been determined under Sec. 13 (3), is to be deposited simultaneously alongwith the amount obligation to pay rent by 15th of each succeeding month arises. The amount of monthly rent upto the date of deposit of rent determined under Sec. 13 (3) cannot constitute as delayed payment, so long as the same amount has been deposited alongwith the amount determined under Sec. 13(3), which admittedly, in the present case, has been paid within time extended by the Court. The amount of monthly rent upto the date of deposit of rent determined under Sec. 13 (3) cannot constitute as delayed payment, so long as the same amount has been deposited alongwith the amount determined under Sec. 13(3), which admittedly, in the present case, has been paid within time extended by the Court. (10) This contention of learned counsel cannot be accepted. It will be relevant to re-produce Sec. 13(3), (4), (5) & (6) at this juncture, which reads as under: "Sec. 13-Eviction of Tenants: — (3) In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-section (1) with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the court shall, on the firs date of hearing or on any other date as the court may fix in this behalf which shall not be more than three months after filing of the written statement and shall be before the framing of the issues, after hearing the parties and on the basis of material on record provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in court or paid to the landlord by the tenant. Such amount shall be calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid or was payable for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which such determination is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of six percent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of determination. Provided that while determining the amount under this sub-section the court shall not take into account the amount of rent which was barred by limitation on the date of the filing of the suit. (4) The tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the. landlord, month by months the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3). (5) If a tenant fails to deposits or pay any amount referred to in sub-section (4) on the date or within the time specified therein, the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. (6) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub- section (4) no decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) shall be passed by the court against him: Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section, if having obtained such benefit or benefits under section 13-A in respect of any such accommodation if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of the accommodation for six months." (11) A reading of these provisions make it abundantly clear that under Sec. 13 (3), the amount of rent payable is to be determined upto the end of previous month, ending prior to the date of such determination under Sec. 13(3). Under Sec. 13(4), the time that is permissible for deposit or payment of amount determined under Sec. 13(3), is separately prescribed. A separate obligation has been cast on the tenant to continue to make payment of rent for periods subsequent to the date upto which amount has been determined under Sec. 13 (3) by 15th of each succeeding month. Thus, the obligation to make two payments are independent of each other; for which different periods for payment have been prescribed and the payment of monthly rent by 15th of each succeeding month is not dependent on and connected with the payment of amount of rent determined under Sec. 13(3). Different period has been prescribed upto which time for payment of the amount on these two accounts is to be paid, can be extended. Different period has been prescribed upto which time for payment of the amount on these two accounts is to be paid, can be extended. While for deposit of amount determined under Sec. 13(3) is to be paid or deposited within 15 days of the date of order and this period can be extended upto 3 months, on the other hand, amount of rent after the date up which rent has been determined under Sec. 13 (3), is to be paid by 15th of each succeeding month and court is further empowered to extend time of such deposit by 15 days. I am forfeited in this view by a decision of this Court in Ram Saran & Anr. vs. Nathulal and Ors. (1). This Court while constructing the scheme of Sec. 13 (3) and 13 (4), observed as under: "...the meaning of the term "shall also continue to deposit" used under section 13(4) cannot be construed to come into operation after the extended period for depositing the rent determined under sub-section (3). The liability of the tenant to deposit or pay the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which date determination has been made under sub-section (3) arises soon after the passing of the order under sub-section (3)." (12) Thus, it cannot be accepted that by deposit of rent of February, 1977 alongwith the amount of rent determined under Sec. 13(3) after 15.03.the defendant has not committed any default. (13) It was next contended by learned counsel for the defendant- appellant that even assuming that the defendant has committed default in making payment of rent for