DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) WILL it nut be unreasonable, if not absurd, to grant relief against the clog on equity of redemption in one breath and to deny the relief of redemption in the other breath by treating the suit as tirnebarred ? This is the question arising for the consideration of this Court in this Second Appeal preferred by the original plaintiff before the trial Court under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the Code for brief) questioning the correctness of the judgment and the decree passed by the learned Assistant Judge of Kutch at Bhuj on 30/01/1979 in Regular civil Appeal No. 45 of 1977. Thereby the learned lower appellate Judge has upset the judgment and the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (J. D.) at Mandvi on 24/01/1977 in Civil Suit No. 117 of 1974. Thereby the learned trial Judge accepted the present appellants suit for redemption of the mortgage and passed a preliminary decree in his favour. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this Second Appeal are not many and not much in dispute. The appellant claims to be the owner of one wada situated towards the Western side of Viiiage Bambhabai, Taluka Mandvi, district Kutch (the Suit Property for convenience ). He is stated to have mortgaged it with the deeeased husband of respondent No. 1 and father of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 herein for 725 Kories (a currency in circulation in those days) on Posh Vad 14 of S. Y. 2000 equivalent to 24/01/1944. The mortgage was subjected to certain terms and conditions and one such term made the mortgage irredeemable for a period of 50 years from the date of the transaction. Under the mortgage date. the mortgagee was invested with several rights including the right to spend any amount on the property and to seek reimbursement thereof from the mortgagor at the time of its redemption. It appears that the mortgagor left for his heavenly abode leaving behind him respondent No. 1 herein as his widow and respondents nos. 2 and 3 herein as his son and daughter. It appears that respondent no. 4 herein was inducted as a tenant in the mortgaged property by the mortgagor. It appears that the mortgagor left for his heavenly abode leaving behind him respondent No. 1 herein as his widow and respondents nos. 2 and 3 herein as his son and daughter. It appears that respondent no. 4 herein was inducted as a tenant in the mortgaged property by the mortgagor. The present appellant tried to pay back to the heirs of the deceased mortgagor the mortgage amount with interest due thereon for the purpose of seeking redemption of the mortgaged property before expiry of 50 years. It appears that his request was not acceded to by and on behalf of the heirs of the deceased mortgagor. The appellant herein thereupon served one notice in that regard through his Advocate on 4/04/1974 claiming redemption of the suit property. That notice was not complied with. He thereof filed one suit in the Court of the Civil Judge (J. D.) at Mandvi against the respondents herein for redemption of the suit property and for its possession and for other incidental reliefs. It came to be registered as Civil Suit No. 117 of 1974. Respondent No. 1 herein only resisted the suit by filing her written statement at Exh. 22 on the record of the trial Court. She inter alia contended that the present appellant was not entitled to seek redemption of the suit property and in the alternative the suit was barred by the Law of Limitation. On the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the learned trial judge framed the necessary issues at Exh. 25 on the record of the case. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, by his judgment and preliminary decree passed on 24/01/1977, the learned Civil Judge (J. D.) at Mandvi accepted the plaintiffs suit and passed the preliminary decree for accounts with respect to. the expenses made by the mortgagor or his successors-in-interest with respect to the suit property. The judgment and the preliminary decree aggrievad respondent No. 1 herein. She carried the matter in appeal before the District Court of Kutch at Bhuj by means of her appeal under Sec. 96 of the Code. It came to be registered as Regular civil Appeal No. 45 of 1977. It appears to have been assigned to the learned assistant Judge of Kutch at Bhuj for trial and disposal. She carried the matter in appeal before the District Court of Kutch at Bhuj by means of her appeal under Sec. 96 of the Code. It came to be registered as Regular civil Appeal No. 45 of 1977. It appears to have been assigned to the learned assistant Judge of Kutch at Bhuj for trial and disposal. After hearing the parties, by his judgment and order passed on 30/01/1979 in Regular civil Appeal No. 45 of 1977, the learned Assistant Judge of Kutch at Bhuj accepted the appeal and set aside the judgment and the preliminary decree passed by the learned trial Judge. the aggrieved plaintiff has thereupon invoked the further appellate jurisdiction of this Court by means of this Second Appeal under Sec. 100 of