Judgment Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee, J. The both the appeals have been heard together and disposed of by the following common judgment: 2. In these Full Bench Reference cases the following questions had been referred by the then Chief Justice N.P. Singh sitting with U.C. Banerjee, J. for determination. The said questions are as follows: (a) Whether by reason of the language used, Rule 9(1) of the West Bengal Service Rules (Part-I) can be said to have a binding effect on the declarant; (b) Whether it is open to the declarant to take recourse to Rule 9(5) of the above noted Service Rules to apply for correction or rectification of the above date of birth at a subsequent stage; (c) Whether a declarant can be permitted to correct his age on the basis of his Matriculation Certificate which certificate the declarant failed to produce at the time of his appointment; (d) Whether an analogy can be drawn from the fundamental rules providing for 'boy service' regularisation in the matter of correction of age; (e) Whether it is the duty of the Law Courts to rely upon a document produced by an employee after a considerable period of time, though at the time of entry into the service his declaration runs counter to such a document, more so when the declarant himself has filled in the declaration in his own handwriting stating his qualification to be a Matriculate. The facts and circumstances under which these Reference made was as follows:- 3. The writ petitioner/opposite party in Full Bench Reference No.1 of 1991 came to the city of Calcutta as a refugee from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in the year 1947 after partition of India. He passed the Matriculation Examination held under the University of Calcutta in July, 1947. Subsequently he was recruited as Constable in the Calcutta Police Force on February 5, 1948. The date of birth as recorded in the declaration furnished by the writ petitioner at the time of his initial entry into the police Force stood at 3rd February, 1930. But, the date of birth mentioned in the Matriculation Certificate was November, 1, 1931. According to the date of birth in the Matriculation Certificate the Petitioner was 16 years 3 months and 4 days on the date of joining the Calcutta Police Force. But, the date of birth mentioned in the Matriculation Certificate was November, 1, 1931. According to the date of birth in the Matriculation Certificate the Petitioner was 16 years 3 months and 4 days on the date of joining the Calcutta Police Force. It was alleged that the writ petitioner was ineligible to be appointed as constable in the Calcutta Police Force on the basis of the date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate. A representation, dated June 24, 1968 was filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner of Police for correction of his date of birth and again another representation was filed on November 27, 1984. But, by the communication dated March 24, 1985 the prayer made on behalf of the writ petitioner for correction of date of birth in the service book, was rejected. The writ petitioner had disclosed names of various persons in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the writ petition whose dates of birth had been corrected by the authorities concerned in similar circumstances and in those cases those police personnel did not even complete the age of 18 years when they joined the police service. The correction of dates of birth of those constables were made on the basis of Matriculation Certificates or Admit Cards subsequently produced. It was further alleged that those persons also made declaration of some other date of birth at the time of joining, still then, their dates of birth were corrected subsequently on the basis of the said documents. It was further stated that there were several other persons who declared some other dates of birth which were recorded in the Service Book, but inspite of such declaration, correction have been made in 29 such cases. It was alleged that though the writ petitioner's case was similar to those cases, his date of birth was not corrected and the writ petitioner was discriminated against. 4. The writ petitioner could not produce the Matriculation Certificate as he alleged that he had misplaced the said Certificate. However, when Matriculation Certificate was made available to him and produced before the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Special Branch, the said Deputy Commissioner of Police by his order, dated March 25, 1955 rejected his prayer without giving any reason therefor. Thereafter the writ petitioner made further representation before the Chief Minister, but the same was of no effect. However, when Matriculation Certificate was made available to him and produced before the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Special Branch, the said Deputy Commissioner of Police by his order, dated March 25, 1955 rejected his prayer without giving any reason therefor. Thereafter the writ petitioner made further representation before the Chief Minister, but the same was of no effect. The writ petitioner was superannuated from the service on the basis of his date of birth originally recorded in the Service Book on February 3, 1930. The writ petitioner filed a writ application challenging the order, dated March 5, 1987 whereby the petitioner was intimated that he was to retire from his service on superannuation with effect from February 29, 1988. The writ application was heard and disposed of by A.K. Sengupta, J. by an order, dated January 29, 1988. The learned Judge allowed the writ application and the notice of superannuation was set aside and it was directed that the service record of the writ petitioner opposite party be corrected on the basis of the Matriculation Certificate. It was further held by the learned trial Judge that the writ petitioner should retire on the basis of the date as recorded in the Matriculation Certificate. Further it was held that as the writ petitioner did not complete the age of 18 years at the time of entry into the service of the petitioner before he attained 18 years should be deducted from the qualifying period of service for the purpose of pension etc. The appellant being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with such judgment, dated January 29, 1988, preferred an appeal. 5. At the hearing of the appeal before the Division Bench three decisions were cited from the Bar. The first being the case of Sisu Ranjan Das vs. Commissioner of Police and others, reported in (1979) 2 C.L.J. 428, the second being the case of Khagendra Nath Dutta vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, reported in (1989) 1 C.L.J. 499 and the third decision was a Bench decision of this court in the case of Nihar Ranjan Bhowmick vs. State of West Bengal, (1991)1 C.L.J. 93. In Sisu Ranjan Das's case it was observed that where the birth of a Government employee has not been correctly recorded in accordance with law on the basis of a valid document simply because he wrote the wrong date of his birth which had been wrongly recorded in his service book in his application for pensionary benefit, that would not estop him from challenging the validity or correctness of the same on the basis of an authentic document that the date of birth as recorded in the Service book was wrong and incorrect. There could not be any estoppel against statute'. Admittedly, the Division Bench Judgment in Nihar Ranjan's Case (supra) was in conflict with the decision of the learned single Judge in Khagendra Nath’s case (supra) and that normally when there is a conflict between two Division Bench Judgments under the rules of the Appellate Side the matter is referred to the Special Bench. In the instant case, the view expressed in Sisu Ranjan's case (supra) was accepted by the Division Bench of this Court in Nihar Ranjan's case. There are other Judgments of the single judges and the Division Bench of this Court on this question which supports the view taken in Sisu Ranjan's case and the only judgment in so far as this court is concerned which had taken a contrary view is in Khagendra Nath Dutt's case. Since the matter had been referred to this Special Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on the questions referred to us, we have to decide the same in the light of the provisions of Rule 9 of the West Bengal Service Rules, Part, 1. 