the month of February, 1977; it was not mandatory on the court to have struck down the defence of the defendant for delayed payment of rent for the month of February, 1977 but it was within the discretion of the trial court and in view of decisions of this Court in Vishandas vs. Savitri Devi (2) and Rameshchandra vs. Manmohan Singh and Anr. (3), the defence of the defendant ought not to have been struck out. (3), the defence of the defendant ought not to have been struck out. (14) Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff also does not seriously dispute the proposition that the power to strike out defence under Sec. 13(5) of the Act, when it is found that defendant-tenant has failed to deposit or pay the amount of rent under Sec. 13(4) within the time allowed, is discretionary and not mandatory; however, he contends that in the presents case the conduct of the defendant in even defying the conditions imposed on him while staying the execution of decree for ejectment clearly goes to show that the defendant is not ready and willing to pay rent in time and his conduct in not depositing the amount of rent is clearly contumacious and not bonafide. He, therefore, contends that discretion ought not be exercised in favour of the defendant in the present case. He further contends that even otherwise, the courts-below while holding that the defence of the defendant is liable to be struck out, has not given effect to, consequence of such striking out of defence, inasmuch as, the finding of default has been arrived at by taking into consideration the entire evidence including that which was led by the defendant on the point. He contends that consequences of such striking out of the defence is not removal of the protection under the Act but is confined only to exclusion of defendants evidence about his defence under the Act. He is otherwise protected under the Act, inasmuch as, the plaintiff still has to prove his case to make a ground for eviction under the Act and the defendant still has an opportunity to cross examine the plaintiffs witnesses and contend that even on the plaintiffs own evidence, he has been able to prove his case. In the present case, since the defence evidence has also been taken into consideration in arriving at a finding about the fact as to whether the defendant has committed a default in payment of rent so as to make out a ground for eviction under Sec. 13(1) (a), therefore, the exercise of discretion in making observation that defence of the defendant is liable to be struck out, is of little consequence and does not result in vitiating the finding on the question of default. (15) So far as the question that the power to strike out defence under Sec. 13 (5) is not mandatory but discretionary; there cannot be any doubt and dispute after decision of this Court Vishan Dass case (supra). It also cannot be said in the present case that late payment of rent for the month of February, 1977 alongwith the amount of original rent determined under Sec. 13 (3), on 14.4.1977 within the period extended by the Court, cannot be said to be contumacious or mala fide. This Court has held on more than one occasion that unless the default in making payment of rent, monthly rent or late payment of monthly rent, can be termed as a contumacious or mala fide; the defence ought not to be struck off. Reference in this connection may be made to decision of this Court in M/s. Sunmoon Stationers vs. Banshilal (4). (16) Thus, in my opinion, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant merits acceptance that the defence of the tenant- defendant ought not to have been struck out in the present case for the delayed payment of rent for the month of February, 1977. There is also truth in what is contended by learned counsel for the respondent that in spite of making observation as to the striking out of the defence of the defendant, the courts below have really not visited the defendant with the consequence of such striking out of defence. The defence evidences have not been excluded from the consideration while arriving at the finding about commission of default in payment of rent on the part of defendant tenant. (17) However, while it is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that as a result of not striking out of defence, the defendant automatically becomes entitled to benefit conferred on him under Sec. 13 (6), as a result of deposits made within time allowed under Sec. 13(4), on the other hand, it is contended by learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that the effect of exercise of discretion in favour of tenant in not striking out defence is only confined to save the defendant-tenant from the consequence which striking out of defence has on his protective umbrella under the Act. He contends that the consequence of striking out of defence is merely taking away his right of leading evidence or if his evidence has already been led, to the exclusion of his evidence from the consideration while arriving at findings as to whether the plaintiff has been able to make out a case for eviction under the Act? By exercise of discretion in favour of the tenant, result is only taking away these evil effects of exclusion of defendants evidence from consideration. But, it