Judgment : Padma Khastgir, Acting Chief Justice, J.: Union of India through Eastern Railway awarded contract to Bridge and Roof Co. Ltd. in favour of the present appellant for construction of sub-contract of Railway Bridge on the river Haldi. One of the terms and conditions of such contract was that the work of such construction job had to be completed by 28th February, 1993. One of the terms and conditions of the said contract was that time should be treated as essence of the contract. For the purpose of completing said work within the stipulated period, the appellant engaged subcontractor not only in the nature of labour contract but also those labour contractors were engaged for the purpose of supplying various labourers as also for the purpose of supplying various labourers as also for the purpose of assisting construction work. As a result, the appellant in the capacity as a contractor selected M/s. Subarna Construction Co. and accordingly a letter of intent was issued in their favour and the formal work order was issued on 22nd June, 1992. The said contract only provided the following clauses. 1.08 There under the Bridge and Roof Co. Ltd. reserved their right and liberty to engage any number of such contractors on the same job without assigning any reason thereof. Under term 1.09 it was specifically agreed by and between the parties that in case of any delay in progress of the work entrusted to Subarna Construction Co. a portion of the entire work would be taken away from the and would be given to other contractors and Subama Construction Co. would not have any claim whatsoever with regard thereto. Under 1.16 it was provided that in case the contract entered into between the appellant Bridge and Roof Co. and the respondent Subarna Construction company is canceled for not complying with the work or for not doing work satisfactorily according to the fullest satisfaction of the appellant or for not engaging sufficient labour or due to any other reason whatsoever it would be open to appellant Bridge and Roof Co. to immediately engage other contractors to comply the work or engage departmental labourers as will be deemed fit and proper by the appellant and the respondent Subarna Construction Co. itself would only be paid off after due measurement of the work cerried out by them. 2. to immediately engage other contractors to comply the work or engage departmental labourers as will be deemed fit and proper by the appellant and the respondent Subarna Construction Co. itself would only be paid off after due measurement of the work cerried out by them. 2. On those salient terms and conditions not only Subarna Construction was selected and the letter of intent was issued in their favour. 3. It is a case of the appellant that in spite of repeated reminders by the Project Manager of Bridge and Roof Co. and as per terms and conditions of the contract Subarna Construction has failed and neglected to produce labour licence according to terms and conditions and in accordance with the provisions of the (Contract Labour Regulations and Abolition) Act 1970. From the various facts and disclosures made to this proceeding it is only before the writ court Subarna Construction Co. for the first time has produced such labour licence and not earlier although request was made by enumerable letters that such licence should be produced by them as agreed upon by and between the parties in the contract itself. 4. Several letters have been annexed to the petition before this court which indicated that several complaints have been made by the appellant not only through the project engineer incharge but also through other engineer and officers on duty. Subarna Construction Co. have committed breach of the contract for not conforming with the terms and conditions of the contract and by not constructing the civil work by proper materials and/or in proper manner within the scheduled period of time. As early on the 3rd December 1991 Subarna Construction was informed by the appellant that the empty cement bags were being filled up by earth instead of sand for making the coffer dam for P.W. 2 island and asked not to repeat the incident. Subarna Construction was also informed by the appellant that wooden ballies were not being driven sufficiently deep below river bed which was to be at least 4 feet below river bed, Subarna Construction was also informed by letter in writing by the appellant company that due to non-completion of shuttering and reinforcement work for 5th lift of well the same could not be checked jointly with the representative of S. E. Railway and such incident was informed several times and pointed out slow progress of work. It was pointed out that due to such slow progress of work the appellant was not in a position to complete the work within scheduled period of time. On 13th March, 1992 again the appellant drew attention of Subarna Construction that the progress of work was very slow due to shortage of manpower and requested to expedite the matter so that the construction could be completed within the scheduled period of time. Under the terms and conditions of the contract it was the duty and responsibility of Subama Construction to provide such manpower. Subarna Construction was also informed by the appellant that sinking work was not being carried out and had no requisite manpower. Again in the month of April, 1992 appellant brought to the notice of the Subama Construction that in spite of the fact that the principal contractor Railways had given certificate in form 5 in favour of the Subarna Construction. It failed and neglected to obtain a labour licence from the Assistant Ladour Commissioner. 