the Code for questioning the correctness of the judgment and the decree passed by the lower appellate Court as aforesaid. ( 3 ) IT may be mentioned that the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the mortgage deed created a clog on equity of redemption as certain terms and conditions found on the mortgage deed were quite oppressive and unconscionable. This finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Judge was never challenged in appeal before the lower appellate Court. It has been categorically mentioned by the learned Appellate Judge in para 4 of his impugned judgment : "this finding (to the effect that there was a clog on equity of redemption in view of certain terms and conditions found to be oppressive and unconscionable) is not challenged by the learned Advocate H. N. Vora for defendant No. 1, who has preferred this appeal". In this view of the matter, the finding of fact in that regard recorded by the trial Court became conclusive and hence binding to the respondents herein. It may be mentioned that the appeal against the judgment and the preliminary decree passed by the learned trial Judge was preferred only by respondent No. 1 herein in the suit. No other defendants in that suit proceedings carried the matter further in appeal. In that view of the matter, the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Judge to the effect that the mortgage transaction contained certain terms and conditions which were oppressive and unconscionable resulting into a clog on equity of redemption became conclusive and final qua the defendants in the suit, that is, the respondents herein. In that view of the matter, the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Judge to the effect that the mortgage transaction contained certain terms and conditions which were oppressive and unconscionable resulting into a clog on equity of redemption became conclusive and final qua the defendants in the suit, that is, the respondents herein. There is no challenge to this finding of fact before this Court in this Second Appeal by and on behalf of the respondents herein as they have chosen to remain ex-parte at the time of hearing of this appeal. Even otherwise, this Court could not have upset that finding of fact in exercise of its limited powers under Sec. 100 of the Code. ( 4 ) THE learned lower appellate Judge has however come to the conclusion that the suit was hit by the Law of Limitation. According to him, Art. 61 (a) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (the Act for brief) prescribes the period of limitation for a suit for redemption of mortgage to be 30 years and the starting point of limitation for the purpose would be when the right to redeem or recover possession accrues. In the view of the learned lower appellate Judge, the condition creating a clog on equity of redemption would be invalid and void, and as such the right to redeem or to recover possession of the mortgaged property would accrue in favour of the mortgagor from the date of the mortgage transaction. In the present case, the mortgage transaction was admittedly entered into between the parties on 24/01/1944. The suit was filed on 19/06/1974, about 30 years and 5 months from the date of the mortgage transaction. In that view of the matter, according to the lower appellate Court, the suit was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation for the purpose under the Act. Shri Mankad for the appellant has vehemently criticised this approach of the lower appellate Court branding it as unreasonable. if not absurd. ( 5 ) I find considerable force in the aforeaid submission urged before me by Shri Mankad for the appellant. Once the condition or conditions in the mortgage deed is or are found to be oppressive and unconscionable creating a clog on equity of redemption, the Court can relieve the mortgagor from his obligation or obligations in that regard arising from the mortgage transaction. Once the condition or conditions in the mortgage deed is or are found to be oppressive and unconscionable creating a clog on equity of redemption, the Court can relieve the mortgagor from his obligation or obligations in that regard arising from the mortgage transaction. The term creating a clog on equity of redemption can be avoided by the Court in favour of the mortgagor. The law on this point is well settled by the Suprems Court in its ruling in the case of Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal, reported in AIR 1958 SC 770 . It has been held therein :"the rule against clogs on the equity of redemption no doubt involves that the courts have the power to relieve a party from his bargain. If he has agreed to forfeit wholly his right to redeem in certain circumstances, that agreement will be avoided. But the Courts have gone beyond this. They have also relieved mortgagors from bargains whereby the right to redeem has not been takea away but restricted. The reason justifying the Courts power to relieve a mortgagor from the effects of his bargain is its want of conscience. Putting it in more familiar language the Courts