cannot result in conferment of a right of additional protection under Sec. 13(6). The provisions of Sec. 13(6) are of mandatory character and has to be strictly complied with. The exercise of discretion being under Sec. 13(5), it cannot bring the case, which has already fallen out of the purview of Sec. 13(6), back within the ambit of that provision. (18) In this connection, it was also contended by learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff that keeping in view the provisions of the Act of 1950, as it existed after the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent) Amendment Ordinance, 1975, replaced by the Rajasthan Amending Act, 14 of 1976, the Court had not jurisdiction to extend time beyond such powers conferred on the court under Sec. 13(4) of the Act. He submitted that where the legislation itself conferred specific powers for extending the time limit originally fixed for deposit of amount under Sec. 13(4) and a limitation has also been fixed on exercise of such power, such provisions has been held to be mandatory and inherent powers of the court cannot be exercised for going beyond the statutory provisions. His contention was that the observations to the contrary in Vishandass case (supra) must be held to be impliedly over-ruled by later decisions of Supreme Court in J.L. Varandani vs. Asha Lata Mukherjee (Dead) by LRs. (5) and Smt. Sulochana Damodar vs. Smt. Ratnaprabha vs. Tople (6). (19) On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that a Full Bench of this Court in Vishan Dass case (supra) has already held that the Court has inherent powers to condone delay in deposit of amount under Sec. 13(4), and extend the period for such deposit beyond the time prescribed under Sec. 13(4), over-ruling the decision of this Court in Kriparam Ganeshilal vs. Vijay Kumar Goyan (7). The decision of their Lordships of Supreme Court in J.L. Varandanis case (supra), which is rendered under the scheme of West Bengal Act, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be made applicable to the provisions of the Rajasthan Act. He also placed reliance on various decisions of the Supreme Court to which reference has been made by the Full Bench in the case referred above. (20) Having carefully considered the rival contentions and decisions cited before mc in this connection, 1 am of the opinion that, prima facie, the contention by learned counsel for the respondent has force and the manner requires consideration by a larger Bench. (21) However, this question need not be examined in detail, in the present case, as in may view; failure to deposit monthly rent by 15th of each month cannot be condoned in the present case for the reasons stated hereinafter. (22) I have noticed above that plaintiff had filed present suit of eviction on the ground that tenant having committed default is liable to be evicted under Sec. 13(l)(a) of the Act. He has also prayed for fixing standard rent under Sec. 6 of the Act, therefore, this suit is a composite suit for fixation of standard rent under Sec. 6 as well as for eviction on grounds set forth under Sec. 13. Hence, the suit is not only governed by Sec. 13 of the Act but also Sec. 7 of the Act. (23) It will be relevant to re-produce Sec. 7 of the Act: "Sec. 7. — Fixation of provisional rent.— (1) Upon the institution of a suit under Sec. 6, the Court shall forthwith make an order fixing in a summary manner a provisional rent for the premises in question, which shall be binding on all parties concerned and shall remain in force till a decree fixing the standard rent therefore is finally made in such suits. (2) The provisional rent fixed under this section shall also apply to such arrears of rent as, in the case of a tenant who has instituted within six months from the commencement of the tenancy a suit under Section 6 on the ground of rent agreed upon being excessive relate to the period intervening between such commencement and institution. (2) The provisional rent fixed under this section shall also apply to such arrears of rent as, in the case of a tenant who has instituted within six months from the commencement of the tenancy a suit under Section 6 on the ground of rent agreed upon being excessive relate to the period intervening between such commencement and institution. (3) A suit for recovery of arrears of rent to which the provisional rent fixed under this section is applicable shall be stayed by the Court upon the payment by the tenant in Court of the total amount due to the landlord on the basis of such provisional rent. (4) Any failure to pay the provisional rent for any month by the fifteenth day of the next following month shall render the tenant liable to eviction under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 13, and all sums due from the tenant as such rent shall be recoverable from him as if the order under sub-section (1) were a decree of the Court in a suit for periodical payments. (5) All amounts paid as provisional rent shall be adjusted towards payment of the standard rent finally decreed." (24) The above provision postulates that as soon as a suit for fixing standard rent is filed, the court has to determine standard rent provisionally, which remain binding between the parties until a decree fixing