5. From the series of letters we need attention of the Subarna Construction that it was obligatory on its part to obtain necessary licence from the Assistant Labour Commissioner. Then again in the month of May the appellant informed the sub-contractor that the progress was extremely slow for non-development of optimum labour for which the progress was lagging behind. It shall ask to take immediate measures not only for engaging optimum number of labours as also taking safety measures for the same. It was amazing how many times reminders were given to the contractor for the purpose of producing the labour licence inasmuch as another reminder was given on 27th May, 1992 with regard thereto. The formal work order was issued on 22.6.92. Under these circumstances the rights and obligation of the parties flowed from the formal contract entered into by and between the parties viz., appellant and Subarna Construction Co. It was expressly agreed by and between the parties that in case of any inconsistency between general conditions of the agreement and the terms' and conditions as contained in form 5 the provisions of letter of intent shall over ride the other and prevail and govern the contract. It was expressly agreed by and between the parties that in case of any inconsistency between general conditions of the agreement and the terms' and conditions as contained in form 5 the provisions of letter of intent shall over ride the other and prevail and govern the contract. Thereafter there are several letters to sign that Subarna Construction was cautioned by the appellant and their attention was drawn to the various failures and lapses on their part with the hope that the said Subarna Construction will try to mend their ways and engage adequate number of skilled labour to do job properly and to accelerate the pace of work. Subarna was informed thereafter on 1st August, 1991 that they were required to rectify defects of the work and that the rectification work of well No. 2 was to be done in a correct position within 15 days at their risk and cost. In the letter dated 22nd June 1992 it has been specifically provided that in the event of contradiction the provisions and the letter of intent shall over ride the other and govern the contract. In view of the repeated breach of the terms and conditions of the agreement because of the slow progress of the work for non supply of licence and non engagement or requisite number of labour and defection nature of the work done by Subarna Construction Company the appellant started looking for other experienced labour contractors as early on 7th October, 1992. They issued advertisement in three leading newspapers viz. Ananda Bazar Patrika, The Statesman and Indian Express inviting tenders from experienced labour contractors. It was also provided in the general conditions of the agreement that such right was reserved in favour of the appellant. That they will have their right to engage number of contractors on the same job without assigning any reason whatsoever. In case of any delay in progress of work entrusted to Subarna Construction a portion of the entire work will be taken away from them and will be given to other contractors and for that Subarna Construction will have no claim whatsoever with regard thereto. Such terms and conditions were expressly agreed upon by and between the parties and upon such agreement, not only the parties entered into an agreement but acted upon the said agreement. Such terms and conditions were expressly agreed upon by and between the parties and upon such agreement, not only the parties entered into an agreement but acted upon the said agreement. Thereafter it seems that Subarna Construction started raising unauthorised claims which were not admissible as such. Subarna Construction was advised by the appellant not to raise any such frivolous claims. Subarna was asked to remove soil so that the well should be cleared from the excavated earth all round. Subarna Construction was informed by the appellant that the appellant had to take rectification work of P.W. 2 which is the priority work of the site. Though the programme of grabbing was given to Subarna's representative one day in advance but in spite of that no winch driver was available/and operation of winch was started by the helper of the winch operator which was not only hazardous but also cannot be done properly by the helper. Under these circumstances Subarna was requested that such action should not be repeated and Subarna will be held responsible for any wrong and for any accident that may happen due to such mishandling of such operation of winch driver. Again on 29th October, 1992 Subarna was informed about the poor progress of work and was requested to speed up the work so that the work could be completed. But in spite of that it was found that inner shuttering was not completed by them. In spite of repeated request not only in writing but also verbal request made by the representative of the appellant, Subarna Construction did not clear all surrounding earth within the periphery of 15 metres of P.W. 10. Even in the month of October they were requested to increase the labour force to complete the work but which was not adhered to. Again in the month of November, 1992 no activity were noticed at the site for a period of 15 days which hampered the progress of work. Specification of the work was clearly provided in the work order and in the schedule of work. Under these circumstances at a very latest stage Subarna's letter regarding that the progress of the work was hampered or delayed due to non supply