6. In order to get proper assistance in the matter, we had appointed Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta, learned Advocate, as an Amicus Curiae. We have heard the learned Advocates, on behalf of the State-appellant as also the private respondents. For the purpose of deciding the question at the very outset it is necessary to set out the relevant Rule 9 of the West Bengal Service Rules, Part-I, 1971. 7. "9. Partha Sarathi Sengupta, learned Advocate, as an Amicus Curiae. We have heard the learned Advocates, on behalf of the State-appellant as also the private respondents. For the purpose of deciding the question at the very outset it is necessary to set out the relevant Rule 9 of the West Bengal Service Rules, Part-I, 1971. 7. "9. (1) Every applicant for government service shall at the time of and for the purpose of, entry into Government service submit to the appointing authority a declaration in the form set out in Note-I, below stating the year, month and date of his birth or where the date of birth is not known or both the month and the date of birth are not known, the year and the month or only the year of birth, as the case may be. The declaration so made shall be binding on the applicant and he shall have no right to revise it subsequently for any reason whatsoever. (2) The applicant shall produce evidence in support of his declaration. If the applicant has passed the Matriculation, or the School Final or the Higher Secondary Examination, the certificate of having passed the examination, indicating the appellant's age, granted by the University or Board holding the examination shall be produced. In any other case, the applicant shall produce other reliable evidence of his age, wherever possible, an extract from the register of birth, shall be produced. (3) The appointing authority shall consider the declaration made by the applicant under sub-rule (1) and the evidence produced in support thereof and pass an order fixing the year, month and date of his birth. In doing so, the appointing authority shall, in the case of an applicant selected by the Public Service Commission, also take into consideration the year, month and the date of birth declared by the applicant in the application form submitted by him to the Public Service Commission and accepted by them. In doing so, the appointing authority shall, in the case of an applicant selected by the Public Service Commission, also take into consideration the year, month and the date of birth declared by the applicant in the application form submitted by him to the Public Service Commission and accepted by them. (4) Where the appointing authority is not the Government and the year or month or date of birth proposed to be fixed under sub-rule (3) is different from the year or date of birth of the applicant recorded in his Matriculation or School Final or Higher Secondary Examination Certificate or recorded in the register of births maintained by any local authority, or accepted by the Public Service Commission, the appointing authority shall submit the case with its recommendation to the Government and thereupon final order shall be passed by the Government in this behalf. (5) The appointing authority or where the final order fixing the year, month and date of birth of a Government servant has been passed by the Government, the Government may at any time for sufficient reasons review the order fixing the year, month and date of birth and modify the same: provided that the year, month and date of birth shall not be modified to the disadvantage of the Government servant unless he has been given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against the proposed action. (6) When, under this rule only the year of birth is declared and accepted, the 1st day of July of that year and where the year and month are declared and accepted the 16th day of the month in question shall be taken as the date of birth. 8. In the questions which were referred to the Special Bench there was no indication whether the said rule is confined to 1971 rules or not. In this connection, it appears that there was a similar rule known as West Bengal Service Rule, Part-I corrected upto 1948 where there was no sub-rule to Rule 9. 8. In the questions which were referred to the Special Bench there was no indication whether the said rule is confined to 1971 rules or not. In this connection, it appears that there was a similar rule known as West Bengal Service Rule, Part-I corrected upto 1948 where there was no sub-rule to Rule 9. Rule 9 under the 1948 Rules is as follows: "A declaration of age, made by an applicant for Government service, at the time of or for the purpose of entry into Government service shall be deemed to be binding on the person who has made it and no revision of such a declaration shall be allowed to be made by him at a later date for any purpose whatsoever." 9. The next Rule was of 1964 which was pari materia with 1971 Rules. Admittedly, in the instant case the writ petitioner joined the service on February 5, 1948. when the West Bengal Service Rules of 1948, which was not made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, was in force and at the time of his entry in service at best he was governed by the old rule 9 of the 1948 rules. In order to ascertain the scope of 1971 rules it is necessary to refer to Rule 4 of 1971 Rules which provides as hereunder: "All rules, orders or notifications corresponding to these rules inforce immediately before the commencement of these rules and applicable to Government servants to whom these rules apply are hereby repealed: Provided that in respect of anything done, any act committed or any omission made before the commencement of these rules, the rules, orders or notifications which were in force when the thing was done, the act was committed or the omission was made shall be deemed to continue and to have always continued to apply." 10. Even though five separate questions have been formulated for the purpose of determination, the moot question is simply whether a Government servant can apply for correction of date of birth subsequent to his entry in service on production of a Matriculation Certificate which could not be produced at the relevant time for the purpose of recording of date of birth which would be contrary to the date of birth recorded in the service book or declared at the time of entry in his service. 11. Mr. 11. Mr. Syed Ataunnabi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, Bhupesh Chandra Karanjai, submitted that the above reference to the Special Bench was bad inasmuch as the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pramatha Nath Chowdhury vs. State of West Bengal and others, reported in 1981 (1) S.L.R. Cal. (D.I. 570 held that an employee can only be retired from service on the basis of the date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate, Where a Matriculation Certificate is produced the age should be recorded and corrected as per the Matriculation Certificate unless genuineness of such Matriculation Certificate is in dispute and that view was also taken by the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Sisu Ranjan Das vs. Commissioner of; Poke and others, reported in 1979(2) C.L.J. 428 stand affirmed by the said Division Bench Judgment. Thereafter, there was a number of judgments and most of the single Judges of this Court took the same view. Ultimately, the last Division Bench Judgment on this point was in the case of Nihar Ranjan Bhowmick vs. State, reported in 1991 C.L.J. 499 and the same could not be a ground for referring the matter to a Special Bench. Only in case of difference between two Division Benches, the matter can be referred to a .special Bench. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents the law in so far as this Court is concerned is well settled. 12. Mr. B.R. Neogy, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent in the other case, viz. in the case of Mati Ranjnan Bhattacharyya, produced before us a Memorandum, dated March 14, 1983 issued by the Finance Department (Audit Branch), Government of West Bengal. The said Memorandum reads as follows: "1. Under the existing rule every employee at the time of entry into Government service is required to submit to the appointing authority a declaration stating the year, month and date of his birth and also to produce documentary evidence in support of such declaration, (vide Rule 9(2) of the W.B.S.R.-Part-I). 2. A reference is also invited to note-2 below rule 9 ibid in terms of which in the case of erstwhile non-gazetted Govt. servant the relevant item in the Service Book is to be written up in words as well as in figures. 3. 2. A reference is also invited to note-2 below rule 9 ibid in terms of which in the case of erstwhile non-gazetted Govt. servant the relevant item in the Service Book is to be written up in words as well as in figures. 3. It has come to the notice of the Government that the provisions mentioned above are not being followed in most cases. Cases of tampering with the date of birth recorded in figures have also been reported to Government. It is felt that if the date of birth is recorded both in words and figures tampering with the same will be rather difficult. 4. In the circumstances, the Governor has been pleased to direct that the date of birth of all categories of Govt. employees should be recorded in the Service Books both in figures and in words under proper attestation by the competent authority with reference to documentary evidence in support of the same." 13. Relying upon the said memorandum issued by the Government Mr. Neogy submitted that as because the provisions of Rule 9(2) were not being followed by the appointing authority in most of the cases, consequently the age was not properly recorded in the service book and, accordingly, an opportunity was given to produce documentary evidence in support of such declaration 'So that the appointing authority could determine the question in accordance with the procedure laid down in sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 of the said Rules. According to Mr. Neogy, when the State Government had issued a circular or memorandum inviting the employees concerned to produce documentary evidence in support of the declaration made under Rule 9(2) of the said rules, the appellant-State cannot be allowed to contend that the documentary evidence, such as, Matriculation Certificate, cannot be entertained for the purpose of correction or revision of age in the service book after one has made a declaration at the time of initial entry in the service and, accordingly, the appointing authority and/ or the State was estopped from taking a stand contrary to the representation made to the employees of the State Government who had not produced or could not produce evidences in support of their age at the time of initial entry in service. It was further submitted that the employee concerned has a right to take recourse to the provisions of Rule 9(5) of the said Rules, where there are sufficient reasons to do so, such as, where the date of birth has not been recorded on the basis of the declaration or the date of birth has not been recorded on the basis of any valid contempo-roneous or acceptable documents as per Rule 9(2) of the said Rules. It was further submitted that Rule 9(5) empowers the Government to review the question of age and to pass appropriate orders. 14. Mr. Neogy submitted that a mere declaration, without any acceptance on the basis of any document or records, as provided under Rule 9(2) and as provided in Rule 9(3), does not become final and binding. Mr. Neogy further submitted that when the appointing authority has failed and neglected to discharge his statutory duties under Rule 9(2) of the said Rules in not making any determination with regard to the age on the basis of, any document or records, the said authority cannot contend that once a' declaration was made, which was not accepted and acted upon, it would bind the maker of such declaration. Mr. Neogy further 'Submitted that with regard to "boy service", there is no provision for regularisation under the Fundamental Rules, but relied on Rule 17 of the West Bengal, Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1971, which provides that subject to the provisions of these rules, qualifying service of a Govt. servant shall commence from the date he takes charge of the office to which he is first appointed either substantively or in an officiating or temporary capacity provided that in the case of officers in Classes-I, II and III services, service rendered before attaining the age of 18 years and in the case of Class-IV services, service rendered before attaining the age of 16 years, shall not) count, except for compensation gratuity. Mr. Neogy further Submitted that the provisions of the West Bengal Services (Death-cum-Retirement-Benefit) Rules are applicable to all the employees of the State Government and in particular so far as police personnel are concerned as referred to under Rule 92A of the Rules, which provides that there is specific provision contained in the West Bengal Service Rules and/or West Bengal Services (Death-cum-Retiremental-Benefit) Rules. This position is not disputed. Mr. This position is not disputed. Mr. Neogy further submitted that under Rule 9(5) of the said Rules an, employee may come forward at any time to make correction of date of birth on the basis of sufficient records and documents. 15. Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta, learned Advocate appearing as Amicus Curiae, submitted that once a Government employee makes a declaration in accordance with the provisions of Rule 9(1) of the said Rules, along with the supporting evidence and/or Matriculation or School Final Certificate indicating the age, as provided under Rule 9(2) and when the appointing authority has considered such a declaration made by the Government servant in accordance with Rule 9(1) and after observing the provisions of Rule 9(2) and passes an order fixing the date of birth of the employee, in that event the employee concerned cannot have any right to ask for revision of the same for any ground whatsoever. According to Mr. Sengupta, this position is clear from the plain reading of the Rule itself. 16. Next it was submitted by Mr. Sengupta that on the question of the scheme of the Rules that the power of the appointing authority to review the order fixing the date of birth on the basis of sufficient reasons at any time cannot be said to be curtailed by an embargo put forth upon a Government Servant under Rule 9(1) of the Rules and as such a Government servant has no right for revision. Mr. Sengupta submitted that the expressions 'revision' and 'review' have different connotations and have different meanings. Mr. Sengupta submitted that once a document is produced, a declaration is made regarding the age by a Government servant with supporting evidence whereupon the authority concerned takes a decision, the employee concerned is debarred or estopped from asking for revision. It is submitted that revision can only be made on the basis of the evidence or documents already on record. Accordingly, under Rule 9(1) of the said Rules, when a document is referred under Rule 9(2) and a decision is taken under Rule 9(3), the Government servant cannot ask for alteration on the basis of revision on the same-self document. But this does not preclude the appointing authority to correct the palpable mistake or error, if any, apparent on the face of the records. But this does not preclude the appointing authority