Judgment :- 1. The tenant against whom an order of eviction was passed in the trial court and which was confirmed before the lower appellate court in R.C.A. 29 of 1991, has come forward with this revision petition. 2. Short facts are:— The respondent/landlord has filed the petition for eviction on the ground of requirement for non-residential purposes and on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. That was opposed by the tenant/revision petitioner herein. In the additional counter, a plea is raised that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. On that, the trial court had taken up that contention also into consideration and had framed a point whether the denial of the petitioners claim is bona fide or not. The trial court had held that there was wilful default in payment of arrears of rent and there was denial of title which was not bona fide, but rejected the petitioners claim of requirement for own use and for non-residential purposes. On appeal by the tenant, the appellate authority had held that there was wilful default in payment of rent, on a finding that there was arrears of rent for the period from May 1988 to July, 1988 and it was wilful. Contrary to the finding of the trial Court, the appellate authority had found that the requirement for own use for nonresidential purr poses was bona fide. Regarding the question of denial of title, the lower appellate court had not differed from the finding of the trial court. Thus the Appellate Authority had also come to the conclusion that the landlord/petitioner in the trial court is entitled to get an order of eviction and dismissed the appeal filed by the tenant. Aggrieved by the same, the tenant/respondent in the trial court has come forward with this Civil Revision Petition. 3. I have heard Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned counsel appearing for the revision-petitioner and also Mr. Peppin Fernando, learned counsel appearing for the respondent with regard to their respective contentions. 4. I shall first take up the plea of the landlord that there was wilful default in payment of rent. According to the petition the respondent is in wilful default in payment of rent from June, 1986 to October, 1988. The trial court has found that the tenant committed wilful default in payment of rent. 4. I shall first take up the plea of the landlord that there was wilful default in payment of rent. According to the petition the respondent is in wilful default in payment of rent from June, 1986 to October, 1988. The trial court has found that the tenant committed wilful default in payment of rent. According to the lower appellate Court, the tenant has committed wilful default in payment of rent from May, 1988 to July, 1988. The landlord/respondent herein has purchased the suit premises under Ex. A2 on 5-6-1988. The petition for eviction was filed on 1.12.1988. Prior to the filing of this R.C.O.P. 150 of 1988, the landlord had sent notice under Ex. A1 on 10.10.1988. It is not the case of the tenant that he paid any rent to the respondent. His claim would be that he paid rent to the prior owner for which neither any receipt is produced, nor the prior owner came to the witness box and substantiated the claim. But, on receipt of the notice the revision petitioner had filed R.C.O.P. 138/1988 for deposit of rent and deposited the rent for August, September and October, 1988. For the period prior to it from the date of purchase of the suit building by the respondent/landlord, there is absolutely no acceptable evidence to show that the revision petitioner had paid the rent. While so, the finding of the lower appellate court that there was wilful default in payment of rent from May, 1988 to July, 1988 is correct. Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned counsel appearing for the revision-petitioner would submit that there was no whisper in Ex. A1 notice that there was arrears of rent and that the revision petitioner/tenant would contend that rent was paid to the prior owner and if those two circumstances are taken together, it can be inferred that the case of the revision petitioner/tenant that he paid rent to the erstwhile owner, must be true. I am unable to accept this submission for the reason that there was no receipt to evidence such payment and because of non-examination of the prior owner. 5. The filing of the petition in R.C.O.P. 138/1988 by the revision petitioner/tenant and deposit of rent for August, September, and October, 1988 would not absolve the liability of the revision petitioner/tenant in respect of payment of rent for the period earlier thereto. 5. The filing of the petition in R.C.O.P. 138/1988 by the revision petitioner/tenant and deposit of rent for August, September, and October, 1988 would not absolve the liability of the revision petitioner/tenant in respect of payment of rent for the period earlier thereto. When there is a finding of fact by the court below regarding non-payment of rent for the period from May, 1988 to July, 1988 which I accept, the filing of R.C.O.P. 138/1988 by the revision petitioner/tenant will not be of any use. On the facts and circumstances of the case, I am convinced that the finding of the courts below that there was wilful default in payment of rent by the revision petitioner/tenant are correct and that has to be sustained. 