of materials was of no consequence. Inspite of repeated requests Subarna Construction failed to rectify the tilt and shift of P.W. 2 as envisaged in the contract. Under these circumstances at a very latest stage Subarna's letter regarding that the progress of the work was hampered or delayed due to non supply of materials was of no consequence. Inspite of repeated requests Subarna Construction failed to rectify the tilt and shift of P.W. 2 as envisaged in the contract. As a result the appellant has no choice but to cancel the contract with the Subarna on 13th February, 1993 and sent notice through messenger as also by registered post with ackowledgment due. The appellant Bridge and Roof Ltd. appointed messrs Ajana Construction and M/s. Hajee C. M. Mustafa & Co. for the purpose of completion of the work on 13th February, 1993 which work was commenced on and from 16th February, 1993. Although after 13th February, 1993 slips had been issued in favour of Subarna Construction for issuance of few bags of cement and their materials for the purpose of construction. But these issuance of materials in no manner had affected appellant's right to terminate the terms and conditions of the agreement and in no manner has interfered with the commencement of the work by the contractor in whose favour new contract has been entered into by the appellant on 13th February, 1993. They engaged skilled workers along with some of the workers who were also engaged by Subarna Construction Company. Subarna Construction received the registered notice on 23rd February, 1993 which was issued by B. K. Bose resident engineer at the site and who was empowered to issue such termination notice. On 26th February, 1993 writ petition was moved exparte without giving any notice not only to the present appellant but also without impleading the new two contractors and an order of status quo ante was obtained. The said contractors thereafter commenced their construction work. Thereafter on 15th March, 1993 the said interim order was varied and an order was passed in favour of the writ petitioner by directing that an order of status quo ante be maintained by the portion. From the parts as noted above indicate that by virtue of the present contract the appellant Bridge and Roof Company have the authority to engage sub-contractors. As a result the appellant engaged Subarna Construction by issuing' the letter of intent in favour of the Subarna Construction of the river Haldi. From the parts as noted above indicate that by virtue of the present contract the appellant Bridge and Roof Company have the authority to engage sub-contractors. As a result the appellant engaged Subarna Construction by issuing' the letter of intent in favour of the Subarna Construction of the river Haldi. Terms and conditions as indicated above will indicate that the appellant had reserved the right to engage any number of contractors with; that Subarna Construction had entered into the contract with the appellant. It has further been provided in the general conditions that without assigning any reason the appellant would have the liberty and has right to engage any number of contractors with regard to the same work. It had further been provided that in case of any dealer in the work entrusted to Subarna Construction a portion of the entire work could be taken away by the appellant and could be given to any other contractors. In that case Subarna Construction will have no claim whatsoever. It further been provided in the agreement that any disputes of any nature that may arise shall be solely settled by the appellant and that decision will be final and binding upon Subarna Construction as quoted earlier and indicated above that the question of appointment of Subarna could only arise after the termination of the contract. It appears that although such right was reserved in the contract itself where the appellant will terminate the contract without assigning any reason whatsoever. But in fact from the series of letters which have been annexed to the petition before this Court and from the letter of termination it was indicated that the appellant has determined the contract not assigning any reason but in fact there are repeated requests where Subarna Construction had been requested to expedite the work. They have been asked to engage skilled labour and also to rectify the defective job excavet earth from the pier well inasmuch as those were hazardous for the future and also they have been repeatedly asked to produce the labour licence which was the statutory obligation on the part of the Subarna Construction. Sufficient notices have been given to remove the defect including the warning but that were not attend to. Sufficient notices have been given to remove the defect including the warning but that were not attend to. Under those circumstances from the facts as stated above this court does not find any ground to hold either there was any lock of bona fides or that the appellant had acted arbitrarily or any action taken by the appellant was vitiated for not giving any proper reasons. Therefore this court does not give any strong ground to interfere with such condition taken at this stage by the appellant. 