to correct the palpable mistake or error, if any, apparent on the face of the records. It was pointed out that there may be cases where something was written in words and something was written in figures or when the Matriculation Certificate was produced, but a bona fide mistake was committed by the appointing authority and that under such circumstances an employee concerned certainly can ask for correcting the admitted errors. Next it was submitted by Mr. Sengupta that ordinarily power of review can only be exercised on the basis of the well-settled principles such as errors apparent on the face of records or for taking into consideration of the evidences which could not be produced at the initial stage for some bona fide grounds and that Rule 9(5) clearly stipulated the power of the appointing authority to review the order recording the date of birth on the basis of availability of sufficient reasons from any source whatsoever. It was submitted that such a power of review could be exercised by the State Government or the appointing authority on the basis of informations and materials gathered by the authorities concerned from whatever source. It may act suo motu or at the instance of the affected party Mr. Sengupta also submitted that even in case of suo motu exercise of power the promotion has been well settled by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tnvl. Bombay Amonia (P) Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2136 . But, on the face of Rule 9(5), the power of review can be exercised on the basis of existence of sufficient reasons and such a power can be exercised at any time. 17. Next it was submitted on the question of rules of interpretation that the legislature while enacting the last clause of the section had the opportunity to look into the earlier provisions and on consideration of earlier provisions when it provides any such power, that power was not intended to be curtailed by the earlier provisions by implication. The last clause is the last say in the matter and that must be allowed to have the fullest effect. 18. Mr. The last clause is the last say in the matter and that must be allowed to have the fullest effect. 18. Mr. Sengupta relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhupindra Nath Chatterjee vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in 1977 (III) S.C.C. 491 . In that case the date of birth recorded in the official records and admitted by the appellant in one of his application was January 1, 1908 and the appellant claimed that his date of birth should be January 16, 1908 on the plea that the date of birth recorded in the Service Book was January, 1908. A notification was issued by the State of Bihar on January 11, 1963 wherein it was provided that the Government of Bihar had extended the age of superannuation from 55 to 58 and had further directed that the benefit of extension would be granted to those government officers who were due to retire after January 14, 1963. The appellant contended that his date of birth was recorded in the service book as January 1908 and as no exact date of birth was mentioned, the date of birth, it was stated, should be considered to be the 16th day of the month so as to get the benefit of the notification with regard to the extension of age of superannuation. In that case the Supreme Court also observed as hereunder: "…………………..Nothing has been brought to our notice as might induce us to interfere with the judgment of the High Court." Relying upon those observations, Mr. Sengupta submitted that it cannot be contended that the date of birth once recorded could not be altered or modified on the basis of first evidences and/or documents produced before the authority concerned, and that there could not be any estoppel with regard to this. 19. Next reliance was placed on the observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Hindusthan Sugar Mills vs. The State of Rajasthan reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1681, wherein the .Supreme Court observed that "in a democratic society governed by the rule of law, it is the duty of the State to do what is fair and just to the citizen and the State should not seek to defeat the legitimate claim of the citizen by adopting a legalistic attitude but should do what fairness and justice demand." 20. Mr. Mr. Sengupta further submitted that when the State Government had corrected the date of birth on the verge of retirement on the basis of the Matriculation Certificate and because of correction of the date of birth at the verge of his retirement it was found that the Government servant entered the service below the minimum age prescribed in this behalf and such service can also be regularised and when in similar circumstances and in similar manner large number of persons have been given benefits, it was not open to the appellant to deny such benefits to others who are similarly /Situated. In this connection, reference was made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Virendra Kumar and others vs. Union of India and others, reported in A.I.R. 1981 SC 1775. In that case, a large number of persons who had completed only two years of services was promoted to the higher post, when the Rule was that promotion could be given to person who has completed three years of service. It was held that other persons similarly situated should be similarly promoted after completing the same period of service. It was held that the Government cannot insist that they cannot be considered for promotion unless they complete 3 years service and there is no justification for such differential treatment. 21. Appearing for the State Mr. Dipak Kundu, learned Counsel, submitted that the declaration under Rule 9(1) was binding on the applicant and under no circumstances could such declaration be altered or revised, Mr. Kundu contended that subsequent to the declaration made by the applicant what could be altered was the service records of the declarant under the, provisions of Rule (5) upon modification of the order passed under Rule 9(3). 22. Mr. Kundu contended that the order passed under Rule 9(3) could be different from, the declaration made by the applicant, and on discovery of fresh materials from whatever source it would be open to the Government to alter such order. Mr. Kundu further submitted that the date of birth made in the declaration filed at the time of entry in service containing a date of birth was binding on him and he has no right to revise it subsequently for any reason whatsoever. Mr. Kundu further submitted that the date of birth made in the declaration filed at the time of entry in service containing a date of birth was binding on him and he has no right to revise it subsequently for any reason whatsoever. It was further submitted that it was also incumbent upon the applicant to produce Matriculation Certificate or School Final or Higher Secondary Certificate, along with declaration for proof of his age and that thereafter, under -sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 the appointing authority shall consider and will pass an order fixing the year, month and date of birth. It was further submitted that only in case where an order, was passed under. Rule 9(3) of the said Rules, in that event sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 could be invoked for the purpose of reviewing of that order and that it could be open to the Government servant to apply for review against that decision taken by the appointing authority under sub-rule (3) or (4). But, such power of review according to Mr. Kundu, is not available for the purpose of revising the date of birth as contained in the declaration filed at the time of initial entry in service on the basis of the declaration made, or, in other words, the Government servant is estopped from asking for revision of the date of birth recorded in the declaration. 