the standard rent is finally passed in such suits. Duty to pay such provisional standard rent during the pendency of suit and consequences of failure to pay such provisional standard rent, is provided under Sec. 7(4). (25) Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 7 is clear in its terms, that where a tenant fails to pay the provisional rent for any month by the fifteenth day of next following month; he renders himself liable to eviction under sec. 13(l)(a) of the Act. (26) This provision is entirely different from the provisions of Sec. 13. The nature of deposit under Sec. 13(4) and its consequences provided under Secs. 13(5) and 13(6), are also, therefore, entirely different. (27) Sub-sections (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Section 13 are also relevant to notice in this context. The Scheme contained in these provisions is that when a suit for eviction is filed on the ground set forth in sec. 13(5) and 13(6), are also, therefore, entirely different. (27) Sub-sections (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Section 13 are also relevant to notice in this context. The Scheme contained in these provisions is that when a suit for eviction is filed on the ground set forth in sec. 13(1)(a), with or without other grounds; the court is required to determine amount of rent payable by the tenant to landlord upto the end of the month previous to that in which such determination is made at the rate of rent at which it was last paid or was payable. Thereafter, tenant has to pay such amount within 3 months. Apart from deposit of such amount determined under Sec. 13(3) tenant is also to deposit or pay monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which rent has been determined, by fifteenth of each succeeding month. That is the scheme of Secs. 13(3) and 13(4). (28) Consequences of non-payment of and payment, are provided under Secs. 13(5) and 13(6) of the Act. While non-payment entails striking out of defence; payment is time confers benefit that notwithstanding the fact that tenant is defaulter in respect of payment of rent for a period of six month as pleaded in plaint, no decree on that account can be passed. However, this is also clear that such benefit can not be availed by the tenant in respect of subsequent defaults. (29) A default simplicitor in payment of monthly rent, which is future rent after determination of amount due under Sec. 13(3), does not make the tenant a defaulter second time, unless such default conforms to Sec. 13(l) (a). In order to be default, within the meaning of Sec. 13(l) (a), there has to be a default in payment of rent for a period of six months or more. However, where in a suit for standard rent, provisional rent is determined under Sec. 7(1), failure to pay such provisional rent for any one month thereafter, render the tenant liable to be evicted under Sec. 13(1) (a) of the Act, by making the provision under Sec. 7(4) that — ".....shall render the tenant liable to eviction under clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13..." — the provision has directly been incorporated by reference, as part of Sec. 13(1) (a) and, it has to be read as if enacted in Sec. 13(1) (a) as well; furnishing one of the grounds that takes away the protective umbrella of the Act on condition of Sec. 7(4) being fulfilled, that is to say, non-payment of provisional rent determined under Sec. 7(1), even for one month makes the tenant liable for eviction on default under Sec. 13(l)(a) of the Act. (30) It is true that where there is no suit for ejectment but is only for fixation of standard rent, tenant cannot automatically be dispossessed for his failure to pay provisional rent by fifteenth of next succeeding month during the pendency of such suit. But, when in a composite suit for ejectment based on grounds set forth under Section 13(1) and for fixation of standard rent, a tenant fails to deposit provisional standard rent during pendency of such suit, two-fold question arise. Firstly, whether the court by taking notice of subsequent event of such failure on the part of the tenant, can sustain a decree for eviction on the ground under Sec. 13(l)(a) read with Sec. 7(4) in that suit itself ? and, Secondly; — whether such failure to deposit monthly provisional standard rent, which is also a required deposit under Sec. 13(4), can be or ought to be condoned and time be extended for payment of such monthly rent? (31) Answer to the first question, in my opinion, must be in the affirmative and of the second question, in the negative. (32) It can be said that in a suit for eviction on the ground of default, under the Scheme of Sec. 13, the court determines amount of rent due to landlord upto the last date of month preceding the month in which such determination is made, at the rate at which rent is last paid or was payable and, thereafter tenant is required to deposit such amount within the time prescribed under Sec. 13(4). Under Sec. 13(4), the tenant is also required to deposit or pay monthly rent at the rate so determined by 15th of every month. Failure to deposit such amount within the time allowed or continued deposit such amount, results in statutory consequences under Sec. 13(5) and 13(6) respectively. Under Sec. 13(4), the tenant is