6. Under the terms and conditions of the agreement 15 days notice that have been agreed upon by and between the parties relate not to the termination of the agreement which could be terminated forthwith. But this 15 days of period of time was agreed upon so far as rectification work was concerned. From the series of letters exchanged between the parties, such sufficient time include 15 days time had been given by the appellant to Subarna Construction to rectify the defects which was found by the appellant in their construction work. From the nature of the construction work done by Subarna Construction we find there had not only been default in proceeding with the work with due diligence in spite of having received notice in printing by giving 15 days notice from the Engineer In-charge but Subarna Construction was also committed default in complying with the terms and conditions of the contract and take effective steps to rectify them within the period as specified in such notice or thereafter. 7. In any event this court is of the view that if there be any disputed question of fact, the writ court is not proper court to go into such details on this disputed question of facts. From the facts as stated above it will indicate that the rights and liabilities of the parties flows from the ordinary contract entered into by and between the appellant and respondent Subarna Construction where no element of public law is involved. In the case reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 1370 "the learned Judges were of the view every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State which do not properly belong to the field of public law but belong to the field of private law are not liable to be subjected to judicial review............... while We do not for a moment doubt that every action of the state or an instrumentality of the State must be informed by reason and that in appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reasons may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Art. 226 of Art. 32 of the Constitution, we do not construe Art. 24 as a charter for judicial review of State actions and to call upon the State to account for its actions in its manifold activities by stating reasons for such actions." 8. The learned Judges further observed "........ . Broadly speaking the court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the Public Law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the actions, the Public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances. When the State or an instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate world and purposes the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a shareholder and done the roles of a shareholder, with all the rights available to such a shareholder. There is no reason why the State as a Shareholder should be expected to state its reasons when it seeks to change the management, by a resolution of the company like any other shareholder." 8. In the State of U.P. vs. Dharmander Prasad Singh, reported in AIR 1993 SC 997 there the learned Judges observed "On a consideration of the matter, we think, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the High Court should have abstained from the examination of the legality or correctness of the purported cancellation of the lease which involved resolution of disputes on questions of fact as well. He further held "accordingly, we hold that the question whether the purported forfeiture and cancellation of the lease were valid or not should not have been allowed to be agitated in proceedings under Article 226". 10. He further held "accordingly, we hold that the question whether the purported forfeiture and cancellation of the lease were valid or not should not have been allowed to be agitated in proceedings under Article 226". 10. In the case Barelly Development Authority vs. Ajay Pal Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1076 . It was held ".........even conceding that the BDA has the trappings of a State or would be comprehended in 'other authority' for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution, while determining price of the houses/flats constructed by it and the rate of monthly instalments to be paid, the 'authority' or its agent after entering into the field of ordinary contract acts purely in its executive capacity. Thereafter the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter-so. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by the contract in the absence of any statutory obligations on the part of the authority in the said contractual field." 11. Applying the said principle to the facts of this case has any statutory obligation have shaken to the field of the contract in the instant case The parties are governed by the pure simple contractual obligation had there been any violation of such contractual obligation? To our mind the remedies lie elsewhere by way of damages in a Civil action not by way of any relief and that too by an order of status quo ante in a writ jurisdiction. In paragraph 21 of the same case it has been held "there is a line of decisions where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. 12. 12. In paragraph 22 of the learned Judges further observed "in view of the authoritative judicial pronouncements of this Court in the authoritative judicial pronouncements of this Court in the series of cases dealing with the scope of interference of a High Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 220 of the Constitution of India in cases of non-statutory concluded contracts like the one in hand, we are constrained to hold that the High Court in the present case has gone wrong in its finding that there is arbitrariness and unreasonableness on the part of the appellants herein in increasing the cost of the houses/flats and the rate of monthly instalments and giving directions in the writ petitions as prayed for." 13. In the case reported in G. B. Mahajan vs. Jalagaon Municipal Council, AIR 1991 SC 1153 Chief Justice Venkatachallah