23. At the time of entry of the respondent/writ petitioner in the service there was a provision for making a declaration of age as provided under Rule 9(1) more or less in the same terms. At that time there was no requirement to produce any supporting document or Matriculation Certificate in proof of age and there was no requirement to pass an order on consideration of records and documents produced before the appointing authority. There was also no provision for service under Rule 9(5) of the said Rules. 24. Rule 9 lays down the procedure for declaration of age, duties and functions of the appointing authority and/or State Government for the purpose of taking a decision in this regard and for review of such order a6 provided in the Rules. In this connection it is to be remembered that one of the objects of fundamental fairness and the whole purpose of any proceeding should be and is to seek, out the truth. In this connection it is to be remembered that one of the objects of fundamental fairness and the whole purpose of any proceeding should be and is to seek, out the truth. The purpose of Rule 9 is to record the date of birth on the basis of the proper and sufficient materials and evidence and even after recording of the same if the Government finds that the date of birth had not been correctly recorded whether in favour or against a Government employee, the Government has the power to review that order and to rectify the same by recording the correct date on the basis of evidence or materials placed before the Government. 24A. It is now well-settled by several decisions of the Supreme Court that right to be in service is one of the rights of livelihood and such a right comes within the scope and ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. There is no right to get service but once one is in service, he could not be put off the service except by the procedure laid down by the law or the rules made in that behalf. It is also well settled that nobody has got any vested right to a procedure and the rules of procedure have retrospective effect and, accordingly, a Government servant who was appointed prior to coming into force of Rule 9 with various sub-rules, the provisions of Rule 9(5) is applicable to the persons who were appointed previous to the coming into force of Rule 9(5). The rules of procedure have to be interpreted in a manner so as to advance the cause of justice and such rules of procedure are not intended to inflict punishment and penalties as observed by Lord Reid in Courts & Co. vs. I.R.C., (1953), A.C. 267. In that case it was observed that in general if it is alleged that the statutory provisions brings about a result, which so startling one looks for some other possible meaning of the statute which will avoid such a result because there is some presumption that Parliament does not intend the legislation to produce highly inequitable results. 25. It was held by the Privy Council in the case of Arnold vs. National West Minister, 1991(1) All. E.R. 49 that estoppel is not an absolute bar to reopening an issue previously decided between the same parties. 25. It was held by the Privy Council in the case of Arnold vs. National West Minister, 1991(1) All. E.R. 49 that estoppel is not an absolute bar to reopening an issue previously decided between the same parties. As an exception to the general rule, an issue may be reopened where there has become available to a party further materials to correct determination of a point involved in an earlier proceeding being material which could not by reasonable diligence have been adduced in those proceedings. 26. In the field of administrative law an incorrect state of affairs cannot be allowed to remain on record for all times to come and on that principle to treat the same as correct. The process of law is to find out the truth. Under certain circumstances the principle of estoppel acquiesence etc. can be applied for the purpose of finality of an order. In service jurisprudence, the principle of estoppel cannot be strictly applicable so as to debar a person from coming forward with correct facts and figures so as to enable the authority concerned from correcting the same to take a decision thereof. There was one set of rules at the time of entry of the writ petitioner into service which was changed in the year 1964 and, subsequently, the same thing was carried forward in the Rule framed in 1971. Originally in 1948 there was no requirement to produce any certificate to prove the age and a mere declaration would have been sufficient. But, the rule-making authority felt it necessary to provide a comprehensive rule and lay down the procedure for recording of age and correction of date of birth. In 1048 there was no requirement to produce any certificate and that there was no requirement for the appointing authority to take a decision and further there was no power of review. When a procedure was laid down by the various sub-rules under Rule 9 with specific power to review, it must be held that the rule-making authority felt it necessary to lay down the procedure and when the procedure has been laid down it cannot be said that an employee is debarred from taking advantage of the provision of review merely on the ground of estoppel. Orginally in 1948 a mere declaration would have been sufficient and a party could not go back from that declaration; or, in other words, a declaration was sought to be made final and binding on both the employer and employee but thereafter, power was conferred upon the employer to make a determination on the basis of production of evidence and that decision could be reviewed on sufficient grounds. The history of the rules clearly indicates that the rule-making authority felt it necessary for producing Matriculation Certificate or other certificate, as provided in the rule and consequently to take a decision by the appointing authority. 27. In the instant case, there is no allegation of any fraud or allegation of taking wrongful advantage of the situation. The question is while at the time of initial entry into service as there was no requirement to produce the Matriculation Certificate, such Matriculation Certificate could not be produced whether such Matriculation Certificate could be produced for the purpose of reviewing the age recorded in the service book on the basis of such Matriculation Certificate. It may be mentioned here that under the provisions of the West Bengal Service Rules-Part I, 1971, no minimum age to entry into the service was prescribed. The writ petitioner was a member of the Calcutta Police Force and not a member of Bengal Police Force. Nothing has been disclosed by the appellant before the trial Court or before this Bench to show that there was any minimum age prescribed for the members of the Calcutta Police Force, particularly, in respect of the post held by the writ petitioner-opposite party. 28. The observation made by the Division Bench in Nihar Ranjan Bhowmick vs. State of West Bengal and others, reported in 1991 (1) C.L.J. 93 has not correctly decided the issue, inasmuch as, the condition of service of the employees of the State Government is governed by the West Bengal Service Rules-Part I and no minimum age is prescribed for appointment in any post. Only Rule 75 of the said Rules provides that the date of compulsory retirement of a Government servant other than a member of the Class-IV service is the date on which he attains the age of 58 years'. Only Rule 75 of the said Rules provides that the date of compulsory retirement of a Government servant other than a member of the Class-IV service is the date on which he attains the age of 58 years'. Rule 17 of the West Bengal Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules which is applicable to all the employees of the State Government, specifically recognises "boy service" and provides for regularised of the period of 'boy service', i.e. where the person below the age of 18 years was appointed in any service, could be regularised for the purpose of qualifying service in the matter of grant of pension or other retiremental benefits. On this basis of the rules