Mr. P. K. Babri, J. ( 1 ) ONLY short point is involved in this appeal. I have heard the arguments and proceed to dispose of this appeal. ( 2 ) THIS appeal is directed against order dated 4/12/1989, byand Additional District Judge by which he had dismissed the applicationmoved by the appellant under Order XXII, Rule 4 read with Section 151 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure tor bringing on record legal representatives ofdeceased respondent-Kartar Singh. The application was dismissed as beingtime barred. ( 3 ) A suit was brought by the deceased-respondent for recovering ofpossession which was decreed vide judgment dated 29/05/1982. Theappellant had filed the appeal before the first appellate Court and on 9/08/1988, Counsel for the respondent informed the appellant that respondenthad died on 25/02/1988. An application for bringing on record thelegal representatives of deceased respondent was moved on 7/12/1988. In the application there were no facts mentioned which could entitlethe applicant-appellant to prove that there existed any sufficient cause forsetting aside of abatement of the appeal. ( 4 ) ARTICLE 120 of the Limitation Act lays down that the applicationfor bringing on record legal representatives of deceased-respondent could bemoved within 90 days and the said period of 90 days is to be counted fromthe date of death of the respondent. Similar provisions existed in the Oldlimitation Act, 1908. ( 5 ) A Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in the case of Shah Muhammad and Anr. v. Khan Bahadur Choudhari Karam Ilahi and Ors,, AIR 1922 Lah 131. held that an application for bringing legal representativeson record under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure has to bewithin the limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act and provisions ofsection 5 of the Limitation Act do not apply to applications to bring onrecord the legal representatives. In the said case the application having beennot moved within the time prescribed, it was held that the suit stood abated. It was. of course, made clear that an application for setting aside of theabatement could be moved but having been not moved the Court held thatthe matter stood abated. ( 6 ) IN Diwan Chand Nirmal Singh and Am. v. Bhagwan Chand and Ors. AIR 1937 Lah 455. It was. of course, made clear that an application for setting aside of theabatement could be moved but having been not moved the Court held thatthe matter stood abated. ( 6 ) IN Diwan Chand Nirmal Singh and Am. v. Bhagwan Chand and Ors. AIR 1937 Lah 455. a Division Bench of the said Court held that a particular application by which a prayer was made to bring on record the legalrepresentatives could be treated as an application for setting aside of theabatement if the application discloses sufficient cause for the delay and theplaintiff is not guilty of laches. ( 7 ) IN Dasondha Singh Teja Singh and Ors. v. Shadi Ram Sardha Ram andors. . AIR 1964 Pandh 336. there were cross appeals pending. The plaintiff-appellant in the appeal had died. The legal representatives of the saidplaintiff-appellant were impleaded within limitation but in the cross-appealfiled by the defendant, no application was moved for bringing on record thelegal representatives of the deceased plaintiff. It was held that benefit ofimpleading the legal representatives within time in one appeal cannot betaken by the defendant in his appeal and his appeal stood abated for failureto implead the legal representatives within time. In the said case the application was filed for bringing legal representatives after lapse of about a yearfrom the date of death although the Counsel had come to know about thedeath of the plaintiff atleast one month prior to the filing of the applicationbut no satisfactory explanation for each day s delay from the date of theknowledge of the death till the date of the application had been given. Itwas held that such delay could not be condoned. Reliance was placed onsupreme Court judgment given in the case of Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. , AIR 1962 SC 361 . ( 8 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Ram Charon (deceased) through his L. Rs. , AIR 1964 SC 215 , had categorically laid downthat limitation for bringing on record legal representatives commences fromthe date of the death and not from the date of the knowledge of the death. ( 9 ) FOLLOWING the abovesaid Supreme Court judgment, this Court in Sardar Begum v. Ajit Kumar (deceased) represented by L. Rs. , AIR 1964 SC 215 , had categorically laid downthat limitation for bringing on record legal representatives commences fromthe date of the death and not from the date of the knowledge of the death. ( 9 ) FOLLOWING the abovesaid Supreme Court judgment, this Court in Sardar Begum v. Ajit Kumar (deceased) represented by L. Rs. , 1979 (1) Rentlaw Reporter 343, also held that limitation commences from the date of thedeath and not from the date of the knowledge of the death for bringing onrecord the legal representatives. ( 10 ) IN the present case admittedly the respondent had died on 25/02/1988 and thus, the application for bringing on record legalrepresentatives of the deceased respondent could be brought within 90 daysi. e. up to 26/05/1988. But no such application was moved and the appealstood automatically abated. However, assuming for the sake of argumentsthat the application which was filed for bringing on record the legal representatives on 7/12/1988, could be deemed to be an application seekingrelief of setting aside of the abatement. The short question which arises fordecision is whether the said application is within time and whether there hasbeen shown any sufficient cause for setting aside of the abatement. In theapplication there are no facts given as to why the application for setting asideof the abatement could not be moved soon after the appellant was informedabout the date of the death of the respondent on 9/08/1988. Theapplication for setting aside of the abatement could be moved within 60 daysfrom the date of the abatement in accordance with Article 121 of the Limitation Act. The said 60 days also expired on 25/07/1988, while the application was moved only on 7/12/1988. So, the same was also barredby time. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that 90days have to be considered from the date of the knowledge of the death ofthe respondent and thereafter 60 days have to be counted. The contention ofthe learned Counsel for the appellant is totally misconceived. The abatement in accordance with law took place when no application was moved forbringing on record legal representatives within 90 days of the date of thedeath of the respondent. The application for setting aside of the abatementcould have been brought within 60 days of the date of the abatement whichwas not done. The law requires explanation of each day s delay in seekingthe condonation of delay. The application for setting aside of the abatementcould have been brought within 60 days of the date of the abatement whichwas not done. The law requires explanation of each day s delay in seekingthe condonation of delay. In the present case, what to talk of giving anyreasons for each day s delay from the date of the knowledge of the appellantregarding the death of the respondent, no facts at all have been mentioned inthe application as to why the application could not be moved soon after 9/08/1988 and why it came to be moved on 7/12/1988. So, thefirst Appellate Court was right in dismissing such a hopelessly misconceivedapplication and dismissing the appeal as abated. ( 12 ) I affirm the impugned order and dismiss this appeal leaving theparties to bear their own costs.