(1) THE appellant was prosecuted on a complaint of the Health Inspector, Dr Bajaj, that he was selling milk ice containing 4.16% fat. Item A. 11.02.09 of Appendix B read with Rule 5 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (the Rules) stipulates that milk ice containing more than 2.0% milk fat would be an adulterated article within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (the Act). (2) THERE is no dispute that the sample of the article sold by the appellant contained 4.16% fat. What is seriously disputed is the nature of the article that was being sold by the appellant when the complainant Health Inspector took the sample of the same. According to the appellant, he was selling "milk ice cream" and not "milk ice". Admittedly, Appendix B in question does not mention any article called milk ice cream. The articles nearest in description mentioned there are ice cream or milk ice. For ice cream, under Item A. 1 1.02.09 of the Appendix, not less that 10% of fat is prescribed whereas for milk ice, as stated above, what is prescribed is not more than 2.0% fat. (3) ALTHOUGH the complaint lodged made an allegation that the appellant was selling milk ice, in his substantive evidence in the trial court, the Health Inspector stated that "after disclosing his identity and serving notice on the appellant, he purchased nine cups of golden milk ice cream weighing 90 grams each for Rupees nine only". That was also the defence of the appellant in his statement under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code, viz., that he was selling "milk ice cream" and not "milk ice". The trial court on the basis of this evidence, in para 11 of its judgment stated as follows: "IT would thus, appear that it cannot be said with certainty that the article out of which the same [sample] was taken was milk ice and not milk ice cream. At least, the possibility of this fact cannot be ruled out." (4) THE trial court thus gave the benefit of doubt to the appellant and acquitted the accused on this count in addition to the ground that Rule 22 of the Rules was violated inasmuch as a smaller quantity was obtained as sample than prescribed in the Rule. At least, the possibility of this fact cannot be ruled out." (4) THE trial court thus gave the benefit of doubt to the appellant and acquitted the accused on this count in addition to the ground that Rule 22 of the Rules was violated inasmuch as a smaller quantity was obtained as sample than prescribed in the Rule. (5) IN appeal, the High court held that one of the grounds on which the appellant was acquitted by the trial court, viz., that there was violation of Rule 22 of the Rules was not sustainable. As regards the question whether the appellant had sold milk ice cream or milk ice, the High court held, relying upon the Form Ex. P.A. signed by the appellant, that the appellant himself had admitted that what was sold was milk ice. (6) WE find it difficult to concur with this finding of the High court. Although it is true that the Form in question was signed by the appellant, the Health Inspector himself in his substantive evidence before the court deposed that what he purchased from the appellant was milk ice cream. In any case, the trial court had on this state of the evidence given the benefit of doubt to the appellant and had acquitted him. It cannot be said that the said reason given for the acquittal of the appellant was either perverse or unreasonable to invite interference with it by the High court. (7) IN the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the High Court on that score and acquit the accused of the offence in question. The bail bond of the accused will stand discharged.