it is clear that even where the minimum age for recruitment is fixed at 18 years, it is possible to make appointment of a person below the age of 18 years and for recognising the same a provision has been made under the statutory rule. The provision of West Bengal Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1971, is applicable to all the employees including the police personnel under the State. Rule 3A of the West Bengal Service Rules, Part-I" also empowers the Government to relax any rule. 29. Under the 1941 Rules no power was reserved by the appointing authority to make any determination of the age at the time of appointment, nor there was any power to review the same even in a case where an incorrect date of birth contrary to the Birth Certificate or Matriculation/S.F. Certificate was furnished. There was no requirement to furnish any proof of age also. In this case also under the 1941 rules as there was no requirement for furnishing any proof of age, merely on the basis of an unilateral declaration of age, the writ petitioners date of birth was recorded. But, under the subsequent rules, an elaborate procedure was laid down for this purpose. Such an unilateral declaration of age is neither final nor binding upon the authorities. Sub-rules (1) to (3) of Rule 9 provides a complete Code for determination and recording the date of birth for the purpose of service record, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 of the said Rules. Under the Rules of 1964 and/or 1971, an employee cannot make any declaration of age without supporting documents regarding the proof of age as provided under Rule 9(2) of the said rules. Under the Rules of 1964 and/or 1971, an employee cannot make any declaration of age without supporting documents regarding the proof of age as provided under Rule 9(2) of the said rules. On the basis of the said declaration regarding the proof of age, the authorities concerned have to consider the same and to pass an order thereon and which doing so, the said authority shall also take into consideration the age disclosed in the application for appointment submitted to the Public Service Commission. Once the process is completed, the declaration of age becomes final, subject to the power of review under Rule 9(5). 30. The expression 'no right to revise it subsequently' appearing in Rule 9(1) of the said Rules means that the Government Servant has no right to revise the declaration already submitted in Form-I. In other words, he is precluded from revising his own declaration as of right. This does not take away his right to apply for rectifying an apparent mistake or error before the appointing authority or the State Government, as the case may be, for invoking the power of review as specifically provided in Rule 9(5) of the Rules. 32. Rule 9(5) of the said rules provides the power of the Government to review the order fixing the year month and the date of any time for subsequent reasons. The only provision contained in the rule is Rule 9(5) which confers power upon the appointing authority of the State Government to reopen the matter by way of review. It is well known that the power to revise and power to review are two different things altogether. Power to revise or power of revision cannot be exercised on the basis of additional evidence or new evidence. But, it can only be exercised on the basis of existing materials or evidence on record. The expression 'Revise' means to correct the order on the basis of materials already on record and no external aid could be taken for the purpose of revising the order. Ordinarily, the power of review could only be invoked to correct an error apparent on the face of record or for consideration of new evidence which the appellant could not produce with due diligence when the matter was originally decided. Ordinarily, the power of review could only be invoked to correct an error apparent on the face of record or for consideration of new evidence which the appellant could not produce with due diligence when the matter was originally decided. So, we have to keep in mind the difference between the power to revise and the power to review appearing in Rule 9(1) and 9(5) of the said Rules. Further Rule 9(1) of the said Rules cannot he read in isolation and the provisions of sub-rules (1), (2) and (3) have to be read as a whole and the cumulative effect of the said three sub-rules is that an applicant shall make a declaration of his date of birth at the time of entry in service and that an unilateral declaration, without anything more, is not contemplated by the Rules. Such declaration must be supported by evidence and in case a candidate had passed the Matriculation or School Final or Higher Secondary examination in that case the applicant shall produce the same certificate and when the same is produced the appointing authority under sub-rule (3) shall consider the declaration made by the applicant under sub-rule (1) and the evidence produced in support thereof and whereupon an order shall he passed. This order determining the date of birth passed on the basis of a declaration supported by evidence and/or matriculation certificate or school leaving certificate shall reach its finality and it will be binding upon the declarant who will have no right to ask to revise the same. It cannot be said to be the intention of the rule-making authority that inspite of such declaration being made, the authority concerned will have no power to rectify an mistake. It is a well-settled principle that the court seeks to avoid a construction that produces a futile' or pointed result. It is also a well-settled principle that the courts seek to avoid a construction that causes unjustifiable inconvenience to a person who is subject to enactment since it is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. It is a well-settled principle that the court seeks to avoid a construction that produces a futile' or pointed result. It is also a well-settled principle that the courts seek to avoid a construction that causes unjustifiable inconvenience to a person who is subject to enactment since it is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Keeping in mind the principles of interpretation and keeping in mind the scope and purpose of Rule 9 of the said Rules we are of the view that the binding effect of the declaration under Rule 9(1) of the said rules would arise only when the declaration was made with a copy of the matriculation certificate and whereupon under Rule 9(3) of the said rules the authority had passed .an order. A simple declaration under Rule 9(1), without anything more, cannot create a total bar to apply for correction on the basis of matriculation certificate. It is only when the declaration is made along with matriculation certificate and when on consideration of the same an order is passed, the same could not be reopened except to correct a mistake apparent on the face of the record. The procedure for correction of date of birth is intended to find the correct date of birth whether it helps the employer or not. Secondly, it could not be the intention of the rule-making authority that a person should be made to retire on the basis of the erroneous date of birth recorded in the service record. In this connection, it appears to us that in the context of the present day society and in the socio economic condition of this country it is no longer possible to hold that the right to be in service is at the simple pleasure of the appointing authority. Right to be in service is one of the rights of livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Now-a-days, for a person who is holding a service, the same is his only social security. So far as this Court is concerned, the first judgment on this question was the case of Pramatha Chowdhury vs. State of West Bengal and others, reported in 1981(1) S.L.R. 570, wherein a Division Bench of this Court held that the government servant can be made to retire on the basis of the age recorded in matriculation