jurisdiction to relieve a mortgagor from his bargain depends on whether it was obtained by taking advantage of any difficulty or embarrassment that he might have been in when he borrowed the moneys on the mortgage. Was the mortgagor oppressed ? Was he imposed upon ? If he was, then he may be entitled to relief. " ( 6 ) IT is obvious that the Court grants this relief to the mortgagor when it finds the terms and conditions in the mortgage deed creating a clog on equity of redemption to be oppressive and unconscionable. As flowing from the observations in the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Ganga Dhar (supra), it is an equitable relief. Can this equitable relief be denied to a party by pressing into service the Law of Limitation after removing in his favour the clog on equity of redemption ? ( 7 ) IN order to answer this question, the Court will have to ascertain what will be the effect of removal of the clog on equity of redemption. Can this equitable relief be denied to a party by pressing into service the Law of Limitation after removing in his favour the clog on equity of redemption ? ( 7 ) IN order to answer this question, the Court will have to ascertain what will be the effect of removal of the clog on equity of redemption. It cannot he gainsaid that, so long as the clog on equity of redemption remains operative, the mortgagor is never entitled to redeem the mortgaged property or to seek its possession from the mortgagee or his succesors-ininterest. The mortgagor is entitled to claim redemption of the mortgaged property only after the clog on equity of redemption is lifted. It can be lifted by the agreement between the parties or by the judgment of the Court if the condition creating such clog on equity of redemption is found to be oppressive and unconscionable. Only then the right to redeem the mortgaged property or to seek its possession from the mortgagee and/or his successorin- interest would accrue in favour of the mortgagor. It may be that such condition creating a clog on equity of redemption might be branded as illegal and invalid by the Court in its judgment. However, it cannot be said to be a condition void ab initio or null and void condition stricto sensu At the most it can be branded as a voidable condition remaining in operation as binding to the parties more particularly if the mortgage is otherwise valid. ( 8 ) IT cannot be gainsaid that such condition can be a part of an agreement between the parties. It again cannot be gainsaid that an agreement induced by undue influence becomes voidable. The term "undue influence" has been defined in Sec. 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (the Contract Act for brief ). Sub-sec. (3) thereof is very material. If the agreement on the face of it is found to be unconscionable, an inference would be raised that it was induced by undue influence and the burden to prove that it is not so would be on the party against whom such inference would arise. Section 19a of the Contract Act empowers the suffering party to avoid such agreement or contract. An agreement or a contract induced by undue influence is thus voidable at the instance of the party subjected to such undue influence. Section 19a of the Contract Act empowers the suffering party to avoid such agreement or contract. An agreement or a contract induced by undue influence is thus voidable at the instance of the party subjected to such undue influence. Even at the cost of repetition it may be reiterated that the condition creating a clog on equity of redemption is branded as oppressive and unconscionable. Unless it is so branded, it cannot create a clog on equity of redemption. Once it is found to create a clog on equity of redemption, that condition has to be avoided and the Court can relieve the mortgagor from obligation to abide by such condition. In that view of the matter, such a condition has to be treated as a voidable condition giving an option to the suffering party to seek its avoidance by persuading the other party to the transaction or by seeking such relief from the Court. In that case, the right to redeem the mortgaged property and to seek its possession would accrue in favour of the mortgagor only when the clog on equity of redemption is removed. Unless the embargo is lifted, the right so redeem the mortgaged property or to seek its possession would not accrue in favour of the mortgagor. The starting point of limitation in that case would be the date on which the clog on equity of redemption is lifted. To hold otherwise would tantamount TO violating the principle behind grant of equitable relief; it would operate against principles of equity, justice and good conscience. ( 9 ) EVEN if the position is examined from a different angle, the same result will ensue. In the present case, the remedy of redemption of mortgage was not altogether taken away but it was restricted upto 50 years. As aforesaid, the mortgage was created on 24/01/1944. The period of 50 years would expire on 2 3/01/1994. The mortgagor might file a suit on 24/01/1994. Will it be open to the mortgagee to