also required to deposit or pay monthly rent at the rate so determined by 15th of every month. Failure to deposit such amount within the time allowed or continued deposit such amount, results in statutory consequences under Sec. 13(5) and 13(6) respectively. For giving effect to either of the provisions, the court has to arrive at a finding whether amount in terms of Sec. 13(4) has been deposited or not ? Thus, this enquiry into events that has taken place during the pendency of suit is must in order to give effect to statutory provisions. The subsequent event of failure to deposit rent at the rate determined, in a composite suit like present, one also entails certain statutory consequences under Sec. 7(4) of the Act. In a suit for eviction based on ground set forth under Sec. 13(l)(a), such fact of failure to deposit provisional standard rent by 15th of succeeding month, when admitted or found by the court as a result of determining question arising under Sec. 13(5) or 13(6), the court must take notice and give effect to for the purposes of Sec. 7(4) as well, without requiring a formal amendment of pleading. In this connection, reference may be made to Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and Ors. vs. Keshwar Lal Chaudhari and Ors. (8), where in their Lordships held as under: "The hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of India is in the nature of re-hearing and therefore in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the appellate Court is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against.." (33) The principle fully governs the case where the question of giving effect to statutory consequences of Sec. 7(4) arising on the basis of facts admitted or established in an enquiry to that effect for giving effect to other provisions of Act as well. However, the decision of this case is not rested on this ground, alone. (34) In a suit for eviction based on grounds set forth under Sec. 13(1)(a) coupled with prayer for determination of standard rent, attracts not only the provisions of sec. 13 but also of sec. 7 of the Act, the determination under Sec. 13(3) is to be made at the rate at which it was payable. (34) In a suit for eviction based on grounds set forth under Sec. 13(1)(a) coupled with prayer for determination of standard rent, attracts not only the provisions of sec. 13 but also of sec. 7 of the Act, the determination under Sec. 13(3) is to be made at the rate at which it was payable. Rate at which amount under Sec. 13(l)(a) is to be determined in a suit where question of fixing standard rent is also involved, is rate of provisional standard rent under Sec. 7(1); whether separately fixed before determination of the amount under Sec. 13(3) or simultaneously determined while amount under Sec. 13(3) is fixed. Recently, in Sunmoon Stationers vs. Banshilal (supra) (S.B. Civil Misc. Appeals No. 173/84 & 174/84), decided on 13.1.1993), this Court opined as under: "The determination of amount of rent under Sec. 13(3) and rate of rent payable or last paid at which that amount is to be calculated, both being provisional in nature and determination of standard rent under Sec. 7(1) also being provisional in nature; in such cases, it must be held that where in a suit for eviction and arrears of rent, a counter claim has been filed for determining standard rent of the premises; it amounts to raising a dispute as to the rate at which rent was payable for period for which tenant may have defaulted and while passing order under Sec. 13(3), the Court also resolve this dispute by provisionally determining rate of rent for calculating the amount of rent to be deposited or paid to landlord and such determination of rent must be deemed to be provisional determination of standard rent within the meaning of Sec. 7(1) also." (35) Amount of rent under Sec. 13(3) is fixed upto end of the month preceding the month in which such determination is made, payment of such amount in terms of Sec. 13(4) can at best result in not passing any decree under Sec. 13(6) in respect of any default that may have occurred upto that period. (36) However, non-payment of future monthly rent in such composite suit, as in the present case, results in two-fold consequences. Firstly, suit being for fixation of standard rent under Sec. 6, non-payment of provisional rent results in furnishing a fresh ground of eviction to the plaintiff. (36) However, non-payment of future monthly rent in such composite suit, as in the present case, results in two-fold consequences. Firstly, suit being for fixation of standard rent under Sec. 6, non-payment of provisional rent results in furnishing a fresh ground of eviction to the plaintiff. It also results in striking out of defence of the tenant against eviction under the Act; albit, under the discretion of the court in respect of default pleaded, under. Sec. 13(5). (37) While in respect of default under Sec. 13(4), assuming without expressing any opinion on the issue raised in this regard, that the courts have power to condone delay and save the consequences of striking out of the defence, it cannot condone delay so as to take away vested right of the landlord to get a decree of eviction on the ground of such second default as a result of breach of obligation under