certificate, unless the genuineness of the matriculation certificate is challenged. Thereafter, there are several Division Bench judgments and the judgments of the single Judges for the purpose of correction of date of birth on the basis of matriculation certificate. A point was raised that a statement in school record has no evidence to show on what materials the entry in the register was made and has not much evidentiary value. But, admittedly the age recorded by Matriculation Certificate unless the genuineness of the same is challenged, is certainly a valid piece of evidence of age. There is no other document known for proof of age. 33. The Supreme Court in the case of Brij Mohan vs. Priya Bratt reported in 1965 S.C. 282 had occasion to consider the fact of considering the clause of entry of date of birth in the school admission register in connection with the determination of age for the purpose of Representation of the People's Act. In that connection, it was observed that it often happens that a person gave a false age of the boy at the time of admission to a school so that later in life he would have an advantage when seeking public service for which a minimum age eligibility is often prescribed. The court of fact cannot ignore this fact while assessing the value of entry and it would be improper for the court to come to any conclusion on the basis of the entry, when it is alleged that the entry was made upon false information supplied with the above motive. Such was not the case before us. Before the learned Judge no challenge was made that the age recorded in the matriculation certificate was wrong or done with some motive which was highlighted by the Supreme Court in Brij Mohan's case (supra). Secondly, when there are several evidence before the Court of facts, the court has to assess the evidence and has to come to a conclusion. If there are contrary evidences, in that event, it cannot be said that the age recorded in the school register is conclusive, final and binding. Secondly, when there are several evidence before the Court of facts, the court has to assess the evidence and has to come to a conclusion. If there are contrary evidences, in that event, it cannot be said that the age recorded in the school register is conclusive, final and binding. So far as government servants are concerned, the age recorded in the matriculation certificate, unless correctness and genuineness of the same is challenged, the same is a valid piece of evidence on which the authority concerned has to depend, otherwise there is no other means and/or any other alternative way for the government to get the age of the employee for the purpose of his service record. Power of the court while assessing the evidence is different from the power of an administrative authority. If the contention of the State is accepted that the matriculation certificate is not a valid piece of evidence, in that event that would lead to an anomalous situation. We have to bear in mind that Rule 9(2) specifically mentions the production of matriculation certificates or the school final certificate, that is clearly indicative of the fact that the authority concerned shall take the same as valid piece of evidence and that when the rule has specifically provided that matriculation certificate has to be produced for the purpose of recording the age, in that event, we cannot hold that it has got no evidentiary value and it should be thrown away as inadmissible evidence by the appointing authority. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case cited by Mr. Kundu have no application in the instant case. 34. Accordingly, we are of the view that in order to disentitle a Government employee from asking for revision of the date of birth, there must be an order under Rule 9(3) or (4) and that when the date of birth is recorded on the basis of matriculation certificate, the same could not be allowed to be reopened at the instance of the Government servant. On a plain reading of Rule 9(5) of the said Rules it is clear that a Government servant can apply for review of his date of birth recorded in the service record if he can make out a good and sufficient case on production of some relevant documents. On a plain reading of Rule 9(5) of the said Rules it is clear that a Government servant can apply for review of his date of birth recorded in the service record if he can make out a good and sufficient case on production of some relevant documents. The power of review under Rule 9(5) could only be invoked on the basis of principles of review for correcting the error apparent on the face of the record and for the purpose of taking into consideration of new and additional evidence which was not produced or considered originally and which has come to his possession subsequently and which could not be produced at the time of entry into the service, or in other words, it would be a case of violence in the language in the rules-Admittedly, rule 9(5) could be invoked by the government or at the instance of a government servant on good and sufficient reasons, or in other words, if any piece of evidence comes in possession of the appointing authority which was sufficient for the purpose of reviewing the date of birth and altering the same, either to the prejudice or to the advantage of such government servant, such a power could be invoked. But, only in a case where a decision is to be given to the disadvantage of the government servant, an opportunity of making representation should be given. 35. A declaration of age by a government servant is made for the purpose of recording the same in the service record and an appointing authority cannot record the same in the absence of the documents mentioned in Rule 9(2) and, thereafter, on consideration of such documents an order has to be passed and that order is to be recorded in the service book. The declaration merges with the order passed thereon. When on the basis of a declaration age is recorded on the basis of evidences mentioned in Rule 9(2), it must be held that a government servant cannot ask for revision of the same subsequently. The declaration merges with the order passed thereon. When on the basis of a declaration age is recorded on the basis of evidences mentioned in Rule 9(2), it must be held that a government servant cannot ask for revision of the same subsequently. But, within the scope of Rule 9(5) we are of the view that by invoking the power of the rule the order fixing the date of birth recorded in the service record can be altered by exercise of the power of review and that it is clear that when the power of review is exercised under Rule 9(5) and when the authority concerned on review alters the date of birth necessarily the same may be contrary to and inconsistent with the age declared by the government servant. On the basis of the principles of interpretation it cannot be said that Rule 9(1) introduced a scheme which is inconsistent with and contrary to what is introduced by Rule 9(5) of the said Rules. The last section or the last sub-rule, when enacted, the legislator or the rule-making authority does so after considering and looking into the earlier provisions, and that the last sub-rule or last section of a particular enactment prevails. While enacting Rule 9, the rule making authority had considered the effect scope and ambit of the sub-sections and, thereafter, with a particular purpose enacted Rule 9(5) and it cannot be said that Rule 9(1) of the said Rules curbs out or takes away the power or abridges the power conferred under Rule 9(5). 36. As far as the question of 'Boy Service' as provided in question (d) is concerned, there is no analogy that could be thrown from the fundamental rules, as there is no fundamental rule for recording 'Boy Service'. 