plead that the condition operating against redemption of mortgage for a period of 50 years was oppressive and unconscionable and was therefore a clog on equity of redemption and as such void ab initio ? The mortgagor might file a suit on 24/01/1994. Will it be open to the mortgagee to plead that the condition operating against redemption of mortgage for a period of 50 years was oppressive and unconscionable and was therefore a clog on equity of redemption and as such void ab initio ? If such condition is treated as a clog on equity of redemption, on the reasoning of the lower appellate Court, it will have to be considered void ab initio irrespective of the fact that the plea has come from the mortgagee and not the mortgagor. In that case, again the law of Limitation prescribing the period of 30 years under Art. 61 (a) of the Act will be pressed into service for defeating the suit. Can this be permitted to be done ? The answer to this question will be in an emphatic "no". It cannot be gainsaid that a void condition is no condition in the eyes of law. It will result into a nullity. It is a settled principle of law that a nullity of the transaction can be set up even in collateral proceedings. In that view of the matter, the mortgagee also can set up a nullity with respect to the mortgage transaction creating a clog on equity of redemption. That would tantamount to allowing or permitting a person or a party to take advantage of his own wrong. That would be against well settled principle of equity bused on good conscience and justice. ( 10 ) EXAMINING the question from any angle, there is no escape from the conclusion that the right to redeem the mortgaged property or to seek its possession would accrue in favour of the mortgagor only when the clog on equity of redemption is removed or the embargo on the right of redemption is lifted. ( 11 ) THE lower appellate Court has relied on the ruling of the Madras high Court in the case of R. Mudaliar v. S. Iyer reported in AIR 1977 madras 297 in support of its conclusion that the suit would be hit by the law of Limitation. With respect, the learned single Judge of the Madras high Court has proceeded on the footing that a condition creating a clog on equity of redemption is a void condition or is a condition void ab initio. With respect, the learned single Judge of the Madras high Court has proceeded on the footing that a condition creating a clog on equity of redemption is a void condition or is a condition void ab initio. With respect, I am unable to persuade myself to accept it in view of what i have stated hereinabove. It would not be a sound principle of law to say that the relief against the clog on equity of redemption will be granted and yet the mortgagor will not be allowed to succeed by pressing into service the Law of Limitation That would result into as good as denial of justice inasmuch as the mortgagor permanently looses his right to redeem the property simply because he chooses to file a suit before the expiry of the stipulated period for redemption of the mortgaged property. In that case, the better course would be to hold the suit to be premature rather than to allow the plaintiff to fail by putting a bar based on the Law of Limitation against his likely success. ( 12 ) IN the instant case, the appellant herein could have very well filed his suit within 30 years from 24/01/1994. By the judgment of the lower appellate Court, his right of seeking redemption of his mortgaged property is just taken away by a stroke of pen which was never intended by the parties to the contract. Such a result cannot be allowed to ensue at the hands of the Court. ( 13 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the view taken by the lower appellate Court was manifestly erroneous in law and cannot be upheld by this Court. The judgment and the decree passed by the lower appellate Court under challenge in this appeal therefore deserves to be upset and set aside. ( 14 ) IN the result, this Second Appeal is accepted. The judgment and the decree passed by the lower appellate Court on 30/01/1979 in regular Civil Appeal No. 45 of 1977 are quashed and set aside and the judgment and the preliminary decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (J. D.) at Mandvi on 24/01/1977 in Civil Suit No. 117 of 1974 are restored. The judgment and the decree passed by the lower appellate Court on 30/01/1979 in regular Civil Appeal No. 45 of 1977 are quashed and set aside and the judgment and the preliminary decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (J. D.) at Mandvi on 24/01/1977 in Civil Suit No. 117 of 1974 are restored. Since the matter is very old, the learned trial Judge is directed to accord the topmost priority to its disposal according to law from the stage of the preliminary decree preferably by 31/10/1993. The Registry is directed to send the writ in this case together with the records and proceeding as expeditiously as possible preferably by 23/07/1993. The parties are directed to bear their own costs in this appeal on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. .