Sec. 7(4). To say that even in such cases also, where the composite suit like present has been filed, the Court as power to condone delay in making payment of monthly rent under Sec. 13(4) and avoid the consequences of Sec. 7(4); will be rendering the substantive provisions of the Act nugatory. It may be noticed that a default in payment of monthly rent at the rate at which standard rent has ben provisional fixed for the period after that date upto which amount has been determined, amounts to subsequent default, to which benefit of sub-section (6) is not envisaged. By necessary corollary it must be held that court has no power to condone delay in payment of such amount which results in taking away the right of plaintiff-landlord to secure a decree of eviction on subsequent default. (38) Therefore, the principle that court has inherent power to condone delay in making payment can only apply to such payments which do not furnish by itself a ground of eviction, but consequence is only confined to striking out of defence. Such power does not extend to condone such default which has resulted in furnishing fresh ground for eviction. (39) In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that principle enunciated in Vishandass case (supra), is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Such power does not extend to condone such default which has resulted in furnishing fresh ground for eviction. (39) In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that principle enunciated in Vishandass case (supra), is not applicable to the facts of the present case. (40) It may be noticed that under Sec. 7(1), a provisional rent is to be binding and remain in force, until a decree fixing the standard rent is finally made in such suits. It may be relevant to notice here that while interpreting Section 13(4), this Court has held that in the absence of any provision for obligation to make the payment of future monthly rent until decision of the suit; as was the case under Bombay Rent Control Act, the appeal cannot be considered as continuation of suit for the purposes of Section 13(4). (41) However, where the is express provision, that a particular order is to remain in force until a decree is finally passed in a suit the expression has been interpreted by the Supreme Court that appeal is continuity of suit and the obligation of tenant in respect of such obligation continues also. That is the view of the Apex Court in Garika Pati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhary and Ors. (9), that, an appeal is not an independent and fresh proceedings; but is only continuation of original suit and is only a stage in the suit itself. (42) The Supreme Court in Mrinalini Shahs case (10), while interpreting the words until suit is finally decided held appeal to be continuity of suit, which has been distinguished by this Court in Kamruddin vs. Wahid Ali (11), on the ground that while Bombay Act used the words until suit is finally decided Sec. 13(4) of the Rajasthan Act does not use such words. As I have noticed, this distinction does not exist when the case is to be considered in the light of Sec. 7(4) read with Sec. 13(4) of the Act. (43) The decisions cited by learned counsel for the appellant relating to question that appeal is not continuation of suit, are all in the context of Sec. 13(4) only and are not applicable to a composite suit, like present one, which is governed by Sec. 7(4) as well as squarely covered by decision in Mrinalini Shahs case (supra). (43) The decisions cited by learned counsel for the appellant relating to question that appeal is not continuation of suit, are all in the context of Sec. 13(4) only and are not applicable to a composite suit, like present one, which is governed by Sec. 7(4) as well as squarely covered by decision in Mrinalini Shahs case (supra). (44) Reference in this connection may also be made to Kewal vs. Sesmal (12), wherein this Court while distinguishing decision in Lalchand Jamatmal vs. Nanabhai Ranchhod (13), held as under: ".....The Full Bench considered Sec. 5(iv)(10), section 11 and Section 12 of the Bombay Act. Having regard to the language used in the aforesaid provisions and the scheme of the Bombay Act and relating on Vera Abbashbhai vs. Haji Gulamnabi ( AIR 1964 SC 1341 ), the Full Bench held that section 12(3) (b) applies even at appellate stage and the words till the suit is finally decided occurring in Section 12(3)(b) refer also to the decision of the suit in appeal by the appellate court when an appeal is preferred by the landlord against a decree passed by the trial court dismissing his suit..." (45) Obligation to pay provisional standard rent fixed under Sec. 7(1) continues till a decree fixing standard rent is finally made in the suit. Until then, possibility of suffering statutory consequences of non-payment under Sec. 7(4) also continues. Therefore, in the context of provisions of Sec. 7(1), the liability of pay standard rent by 15th of next month continues even in the appeal. It may be noticed that the appellant has also challenged the fixation of standard rent by the trial court. The decree being sub-judice in respect of fixing of standard rent, the said rent remain a provisional standard rent, until the decree is finally