observed "Jalgaon Municipal Council sponsored a project for development of a real estate. A building was to be constructed with 17 floors to be used for the office of the Municipal Council plus five upper floors to be used as a vegetable market and a commercial complex, shops and small stalls are to be made available at concessional rate. The project was to be financed by a developer at its own cost. For this purpose advertisements were made in Newspapers five developers responded and submitted their tenders. After a process of scrutiny of the tenders and the elimination of ineligible ones the tender of Respondent No. 6 was accepted by the Municipal Council and a letter of intent was issued on 15.10.1988 and thereafter a formal agreement was concluded. The contract between the Municipal Council and the Respondent No. 6 was challenged in the writ petition which was dismissed by the Bombay High Court and the S.L.P. before the Supreme Court was also dismissed. The Supreme Court observed in paragraph 20 "While it is true that principles of judicial review apply to the exercise by a government body of its contractual powers, the inherent limitations of the schope of the enquiry are themselves a part of those principles. For instance, in a matter even as between the parties, there must be shown a public law element to the contractual decision before judicial review is invoked. In the present case the material placed before the Court falls far short of what the law requires to justify interference." 14. For instance, in a matter even as between the parties, there must be shown a public law element to the contractual decision before judicial review is invoked. In the present case the material placed before the Court falls far short of what the law requires to justify interference." 14. In conclusion we find that in the instant case time was essence of the contract. There is a termination clause. Under the circumstances such agreement was not enforceable under the specific Relief Act. So if it could not be directly enforced in Civil Suit can a relief be obtained indirectly by way of writ and by way of direction that status quo ante be maintained thereby. The parties be placed in a position where third parties' interest had intervened. Those third parties had not been made parties by this proceeding. Their rights could not be taken away without giving, them any notice and without hearing them. We have minutely considered this case. This court do not find any violation of the principles of Article 14. On the submissions of Mr. Amiya Bose appearing on behalf of the labour union this court is of the view that he has no locus standi in asmuch as none of the rights of the labour have been invaded. Dr. Monotosh Mukherjee appearing for one of the Sub-Contractors Shakti Nath Mukherjee also appearing for the other Sub-Contractors stated that they have engaged most of the labourers employed by Subarna Construction and they have also given undertaking before this court that they will engage all the labourers who are engaged by Subarna Construction for the purpose of construction of work. Under these circumstances, interest of the labourers will not in any manner be affected if such sub-contracts are carried out by the newly appointed contractors. In any event the labourers have no right of employment under Subarna. Under these circumstances question of violation of any right does not arise. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of Subarna Construction submitted that there has been violation of the principles of Article 14. This court was unable to appreciate such submissions how and in which manner such principles have been violated which he could not be able to substantiate. In the case of Sterling Computer Ltd. vs. M/s. N. Publications Ltd., reported in SCC (1) 1993 page 445. This court was unable to appreciate such submissions how and in which manner such principles have been violated which he could not be able to substantiate. In the case of Sterling Computer Ltd. vs. M/s. N. Publications Ltd., reported in SCC (1) 1993 page 445. After considering the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India, Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy vs. State of J. & K. Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.) Sindri vs. Union of India, Mahabir Auto Stores vs. Indian Oil Corpn. the learned Judges observed as follows : there is nothing paradoxical in imposing legal limits on such authorities by courts even in contractual matters because the whole concept of unfettered discretion is inappropriate to a public authority, who is expected to exercise such powers only for public good." In paragraph 17 the learned Judge quoted Prof. Wade- "The powers of public authorities are therefore essentially different from those of private persons........ .But a public authority may do none of these things unless it acts reasonably and in good faith and upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest." 15. There is no dispute so far as proposition of law is concerned getting these laudible proposition in view and applying the same in the facts and circumstances of this case this court does not find any violation by the appellant of such principles while terminating the contract. In the instant case there is no limits of public law involved and the appellant has acted strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and has acted bona fide and there is no malice and arbitrariness in their decision. 