Judgment :- 1. This second appeal arises out of a suit O.S.No.789 of 1979, and the civil revision petition arises out of I.A.No.1367 of 1980 in that suit. 2. The suit was filed by the landlord for eviction of the first defendant-tenant and also the second defendant-subtenant from the suit premises, and also for damages for use and occupation of the premises after the termination of tenancy. The first defendant-tenant filed I.A.No.1367 of 1980 contending that he has put up the superstructure in the plaintiffs land and therefore under Sec.9 of the City Tenants Protection Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, he is entitled to purchase the land for the value to be fixed by the court. This application was resisted by the plaintiffs contending inter alia that the landlord let out to the first defendant the land together with the building thereon and therefore no question of claiming benefit by the first defendant under Sec.9 of the City Tenants Protection Act arises. 3. The trial court considering both the suit and the I.A., held that the plaintiffs had let out only the land, and the superstructure has been put up by the first defendant. It appears it was contended before the trial court on behalf of the plaintiffs that since the first defendant has sublet the premises to the second defendant and therefore he is not in actual possession of the premises he is disentitled claim the benefits under the Act. This contention was rejected by the trial court. Ultimately the trial court dismissed the suit and allowed the LA. 4. Against the dismissal of the suit the plaintiffs filed the appeal A.S.No.238 of 1981, and against the order in I.A., they filed C.M.A.No. 183 of 1981. The appellate Court dismissed the appeal. In the C.M.A it held that the first defendant is entitled to purchase the land under Sec.9 of the City Tenants Protection Act, but he would be entitled to purchase only that extent of land which is necessary for his convenient enjoyment but that has not been determined by the court below. On these findings it allowed the C.M.A. and remanded the LA. to the trial court for determination of the extent necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the first defendant-tenant. 5. On these findings it allowed the C.M.A. and remanded the LA. to the trial court for determination of the extent necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the first defendant-tenant. 5. Now, the second appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs against the dismissal of the appeal, and the C.R.P. has been filed by the plaintiffs against the remand order in the C.M.A. Since both the matters are connected they can be disposed of in one Judgment. 6. Mr. V.Raghavachari, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-plaintiffs in both the matters contends that (i) the plaintiffs let out both the land and the superstructure standing thereon and the superstructure was not put up by the first defendant-tenant and therefore no question of the tenant claiming benefits under the City Tenants Protection Act arises; (ii) I.A.No.1367 of 1980 filed under Sec.9 of the City Tenants Protection Act has been filed beyond the time of limitation and therefore it should have been dismissed as time barred; and (iii) the first defendant-tenant has sub-let the premises to the second defendant and therefore the first defendant is not in actual possession and as such he is disentitled to claim the benefits under the Act. 7. The first point is devoid of any merit because the schedule of property which has been leased out under Ex.A-1 in clear and unequivocal terms states that only the vacant site has been leased out. Correctly the courts below have found that only the vacant site has been leased out and the superstructure has been put by the first defendant-tenant. 8. Regarding the second point that the LA. filed under Sec.9 of the Act is barred by limitation, this plea has not at all been taken either in the trial court or in the first appellate court.