passed. Therefore, contention of learned counsel that the default made in breach of interim order passed by this court, cannot be taken into consideration in the present appeal for the purposes of agitating the validity of the orders passed by the trial court, cannot extend to the facts of the present case. Therefore, contention of learned counsel that the default made in breach of interim order passed by this court, cannot be taken into consideration in the present appeal for the purposes of agitating the validity of the orders passed by the trial court, cannot extend to the facts of the present case. (46) Applying this test is terms of language used in Sec. 7(1), for the purposes of obligation to pay provisional standard rent until final decree is passed in the suit, the appeal is continuation of the proceedings of the suit itself and the obligation to pay rent at the rate of provisional standard rent continues, even at the stage of appeal. (47) In the present case, which is also a suit under Sec. 6 of the Act, the court has determined the amount of rent payable for a month while determining the amount of arrears of rent payable under Sec. 13(3), which, as discussed above, for the purposes of present suit, is the provisional standard rent, binding between the parties in terms of Sec. 7(1) of the Act, until a final decree is passed and, non-payment of such provisional rent by 15th of next month, furnishes the landlord a ground to secure eviction under Sec. 13(l)(a) of the Act. (48) It is apparent from the applications for condonation of delay in making payment of monthly rent in terms of interim order passed by this Court, that defendant has made default in making payment of rent for the month of February, 1977 by 15th of next month during the pendency of suit in the court of first instance and again made defaults in making payment by 15th of succeeding month during pendency of this appeal. This not only amount to breach of the interim order but also breach of provisions of Sec. 7(4), rendering tenant liable to eviction, as defaulter under Sec. 13(l)(a) of the Act. (49) The details furnished by appellant himself shows that he was habitually made late and irregular payments of rent during pendency of this appeal. The chart furnished by him alongwith rejoinder to Second Stay Application shows that he was never paid rent month by month. To start with, he started making payment after a lapse of two to three months delaying payment of the first part of payment, beyond the time allowed under Sec. 7(4) and Sec. 13(4) of the Act. The chart furnished by him alongwith rejoinder to Second Stay Application shows that he was never paid rent month by month. To start with, he started making payment after a lapse of two to three months delaying payment of the first part of payment, beyond the time allowed under Sec. 7(4) and Sec. 13(4) of the Act. Thereafter, since August, 1983, he started making payment of rent by lapse of several months ranging from 4 to 15 months. In all such payments, while payment for last month of the period only was within time but rest of the payment was delayed by 2 months to 13 months, depending upon period for which payment had become over due by then. To illustrate, rent for the period of May, 1985 to February, 1986 was paid only on 15.1.1986, March, 1986 to December, 1986 on 5.11.1986, for January, 1987 to October, 1987-on 15.10.1987. These all payments were made at the interval of 10 months. Then, no payment was made for another 14 months and payment was made for 15 months from November, 1987 to January, 1989-on 5.1.1989 only. Thereafter also, succeeding payments were made at intervals of 10 months, 6 months, 13 months, 7 months, 12 months and 12 months respectively. This clearly shows not only gross violation of provisions of Sec. 7(4), read with See. 13(4), but leaves no room of doubt that appellant was not ready and willing to pay rent for the suit premises in terms of the provisions of the Act and is not entitled to non-obstance. protective clause of Sec. 13 of the Act which confers, protection only so long as he is ready and willing to pay; rent therefore to the full extent allowable by this Act... (50) Thus, in my opinion, not only the appellants protective cover against eviction is lost on the ground set forth under Sec. 13(l)(a) but he has disentitled himself to invoke the protective cover at all as conditions precedent to, protec-tion-willingness and. readiness of the tenant to pay the rent as provided under the Act - being established to be non-existing. (51) It will also be incongruous to say, that delay in making the payment For the purpose of Sec. 13(5) —default can be condoned but still right to get the tenant evicted for such default in terms of Sec. 7(4) read with Sec. 13(1)(a) subsists. (51) It will also be incongruous to say, that delay in making the payment For the purpose of Sec. 13(5) —default can be condoned but still right to get the tenant evicted for such default in terms of Sec. 7(4) read with Sec. 13(1)(a) subsists. (52) It may be looked from other way round. If the delay is condoned; qua the first default. as it subsists at the time of filing of suit, the plaintiff will be entitled to get a decree for eviction as a result of non-payment of provisional