16. In the case reported in (1993) 1 SCC page 71 Food Corporation of India vs. M/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court while taking into consideration the scope of administrative law in paragraph 7 held that "in contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law. A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fairplay in action'. There is no unfettered discretion in public law. A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review." 17. In applying such principles in the facts and circumstances of the case decisions taken by the appellant is for public good inasmuch as the contract was for construction of a project for the benefit of the South Eastern Railways where the bridge had to be completed within a specified period strictly in terms and conditions of the contract. This court is of the view that there has been no violation of such contract and the action taken by the appellant was neither arbitrary nor lack of bona fides. The case reported in AIR 1990 SC page 1031 Mahabir Auto Stores and others vs. Indian Oil Corporation and others in paragraph 12, the learned Judges observed as follows : "It is well settled that every action of State or an instrumentality of the State in exercise of its executive power, must be informed by reason. In appropriate cases, actions uniformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Reliance in this connection may be placed on the observations of this court in M/s. Radha Krishna Agarwal vs. State of Bihar and also quoted the ratio from the said judgment. 18. In appropriate cases, actions uniformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Reliance in this connection may be placed on the observations of this court in M/s. Radha Krishna Agarwal vs. State of Bihar and also quoted the ratio from the said judgment. 18. In paragraph 12 the learned Judges observed that the rule of reason and rule against arbitrariness and discrimination rules of fair play and natural justice are part of the rule of law applicable in situation or action by State instrumentality in dealing with citizens in a situation like the present one. Even though the rights of the citizens are in the nature of contractual rights, the manner, the method and motive of a decision of entering or not entering into a contract are object to judicial review on the touchstone of relevance and reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and nondiscrimination. 19. On the question of the nature of the transaction and dealings between the parties the learned Judge observed as follows. In paragraph 20-the long period and the nature of the dealings between the parties, the appellant should have been taken into confidence. Equality and fairness at least demands this much from an instrumentality of the State dealing with a right of the State not to treat the contract as subsisting." 20. The principles laid down in the case of Shrilekha Vidyarthy vs. State of U.P., reported in 1991 SCC 537 had not been followed in the instant case. In view of our findings there is no arbitrariness nor any lack of bona fide or the letter of termination is not devoid of any reason. 21. In the case reported in 1991 (1) SCC at page 533 Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Amritsar Gas Service, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 12: "The Distributorship Agreement was revokable and the same being admittedly for rendering personal service, the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act were automatically attracted. Sub-section (1) of s. 14 of the Specific Relief Act specifies the contracts which cannot be specifically enforced, one of which is a contract which is in its nature determinable. Sub-section (1) of s. 14 of the Specific Relief Act specifies the contracts which cannot be specifically enforced, one of which is a contract which is in its nature determinable. In the present case it is not necessary to refer to the other clauses of sub-s. (1) of S. 14 which also may be attracted in the present case since clause (c) clearly applies on the finding read with reasons given in the award itself that the contract by its nature is determinable. This being so granting the relief of restoration of the distributorship even on the finding that the breach was committed by the appellant-corporation is contrary to the mandate in s. 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act and there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award which is stated to be made according to the law governing such cases. The grant of this relief in the award cannot, therefore, be sustained." 22. Under these circumstances the order of status quo ante to be maintained cannot be sustained. Under these circumstances this court is of the view that the impugned order be set aside. As a result this appeal is allowed and the interim order is vacated. 23. This appeal as also application are disposed of accordingly. 24. Mr. P.K. Dutta appearing for some added respondents submits that when the matter was appearing before the learned Chief Justice it was agreed by and between the parties that at the time of the final hearing of the application not only the appeal and the application pending but also the writ petition shall be disposed of by the same order and judgment. 25. Under these circumstances the order dictated by this Court shall be disposed of not only this appeal and the application but the writ petition pending in the trial court shall be treated as disposed of in terms of this judgment. 26. There will be no order as to costs. The 8th June, 1993. S.N. Mallick, J.: I agree. Appeal allowed and interim order vacated. Appeal, application and the writ application pending in the trial court disposed of in terms of the judgment.