6. The next ground on which the landlord/respondent herein had sought for eviction was that he requires the building for his own use and occupation. In paragraph 5 of the petition, he has set out this ground. It reads as follows: “Moreover, the petitioner requires the schedule building for his own use and occupation. The petitioner is a goldsmith by profession. He purchased the schedule building not only for residential purpose but also for his professional business. He is not having any building of his own within Tirunelveli Municipal limits. The requirement is bona fide and honest. Since the respondent has already closed his business in the schedule mentioned building no hardship will be caused to him if he is evicted.” The trial court has rejected this ground whereas the Appellate Authority has accepted this ground. 7. Mr. R. Balasubramanian would submit that this finding rejecting this ground by the trial court is a finding adverse to the respondent/landlord, that the respondent had not filed any appeal despite that finding and while so, the Appellate Authority was wrong in giving a finding that this requirement is a bona fide one and allowed the petition on that ground also. The very question as to whether a party can urge a ground before the Appellate Authority when it failed before the Rent Controller, without filing an appeal questioning that finding, came up for consideration in this Court and this Court found that it can be so urged in Shelat Brothers v. Lodd Narendradas 1986-1-M.L.J. 16 =1988-2-LW. The very question as to whether a party can urge a ground before the Appellate Authority when it failed before the Rent Controller, without filing an appeal questioning that finding, came up for consideration in this Court and this Court found that it can be so urged in Shelat Brothers v. Lodd Narendradas 1986-1-M.L.J. 16 =1988-2-LW. 8 (S.N.), Justice V. Ratnam as he then was, had held that it is open to the parties to sustain the order of the Rent Controller on grounds found against him without filing an independent proceeding, before the Appellate Authority. The learned Judge has held as follows: “Even in a case when the relief of eviction is asked for cumulatively on several grounds and the landlord succeeds in obtaining an order for eviction on one of several grounds, it has been held by a series of decisions of this Court as well as others that it would be open to the landlord without filing an independent appeal to support an order of eviction secured by him on grounds which have been found against him either by the Rent Controller or by the Appellate Authority.” With respect, I agree with the learned Judge. So, this submission made by Mr. R. Balasubramanian is to be rejected. 8. In the instant case, the petitioner does not have any business within Tirunelveli Municipal limits wherein the building is situated. It is his specific case that he has got no other building within Tirunelveli Municipality and that he is doing goldsmith work at Karungulam and he requires the building for his own use. The learned Rent Controller has summarised the contentions of the revision petitioner/tenant in para 3 of its order. In it, the trial court has mentioned that it is the tenants case that the landlord was doing goldsmith work at Karugalam. Admittedly, he is not having any building of his own within Tirunelveli Municipal limits. He wants to do goldsmith work at Tirunelveli. On the above factors, he is entitled to succeed on the ground of requirement for own use for the aforesaid purpose. 9. To elucidate this finding further, it would be convenient to extract S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, which reads as follows: “3. He wants to do goldsmith work at Tirunelveli. On the above factors, he is entitled to succeed on the ground of requirement for own use for the aforesaid purpose. 9. To elucidate this finding further, it would be convenient to extract S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, which reads as follows: “3. (a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building (1).. (2).. (iii) In case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own.” The requirement contemplated in the abovesaid section came up for consideration before this Court on several occasions. In R.M. Solai Nadar v. A.T.A.V. Guruswami Nadar & Co. 1969 I M.L.J. 629 = 82 L.W. 345, four ingredients of S. 10(3)(a)(iii) were set out. They are (1) the landlord requires the premises (2) that such requirement is for purposes of a business which the landlord or his son is carrying on (3) that such a requirement is bona fide and (4) he is not occupying another building of his own in the same city, town or village in which the suit premises is situate. In the instant case, all the aforesaid four ingredients are available. In that case, the business that was being carried on was at Dindigul. The requirement was for the building situated at Madras for the purpose of the business. That was upheld. The language of the said section does not warrant an interpretation that the business carried on by the landlord must be in the place where the building required is situated. Mr. Peppin Fernando also relied upon A.M. Dhanapal Chettiar v. T.D. Sundaram Chettiar and others 1991 (I) M.L.J. 490 and Bank of Baroda v. Mahandra Dadha 1982 (II) M.L.J. 85 = 95 L.W. 337. 10. Mr. Peppin Fernando also relied upon A.M. Dhanapal Chettiar v. T.D. Sundaram Chettiar and others 1991 (I) M.L.J. 490 and Bank of Baroda v. Mahandra Dadha 1982 (II) M.L.J. 85 = 95 L.W. 337. 