36. As far as the question of 'Boy Service' as provided in question (d) is concerned, there is no analogy that could be thrown from the fundamental rules, as there is no fundamental rule for recording 'Boy Service'. Only in Rules 17 and 92A of the West Bengal Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1971 there is provision for regularisation of such service and this rule clearly throws light that the government contemplated appointment of persons below the minimum age of recuritment and, accordingly, when there is a clear rule governing the field and governing the case, in that event there is no difficulty of holding that there could be appointed below the age fixed as a minimum age and that the service beyond the period can be regularised in the matter of correction of age, further, in the instant case, the specific order has been annexed which has not been challenged, that because of correction of date of birth of one of the applicants of a government service, such appointment was found to have been made at an age which is below the minimum age, but, the same was regularised. If the government follows as a matter of practice for recognising and regularising 'boy service', in that event, other similarly situated employees can ask for similar treatment. On the basis of the principles of legitimate expectation a government servant can claim a right to get a similar treatment which has been consistently followed in the past. Accordingly" 'Boy service' is recognised, accepted and regularised by the authority concerned and when it is specifically provided in the rules framed under Article 309, in that event it is not necessary to draw an analogy from Fundamental Rules, when the rules governing the case and the service are clear. 37. As already indicated, if a declaration was made accompanied by the relevant certificates and that if a date of birth was recorded on the basis of such certificate, in that event, it would not be open to a government servant to come forward at a later stage to revise his case. Rule 9 of the said Rules are not designed to impose penalties, but is done for the purpose of recording or correcting the date of birth. We are of the view that the principles of estoppel and acquiescence will not apply in such circumstances. Rule 9 of the said Rules are not designed to impose penalties, but is done for the purpose of recording or correcting the date of birth. We are of the view that the principles of estoppel and acquiescence will not apply in such circumstances. When the purpose of the rule is to find out the correct date of birth and when the date of birth was not recorded in accordance with the rules in that event, there is no valid recording of age in the service record and, accordingly, for the purpose of valid recording of the date of birth, an applicant can come forward at any stage, as provided, in Rule 9(5) for review of the same, otherwise this will be contrary to the scope, ambit and effect of Rule 9(5) of the said Rules. 38. Let us now examine the questions referred to the Full Bench In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove. (a) The answer to the first question referred to the Full Bench must be in the affirmative, subject, however, to the rider that under Rule 9(5) the declarant would be entitled to apply for correction of a genuine mistake in the service records or to ask for correction of, his service records on review of the order passed under Rule 9(3). What rule 9(1) prohibits is that once a declaration of age is made the government servant has no right to revise the said declaration as of right. (b) The answer to the second question must also be in the affirmative, though two different situations may be contemplated in. the circumstances. Firstly, the declarant would be entitled to ask for correction or rectification of a genuine and bona fide mistake. Secondly, he may bring to the notice of the appointing authority of the government materials which were not within his knowledge or which he was not in a position to produce at the time of making the declaration, which, on the principles of review, as embodied in Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, would occasion an alteration of the order passed under Rule 9(3). (c) The answer to the third question contemplates a situation where there was no requirement for documents to be submitted in support of the declaration made by the applicant at the time of entry into service. (c) The answer to the third question contemplates a situation where there was no requirement for documents to be submitted in support of the declaration made by the applicant at the time of entry into service. In our view, this contemplates an appointment made prior to the framing of the 1964 Rules, as also the 1971 Rules. In such a situation, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 4 of the said Rules of 1964 and 1971, the answer to the said question, must again be in the affirmative, provided that the Matriculation Certificate or any other similar certificate to be produced by the employee is a document contemporaneous with his entry into service. (d) The answer to the fourth question is to be found in the provisions of the West Bengal Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1971. Both Rules 17 and 92A of the said Rules contemplate entry into government service below the age of 18 years. In fact, the lower age limit for the purpose of appointment in Government service has not been provided for in the West Bengal Service Rules (part-I). 1971, although Rule 17 does provide the upper age limit for the said purpose. While Rule 17 of the said Rules provides for qualifying service in the case of Government servants and contemplates service rendered by Class-I, II and III officers before the age of 18 years and in the case of Class-IV services before the age of 16 years. Rule 92A makes provision for special rules for the police in regard to qualifying service for the purpose of pension. It must, therefore, be held in answer to the fourth question posed to the Full Bench that the appointment of a minor or 'boy service' is recognised for limited purposes and should not stand in the way in the matter of correction of age, particularly in view on the fact that the applicant receives no advantage thereby in the absence of any minimum age prescribed for entry into Government service. (e) The answer to the fifth and last question referred to the Full Bench is a combination of the answers to the first, second and third questions hereinabove. (e) The answer to the fifth and last question referred to the Full Bench is a combination of the answers to the first, second and third questions hereinabove. While no duty has been cast on the law courts to rely upon a document produced by an employee after a considerable period of time, though at the time of entry into service his declaration runs counter to such document, it must be held that the law courts may direct the concerned authority in the circumstances of each case to consider a document produced by an employee, which is contemporaneous with his entry into service for the purpose of review, as contemplated in Rule 9(5) of the Rules of 1971. This will even apply in case of persons appointed under the West Bengal Service Rules, 1941 where there was no provision similar to those contained in Rules 9(2) to 9(5) of the 1971 Rules in keeping with the principle that a genuine and bona fide mistake may be corrected at any time. In the absence of a proper determination by the concerned authorities taking into consideration of the document/documents in question, the Court will also be entitled to give directions for correction of the employee's age in the employees service records. The reference cases are disposed of on the above terms. Applying the principles determined by us on the basis of the questions being F.M.A. 1469 of 1990 and F.M.A. 3541 of 1990 fail and are dismissed and the judgments passed by the learned trial judges in the respective writ applications stand affirmed. There will be, however, no order as to costs. Let a xeroxed copies of the above order be given to the parties on the usual undertaking. Both the appeals dismissed and the judgments passed by the trial Judge stand affirmed.