standard rent by 15th of next month, which the defendant has admittedly failed to pay in the present case. If the delay is not condoned- the plaintiff will still be entitled to get a decree for eviction in view of he being n0t entitled to benefit of Sec. 13(6) and both.the court below having found concurrently that defendant has committed a default, in terms of Sec, 13(l)(a) of the Act, (53) Even otherwise, assuming but not laying down; that court has such power to condone delay, when the consequences "of condoning the delay are of such gravity as to deprive the plaintiff of his fight to obtain a decree for eviction on the ground of subsequent default, it will be an injudicious exercise of discretion to condone delay. (54) The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that breach of Condition of stay order during pendency of appeal is not relevant for the purpose whether delay in payment ought to be condoned?, and, only facts as they existed on the date of default made during the pendency of suit in the court of first instance is relevant, cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the present- case. - (55) As has been discussed above, in the case like present where suit is a composite suit for fixing standard rent as well as for eviction on ground set forth under Sec. 13(1)(a), and in such cases for the purpose of deposit of monthly rent also, appeal is continuation of suit. Secondly, in deciding the question of condonation of delay, two factors are always relevant (i) whether tenant had sufficient cause for non-deposit or delayed deposit when the amount of rent became due; (ii) whether the conduct of tenant has not bee contumacious. Secondly, in deciding the question of condonation of delay, two factors are always relevant (i) whether tenant had sufficient cause for non-deposit or delayed deposit when the amount of rent became due; (ii) whether the conduct of tenant has not bee contumacious. Contumacious conduct need not necessarily be confined to delayed deposit of amount but his conduct qua proceedings as a whole will be relevant while considering whether a discretion be exercised in favour of an erring party. Discretion of court is always a part of its equity jurisdiction which has to be exercised in consonance with the justice of the case in a judicious manner. It has been noticed above, that since obtaining protection of this court against his eviction, on condition of payment of rent month by month, way back in July, 1981, the tenant has not even deposited rent month by month but has regularly indulged in late deposits, until plaintiff filed execution on 3.08.1991. Such late deposits are not on a few stray occasion and for a few days but rent for month together has nor been paid with regularity in shear disregard of statutory provisions as well as orders of this Court; whose protective; umbrella he seeks, and he started making payment in advance only after 3.8.1991, alter 10 years of obtaining stay "order and" execution was laid for committing breach of courts order. No condonation application showing any sufficient cause was ever made in this regard until after judgment in the present appeal was reserved. No sufficient casue was shown for such delayed payment except that such delay in appeal is not relevant. Such a conduct of appellant cannot but be conturnacious and such conduct is sufficient to refuse exercise of discretion in favour of appellant at this stage in the present case. No sufficient casue was shown for such delayed payment except that such delay in appeal is not relevant. Such a conduct of appellant cannot but be conturnacious and such conduct is sufficient to refuse exercise of discretion in favour of appellant at this stage in the present case. (56) In the facts and circumstances of this case I am fortified in my view by decision of Supreme Court in Mrinalini Shahs case (supra), wherein the Apex Court taking, notice of irregular payment like in the present case, observed as under: ".....If he persistently defaults during the pendency of the suit or appeal in payment the rent, such as where he pays it at irregular, intervals of 2 or 3 or 4 months as is the case before us the Court has no discretion to treat what were manifestly irregular payments, as substantial compliance with the mandate of this clause irrespective of the fact that by the time the judgment was pronounced all the arrears had been cleared by the tenant." (57) The ratio of above case fully applicable in the facts of the present case. (58) In the result, applications for condoning delay in making payment of rent dated 4 2.1993 and 9.2.1993, are rejected. Consequently, the defendant is riot entitled to benefit under Sec. 13(6) or protection from eviction on the grounds set forth by him under Sec. 13(1)(a) of the Act. (59). The finding that the plaintiff was a defaulter at the time of filing of the suit, is a finding of fact and is not open to challenge in second appeal This is also not seriously disputed before me that unless the defendant can get benefit under Sec. 13(6), the decree for eviction on the ground of default cannot be disturbed in this appeal. (60) As a result of aforesaid discussion, the appeal fails and hereby dismissed. (61) There will be no order as to costs of appeal.