10. In view of the above, on the admitted facts and established facts namely, that the landlord/respondent is doing business in goldsmith at Karungalam, that he wants to do it at the suit building situated within Tirunelveli Municipality, that he does not own any building within Tirunelveli Municipality, his requirement is to be taken as bona fide. The finding in this regard by the appellate authority is correct and does not call for any interference. 11. Coming to the third ground regarding denial of title which is not bonafide, such a ground was not taken in the petition. But, on the plea taken by the revision petitioner/tenant in the counter, that ground was also taken up for consideration by the trial court. The trial court has formulated a point covering this aspect of the case as point No. 3 In its order, the trial Court has referred to the contention of the landlord that the tenants plea that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant has to be considered as to whether it is bonafide and that for considering that ground, the landlord has paid court-fee also and the landlord/respondent had relied upon 1990(I) L.W. 572 in support of his contention and has considered that ground also. So, it is not as if this ground was formulated by the trial court without the knowledge of the parties. That has been taken up and has been argued before the trial court. The landlord has also paid court-fee for separately considering that ground. While so, the submission made by Mr. R. Balasubramanian that without any plea in the petition in this regard, the trial court is wrong in considering this ground, cannot be accepted. In Majoti Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao 1990-I L.W. 572, the Apex Court had considered this aspect of the case, in a case arising out of Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act (1950). In that case, eviction petition was filed on the ground of bona fide requirement for owners occupation. There was denial of landlords title by the tenant in the counter-statement. In that case, eviction petition was filed on the ground of bona fide requirement for owners occupation. There was denial of landlords title by the tenant in the counter-statement. The learned Rent Controller passed an order of eviction on both the grounds, namely, requirement for owners occupation and denial of landlords title by the tenant. Those findings were confirmed by the Appellate Authority. The High Court sustained the order of eviction only on the ground of denial of landlords title. A plea was put forth before the Apex Court by the tenant that the denial of title, in order to be available as a ground for eviction, must have been anterior to the filing of the eviction petition. That plea was rejected by the Apex Court. In para 6 the Apex Court has held as follows: “It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that, in any event, the respondent failed to apply for amendment of his plaint and incorporate the ground of denial of title therein as he was bound to do so in order to get relief on that ground which had arisen after the eviction petition was filed. We agree that normally this would have been so but, in the present case, we find that the trial court, namely, the Rent Controller, framed an issue as to whether the tenants denial of the landlords title to the Schedule property including the said premises was bona fide. The parties went to trial on this clear issue and the appellant had full knowledge of the ground alleged against him. It was open to him to have objected to the framing of this issue on the ground that it was not alleged in the eviction petition that the appellant had denied the title of the respondent and that the denial of title was bona fide. If he had done that, respondent could have well applied for an amendment of the eviction petition to incorporate that ground. Having failed to raise that contention at that stage it is not open now to the appellant to say that the eviction decree could not be passed against him as the ground of denial of title was not pleaded in the eviction petition. No other arguments have been advanced before us.” 12. Mr. Having failed to raise that contention at that stage it is not open now to the appellant to say that the eviction decree could not be passed against him as the ground of denial of title was not pleaded in the eviction petition. No other arguments have been advanced before us.” 12. Mr. R. Balasubramanian would distinguish the abovesaid ruling on the facts of this case by submitting that in that case, issues were framed and attention of both parties was drawn to that issue relating to the denial of title and such is not the case here where the points were formulated only at the time of rendering the order. I am unable to accept this submission for the reason that court-fee has been paid for considering that ground and from the order of the trial court, it is apparent that both parties have addressed arguments on this point and then only a decision was arrived at. So, it is not as if the tenant/revision petitioner was oblivious of this ground being considered by the trial court. 13. On facts, it is clear that the denial of title of the landlord by the tenant is clearly not bona fide. The finding in this regard is also correct and I find no ground to interfere with the same. 14. For the reasons which I have stated above, since none of the grounds urged by the learned counsel finds acceptance with me, the inevitable result is that the Civil Revision Petition has to be dismissed and shall stand dismissed. Time for the vacating the building two months.